1855. Ex parte In re the nonpayment by the Defendant of the annual payment of the premium from year to year on each of the three policies, the Plaintiffs paying these premiums, or reinsuring after the policies were forfeited, and the Plaintiff making a demand upon the Defendant for the amount of the money so advanced. But the section seems to contemplate only the happening of one contingency, whereupon the whole demand in respect of the liability shall be ascertained, and thereupon 'he shall be admitted to prove such demand, and receive dividends with the other creditors.'. . For the happening of subsequent contingencies, on which a fresh liability under the covenant would attach, no provision appears to be made, so that there could be no further proof, and for subsequent breaches no dividend could be obtained. The words 'so far as practicable' occur, but they are only applicable to the receipt of dividends by reason of one contingency having happened. . . In any attempt to admit the covenantee, in such a case, to have a value put upon the whole covenant, and to receive dividends with the other creditors, the difficulties appear equally insuperable as those which induced the Court of Common Pleas to hold in Thompson v. Thompson (a), and this Court in Amott v. Holden (b), that the surety for the payment of an annuity was not discharged by his certificate. It appears to us, therefore, that to effect the complete discharge of a bankrupt from all liability in respect of such a deed as this, the further interposition of the legislature is still necessary, and that in this case we are bound on both breaches to give judgment for the Plaintiff.” We submit that the similarity of the present case to that of a proof against a surety for the future payment of an annuity is complete, and it seems clear from the 175th and and 176th sections of the Act, that such a liability is not contemplated as falling within the 178th. The remaining case is Ex parte Todd (a), where this Court held, that a consent to a verdict for such an amount as should be determined by an award did not after the award made become proveable under the section. Mr. Swanston and Mr. Giffard, for the Respondent. They contended that, whether this case were within the 177th section or not, it was within the 178th. They referred to Ex parte Minet (b). Mr. Chandless, in reply. The LORD JUSTICE KNIGht Bruce. This Act of Parliament is assuredly not without faults, but I think it not so badly framed as the Appellant would have us consider it. In my opinion, it would be an inconvenient and erroneous construction of the Act, to hold that it does not authorize a claim of this description to be placed upon the proceedings. The LORD JUSTICE TURNER. Up to the time of the passing of the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, the law had made no provision for working out under a bankruptcy claims founded upon contingent liabilities. The 178th section of that Act is intended to supply that defect, and it shows the intention of the legislature to exonerate a bankrupt as far as possible from all liability incurred before his bankruptcy. It is the duty of the Court to endeavour to carry into effect the intention of the legislature. Now 1855. Ex parte BARWIS. In re STRAHAN. 1855. Er parte BARWIS. In re STRAHAN. Now the covenant upon which the present claim is founded, is one by the bankrupts and others, that the others shall pay a sum by instalments with interest. This created, as it appears to me, a liability depending upon a contingency, namely, the contingency of the principal debtors not paying the sums covenanted to be paid. It is said that this is not a contingent liability to pay any particular sum of money. But it is in substance a covenant to pay such of the specified sums as shall not be paid by the principal debtors. It is said that the amount to be paid must be uncertain, inasmuch as the person immediately liable might make some of the payments, leaving it in uncertainty what the deficiency would be, and there is some truth in that observation, but here there is a measure and a limit of the liability. It cannot exceed a certain sum. The Act appears to me to have been intended to meet such a case, for it gives a discretion to the Commissioner as to the amount for which the claim shall be entered. With regard to the cases cited upon the construction of the 178th section, that which was before us, Ex parte Todd, was one of unliquidated damages, which were to be determined by an arbitrator, and, therefore, not a case resembling the present; and, looking at the other two, I do not think it necessary to give any opinion upon them, since this case differs from them in the circumstances of the liability here being one which must be determined within three years, and, therefore, fairly, as it appears to me, within the meaning of the Act of Parliament; but if I were called upon to give an opinion on those cases, I must say that they do not seem to me reconcileable with each other, and that I should prefer the decision in Young v. Winter. 1848. Ex parte JOSEPH BROOK, RICHARD BROOK, THIS In the Matter of WILLIAM WILLIS. March 6. July 26. 1850. Jan. 16. HIS was a petition by way of appeal from the rejec- Before The tion of a proof. The Petitioners, who were woolbrokers at Huddersfield, received on the 18th of March 1847, an order from certain customers named Wilkins and Evans for 136 bales of wool. The Petitioners agreed to execute the order on receiving from the bankrupt the following guarantee: "Messrs. J. Brook, Sons & Co. Vice-Chancellor KNIGHT BRUCE. A bankrupt had, in consi deration of the payinent of a sum of money to him by the vendors of goods, guaranteed the payment of the purchasemoney by the purchasers, according to the contract of purchase, viz., "Gentlemen,-In consideration of 17. per cent. I hereby guarantee the due and correct payment of onehalf the amount of 136 bales of wool sold to Messrs. Wilkins and Evans of Trowbridge as per contract of by the due Mr. Richard Dutton, dated the 18th inst. "I remain, Gentlemen, "Your most obedient, "W. Willis." "Trowbridge, March 19th 1847." The contract referred to was the following: "London, 18th March 1849. "Sold for account of Messrs. Joseph Brook, Sons & Co. to Messrs. Wilkins and Evans the following wools, viz. No. 1/89, 89 bales, at 2s. 44d. 95/141, 49 bales, at 2s. 4d. (a) Referred to ante, p. 765. "Customary honour of a bill of exchange accepted by the purchasers. The bill did not fall due till after the fiat issued against the guarantor. On its being dishonoured, Held, that the vendors were entitled to prove. 1848. Er parte Вкоок. In re WILLIS. "Customary tare and draft to be weighed off, and the The 136 bales were thereupon, in due course of business, weighed and delivered in accordance with the contract; and for the net price thereof, amounting to the sum of 2,9661. 5s. 4d. the Petitioners, in accordance with the contract, drew their bill of exchange of the 18th of May 1847 on Messrs. Wilkins and Evans, payable eight months after date to the Petitioners' order. The bill was duly accepted by Messrs. Wilkins and Evans, and became due on the 21st of January 1848. The Petitioners paid to the bankrupt on the 4th of September or allowed to him 147. 17s. in satisfaction of the commission of 17. per cent. for his guarantee. Messrs. Wilkins and Evans subsequently became bankrupts, and a fiat issued against them dated the 20th of October 1847. The bill for 2,9651. 5s. 4d. was dishonoured on the 21st of January 1848, and was now in the hands of the Petitioners unpaid. The Petitioners tendered a proof against the present bankrupt for 1,4821. 2s. 8d. under the guarantee, but the Commissioner rejected the proof on the ground that the liability incurred by the guarantee was not a contingent debt within the meaning of the 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, s. 56. Mr. Russell and Mr. Glasse in support of the petition cited Ex parte Myers (a). (a) Mont. & B. 229; 2 D. & C. 251. Mr. |