An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
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Page 85
Anthony Downs. they want to vote . This does not mean that they know every fact relevant to their voting decision , nor that they are absolutely sure it is the best one they can make . It means they know enough to have reached a definite ...
Anthony Downs. they want to vote . This does not mean that they know every fact relevant to their voting decision , nor that they are absolutely sure it is the best one they can make . It means they know enough to have reached a definite ...
Page 152
... decision they favor at the end of this time . If all men are thus quasi - informed passives , democracy will not collapse from lack of voting . But whether the voters themselves will succeed in selecting a government or whether they ...
... decision they favor at the end of this time . If all men are thus quasi - informed passives , democracy will not collapse from lack of voting . But whether the voters themselves will succeed in selecting a government or whether they ...
Page 215
... decision- making end . As with all means , the usefulness of this information and the manner in which it is selected ... voting decision a citizen makes , assuming he follows the decision procedure set forth in Chapter 3 . The making of ...
... decision- making end . As with all means , the usefulness of this information and the manner in which it is selected ... voting decision a citizen makes , assuming he follows the decision procedure set forth in Chapter 3 . The making of ...
Contents
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Copyright | |
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abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reƫlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero