An Economic THeory of Democracy1957 |
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Page 19
... J. R. Hicks filled in the details of the indifference maps or produc- tion functions in Value and Capital.21 To do so is the task of poli- ticians , consumers and businessmen respectively . Abstract analysts 21 J. R. Hicks , Value and ...
... J. R. Hicks filled in the details of the indifference maps or produc- tion functions in Value and Capital.21 To do so is the task of poli- ticians , consumers and businessmen respectively . Abstract analysts 21 J. R. Hicks , Value and ...
Page 302
... Hicks , J. R. Value and Capital . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1950 , 2nd ed . Horney , Karen . The Neurotic Personality of Our Time . New York : W. W. Norton & Company , Inc. , 1937 . Hotelling , Harold . " Stability in Competition ...
... Hicks , J. R. Value and Capital . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1950 , 2nd ed . Horney , Karen . The Neurotic Personality of Our Time . New York : W. W. Norton & Company , Inc. , 1937 . Hotelling , Harold . " Stability in Competition ...
Page 305
... Hicks , John R. , 19 Horney , Karen , 9 n . Hotelling , Harold , 115 , 117 Houthakker , Hendrik S. , 159 n . Kahn , Robert L. , 298 n . Katz , Elihu , 8 n . , 22 n . , 229 n . , 298 n . Key , V. O. , Jr. , 124 n . , 137 n . , 271 n ...
... Hicks , John R. , 19 Horney , Karen , 9 n . Hotelling , Harold , 115 , 117 Houthakker , Hendrik S. , 159 n . Kahn , Robert L. , 298 n . Katz , Elihu , 8 n . , 22 n . , 229 n . , 298 n . Key , V. O. , Jr. , 124 n . , 137 n . , 271 n ...
Contents
vi | 19 |
Party Motivation and the Function | 21 |
CONTENTS | 29 |
Copyright | |
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abstain actually alternative ambiguous analysis assume assumption axiom basic benefits cause ceteris paribus coalition competition conclusion cost of voting decision-making definition democracy depends desire distribution of voters division of labor effect election period electorate equal equilibrium ernment example exist extremist fact favor favorite party gain goals government action government's groups hence hypothesis ideologies indifferent individual influence irrational issue J. R. Hicks Kenneth Arrow legislature majority principle marginal marginal cost maximize means ment motives multiparty system normative number of parties oligopoly opposition party outcome Paretian optimum party differential party's passionate majority platforms political parties position possible predict preferences proportional representation rational behavior rational citizen rational voter real world reason reƫlected reliability social society strategy structure tion two-party system uncertainty utility functions utility incomes V. O. Key views voting decision Welfare Economics zero