515 Opinion of the Court. and the purposes cal consequences [resulting] . IV. Our interpretation of the power of the Commission under §§ 7 (c) and (e) is buttressed by the legislative history. They were added to the Act in 1942, four years after its original passage. Prior to their adoption the only rate-making regulatory tools the Commission possessed were §§ 4 and 5, and they came into operation only after the natural gas was already moving in interstate commerce. Sections 7 (c) and (e) were designed to control the certification of gas destined for interstate movement. The purpose of the amendments was to give "the Commission an opportunity to scrutinize the financial set-up, the adequacy of the gas reserves, the feasibility and adequacy of the proposed services, and the characteristics of the rate structure . . . at a time when such vital matters can readily be modified as the public interest may demand. . . ." House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H. R. Rep. No. 1290, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3. Its counterpart in the Senate likewise reported: "Provisions of the Natural Gas Act empower the Commission to prevent uneconomic extensions and waste, but it can so regulate such powers only when the extension is to 'a market in which natural gas is already being served by another natural-gas company.' Thus the possibilities of waste, uneconomic and uncontrolled extensions are multiple and tre 2 The Commission did have authority with reference to the entry of a natural gas company into a competitive market but not into new and unserviced markets. Opinion of the Court. 376 U.S. mendous. The present bill would correct this glaring inadequacy of the act. It would also authorize the Commission to examine costs, finances, necessity, feasibility, and adequacy of proposed services. The characteristics of their rate structure could be studied." Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, S. Rep. No. 948, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-2. Clearly, the Commission was given the power to lay down conditions precedent to the entry of the natural gas into interstate commerce. Moreover, the Commission has long recognized this obligation and has required modification of many tariff and contract provisions as a condition to the granting of a certificate.3 The existence of broad discretionary power in the Commission to condition temporary certificates appears to us to be vital to its ability to hold the line in pricing. The extent of that power in permanent certification is not before us now, since each of these applications is for temporary certification. It is said that the condition of the Commission's docket transposes, for all practical matters, 3 See, e. g., Florida Economic Advisory Council v. Federal Power Comm'n, 102 U. S. App. D. C. 152, 251 F. 2d 643, cert. denied, 356 U. S. 959; Northern Natural Gas Co., 22 F. P. C. 164, 174-175, 180, aff'd sub nom. Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 108 U. S. App. D. C. 36, 278 F. 2d 870, cert. denied, 364 U. S. 891 (certificate conditioned upon removal of clauses permitting cancellation depending on price relationship of gas and competitive fuels in gas purchase contracts upon which feasibility of pipeline project depended); Transwestern Pipeline Co., 22 F. P. C. 391, 394–395, modified on rehearing, 22 F. P. C. 542 (minimum bill provisions of proposed tariff required to be modified); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 10 F. P. C. 185 (conditions requiring inclusion of interruptible rate schedules in tariffs); Trans-Continental Gas Pipe Line Co., 7 F. P. C. 24, 38-40 (commencement of service conditioned upon filing of new tariff satisfactory to Commission because of disapproval of certain terms of service); Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co., 7 F. P. C. 257 (commencement of service conditioned upon filing of tariff satisfactory to Commission). 515 HARLAN, J., dissenting. temporary certificates into permanent ones. This claim arises due to the delays incident to the issuance of a permanent certificate. We spoke of the "nigh interminable" delay in § 5 proceedings in Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, supra, at 389. There delay operated against the consumer. Here it operates against the producer. The Commission has been making efforts in this regard, through the establishment of guidelines for determining initial prices and other administrative devices. 43 F. P. C. Ann. Rep. 13, 119-120 (1963). However, we again call to its attention the dangers inherent in the accumulation of a large backlog of cases with its accompanying irreparable injury to the parties. Moreover, consumers may become directly affected thereby through the reluctance of producers to enter interstate markets because of the long delay incident to permanent certification. Procedures must be worked out, not only to clear up this docket congestion, but also, to maintain a reasonably clear current docket so that hearings may be had without inordinate delay. In this connection the techniques of the National Labor Relations Board might be studied with a view to determining whether its exemption practices, see Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U. S. 1, 3-4 (1957), might be helpful in the solution of the Commission's problems. Reversed. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART joins, dissenting. While the result reached by the Court may be thought desirable, I can find no justification for it either in the Natural Gas Act or in any of the prior decisions of this Court. The matter is one for Congress. I would affirm the judgments below substantially for the reasons given by Judge Brown in his convincing opinion for the Court of Appeals. 306 F. 2d 334. Syllabus. 376 U.S. RUGENDORF v. UNITED STATES. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT. No. 223. Argued February 27, 1964.-Decided March 30, 1964. Petitioner was convicted of knowingly concealing stolen fur garments in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 2315. The stolen furs were found in the basement of his home pursuant to a search warrant issued on the strength of an affidavit factually inaccurate in two respects and based partly on hearsay statements of confidential informants. Petitioner's motion to suppress the introduction in evidence of the seized furs was denied by the trial court. Held: 1. The search warrant was valid as long as it provided a substantial basis to support the conclusion that the stolen goods were probably in petitioner's basement. Pp. 531-533. (a) Factual inaccuracies, not going to the integrity of the affidavit, do not destroy probable cause for a search. Pp. 532-533. (b) Hearsay, if it provides sufficient evidence of probable cause, justifies the issuance of a search warrant. Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, followed. P. 533. 2. Petitioner's claim that he was entitled to the informant's name in order to defend himself at the trial must be rejected where first raised in petitioner's reply brief on appeal, his previous request having been confined to support of his motion to suppress the evidence. Pp. 534-536. 3. The evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. Pp. 536-537. 316 F. 2d 589, affirmed. Julius Lucius Echeles argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Melvin B. Lewis and Howard W. Minn. David C. Acheson argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Frank Goodman and Philip R. Monahan. 528 Opinion of the Court. MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. Following a trial by jury, petitioner was convicted of violating 18 U. S. C. § 23151 by knowingly receiving, concealing and storing 81 stolen fur pieces, the fur pieces having been transported in interstate commerce and having a value exceeding $5,000. The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction despite petitioner's objections that the evidence was not sufficient to support the verdict; that the fur garments should have been excluded. from evidence because they were seized on the authority of a search warrant supported by a deficient affidavit; and that the names of certain confidential informants referred to in the affidavit should have been disclosed. 316 F. 2d 589. We granted certiorari, 375 U. S. 812, and affirm the judgment. I. The search warrant under attack was issued by the United States Commissioner on the strength of an affidavit dated March 22, 1962, and signed by Marlin Moore, a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The affidavit stated that Moore had reason to believe that approximately 80 fur stoles and jackets, taken in a burglary in Mountain Brook, Alabama, and worth about $40,000, were concealed in the basement of a single family residence at 3117 West Jarvis Avenue in Chicago. 118 U. S. C. § 2315: "Whoever receives, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of any goods, wares, or merchandise, securities, or money of the value of $5,000 or more, or pledges or accepts as security for a loan any goods, wares, or merchandise, or securities, of the value of $500 or more, moving as, or which are a part of, or which constitute interstate or foreign commerce, knowing the same to have been stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken; . . . "Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both." |