refer to the civil war against the allies, and are so explained. even by the defenders of that hypothesis. (See Rudiger l. I.)

A particular stress is farther laid on the passage, p. 42. v. ὑμῶν, κ. τ. λ. contrasted with p. 52, θαυμάζω δε, κ. τ. λ. « These passages," say Jacobs and Rüdiger, "contradict each other; in the first, the orator anticipates the future, and expresses the hope, that, in the war to take place, Philip may be punished, if the Athenians follow the advice proposed. In the second passage, the orator speaks of a war already commenced, for the purpose of punishing Philip, but disgraceful in its proceedings." Whoever has attentively read Demosthenes, knows that he always considers the Athenians in a state of warfare against Philip, after the first deception they had experienced from him; as also does Libanius, (cf. Hyoth. Tou Tepi eipvns init.) The hostile relation between these two states was particularly increased, after Philip began (Olymp. ċvi. 4.) more clearly to develope his intentions; and to this period, the passage, p. 52, may conveniently be referred, as we shall soon show more fully. The first passage, p. 42, by no means contradicts this; Demosthenes does not deny in it, that a war had been waged for the purpose of punishing Philip; the character of the whole speech, from its commencement, rather tends to show, that it presupposes a durable state of warfare; but the orator denies in both passages, that the. purpose of punishing Philip had been attained, and gives reason to hope, in the former, that it may be attained by means of his counsels.

These seeming arguments were broached after Leland, in order to enforce his hypothesis. He himself chiefly founded his opinion on the nature of the transactions mentioned in p. 49. Philip attacked the tributary islands of the Athenians with a fleet, surprised and took a squadron of their vessels stationed on the coast of Eubœa, made a descent on the shore of Marathon, and carried off the Salaminian galley. These events are related only by Demosthenes in this passage, and by no other writer: they are indefinitely alluded to in a few passages. Now these occurrences, remarks Dr. Leland, suppose such an hostility between Athens and Philip, as cannot be assumed at the time preceding the epoch of the first Philippic: he therefore looks for another period, and deceived by two passages of Demosthenes and Æschines relating to those incidents, he places them immediately before the negociations of peace. The first of these passages is Demosth. Exord. 32. But nothing can be inferred from this passage, excepting that Philip first spent some time in making depredations on the islands, and afterwards (xal

πάλιν ἡνίκα εἰς Μαραθῶνα τριήρεις ληστρίδες πρόσεσχον) sailed to the Attic coasts; not a word about the time of these incidents. The second passage is Æsch. de fals. leg. In this passage are the following words: Φίλιππος δὲ ὁρμηθεὶς ἐκ Μακεδονίας, οὐκέτ ̓ ὑπὲρ ̓Αμφιπόλεως πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἠγώνιζετο, ἀλλ ̓ ἤδη περὶ Λήμνου καὶ Ιμβρου καὶ Σκύρου, τῶν ἡμετέρων κτημάτων· ἐξέλειπον δὲ Χεῤῥόννησον ἡμῶν οἱ πολῖται, τὴν οὖσαν ὁμολογουμένως 'Αθηναίων. Οἱ μὲν καιροὶ τῆς πόλεως τοιοῦτοι ἦσαν, ἐν οἷς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης ἐγέVOYTO Móyo. But Dr. Leland does not deal fairly with this passage; he collects together what may support his opinion, and omits the rest. We think that every impartial person who reads the whole passage, will find that schines takes a view of the whole war, and points out the losses which the Athenians had sustained (omitting what regarded the allied cities) during it, at whatever period, the sums wasted in the unsuccessful undertakings of Chares, the damage sustained by Athenian citizens in the isles and in the Chersonese; oi pèv xaιpol Tйs Tóλews, therefore, only denotes, "Such was, in general, the situation of the republic;" and these words refer to all the disasters endured by Athens in this war. This, we do not doubt, is the correct interpretation of this passage, which throws down the only prop on which the opinion of Dr. Leland can possibly be supported.

But let us particularly consider the situation of things before the expedition of Philip to Thermopyla; we shall find that we can very appropriately refer thereto the events mentioned in p. 49; we shall, on the contrary, also prove every other period to be unsuitable. First, Philip continually infested Chesobleptes, the friend of the Athenians; next, when this prince ceded the Chersonese to the republic, he took from it the city of Methone; he endeavored to detach Chesobleptes from the Athenians; his irritation increased to such a degree, that he not only attacked Olynthus, but also formed the design of seizing Byzantium-a design, by means of which he threatened to exclude the Athenians from their necessary annual supplies of corn, which they drew from the northern regions. He actually discovered & this design by his attack on the fortress of Heræum, thereby throwing off the mask he had worn so long. The Athenians were roused from their lethargy; they saw their most important interests in danger; they accordingly warned Chesobleptes, formed an alliance with Olynthus, and determined to wage war against Philip from two quarters; viz. by supporting the Phocians, and by sending a fleet into the Hellespont. The report of Philip's death stopped indeed their naval preparations, but the joy which

it caused shows sufficiently the state of the public mind. Why should we not admit, that the war, decreed at that period, was that for punishing (TO Tμwphoαolai, p. 42.) Philip? Why should we not admit, that the hostilities having put on such a character of animosity, Philip, irritated still more by his disappointments concerning Olynthus and Byzantium, finding the sea unguarded in consequence of the supineness of Chares, made those depredations which are mentioned in' p. 49.? These depredations did not tend to important conquests, but to insult and humiliate the republic; too insignificant to be alluded to afterwards by Demosthenes, accustomed to dwell only on events of greater importance; they formed, however, characteristic features in a war, commenced in order to chastise the insolence of Philip, and concluded in consequence of the bold expedition of the latter to Thermopyla, by the Athenians being compelled to attend to their own safety. It appears by this view of the situation at that period, how properly Demosthenes could make the consideration in p. 52, (there is a similar one in Olynth. 1. p. 25.) and also how properly he could say, that if the Athenians followed his advice, they might now cherish the hope of being able to punish Philip. We are of opinion, that by this survey, the doubts of Dr. Leland entirely vanish. The authority of Gillies on the subject is very inconsiderable. This historian closely follows the learned Doctor in the narrative of all the transactions of Philip, and proceeds so far as frequently to borrow whole passages from him in his very expressions, as every one may find by a comparison.

There yet remains the last argument, adduced by Rüdiger, which at first sight appears to be important, but on a closer consideration will be found to be of as little consequence as the others. "Dion. Hal." says he, "speaks (in ep. ad Ammæ. e. 4.) of a sixth (or fifth) Philippic oration, which is lost, and observes the security of the islands and towns of the Hellespont to be the subject of it; he points out the commencement of this oration with the words ἃ μὲν ἡμεῖς, κ. τ. λ. Now this is just the beginning of the second part of the first Philippic; nay, Dion. has even explained a passage of this sixth (or fifth) oration: καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις—θάλατταν. But this passage occurs just in the second part of Philipp. 1. p. 49." We are by no means frightened by this argument. If we reflect that Demosthenes had prepared 56 exordia, and that the beginnings of several orations are extremely similar; if we consider the numerous and striking repetitions occurring in his orations, (see the judicious developement of this subject in the Edinb. Rev. No.

74. ann. 1821.) we conceive, that by these reflections alone (we shall soon adduce some of another nature) the apparent force of this argument totally disappears.

These are the best arguments for the hypothesis; they prove, as we have seen, by a close examination, to be quite inefficient. II. Let us now come to the counter arguments. They are partly historical, partly oratorical: we shall first speak of the

former.

The historical reasons, which show the impropriety of the hypothesis in question, refer either to circumstances occurring in the body of this speech, or to the difficulty of ascertaining a convenient time when it might have been pronounced.

If we consider the first Philippic as two distinct orations, and suppose that the second of them was spoken after the seizure of Olynthus, it is, in the first place, very strange, that the orator has made no mention at all of the tragic fall of this city. To remove this difficulty, Rüdiger (1. 1.) says, that the orator was conscious how deeply the Athenians were affected with the destruction of Olynthus, and that he would not irritate this wound. But the whole tone of that speech betrays indeed very little regard to the weaknesses of the Athenians; and he, who imputes to Demosthenes such a delicate regard for the feelings of his hearers, and which is peculiar to modern orators, is not acquainted with the character of his eloquence. How does he speak of this event in his later orations, as, for instance, in the second Philippic? Must not every one, who attentively consi ders the passage in p. 51, where the orator so bitterly ridicules the Athenians, and expatiates on the losses sustained in consequence of the inactivity of his countrymen, admit, that he has for his subject a period which ends with the march of Philip to Thermopyla?

In the next place; how can the manner in which he speaks of Thebes, of the designs of Philip, and of the isle of Euboea, at the conclusion of this oration, be reconciled with the events of a later period? It is known that the Thebans openly sided with Philip, even during the siege of Olynthus (compare what is said respecting them in Olynth, 11. according to the arrangement of Dionysius). How then, at a later period, could the report arise, that Philip plotted the destruction of Thebes? The same remark may be applied to what he observes respect ing the obscurity of Philip's plans. They were obviously at la later time; every one knew that he meditated war against the Phocæaus. But at the period when the first Philippic was spoken, the situation of things was different, and in every respect

consistent with the political conjectures alleged in that passage. After his disappointment at Thermopyla, Philip affected to lay aside his plans against the Athenians, and confined himself to his dominions, auxious to disperse the clamor occasioned by his too great precipitance: at the same time, he spread various rumors respecting his designs, in order to avert the attention of Athens.

!

The same difficulties arise respecting the letter written by Philip to the Euboeans, and which is mentioned in the first Phi lippic, as we shall see hereafter.

Now if we turn from these considerations, and look for a proper time for the delivery of the pretended distinct oration, the difficulty increases more and more. This inquiry is intimately connected with the question respecting a proper period for the events mentioned p. 49. In dividing the first Philippic into two distinct orations, and placing the latter of them after the taking of Olynthus, the naval depredations committed by Philip on the tributary islands of Athens, and on Attica itself, and his surprisal and capture of a squadron of vessels stationed on the southern coast of Euboea; these events, which are mentioned in that second part, must likewise be placed after the destruction of Olynthus (because, if they had happened during the siege, Demosthenes would undoubtedly have spoken of them in one of his three Olynthiacs); nay, they must be combined with the expedition to Euboea, which happened shortly after the affair of Olynthus, by which Philip expelled the Athenian general Molossus, and put himself in possession of that island and Gillies, in his History of Greece, really does so. He says, that Philip, whilst he celebrated the festival of the Muses at Dium (immediately after the destruction of Olynthus), committed those depredations on purpose "to make the Athenians feel the incon venience of war, the better to prepare them for the insidious proposal of a separate peace, and to detach them from the cause of Phocis and Chesobleptes," A strange preparation, indeed, for proposals of peace! Those depredations were, and must be, to Athenians, of the most insulting nature: the illustrious trophies of Marathon and Salamis were effaced by these insults (as Gillies himself observes), and they were consequently well fitted to exasperate, and not at all to appease the minds of the Athenians. But nothing is more certain (which is also admitted by Gillies) than that he did not by any means intend, at that time, to exasperate and rouse the Athenians; he endeavor, ed, on the contrary, to appease them, and to foster their supineness, in order that he might execute his long premeditated pro