it is better, in such a case, either not to cross-examine him at all, or to confine your questions to his credibility, by impugning his means of knowledge, his disinterestedness, his integrity, or his veracity. See ante, p. 139-143.

If the witness tell only part of the truth, then the opposite counsel, if the residue be favourable to his client, will immediately proceed to cross-examine him as to it; but if unfavourable, the counsel will either refrain altogether from cross-examining him, or will confine his questions to the witness's credibility, as above mentioned.

If, on the other hand, the evidence of the witness be false, then the whole force of the cross-examination must be directed to his credibility; see ante, p. 139–143; and you may afterwards prove the truth by other witnesses.

In cross-examining a witness, the counsel may ask him leading questions; that is, he may lead the witness, so as to bring him directly to the point on which he requires the answer; but he will not be allowed to put into the witness's mouth the very words he is to echo back again. Per Buller, J., in R. v. Hardy, 24 How. St. Tr. 755. The questions, however, must be either relevant and pertinent to the matter in issue, or calculated to elicit the witness's title to credit.

When, in cross-examining a witness, you shew him a letter, and he admits it to be of his handwriting, the ordinary course is to have the letter read, as part of your evidence, after you have opened your case. But if it become necessary to have the letter read, in order to found certain questions, with relation to the contents of the letter to be propounded to the witness, the court, upon application, will allow the letter to be read at the time of the cross-examination, subject, of course, to the consequences of the letter being considered as part of your evidence. The Queen's case, 2 B. & B. 288.

If, upon the trial of an indictment, it appear, upon cross-examination of one of the witnesses for the prosecution, that J. S. was employed by the prosecutor, for the purpose of procuring and examining evidence and witnesses in support of the indictment: the defendant cannot give evidence of J. S.'s having offered a bribe to a certain person, to induce him to give evidence touching the matter of the indictment, unless such person have been examined as a witness. The Queen's case, 2 B. & B. 302.

It may be necessary to mention, that if, upon the trial of an indictment for misdemeanor, the defendant address the jury, he will not be entitled to the assistance of counsel to cross-examine the witnesses; but counsel may argue points of law, and suggest questions to be put to the witnesses. R. v. White, 3 Camp. 98. R. v. Parkins, R. & M. 166.

Re-examination]-If any new fact arise out of the cross-exam

ination, the witness may be examined as to it by the counsel who first examined him. In the same manner he may be reexamined when necessary, in order to explain any part of his cross-examination. In The Queen's case it was holden, that if a witness, upon his cross-examination, admit his having used certain expressions in a conversation with a person not a party to the cause, the opposite counsel, in re-examining the witness, is confined to such questions as may elicit the meaning of the expressions, and the motives of the witness for using them. But where a witness deposes to certain expressions being used by a party to the cause, the counsel for that party is entitled to reexamine the witness as to the whole of the conversation in which the expressions occurred; because the expressions are given in evidence, in such a case, as an admission of the party, and the whole of the admission should be taken together. 2 B. & B. 294.

PLEADING AND EVIDENCE, IN PARTICULAR CASES.

PART I.

OFFENCES AGAINST INDIVIDUALS.

CHAPTER I.

OFFENCES AGAINST THE PROPERTY OF INDIVIDUALS.

SECT. 1. Larceny.

2. Embezzlement.

3. Cheating.

4. Burglary.

5. Arson.

6. Malicious Injuries.

7. Forgery.

8. False Personation.

SECT. 1.

Larceny.

Indictment for Simple Larceny.

MIDDLESEX, to wit: The jurors for our lord the King, upon their oath present, that J. S., late of the parish of B., in the county of M., labourer, on the third day of May, in the first year of the reign of our sovereign lord William the Fourth, at the parish aforesaid, in the county aforesaid, [three pairs of shoes of the value of twelve shillings, one shirt of the value of four shillings, and one waistcoat of the value of seven shillings], of the goods and chattels of one J. N., then and there being found, feloniously did steal, take, and carry away: against the peace of our lord the King, his crown and dignity.

Felony, transportation for seven years, or imprisonment not exceeding two years, (with or without hard labour, and with or with

out solitary confinement, for the whole or any part of the imprisonment, 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29, s. 4), and, if a male, to be once, twice, or thrice publicly or privately whipped, in addition to the imprisonment, if the court shall think fit. 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29, s. 3.

If the defendant be previously under sentence of transportation or imprisonment for another crime, the court may award the transportation or imprisonment for every subsequent felony to commence at the expiration of the transportation or imprisonment to which the prisoner was previously sentenced. 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 28, s. 10.

The distinction between grand and petit larceny is now abolished; and courts whose jurisdiction was before limited to petit larceny may now try every case punishable as simple larceny, and all accessaries to such cases. 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29, s. 2.

Evidence.

J. S. late of, &c.]—It is little matter whether this be the correct name and addition of the defendant or not; if he do not plead the misnomer or wrong addition in abatement, he waives all objection to the indictment for any error in this respect. All, therefore, the prosecutor has to do, is, to prove that the defendant is the person who actually committed the offence; which is done either by identifying him as the party who committed it, or by circumstantial evidence. See ante, p. 113.

On the third day of May, &c.]—The time and place here stated need not be proved as laid: if the offence be proved to have been committed at any time before or after, provided it be some day before the finding of the indictment, ante, p. 35, 88—or at any other place, provided it be within the county, or other extent of the court's jurisdiction, ante, p. 35, 89, it will be sufficient. Or if it be proved that the larceny was actually committed by the defendant in another county, or in another part of the united kingdom, and that he carried the goods, at any distance of time, through or into the county or other extent of the court's jurisdiction, it will be sufficient; unless the nature of the property be changed, and the indictment be for stealing the article in its original state. So, it will be sufficient if the offence be either begun or completed in the county in which the defendant is indicted; or be committed within five hundred yards of the boundary of such county. And where a larceny is committed on a person, or with respect to property in or upon any coach, &c., or vessel, during a journey or voyage, it will be sufficient if the coach or vessel, in the progress of the journey or voyage, pass through the county, or by the boundary of the county, in which the defendant is indicted. See ante, p. 20, 21.

Three pairs of shoes, &c.]—The species of goods must be proved as laid; for instance, upon this indictment, if the prosecutor were to fail in proving that shoes, or a shirt, or a waistcoat, were

stolen, the defendant should be acquitted, although there might be indisputable evidence of his having stolen other articles. See ante, p. 45, 92. Goods may be described by the name by which they are known in trade; as, for instance, a set of new handkerchiefs in the piece may be described as so many handkerchiefs, though they are not separated from each other, if the pattern designate each, and they are considered in trade as so many handkerchiefs. R. v. Nibbs, R. & R. 25. An indictment for a larceny of live animals need not state them to be alive, because the law will presume them to be so, unless the contrary be stated; but if, when stolen, the animals were dead, that fact must be stated; for, as the law would otherwise presume them to be alive, the variance would be fatal. R. v. Edwards, R. & R. 497. See R. v. Williams, R. & M. 107. But if an animal have the same appellation whether it be alive or dead, and it make no difference as to the charge, whether it were alive or dead, it may be called, when dead, by the appellation applicable to it when alive. R. v. Puckering, R. & M. 242. But it is not necessary that the prosecutor should prove all the articles mentioned in the indictment to have been stolen; if he prove the defendant to have stolen any one of them, (as, for instance, if he prove that the defendant stole the waistcoat, or the shirt, or one pair of the shoes), it would be sufficient. Ante, p. 45, 92.

The goods taken must appear in evidence to be personal goods; for none other can be the subject of larceny at common law.

First. Things real, or which savour of the realty, cannot be the subject of larceny at common law; and so strict was the rule in this respect, that a larceny could not be committed even of title-deeds, 1 Hale, 510. 1 Hawk. c. 33, s. 35. 2 Str. 1137, or any other charter or writing concerning the realty, R. v. Westbeer, 1 Leach, 12. R. v. Walker, R. & M. 155, or even of the box in which they were kept. 1 Hale, 510. 3 Inst. 109. But now, to steal, or, for any fraudulent purpose, to take from its place of deposit, or from any person having the lawful custody thereof, or unlawfully and maliciously to obliterate, injure, or destroy any record, writ, return, panel, process, interrogatory, deposition, affidavit, rule, order, or warrant of attorney, or any original document whatsoever, of or belonging to any court of record, or relating to any matter civil or criminal, begun, depending, or terminated in any such court; or any bill, answer, interrogatory, deposition, affidavit, order or decree, or any original document whatsoever of or belonging to any court of equity, or relating to any cause or matter begun, depending, or terminated in any such court, is a misdemeanor punishable by transportation, or by fine or imprisonment, or both. 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29, s. 21. And to steal, or fraudulently destroy or conceal, either during the life of the testator or after his death, any will, codicil, or other testamentary instrument, whether the same relate to real or personal estate, or to both, (7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29, s.