56. Operation under trackage rights.--Commission herein precribed terms and conditions for applicant's continued operations under trackage rights over rail line of Southern Pacific Co. In regard to the basis for payment for both bridge and local rights, the Commission need not be mathematically precise but must only find the limits of trackage rights charges within a range of reasonableness. The Commission has not adopted any particular formula for determining trackage rights charges but has employed various bases (see 307 I.C.C. 329). Valuation of $17 million set as rental basis for bridge rights herein.--Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. --Operating Agreement, 331 I.C.C. 367 (372–73).

Further, the Commission found that it would be unfair to charge applicant as an operating expense a portion of the current value of an unreplaced facility retired for obsolesence or disuse. Commission also refused to set a time limit on trackage rights herein as its jurisdiction is continuous and terms and conditions may not be revised or such rights terminated with prior Commission approval, as was stated in 328 U. S. 134. Finally, Commission's power to impose condition requiring arbitration to settle controversies as to the meaning of terms and conditions it imposes has been consistently recognized. Such a condition does not delegate authority to arbitrators to prescribe terms and conditions or to change conditions imposed by the Commission.--Id., pp. 381-84.

70. Employees.--On further hearing upon remand by Supreme Court, Commission clarified its order of Dec. 3, 1962 to specifically provide for the inclusion, in employee-protective conditions imposed therein, of the New Orleans conditions (282 I.C.C. 271) and 4, 5, and 9 of the Washington Agreement (cited herein), except as $5 is modified by Commission's order of Nov. 7, 1962.--Southern Ry. Co.--Control--Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 331 I.C.C. 151 (185-7)*.

5(4). UNAUTHORIZED CONTROL; UNLAWFUL

1. Construction and interpretation.--Although members of applicants' families held a significant interest in other carriers, such a elationship does not per se prove control, management, or operation in a ommon interest. However, close family interests are presumptive of control nd all applicants are charged to disclose any interest, including family nterests. Failure to make such disclosures is in violation of $5(4).--& M Express Co., Ext.--North Carolina, 110 M. C. C. 845 (850).

5(9). SUPPLEMENTAL ORDERS

10. Supplemental orders.--Under the provisions of $5(9) the Commission s specifically authorized, upon a showing of good cause therefor, to issue, rom time to time, such orders, supplemental to any order made under pararaphs (1), (2), or (7) of §5, as it may deem necessary or appropriate.-outhern Ry. Co.--Control--Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 331 I.C.C. 151 (184)*.

$5(11). ANTITRUST PROVISIONS, ETC.

3. Other acts.--No collective bargaining agreements are superseded by operation $5(11) whenever conditions are imposed under §5(2)(f), and, in the absence of lawful reasons requiring modification of outright nullification, private contracts between the parties remain in full force and effect and coexist alongside the conditions imposed under §5(2)(f).Southern Ry. Co.--Control--Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 331 I.C.C. 151 (168-71)*.

$5a AGREEMENTS BETWEEN CARRIERS

8. Notice.--Commission hereby orders all agencies operating pursuant to agreements approved under $5a to amend such agreements so as to giv shipping public notice of independent action by member carriers in the same manner and same extent that notices of collective action are given and no other collective procedures under the agreement are thereby invoked. All future agreements submitted to Commission must contain such an appropriate rule.--Notice of Independent Action, 332 I.C.C. 22 (32).

$6(7). TRANSPORTATION WITHOUT FILING AND PUBLISHING TARIFFS FORBIDDEN; REBATES; PRIVILEGES

Principles Governing Tariff Interpretation

10. In general.--Where there is no issue of fact in a carrier's action to recover freight charges allegedly owed by shipper, and words of the tariff are used in their ordinary meaning with no particular connotation in the expert field of the Commission, then interpretation of a tariff ordinarily presents a question of law; however, as a tariff is no different from any contract, its true application must sometimes be determined by the factu situation on which it is sought to be impressed. In interpreting a tariff, its terms must be taken in the sense in which they are generally used and accepted; and it must be construed in accordance with the meaning of the wor used. Also, published rules relating to tariffs should have a reasonable construction and should be interpreted in such a way as to avoid unfair, unreasonable, absurd, or improbable results.--Penn Central Co. v. General Mill Inc., 439 F. 2d 1338 (1340, 1341).

12. Ambiguities construed against maker.--Since a tariff should be construed strictly against carrier that drafted it, any ambiguity or doubt as to its meaning should be decided in favor of the shipper. However, such ambiguity or doubt must be a reasonable one and should not be the result of a straining of the language; also, there must be a substantial and not a mere arguable basis in order to justify resolving such doubt against the carrier.--Penn Central Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 439 F. 2d 1338 (1341).

14. Practices of carriers; handling, etc.--Modification of rules reducing rates on lumber when loaded to fullest visible capacity by basing such rates on cubic capacity of cars found not just and reasonable as such modifications do not cover all commodities and do not allow for irregularitie in a car's capacity caused by repairs. Also, tariff rules presently publishe

by defendant railroads establishing reduced rates on lumber at weightloads no greater than 55,000 pounds when loaded to fullest visible capacity and moved from the Pacific coast to eastern destinations found lawful, but ordered cancelled as they are ambiguous and lack adequate means of enforcement.--Western Forest Inds. v. Aberdeen & R. R. Co., 332 I.C.C. 408 (421

22).

15. Construction not to be strained or unnatural.--While a tariff must be construed in accordance with the meaning of words used therein, a strict construction against the drafting carrier is not justified where it ignores a permissible and reasonable construction which conforms to intentions of the tariff framers, avoids possible violations of law, and accords with the practical application given by shippers and carriers alike. Also, published rules relating to tariffs must be reasonably construed so as to avoid unfair, unreasonable, absurd, or improbable results. Therefore, as the trial court's interpretation of disputed language in considered rail classification "follow-lot" rule is a permissible and reasonable construction which conforms to apparent intent of framers of the tariff, whereas interpretation urged by defendant shipper would lead to an unfair, unreasonable, absurd, or improbable result, judgment of the lower court in favor of plaintiff is affirmed.--Penn Central Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 439 F. 2d 1338 (1341-2).

Combination Rates

80. Not applicable when single-factor through rate is published.-The applicable rates on export carload shipments of automobile parts from Detroit, Mich. to Laredo, Tex. were the single-factor through rates subject by tariff provision to the single-factor rates from Detroit to Deming, N. Mex. as maximum. Lower combination rates sought by complainant shipper were not applicable because a factor in each combination was restricted against applying on export shipments.--Fabricas Auto-Mex., S.A. v. New York Central R. Co., 332 I.C.C. 1(7).

Observance of Published Tariff

217. Strict compliance with tariff rules as to service offered.-See Penn Central Co. v. General Mills, Inc., n. 15, above.

Action Before the Courts and Commission

263. Actions to enforce provisions.--District court correctly held, in railroad's action against shipper to recover freight charges on various multi-car shipments, that the rational and logical meaning of the words "CL rate or rating on entire shipment" in §2 (a) of classification Rule 24 is that the entire shipment should receive the C.L. rate on the lead car-which is filled to capacity--even through the trailer car is not full and that, in absence of the quoted clause, trailer car could be charged a higher rate. This gives shipper the same (but not higher) rate on the trailer car, regardless of weight of a shipment, as it receives on the lead car or cars.

Interpretation urged by defendant, which conveniently ignores "CL rate" and emphasizes "rating on entire shipment," would permit an unjust and absurd result that is neither reasonable nor consistent with purposes of the tariff. While the disputed language is not perfect, when the rule is read in its entirety, the proper interpretation is as set forth by the lower court. Judgment affirmed.--Penn Central Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 439 F. 2d 1338 (1341-2).

$8. LIABILITY IN DAMAGES TO PERSONS INJURED BY VIOLATION OF LAW

Complaints Seeking Reparation

217. Necessity of through charge being in issue.--Where a complai seeking reparation is concerned, the total through charge must be considered Complainant United States has not brought charges for the through movement i issue but only charges for movement from Lathrop, Calif., to Fort Benning Ju Commission cannot relate its finding as to reasonableness of a rate for such portion of a through movement.--United States v. Central of Georgia R. Co., 332 I.C.C. 33 (36).

$9 REMEDIES OF PERSONS DAMAGED; ELECTION; WITNESSES

Exclusive Jurisdiction of Commission and of Courts

44. Questions as to damages justiciable without determination by

Commission.-

Tariff construction and overcharges: See Penn Central Co. v.

General Mills, Inc., 56(7), n. 10.

$12 (1).

AUTHORITY, DUTY AND PROCEEDINGS OF COMMISSION, WITNESSES

Historical Note

On August 9, 1973, the Commission recommended to Congress legislation to amend $12(1), 204(a)(6), 304(a), and 403 (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act to enable the Commission to exempt certain transportation from regulation upon a finding that the regulation is not necessary in order to effectuate the National Transportation Policy and that regulation would serve no public purposes (S. 2458). Annual Report, 1974, p. 84

In General

9. Legislative.--Commission instituted this proceeding as empowere by $12 (1) in order to formulate a uniform requirement as to public notice of independent action by member carriers of an agency operating pursuant to $5a as present regulations vary greatly and include practical potential for collective action under the guise of independent action. Amendments to 5a agreements and for future application ordered so as to give same notice for independent as for collective action.--Notice of Independent Action, 332 I.C.C. 22 (23-4).

19. Carrier management in general.--Commission found that as long as voluntarily established multiple-carload rates on iron ore from Pilot Knob, Mo. to Granite City, Ill. are reasonable and lawful, this Commission may not interfere with defendant railroads' managerial prerogatives as to method of operation of their physical plants for such movements.--Hanna Mining Co. v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 332 I.C.C. 166 (171). §13(1). COMPLAINT TO COMMISSION OF VIOLATION OF LAW BY CARRIER; REPARATION; INVESTICATION

Scope of Power to Investigate

29. General revenue cases; general findings.--Upon further investigation in this general revenue proceeding, Commission finds increased rates and charges by respondent railroads to be just and reasonable. Such finding applies to the general bases of rates and charges and will not preclude interested parties from bringing any maladjustment to our attention for correction. Increased rates authorized herein are not considered as prescribed and are subject to complaint and investigation as provided by the act.--Increased Freight Rates, 1967, 332 I.C.C. 280 (346)*.

Pleadings, Generally

47. Effect of faulty or inadequate pleading.--Complainant United States seeks reparation for charges on movement of a freight automobile, old, used, from Lathrop, Calif., to Fort Benning Junction, Ga. Such movement is a portion of a through movement from Oakland, Calif. Inasmuch as charges for the through movement have not been brought into issue, the complaint is fatally defective. Complaint dismissed.--United States v. Central of Georgia R. Co., 332 I.C.C. 33 (35).

$13a.

DISCONTINUANCE OR CHANGE OF CERTAIN OPERATIONS OR SERVICES

2. Construction and interpretation.--The Supreme Court clearly set forth the meaning of 913a (2) when, in 372 U. S. 1, it held that Congress intended to leave initial jurisdiction over trains operated wholly within a State with the State regulatory commissions. Thus, the Commission cannot take jurisdiction under §13a (2) until the State has denied the railroad's application or failed to act thereon; and if a different proposal involving intrastate trains is presented to the Commission, of course, it is not one denied by the State. Therefore, in oroceeding on Missouri Pac. R.'s petition for authority to discontinue two pairs of trains (Nos. 14 and 17 and Nos. 15 and 16) operated between St. Louis and Kansas City, Mo., the Commission has no authority to exercise initial jurisdiction to authorize discontinuance of trains Nos. 14 and 15, which it did in substance, since such a proposal was never submitted to, heard or denied by the Missouri Public Service Commission. --Jefferson City v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 751 (755-6)*.

And though MoPac's two separate petitions to the Missouri Commission, each of which involved one pair of the trains, were consolidated " on a joint