trial, nor anything upon which to base a judgment of ouster. Dismissal was therefore the proper decree.

Trade Labels-Fraudulent Use--Injunction--Suit by Trade Union.-Tracy v. Banker, 49 N. E. Rep. (Mass.) 308. Under St. 1895, c. 462, § 3, entitled, “An act to protect manufacturers from the use of counterfeit labels and stamps," which extends to " any person, association or union;" held, that an unincorporated trade union may enjoin the unauthorized use and counterfeiting of a label it has adopted. This is contrary to the earlier decision of Weener v. Brayton, 152 Mass. 101, 25 N. E. 46, where technical difficulties in the statute as it then stood precluded a recovery by plaintiff in a similar action. See Hetterman et al. v. Powers et al., 43 S. W. Rep. (Ky.), 180; YALE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. VII. No. 5, p. 239, and cases there cited pro and con.

PROCEDURE.

Arguments to Jury-Reading Lawbooks.-Griebel v. Rochester Printing Co., 48 N. Y. Supp. 505. To permit counsel, in summing up a case, to read extracts from textbook and reports of cases to the jury, held, error, if objected to by opposing counsel and exceptions taken thereto. Reich v. City of New York, 12 Daly 72; Bell v. McMaster, 29 Hun. 272. See I Thomp. Trials, p. 720, tit. 4, c. 20, for a general discussion. The reading of such extracts is not relevant to a question of fact and may mislead the jury by inducing them to believe that such a thing is so as a matter of law.

Libel and Slander-Libelous Pleading-Privileged Matter in Pleading -Relation to Issue.-Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 83 Fed. Rep. 803. In an action by defendant against plaintiff insurance company to recover upon an insurance policy issued by the company on the life of defendant's husband, the company made answer denying the death of insured, and alleging as an affirmative defence that defendant and her attorneys had entered into an agreement and conspiracy to defraud plaintiff; that defendant and her attorneys had no knowledge of the death of the insured, but had alleged his death for the sole purpose of carrying out the conspiracy and fraud. Held, libel and slander. The American rule, contrary to the English, is that matter alleged in a pleading, in order to be privileged, must be at least so pertinent to the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry during the course of the trial.

Criminal Law-Appeal-Review.-People v. Helmer, 49 N. E. Rep. (N. Y.) 249. Held, that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is confined to the review of questions of law only, and no unanimous decision of the appellate division in a criminal case, not involving the death penalty, that there is evidence supporting or tending to sustain a verdict not directed by the court can be reviewed on appeal (Const., Art. 6, § 9). From this decision, O'Brien, J., vigorously dissents. He maintains that the question in the case-whether there is any evidence to sustain the verdict-has been considered as purely a question of law, ever since the decision of Lord Mansfield, in Carpenter's Co. v. Haywood, 1 Doug. 373. See also I Greenl. Ev., § 49; Mason v. Lord, 40 N. Y. 476. The limitations upon appeals to this court in Const., Art. 6, § 9. embrace three cases only; (1) judgments finally determining actions; (2) final orders in special proceedings; (3) orders granting new trials upon exceptions, where the appellant stipulates that judgment absolute may be rendered in case of affirm

ance. These limitations, he argues, apply only to civil cases. The majority of the court were probably misled to construe them as applying to criminal cases, as well, from the fact that judgments of death are mentioned by way of exception. But this exception was clearly intended only to enable the court to continue to entertain appeals in capital cases, just as it had before.

WILLS.

Wills-Bequest for Celebration of Mass.-Harrison v. Brophy et al., 51 Pac. Rep. (Kan.) 883. In a will a residuary sum was bequeathed in the following language: "I give and bequeath to Rev. James Collins, for mass, for his grandfather's and grandmother's soul." The validity of the legacy was denied by the heirs on the ground that the will created a trust which was void for uncertainty of beneficiaries. Held, it was an absolute gift, imposing upon the conscience of the donor the duty of performing the service named.

Wills-Construction-Equitable Conversion-Res Judicata-Internaitonal Comity.-Appeal of Clark, 39 Atl. Rep. (Conn.) 155. A will directed that the residue of the testatrix's estate be divided equally among her husband and children, "share and share alike, my husband and my children sharing per capita." The husband was to hold the children's shares in trust until each became twenty-five years of age, and then "to pay the whole sum over to" such child; but if the child should previously marry, one half of its share was to "be paid" on such marriage, "the other half on becoming twenty-five years of age. Held, not to work an equitable conversion of lands of which testatrix died seised. A general residuary clause will not be given the effect of a conversion, unless a power of sale is clearly implied from the whole will. Hobson v. Hale, 95 N. Y. 588; Hale v. Hale, 125 Ill. 399. The courts of Connecticut are not required by international comity to adopt the construction of a will by a court of a foreign State as to whether the will marked a conversion of lands situated within the State, and of which the testatrix died seised. It would probably be otherwise if the question were not one directly involving the mode of passing title to lands in the State. Rockwell v. Bradshaw, 67 Conn. 814, 34 Atl. 758.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Intoxicating Liquors-Sales to Minors.-Bartman v. State, 43 S. W. Rep. (Tex.) 984. Held, that one who delivers to a minor a glass of intoxicating liquor at the request of another, who pays for the same, is not guilty of the offense of selling or giving liquor to a minor.

Dedication-Identity of Descriptions-Home for Care of the Inebriates v. City and County of San Francisco. 51 Pac. Rep. (Cal.) 950. The city of San Francisco dedicated a certain lot owned by it to the public use, as a "Home of Inebriates." The legislature, later, in 1870, passed an act reading: "The title to the lot set apart by the Board of Supervisors of San Francisco, or a committee of said board, to and for the corporation known as the Home for the Care of the Inebriates,' is hereby confirmed to said corporation." The lot was not described in the act, was not set apart, nor was there such a corporation as the " Home for the Care of the Inebriates." Held, in an action to quiet title that no title had ever been acquired.

Damages-Examination of Person of Plaintiff.-Belt Electric Line Co. v. Allen, 44 S. W. Rep. (Ky.) 89. Plaintiff, in an action for damages for permanent injuries to his person may be required upon motion of defendant to submit to a surgical examination of his person by experts, where the examination may be made without danger to the plaintiff's life or health, and without the infliction of serious pain. The motion therefore is addressed to the sound discretion of the court; and the refusal of it in a proper case is ground for appeal. This decision, which appears to be the first upon the point in Kentucky, is in harmony with that of Shroeder v. Chicago R. I. R. R. Co., 47 Ia. 375, and like cases (95 Mo. 189; 37 Ohio St. 104; 29 Kan. 776; 16 Neb. 578; 61 Wis. 536; 33 Min. 130; 72 Tex. 95; 90 Ala. 71). But it is contrary to the ruling in R. R. Co. v. Botsford, 11 Sup. Ct. 1000, followed by the supreme court of Indiana, in Penn. Co. Newmeyer, 28 N. E. 860, which reverses the earlier decisions in that State. Compare also Parker v. Ensloe, 102 Ill. 272; McQuiggan v. R. R. Co., 29 N. E. Rep. (N. Y.) 235. The New York code now embodies a provision allowing an examination in certain cases. For a recent decision in the latter State, granting a wife the right to demand such examination of her husband in a suit for divorce against him on the ground of impotency, although the code does not authorize it, see Cahn v. Cahn, 48 N. Y. Supp. 173.

Eminent Domain-Mortgage Foreclosure-Rights of PurchaserPhiladelphia, R. & N, E. R. R. Co. v. Bowman, 48 N. Y. Supp. 901. The plaintiff railroad company, with the consent of the owner, entered upon and improved property by constructing its tracks thereon. At the time there was a mortgage on the property, a release of which was not obtained, nor were there any proceedings instituted to condemn the right of the mortgagee. The mortgage was subsequently foreclosed, and in an action by the railroad to condemn the interest of the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, it was held that the latter was entitled to compensation for the improvements placed on the land by the company. By the decree, and the sale thereunder, not only the land, but the fixtures and improvements thereon passed to the purchaser, for the value of which he was entitled to compensation (Briggs v. Railroad Co., 56 Kan. 526).

Customs Duties-Classification-Dredges and Scows-The International et al., etc., 83 Fed. Rep. 840. Dredges and scows are vessels, and are not dutiable as "goods, wares and merchandise" under the tariff laws. The case is distinguished from U. S. v. Dunbar (14 C. C. A. 639), 67 Fed. 783, where the dredge was entered by its owner as an imported article, and the only question presented was as to the correctness of the ruling of the collector that it was not on that account exempt. See The Conqueror, 166 U. S. 110, 17 Sup. Ct. 510, cited in YALE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. VI., No. 5, p. 289.

Interstate Commerce-Effect of Competition-Dissimilar Circumstances and Conditions—Behlmer v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. et al., 83 Fed Rep. 898. Held, that competition between carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act does not produce such substantial dissimilarity in the circumstances and conditions under which transportation is performed as will justify such carriers in making a greater charge for short than for long hauls without an order to that effect from the commission, in accordance with the proviso of section four of the act. Morris, District Judge, dissenting, deems it erroneous to hold that the carriers could not justify themselves for such discrimination,

unless they had first applied to the commission. But the only case he cites to sustain his contention is Interstate Commerce Com. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. Co., 50 Fed. 295. Since the decision in the present case, however, there has appeared the case of Brewer et al. v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co. et al., 84 Fed. Rep. 258, which flatly contradicts the present decision, citing as exactly to the same view, Interstate Commerce Com'n v. Alabama M. R. R. Co., 18 Sup. Ct. 45. In this last case are quoted the words of Judge Cooley in In re Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Com'n, 1 Interst. Commerce Com. R. 47. "if the carrier, without first obtaining an order for relief, shall depart from the general rule, its doing so will not alone convict it of illegality, since, if the circumstances and conditions of the two hauls are dissimilar, the statute is not violated. * Beyond question the carrier

must judge for itself," etc.

*

Patents-Infringement-Sale of Patented Articles Purchased Abroad-Dickerson v. Tinling, 84 Fed. 192. Dickerson was the assignee of a patent on phenacetine. Defendant purchased phenacetine in Germany, where it was not patented, imported and sold it in this country. Held, that such sale in this country was an infringement, whether he purchased the phenacetine in Germany from persons other than the owner of the U. S. patent or his vendees, or whether he purchased it from the owner of the U. S. patent with a condition marked on the article that it should not be imported into the U. S. See Vol. 7 YALE Law Journal, p. 233, for comment on analogous cases.

Contempt What Constitutes - Defence-Jurisdiction Review-McClatchy v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 51 Pac. Rep. (Cal.) 696. The attention of a judge while sitting on a bench being drawn to a newspaper article descriptive of the proceedings of the day before, he pronounced them a gross fabrication.

In a succeeding issue of the paper an editorial read as follows: "The Bee will not keep in its employ a reporter who garbles or mistakes, * * and it will not stand silently by while an aggregation of attorneys tries to make him out a liar and while a prejudicial and vindictive czar upon the bench aids and abets them in such a purpose." Thereupon the editor was charged with contempt and found guilty. On trial in lower court counsel sought to prove the truth of its publications, after evidence of their falsity in the shape of official court reports had been introduced by the prosecution, but was not permitted to do so. On a writ of certiorari it was held, that the court exceeded its power in refusing to admit such evidence. The publication of the truth as to legal proceedings is not a contempt of court (In re Shortbridge, 99 Cal. 526, 34 Pac. Rep. 227); and the criticisms of the action of the judge, if made only in proper response to an unjust charge against accused's veracity, and without intent to improperly influence the proceedings of the court would not be contemptuous. The action of the court constituted a denial of due process of law. Beatty, C. J., concurring, based his decision on the ground that the judge of the lower court, in denouncing the original report, was acting outside of his judicial capacity. Harrison, J., dissented on the ground that the action of the lower court, after obtaining jurisdiction to investigate the charge, was not a subject of review, and that the finding as to the facts, upon which it based its opinion, was final. Compare State ex rel. Atty Gen. v. Court of Eau Claire County et al., YALE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. VII., No. 2, p. 278.

Taxation-Property Subject—Life Insurance Policies-State Board of Tax Com'rs et al. v. Holliday et al., 49 N. E. Rep. (Ind.) 14. Const., Art. 10, § 1, requires the General Assembly to provide by law for uniform taxation, and prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, except such as may be exempted by law. Sec. 3 of the tax law of 1891 (Rev. St. 1894, § 8410) provides that "all property in the State not expressly exempted shall be subject to taxation." Sec. 50 includes in the specification of what shall be embraced in the taxing schedule, "all other goods, chattels and personal property, not heretofore mentioned," except exempt property. In providing the form of schedule (Section 53) the words "credits," "demands," and "claims" are used. Held, that life insurance policies, while they may be conceded to be “personal property,” or “demands” under the tax laws, are not subject to taxation, in the absence of a statute providing regulations for assessing or valuing such policies for taxation. Howard, C. J., in a forcible dissenting opinion (Monks, J., therein concurring), maintains that it was the duty of the Legislature to select as subjects of taxation all real and personal property, saving what the constitution exempts; that life insurance policies which have so far matured as to have an absolute present money value are not exempt; that the Legislature has empowered the tax board by clause 9 of Sec. 120 of the tax law (Sec. 8538, Rev. St. 1894) to make such rules and regulations as they deem proper to effectually carry out the purposes for which it was constituted, thereby in effect providing a manner of assessing or valuing such policies for taxation.