Per Curiam.

PUBLISHERS' ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK CITY v. NEW YORK MAILERS' UNION NUMBER SIX.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

No. 384. Argued March 23-24, 1964.-Decided April 6, 1964.

Judgment vacated insofar as it reversed stay provision, and case remanded to District Court with directions to dismiss as moot that portion of the complaint seeking a stay.

Reported below: 317 F. 2d 624.

Andrew L. Hughes argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.

Sidney Sugerman argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Gerhard P. Van Arkel and George Kaufmann.

PER CURIAM.

Upon the respondent's suggestion of mootness the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals is vacated insofar as it reversed the stay provision of the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and the case is remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss as moot that portion of the complaint seeking such a stay.

HENRY ET AL. v. CITY OF ROCK HILL.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

No. 826. Decided April 6, 1964.

After this Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment holding petitioners guilty of breach of the peace, and remanded the case to the Supreme Court of South Carolina "for further consideration in light of Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229," that court found Edwards and the later case of Fields v. South Carolina, 375 U. S. 44, not controlling and reaffirmed the convictions. Held: Edwards and Fields, which established that the peaceful expression of unpopular views at a place not lawfully proscribed by state law is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from state criminal action, are controlling here.

Certiorari granted and judgment reversed.

Jack Greenberg, Constance Baker Motley, Matthew J. Perry, Lincoln C. Jenkins, Jr., Donald James Sampson and Willie T. Smith, Jr. for petitioners.

PER CURIAM.

When this case was last before us, we granted certiorari, vacated the judgment holding petitioners guilty of breach of the peace, and remanded the case to the Supreme Court of South Carolina "for further consideration in light of Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229." 375 U. S. 6. That has been our practice in analogous situations where, not certain that the case was free from all obstacles to reversal on an intervening precedent, we remand the case to the state court for reconsideration. Daegele v. Kansas, 375 U. S. 1; Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U. S. 2; Newsome v. North Carolina, 375 U. S. 21; Shockey v. Illinois, 375 U. S. 22; Ausbie v. California, 375 U. S. 24; Herrera v. Heinze, 375 U. S. 26; Barnes v. North Carolina, 375 U. S. 28. The South Carolina Supreme Court examined Edwards and the later case of Fields v. South

Carolina, 375 U. S. 44, found them not controlling, and reaffirmed the convictions. In its opinion on the remand in the present case, the South Carolina Supreme Court expressed doubt concerning the meaning and significance of our remand order, and it went on to explain why, in its view, the Edwards and the Fields cases were distinguishable. For those reasons, it is appropriate to add these words of explanation.

The South Carolina Supreme Court correctly concluded that our earlier remand did not amount to a final determination on the merits.* That order did, however, indicate that we found Edwards sufficiently analogous and, perhaps, decisive to compel re-examination of the

case.

We now think Edwards and Fields control the result here. As in those cases, the petitioners here, while at a place where the State's law did not forbid them to be, were engaged in the "peaceful expression of unpopular views." Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S., at 237. They assembled in a peaceful, orderly fashion in front of the City Hall to protest segregation. They carried signs to that effect and they sang patriotic and religious songs. Although white onlookers assembled, no violence or threat of violence occurred and traffic was not disturbed. After 15 minutes of this, they were arrested for failure to disperse upon orders. Here, as in Edwards and Fields, petitioners "were convicted of an offense so generalized as to be, in the words of the South Carolina Supreme Court, 'not susceptible of exact definition.'" Ibid. And here as there "they were convicted upon evidence which showed no more than that the opinions which they were

*The South Carolina Supreme Court intimated that the rule of Edwards was designed to guide us in determining our review of state action. But Edwards states a rule based upon the Constitution of the United States which, under the Supremacy Clause, is binding upon state courts as well as upon federal courts.

peaceably expressing were sufficiently opposed to the views of the majority of the community to attract a crowd and necessitate police protection." Ibid.

Edwards established that the "Fourteenth Amendment does not permit a State to make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views." Ibid. As in Edwards, the South Carolina Supreme Court has here "defined a criminal offense so as to permit conviction of the petitioners if their speech 'stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest. A conviction resting on any of those grounds may not stand.' [Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 5.]” Id., at 238. Accordingly certiorari is granted and the judgment is reversed.

PAN-AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE CO. v.
RODRIGUEZ ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT,

No. 67. Decided April 6, 1964.

Certiorari granted; judgment vacated; and case remanded.
Reported below: 311 F. 2d 429.

William A. Gillen for petitioner.

John P. Corcoran, Jr. for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, ante, p. 398.

J. B. ACTON, INC., v. UNITED STATES Et al.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.

No. 726. Decided April 6, 1964.

221 F. Supp. 174, affirmed.

James W. Wrape, Robert E. Joyner and Harold G. Hernly for appellant.

Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick, Robert B. Hummel, Robert W. Ginnane and Francis A. Silver for the United States et al.

PER CURIAM.

The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is affirmed.