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payment of the premium is an implied condition In Milhous v. Johnson, 21 N. Y. S. R. 382, precedent. In the other cases it does not ap- 4 N. Y. Supp. 199, it does not appear whether pear whether the premium accompanied the the first premium was paid before or at the application or was paid at the time the pol- time of the delivery of the policy. icy was delivered.
In Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Nixon, 26 C. It will be observed that Perry v. Dwelling. C. A. 620, 48 U. S. App. 482, 81 Fed. 796, and House Ins. Co. 67 N. H. 291, 33 Atl. 731, makes Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Trimble, 27 C. C. notice to the insured of the acceptance of his A. 404, 48 U. S. App. 565, 83 Fed. 85, decided application essential to the consummation of on the authority of that case, it expressly apthe contract. The, court, in Horton V. New peared that the first premium accompanied the York L. Ins. Co. 151 Mo. 604, 52 S. W. 356, application, and the case is expressly distingave as one of the reasons why the contract guished from Equitable Life Assur. Soc. was to be regarded as made in Missouri, where Clements, 140 U. S. 226, 35 L. ed. 497, 11 Sup. it was delivered to the insured, that the latter Ct. Rep. 822, upon that ground. In Desmazes v. had no notice that his application had been Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. 7 Ins. L. J. 926, Fed. accepted until the policy was delivered to him. Cas. No. 3,821, it also appeared that the In this case, however, there was an express stip- premium accompanied the application. These ulation that the contract should not take effect cases are therefore not authority for lountil actual payment of the premium by the in- cating the place of making the contract at the sured.
home office of the association when the premium The two cases next cited did not involve any
is paid at the time of the delivery of the policy question as to conflict of laws, but emphasized to the insured in the other state. the necessity of notice to the consummation of
In Shattuck v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 4 Cliff. the contract.
598, Fed. Cas. No. 12,715, however, it expressly Where an application for insurance was found appeared that the first premium was paid, at satisfactory, and
The court the time the policy was delivered. policy written and offered
"Contracts of insurto the applicant for inspection, but he did not said, in this conuection : pay the premium called for by its terms, and it
ance are completed when the proposals of the was not delivered to him, no communication
one party have been accepted by the other by having been made by the insurance company
some appropriate act signifying such an acceptance.
Consequently, if an agent, after receiving the application until the offer appointed in a state other than that which charof the policy was made, -no contract of any
tered the company and in which the company kind was consummated between the parties. has its home office, forwards the requisite paMarkey v. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. 126 Mass.
pers to that office, and a policy is thereupon exe158.
cuted there and mailed directly to the appliIn Heiman v. Phænix Mut. L. Ins. Co. 17 cant, the contract is a contract made in the Minn. 153, 10 Am. Rep. 154, GII. 127, it was
state where the home office is situated; and, held that where, independent of the policy, there since the acceptance of the proposals is the test is nothing to show any acceptance of the ap
of completion, it follows that a transmission plication for life insurance, or any agreement of the policy by mail to the agent, to be deto insure, the presumption is that, while there livered by him to the applicant if the policy were negotiations, there was no contract, and conforms in all respects to the proposals, would no purpose to contract otherwise than by a have the like effect, unless by the terms of the policy made and delivered upon simultaneous policy it was not to be binding until it was payment of premium. The court took the posi- countersigned by the agent who forwarded the tion that the application for life insurance is proposals." å mere proposal on the part of the applicant, In Whitcomb v. Phenix Mutual i. Ins. and that when the insurer signifies its accept- Co. 11 Chicago Legal News, 408, Fed. Cas. ance of it to the proposer, and not before, the No. 17,530, also, it appeared that the preminds of the parties meet, and the contract is mium was paid to the agent at the
time made; but that this acceptance must be signi. the policy
delivered. So far apfied by some act.
pears in the last two cases, the insured In the following cases it is held that the not notified of the acceptance of the contract must be regarded as made in the application until the policy was delivered to state in which the home office is situated, and him. It would seem, therefore, that these cases in which the application is accepted, and from make the acceptance of the application at the which a policy is forwarded to the local agent home office of the society, manifested by the of the insurer and by him delivered to the in- issuance of a policy and putting it in conduit sured, if the policy corresponds to the appli- to the insured through the insurer's local agent, cation, and no conditions precedent to the tak- the last act essential to put the contract into ing effect of the contract are expressly im- effect; and that they in effect deny that delivery posed ; Desmazes v. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. 7 of the policy, payment of the first premium, or Ins. L. J. 926, Fed: Cas. No. 3,821 (III. k) ; Whit- notice of acceptance of application, is an imcomby. Phønix Mut. L. Ins. Co. 11 Chicago plied condition precedent, the place of performLegal News, 408, Fed. Cas. No. 17,530 (I11. k); ance of which determines the place where the Smith v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 5 Fed. 582; Shat contract is made. The other cases can, at the tuck v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 4 Cliff. 598, Fed. most, only be regarded as authority for elimCas. No. 12,715 (III. k); Equitable Life Assur. inating delivery of the policy and notice of the Soc. v. Nixon, 26 C. C. A. 620, 48 U. S. App. 482, acceptance of the application as conditions 81 Fed. 796 (III. k); Equitable Life Assur. precedent, and are only implied, if any, au· Soc. v. Trimble, 27 C. C. A, 404, 48 U. S. App. thority for the elimination of notice; since, so 565, 83 Fed. 85 (III. k); Milhous y. Johnson, far as appears, the insured may have received 21 N. Y. S. R. 382, 4 N. Y. Supp. 199 (III. h). notice otherwise than by the delivery of the (See also Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Fromm policy. hold, 75 Ill. App. 43, infra, III. c.)
All of the foregoing cases, which locate the
making of the contract at the home office of which contains all the conditions for each septhe company, notwithstanding the delivery of arate shipment and insurance, requires notice the policy by the local agent of the company to the company prior to the shipment, reserves in another state, are fuil and express author- to the company the right to accept or reject the ity for the proposition that, in the absence of application for insurance on any particular shipan express stipulation to that effect, delivery of ment, and contemplates that a new and separate the policy is not essential to the consummation policy shall be issued for each risk, the preof the contract, and that the place of delivery, | mium upon which is to be paid in cash upon therefore, does not necessarily determine the delivery of the policy in New York,—the conplace where the contract is made.
tract of insurance with respect to any particIn Commercial Ins. Co. v. Hallock, 27 N. J. ular shipment will be deemed to have been L. 645, 72 Am. Dec. 379, it was held that the made in New York, notwithstanding that, by the acceptance of a proposition to insure completes terms of the open policy, the risk attaches from the contract between the insurer and the in- the time the goods are loaded on shipboard at sured ; and when the policy is sent by mail to New Orleans. State v. Williams, 46 La. Ann. the agent of the company for delivery the con-922, 15 So. 290. The question as to where tract cannot be rescinded without the consent the contract was made, affected the company's of the party insured. This is upon the as- liability to pay a license under the terms of sumption that there is nothing in the circum- the Louisiana statute, it having been previousstances showing that when the policy was ly held that a foreign insurance company, which signed and sent to the agent it was meant to issues policies directly from its domicil, and be subject to any future action on either side. which has no agent in Louisiana, and only The question in this case was not as to con- agrees to accept risks placed for them by a perflict of laws, but as to when the contract be- son residing there, cannot be compelled to pay came consummated.
a license. In Yore v. Bankers'&' M. Mut. Life Asso. 88 Cal. 609, 26 Pac. 514, the question as to the
f. Summary. county in which a contract of insurance was
The authorities reviewed in the preceding submade became important for the purpose of de- divisions seem to warrant the following propotermining the venue of an action thereon. The
sitions with reference to the question where a application was made in Yuba county and for
contract of insurance is deemed to have been warded by a local agent to San Francisco, and, made : upon its receipt, the officers of the company is
1. In the exceptional case when the local sued and caused a policy to be mailed to the agent of the insurer has final authority to bind agent of the company with instructions to de
the insurer by the acceptance of the applicaliver it to the applicant. The court said that, tion, the contract is deemed to have been made if the policy issued had been in exact accordance
in the state where he accepted the application, with the terms proposed in the application, the although the policy may have been issued at contract woulù be deemed to have been made
the home office of the insurer in another state in San Francisco, but, as there was a variance
(II. c). between the application and the policy, it was 2. If the local agent's authority is limited to held that the contract was completed when the receiving and forwarding applications to the policy was accepted by the applicant in Yuba home office of the insurer for acceptance or recounty.
jection, the contract will be deemed to have been Actual delivery of a policy to the insured made at the home office, when a policy in subis not essential to the validity of a contract of life insurance, unless expressly made so by the directly from the home office to the insured or
stantial conformity to the application is mailed terms of the contract. New York L. Ins. Co. v.
his agent in another state, and no conditions Babcock, 104 Ga. 67, 42 L. R. A. 88, 30 S. E. precedent to its taking effect are expressly im273.
posed, and there is nothing in the transaction
showing that the contract was intended to be e. Revival; open policy.
left open until the receipt of the policy by
the insured (II. d, 2, 3). Reinstatement of an insurance policy, al- 3. If the policy mailed to the insured or his though accomplished in another state, consist- agent, under the circumstances assumed in the ing of a mere cancelation of a forfeiture, where- last paragraph, varies materially from the apupon the original policy is restored and recog- plication, the contract will be deemed to have nized as binding without any different terms been made in the state in which the insured rebeing agreed upon, is not a new contract, but ceives the policy from the mail, and in which the policy is to be governed by the laws of he expressly or impliedly assents to the vathe state in which it was originally issued. riance (I1. d, 2, 3). Goodwin v. Provident Sav. Life Assur. Asso. 4. When the application is accepted at the 97 Iowa, 226, 32 L. R. A, 473, 66 N. W. 157. home office of the insurer, and sent to a local
The fact that a life insurance policy, taken agent of the insurer, and by him delivered to out by the insured in one state, was revived up- the insured in another state, the contract will on the application of a relative residing in an- be deemed to have been made in the latter state, other state, by whom the premiums were paid even though the policy corresponds in all re and the policy received, does not change the spects to the application, if certain acts, to be place of contract, where the applicant for the performed by the agent or insured,-€. 9., the revival was not named as beneficiary. Bottom countersigning of the policy (II. d, 4, (a)), the ley v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. 170 Mass. 274, delivery of the policy and the payment of the 49 N. E. 438 (III. d).
first premium (II. d, 4, (b)),-are expressly Under an open policy of insurance covering made conditions precedent to the taking effect shipments to be made from New Orleans (con of the contract. sented to in New York and issued directly from 5. When the application is accepted at the the domicil of the company in that state). 'home office of the insurer, and sent to a local
agent of the insurer, and by him delivered to
III. Choice of laws. the insured in another state, without any conditions precedent to the taking effect of the a. General principles; intention; express stipcontract having been expressly imposed, there ulation as to governing law; public policy. is some conflict among the authorities as to the place where the contract shall be deemed to
The cross references in parentheses after some have been made, though the conflict is to some of the cases cited in the subdivisions of III. extent reconcilable when proper attention is refer to the subdivisions of II. in which the paid to the fact whether the first premium ac- cases are cited in their bearing upon the quescompanied the application or was paid at the tion as to where the contract was made. time of the delivery of the policy. Upon the Questions relating to the formal validity of state of facts assumed in this paragraph, most the contract, or to the conditions imposed upon of the cases have located the place of making the right of the insurer to make the contract, the contract at the home office of the company are doubtless to be determined by reference to when the first premium accompanied the appli- the law of the place where the contract was cation, thus in effect holding that, in the ab- consummated, unless the local statute, expressly sence of an express stipulation to that effect,
or by construction, extends to cases in which delivery of the policy is not essential to the some of the preliminary steps were taken in consummation of the contract. See, however, the state even wben the contract has been conReliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sawyer, 160 Mass. summated elsewhere (as to this point see infra, 413, 36 N. E. 59; Stevens v. Rasin Fertilizer III. b). In neither case, however, does the Co. 87 Md. 679, 41 Atl. 116, and Expressman's choice of the governing law depend upon the Mut. Ben. Asso. v. Hurlock, 91 Md. 585, 46 intention of the parties. Again, when a limiAtl. 957, supra, II. d, 4, (c). Upon the other tation is imposed upon the insurer's power to hand, the majority, though not all, of the cases, contract by a provision in its charter or by a have, upon the state of facts assumed in the
statute of the state in which it is incorporated, paragraph, located the place of the making of that limitation, of course, applies without refthe contract in the state where the first pre- erence to the intention of the parties (see infra, mium was paid, when it did not accompany the III. c). When, however, the question relates to application, but was paid at the time of the de- the construction or interpretation of the lanlivery of the policy ; thus impliedly holding that, guage of the contract; to the rights and oblieven in the absence of an express stipulation to gations of the parties as affected by laws not that effect, the payment of the first premium constituting a limitation upon the insurer's is a condition precedent to the consummation of power to contract; or, perhaps, to the essential the contract when the policy is sent to the in- validity of the contract,-it would seem that, unsurer's agent to be by him delivered to the in- der the general principles governing the choice sured. But see Shattuck v. Mutual L. Ins. Co.
of laws, the intention of the parties, expressed 4 Cliff, 598, Fed. Cas. No. 12,715, and Whitcomb
or presumed, as to the governing law, should v. Phænix Mut. L. Ins. Co. Fed. Cas. No. 17,530, prevail, unless there is a statute of the forum supra, II, d, 4, (c).
upon the point in question that expressly, or by Even assuming that delivery, as such, is not construction, embraces the contract, notwithessential to the consummation of the contract, standing its foreign elements, or unless it would and that the first premium accompanies the ap- be contrary to the public policy of the forum plication, the question remains whether the
to apply the law of another state or country fact that the insured did not receive notice with reference to which the parties intended to of the acceptance of his application until the contract, or to refrain from applying the law delivery of the policy by the local agent of the of the forum. insurer is sufficient to locate the place of the The principle that the intention of the parconsummation of the contract in the state where ties is to prevail is frequently obscured when he received such notice, rather than in the state there is no express provision in the contract where the home office is situated. With the designating the governing law.
In such cases, exception of Perry v. Dwelling-House Ins. Co. the attention being diverted to the conflicting 67 N. H. 291, 33 Atl. 731, supra (II. d, 4, claims of lex loci contractus and lex loci solu(c)), the cases pay but little attention to the tionis, and perhaps other laws, one is apt to matter of notice, and even in that case it ap- lose sight of the fact that, with the exceptions pears that the premium was paid at the time of mentioned at the beginning of the subdivision, the delivery of the policy, so that the de- the principles or rules that have been estabcision locating the consummation of the con
lisbed for the choice of laws determining the tract in the state of the insured's residence does substantive rights of the parties are based upnot rest solely upon the ground that he first
on the presumed intention of the parties, and received notice of the acceptance of his appli- do not apply when the presumptions upon which cation there, though the language of the opin- they rest are overthrown by circumstances indiion indicates that, in the view of the court, that
cating a contrary intention.
The foilowing cases illustrate the subordifact would have, of itself, been a sufficient
nate position and function of such principles ground. It seems doubtful, however, in view of
and rules, and their liability to be overthrown the decisions that have located the place of the
when the circumstances reveal an intention on consummation of the contract at the home of.
the part of the parties inconsistent with them. fice without referring to the matter of notice,
A policy of insurance issued by a New Hampwhether the mere fact that the insured did shire corporation to a resident of Massachusetts not receive notice of the acceptance of his ap
upon property situated there is governed by plication until the delivery of the policy to the law of Massachusetts, notwithstanding that him in the state of his residence is sufficient to the contract became complete in New Hampshire locate the place of the consummation of the con- by the deposit of the policy in the mail there, tract in that state, if the premium accom- to be forwarded to the insurance brokers from panied the application,
whom the application was received; it appear.
ing that the New Hampshire form of policy that any inquiry as to the place where the conwas not used, and that the policy contained cer- tract was made, or as to whether the law of tain provisions which are invalid if the contract that or some other place should govern, is unis governed by the statute of New Hampshire necessary; and that the only inquiry is as to (the defense being based upon such provisions). whether, in the particular case, it is contrary to Davis v. Etna Mut. F. Ins. Co. 67 N. H. 218, the public policy of the forum to apply the law 34 Atl. 464 (11. d, 3). This decision was based so designated, or to refrain from applying the upon the presumed intention of the parties, law of the forum. gathered from the circumstances of the case. Thus, it was held in Griesemer v. Mutual L.
In Royal Exch. Assur. Corp. v. Sjorforsak- Ins. Co. 10 Wash. 202, 38 Pac. 1031, that an rings Akticbolaget Vega (1901) 2 K. B. 567, insurance policy issued by a New York corpora70 L. J. K. B. N. S. 874, 85 L. T. N. S. 241, tion reciting that it is "a contract made and 50 Week. Rep. 25, 9 Asp. Mar. L. Cas. 233, to be executed" in the state of New York, and Affirmed in  2 K. B. 384, 71 L. J. K. B. N. is to be construed only according to the charter S. 739, 87 L. T. N. S. 350, 50 Week. Rep. 694, of the company and laws of New York,—was it was held that a second contract of reinsur- governed by the law of New York with respect ance of a marine risk, although made in Swe- to notice as a condition of forfeiture, although den, was invalid under the provision of the in fact executed and delivered in another state. English stamp act, providing that no policy of In Griesemer v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 10 Wash. sea insurance made for time shall be made for 211, 38 Pac. 1034, the facts were the same as any time cxceeding twelve months. The court in the case of the same name reported at page conceded that, as a general rule, the law to be 202 of the same volume (p. 1031, 38 Pac.), exapplied in construing and enforcing a contract cept that the stipulation with reference to the is the law of the country where the contract law of New York was in the application, instead was made, but said that that was so only of the policy. It was held, however, that that because, in the absence of other circum- made no difference. stances, the courts assume that such
In Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 179 U. S. 262, the intention of the parties. In this case, 45 L. ed. 181, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 106 (II. d, 4, however, the court held that the circum- (b)), it was held that a contract of life instances showed that the parties intended to surance which was made in Montana by a New contract with reference to the law of England. | York corporation was not subject to the New The circumstances relied on were that the orig- York statute referred to in the preceding case, inal insurance was on a Lloyd's form, and was notwithstanding that the application recited a contract made in England to which the Eng. that it (the application) was subject to the lish law was alone applicable, and that the con-charter of the company and the laws of New tract in question contained the same provisions York. The decision, however, is upon the as the original contract, and was by its terms ground that the stipulation was not tantamount payable in London. The question in this case to a stipulation that the contract should be conwas whether the policy sued on was inadmis- | trolled by the laws of New York. The court sible under the English statute, and, independ-conceded that the parties might have incorpoently of the other considerations, the court ex- rated the law of New York and made its propressed the opinion that the policy was proper- visions controlling, even though the contract ly excluded because it would be contrary to the was executed elsewhere. The ground of the deEnglish procedure to admit it.
cision is still further shown by the fact that In Greer v. Poole, L. R. 5 Q. B. Div. 272, 49 the court distinguished the case from Baxter v. L. J. Q. B. N. S. 463, 42 L. T. N. S. 687, 28 Brooklyn L. Ins. Co. 119 N. Y. 450, 7 L. R. A. Week. Rep. 582, 4 Asp. Mar. L. Cas. 300, it was 293, 23 N. E. 1048, upon the ground that the held that a policy of marine insurance effected stipulation in the latter case was that the conwith English underwriters by an English mer- tract was made and to be executed in New chant upon goods shipped in a French ship was York, and to be construed only according to the not to be construed according to the French | laws of that state, whereas in the case at bar law, except so far as the parties had expressly the stipulation was that the application should stipulated that it should be. The question in be subject to the law of New York. this case, which was determined by the law of In Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Hathaway, 45 C. C. England rather than the law of France, was A. 655, 106 Fed. 815, which is decided upon whether the amount paid by the owner of the the authority of the Coben Case, the stipulation goods to release the same from a seizure on a was substantially the same as in that case. bottomry bond covering ship, freight, and cargo, Upon a subsequent appeal after a new trial in which was given by the master of the vessel the case of Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Hill, 55 C. C. to raise funds to repair damages which the A. 536, 118 Fed. 708 (II. d, 4, (b)), the circuit vessel had received in a collision, was a loss court of appeals held that a stipulation in a polby perils of the sea. The bond in this case icy of life insurance issued by a New York cor was given at Gibraltar, and the seizure under poration, which was delivered and the first pre it and the payment made to release the goods mium paid in Washington, that the contract from the seizure were made at Marseilles. of insurance, when made, shall be held and con
See also Gibson v. Connecticut F. Ins. Co. strued at all times and places to have been 77 Fed. 561 (II. d, 3), infra, III., m, which made in the city of New York, operated to subemphasizes the importance of the intention of ject the policy to the New York statute referred the parties, and illustrates how it may be in- to in the preceding cases. The court drew subferred when not expressed.
stantially the same distinction between the case If, then, with the exceptions already noted, at bar and the Cohen Case, 179 U. S. 262, 45 the intention of the parties as to the govern- L. ed. 181, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 106, supra, that ing law is to prevail, it would seem that when, the court in the latter case drew between that by an express stipulation in the contract, they case and the Baxter Case ; namely,—that in one have designated the governing law, the question case the stipulation referred to the application, as to what law should govern is answered, and 'and in the other to the contract.
The decision of the circuit court of appeals | administrators of the insured, from the claims was, however, reversed in 193 U. S. 551, 48 L. of his creditors. ed.- 24 Sap. Ct. Rep. 538, upon another In Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Robison, 54 ground, See infra, III. k.
Fed. 580, Atfirmed in 22 L. R. A. 325, 7 C. C. A. So, in Voorheis v. People's Mut. Ben. Soc. 444, 19 U. S. App. 266, 58 Fed. 723 (II. d,. 4, 91 Mich. 469, 51 N. W. 1109 (II. c), it was (b)), it was held that a statute of Iowa, proheld that a policy which stipulated that it viding that any person who shall solicitor should be considered as entered into in Indiana, procure applications shall be held to be the soand should be governed by the laws of that liciting agent of the insurance company issustate, was not subject to the laws of Michigan, ing a policy on such application, anything in although the application was taken in Michi. the policy or application to the contrary notgan. In this case, however, the contract was withstanding, could not be waived by the asregarded as made in Indiana, so that the law sured by a provision of the policy that it should of that state would probably have been held be construed according to the laws of the state to govern, even in the absence of such a stipu. in which the home otfice was situated, the con. lation.
tract having been in fact consummated in Iowa. It will be observed that the stipulation in- So, it was held in New York L. Ins. Co. v. volved in the foregoing cases not only provided Russell, 23 C. C. A. 43, 40 U. S. App. 530, 77 that the contract should be construed by the Fed. 94, that the Nebraska rule, which estops laws of a certain state, but that it should also an insurance company to set up the falsity of be regarded as made in that state.
It is not ap
answers inserted in the application upon the parent, however, how the latter provision adds assurance of the insurer's agent that they were anything to the force of the stipulation. It proper, applied where a policy of life insurance certainly cannot change the fact, if it was a was issued by a New York corporation upon an fact, that the contract was made in another application made in Nebraska to a local agent state ; that is, that the last act essential to the doing business for the insurer in that state, the consummation of the contract was performed in policy being delivered to the insured, and the the latter state.
premiums paid there, notwithstanding a stipulaThe other cases in which the courts have giv. tion that New York should be regarded as the en effect to the stipulation of the parties des place of the contract, and that it should be conignating the governing law are cited in the sub- strued according to the laws of New York. sequent subdivisions which treat of the govern- In the cases thus far cited on this subject ing law with respect to particular matters af- it will be observed that the question was as to fecting insurance contracts.
the effect of the stipulation to avoid the effect As already stated, such a stipulation will not of a statute of the state where the contract be enforced when the court deems it contrary to was made, which was also the state of the the public policy of the forum to apply the law forum. In Pietri v. Seguenot, 96 Mo. App. 258, designated by the parties, or to refrain from ap- 69 S. W. 1055, the court said that the laws of plying the law of the forum.
Missouri enter into and become a part of the Thus, where a contract of insurance between contract of insurance made in that state, so far a resident of Massachusetts and a New York as concerns the interpretation and effect of the corporation was made in Massachusetts, the par- terms of insurance to which those laws apply. ties cannot, by the insertion of provisions in this would seem to indicate that any local statthe policy which adopt the law of New York and ute which is broad enough in its terms to cover make the policy payable there, evade statutory the case is such a part of the public policy of provisions of Massachusetts declaring a rule of the state that a court of the state will apply public policy with reference to insurance con- it to a contract made in the state, without reftracts. Albro v. Manhattan L. Ins. Co. 119 erence to the intention of the parties. The MisFed. 629 (II. d, 4, (b)). The statute referred souri supreme court, in Cravens v. New York to in this case made the statements in the ap- L. Ins. Co. 148 Mo. 583, 53 L. R. A. 305, 50 S. plication as to age, physical condition, and fam- W. 519, said: “The rule to be deduced from ily history of the insured valid and binding up- the authorities seems to be that, when no staton the company, in the absence of fraud on ute intervenes prohibiting it, a corporation dothe part of the applicant, and declared that the ing business by permission in another state from application should not be considered as a part that of its incorporation may, by contract, make of the policy unless a copy thereof was attached the law of the state of its incorporation the apto the policy.
plicatory law of the contract; but that, where So, in Cravens v. New York L. Ins. Co. 148 the laws of the state in which it does business Mo. 583, 53 L. R. A. 305, 50 S. W. 519, Affirmed by license prohibit such corporations from makin 178 U. S. 389, 44 L. ed. 1116, 20 Sup. Ct. ing certain kinds of contracts, they can only act Rep. 962 (II. d, 4, (b)), and Horton v. New in accordance therewith." In this case the York L. Ins. Co. 151 Mo. 604, 52 S. W. 356 court cited the case of Equitable Life Assur. Soc. (II. d, 4, (b)), it was held that a stipulation v. Clements, 140 U. S. 226, 44 L. ed. 497, 11 in a contract of life insurance, which was in Sup. Ct. Rep. 822 (11. d, 4, (b)), as authority fact made in Missouri, that New York should be for the proposition that it is not competent for deemed the place of contract, and that it should the parties to waive such a statutory provision be construed according to its laws, was pot
as that involved in the case, and then held that effectual to take the case out of the operation such a waiver could not be affected indirectly of the Missouri statute requiring extended in by stipulating that the contract should be govsurance after the payment of two years' pre- erned by the law of another state. Even asmiums.
suming that the particular statutory provision So, in Pietri v. Seguenot, 96 Mo. App. 258, involved is one that might be expressly and di69 S. W. 1055, it was held that, notwithstand rectly waived by the parties, still the court ing such a stipulation, the contract was sub-might regard the statutory provision as so much ject to the Missouri statute exempting the pro- a part of its public policy that, in the absence of ceeds of a policy, payable to the executors or an express waiver thereof, it could not be avoid