1 Opinion of the Court. bons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. The right to vote is too important in our free society to be stripped of judicial protection by such an interpretation of Article I. This dismissal can no more be justified on the ground of "want of equity" than on the ground of "nonjusticiability." We therefore hold that the District Court erred in dismissing the complaint. II. This brings us to the merits. We agree with the District Court that the 1931 Georgia apportionment grossly discriminates against voters in the Fifth Congressional District. A single Congressman represents from two to three times as many Fifth District voters as are represented by each of the Congressmen from the other Georgia congressional districts. The apportionment statute thus contracts the value of some votes and expands that of others. If the Federal Constitution intends that when qualified voters elect members of Congress each vote be given as much weight as any other vote, then this statute cannot stand. We hold that, construed in its historical context, the command of Art. I, § 2, that Representatives be chosen. "by the People of the several States" means that as 9"The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature. "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Man Opinion of the Court. 376 U.S. nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's. 10 This rule is followed automatically, of course, when Representatives are chosen as a group on a statewide basis, as was a widespread practice in the first 50 years of our Nation's history." It would be extraordinary to suggest that in such statewide elections the votes of inhabitants of some parts of a State, for example, Georgia's thinly populated Ninth District, could be weighted at two or three times the value of the votes of people living in more populous parts of the State, for example, the Fifth District around Atlanta. Cf. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368. We do not believe that the Framers of the Constitution intended to permit the same vote-diluting discrimination to be accomplished through the device of districts containing widely varied numbers of inhabitants. To say that a vote is worth more in one district than in another would not only run counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic government, it would cast aside the principle of a House of Representatives elected "by the People," a principle tenaciously fought for and established at the Constitutional Convention. The history of the Constitution, particularly that part of it relating to the adoption of Art. I, § 2, reveals that those who framed the Con ner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative . . . ." U. S. Const., Art. I, § 2. The provisions for apportioning Representatives and direct taxes have been amended by the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Amendments, respectively. 10 We do not reach the arguments that the Georgia statute violates the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 11 As late as 1842, seven States still conducted congressional elections at large. See Paschal, "The House of Representatives: 'Grand Depository of the Democratic Principle'?" 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 276, 281 (1952). 1 Opinion of the Court. stitution meant that, no matter what the mechanics of an election, whether statewide or by districts, it was population which was to be the basis of the House of Representatives. During the Revolutionary War the rebelling colonies were loosely allied in the Continental Congress, a body with authority to do little more than pass resolutions and issue requests for men and supplies. Before the war ended the Congress had proposed and secured the ratification by the States of a somewhat closer association under the Articles of Confederation. Though the Articles established a central government for the United States, as the former colonies were even then called, the States retained most of their sovereignty, like independent nations bound together only by treaties. There were no separate judicial or executive branches: only a Congress consisting of a single house. Like the members of an ancient Greek league, each State, without regard to size or population, was given only one vote in that house. It soon became clear that the Confederation was without adequate power to collect needed revenues or to enforce the rules its Congress adopted. Farsighted men felt that a closer union was necessary if the States were to be saved from foreign and domestic dangers. The result was the Constitutional Convention of 1787, called for "the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation . . . " 12 When the Conven 123 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Farrand ed. 1911) 14 (hereafter cited as "Farrand"). James Madison, who took careful and complete notes during the Convention, believed that in interpreting the Constitution later generations should consider the history of its adoption: "Such were the defects, the deformities, the diseases and the ominous prospects, for which the Convention were to provide a remedy, and which ought never to be overlooked in expounding & appreciating the Constitutional Charter the remedy that was provided." Id., at 549. Opinion of the Court. 376 U.S. tion met in May, this modest purpose was soon abandoned for the greater challenge of creating a new and closer form of government than was possible under the Confederation. Soon after the Convention assembled, Edmund Randolph of Virginia presented a plan not merely to amend the Articles of Confederation but to create an entirely new National Government with a National Executive, National Judiciary, and a National Legislature of two Houses, one house to be elected by "the people," the second house to be elected by the first.13 The question of how the legislature should be constituted precipitated the most bitter controversy of the Convention. One principle was uppermost in the minds of many delegates: that, no matter where he lived, each voter should have a voice equal to that of every other in electing members of Congress. In support of this principle, George Mason of Virginia "argued strongly for an election of the larger branch by the people. It was to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of the Govt." 14 James Madison agreed, saying "If the power is not immediately derived from the people, in proportion to their numbers, we may make a paper confederacy, but that will be all." 15 Repeatedly, delegates rose to make the same point: that it would be unfair, unjust, and contrary to common sense to give a small number of people as many Senators or Representatives as were allowed to much larger groups 16-in short, as James Wilson of Pennsyl 13 1 id., at 20. 14 Id., at 48. 15 Id., at 472. 16 16 See, e. g., id., at 197-198 (Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania); id., at 467 (Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts); id., at 286, 465-466 (Alexander Hamilton of New York); id., at 489-490 (Rufus King of Massachusetts); id., at 322, 446-449, 486, 527-528 (James Madison of Virginia); id., at 180, 456 (Hugh Williamson of North Carolina); id., at 253-254, 406, 449-450, 482-484 (James Wilson of Pennsylvania). 1 Opinion of the Court. vania put it, "equal numbers of people ought to have an equal no. of representatives. ." and representatives "of different districts ought clearly to hold the same proportion to each other, as their respective constituents hold to each other." 17 Some delegates opposed election by the people. The sharpest objection arose out of the fear on the part of small States like Delaware that if population were to be the only basis of representation the populous States like Virginia would elect a large enough number of representatives to wield overwhelming power in the National Government.18 Arguing that the Convention had no authority to depart from the plan of the Articles of Confederation which gave each State an equal vote in the National Congress, William Paterson of New Jersey said, "If the sovereignty of the States is to be maintained, the Representatives must be drawn immediately from the States, not from the people: and we have no power to vary the idea of equal sovereignty.' To this end he proposed a single legislative chamber in which each State, as in the Confederation, was to have an equal vote.20 A number of delegates supported this plan." 99 19 21 The delegates who wanted every man's vote to count alike were sharp in their criticism of giving each State, 17 Id., at 180. 18 Luther Martin of Maryland declared "that the States being equal cannot treat or confederate so as to give up an equality of votes without giving up their liberty: that the propositions on the table were a system of slavery for 10 States: that as Va. Masts. & Pa. have 42/90 of the votes they can do as they please without a miraculous Union of the other ten: that they will have nothing to do, but to gain over one of the ten to make them compleat masters of the rest . . . ." Id., at 438. 19 Id., at 251. 20 21 E. g., 1 id., at 324 (Alexander Martin of North Carolina); id., at 437-438, 439-441, 444-445, 453–455 (Luther Martin of Maryland); id., at 490-492 (Gunning Bedford of Delaware). |