the prevention and redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts; that no impediment should be interposed to the pursuits of anyone except as applied to the same pursuits by others under like circumstances; that no greater burdens should be laid upon one than are laid upon others in the same calling and condition," etc. These princi ples are precisely applicable to the present case, where a greater burden is imposed by § 8 upon employers who are subjected to strikes and lockouts than upon other em. ployers in the same calling and condition, who are not subjected to such strikes and lockouts, irrespective of the justice or propriety of the strike or lockout.

the equal protection of the laws to those within its jurisdiction who are not embraced by the 9th section."

created the free employment agencies in question, unless the class of employers mentioned in § 8 were excluded from the operation of the act. It follows that the employment act of April 11, 1899, must be regarded as unconstitutional as an entirety.

In the case at bar, if § 8 be eliminated from the employment act, the other sections, without it, would cause results not contemplated or desired by the legislature. This is so because, without the obnoxious clause or section, all employers, including those whose workmen are out upon a strike or are locked out, as well as all others, would be entitled to the benefits of the act. But clearly it was the intention of the legislature, by inserting § 8 in the act, to deprive the class of employers therein named of the benefits of the act. ConseIt is claimed, however, by the attorney quently, the elimination of that section general, that § 8 can be eliminated from the would not be in accordance with the maniemployment act without invalidating the fest intention of the legislature. An elimrest of the act. Undoubtedly, "if different ination of § 8 would make the act apply to sections of a statute are independent of each all classes of employers, and thereby cause other, that which is unconstitutional may a result evidently not contemplated or debe disregarded, and valid sections may sired by the legislature. If all the sections stand and be enforced. But if an obnoxious of the act be construed together, it is evisection is of such import that the other sec-dent that the legislature would not have tions, without it, would cause results not contemplated or desired by the legislature, then the entire statute must be held inoperative." Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 541, 46 L. ed. 682, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431. In the Connolly Case it was held by the Supreme Court of the United Section 10 of the act, under which the States that the exception contained in § 9 present prosecution was instituted, depends of the Illinois act of 1893 (Laws 1893, p. upon all the other provisions of the act, and 184) made the whole act invalid. Upon is so connected with them that it cannot this subject the Supreme Court of the stand by itself. Section 1 of the act proUnited States there says: "The 1st section vides for the creation of free employment of the act here in question embraces by its agencies, and § 7 of the act provides that terms all persons, firms, corporations, or as- no fee or compensation shall be charged sociations of persons who combine their or received directly or indirectly from percapital, skill, or acts for any of the pur- sons applying for employment or help from poses specified, while the 9th section de- the free employment offices. Section 10, folclares that the statute shall not apply to lowing immediately upon the provisions in agriculturalists or live-stock dealers in re- reference to free employment agencies where spect of their products or stock in hand. no fee is charged, provides that no person, If the latter section be eliminated as un-etc., shall maintain a private-employment constitutional, then the act, if it stands, agency for hire, or where a fee is charged, will apply to agriculturalists and live-stock dealers. Those classes would in that way be reached and fined, when evidently the legislature intended that they should not be regarded as offending against the law, even if they did combine their capital, skill, or acts in respect of their products or stock in hand. Looking, then, at all the sections together, we must hold that the legislature would not have entered upon or continued the policy indicated by the statute unless agriculturalists and live-stock dealers were excluded from its operation, and thereby protected from prosecution. The result is that the statute must be regarded as an entirety, and in that view it must be adjudged to be unconstitutional, as denying

without first having obtained a license, etc., which license is fixed at the sum of $200 per annum. Whatever else may have been the purpose of § 10, whether designed for revenue or for regulation, or as an exercise of the police power, or otherwise, its evident design was to discourage the existence of private employment agencies by compelling them to pay a heavy license fee, and to throw business into the hands of free employment agencies where no fee is charged. The purpose, also, of § 10 was to prevent imitation of the name of the free employment agencies in the mode therein indicated. It follows that the whole act, including § 10, relates to but one subject,the creation and operation of free employ

The

Upon further reflection we are satisfied that while the views there expressed may be correct as applicable to a section like § 10 standing by itself, yet when applied to § 10 as a part of the whole act they ought not to be adhered to. case of Price v. People, 193 Ill. 114, 55 L. R. A. 588, 61 N. E. 844, was decided in October, 1901, and the rehearing therein applied for was denied in December, 1901. Since that time, to wit, in March, 1902, the Supreme

its decision in Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 541, 46 L. ed. 682, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431, and the latter case holds that legislation containing such an exception as § 8 of the act of April 11, 1899, is in contravention of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. As the Supreme Court of the United States is paramount authority upon all questions relating to the interpretation of the Constitution of the United States we feel it to be our duty to follow the holding of that court to the effect that such legislation as is here under consideration is a violation of the 14th Amendment. Mapes v. Scott, 94 Ill. 385. Therefore, the case of Price v. People, 193 Ill. 114, 55 L. R. A. 588, 61 N. E. 844, is overruled.

ment agencies; and, when the act is de- I made as to the validity of the act as an clared unconstitutional so far as the free entirety. employment agencies are concerned, § 10 falls with the balance of the act, because it is merely a part of the scheme to promote the business of the free employment agencies and secure their successful operation. Section 10 provides that any person, etc., violating the provisions of the act, or any part thereof, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. Therefore, any superintendent who furnishes or causes to be furnished workmen or other employees to any appli- | Court of the United States has announced cant for help whose employees are at that time on strike or locked out, or shall show to any such employer any list of names and addresses of applicants for employment, or expose the same where it can be copied or used by such employer, would be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and subject to the punishment prescribed by § 10. Section 10 is directed mainly against the imitation by private employment agencies of the name of the Illinois free employment offices, and, of course, if the part of the act in reference to such free employment offices is void for the reasons already stated, then the necessity for § 10 no longer exists. There can be no doubt that § 10 "would never have been enacted as a law without the remainder of the act. The leg islature would not provide against imita- Counsel for the plaintiff in error are cortion of something having no existence, and rect in the contention that § 2 of the act of would provide for the free agencies before April 11, 1899, is violative of the Constituproviding that they should not be imitated." tion of Illinois. Section 2 of the act, after In the case of Price v. People, 193 Ill. 114, fixing the amount of salaries to be paid the 55 L. R. A. 588, 61 N. E. 844, the validity superintendent, assistant superintendent, and of § 10 only of the free employment agency clerks, provides as follows: "Which sums, act was passed upon. Although the errors together with proper amounts for defraying assigned in that case were broad enough the necessary costs of equipping and mainto have raised the question of the validity taining the respective offices, shall be paid of the entire act, yet the only question pre- out of any funds in the state treasury not sented by counsel in their arguments in that otherwise appropriated." This provision case was the validity of § 10. It was there is in conflict with § 16 of article 4 of the held that § 10, requiring persons operating Constitution of this state, which provides private employment agencies for hire in as follows: "The general assembly shall certain cities to pay a license fee of $200 make no appropriation of money out of the per annum, and give a bond for $1,000, was treasury in any private law. Bills making not unconstitutional, upon the grounds that appropriations for the pay of members and conducting a private employment agency officers of the general assembly, and for the for hire is an occupation for which the leg- salaries of the officers of the government, islature may require a license fee in order shall contain no provision on any other subto promote the public welfare, and that in ject." 1 Starr & C. Anno. Stat. 2d ed. p. the exercise of its police power the legis- 131. The superintendents, assistant superlature may provide that an occupation intendents, and clerks mentioned in the act which is a proper subject of such power are officers of the government within the shall not be followed except under a license meaning of § 16, as construed in the case issued by public authority upon the pay of Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 29 L. R. A. ment of a license fee, and the execution of a 79, 40 N. E. 454, and therefore their sala bond in accordance with the purposes of theries must be provided for by separate act or act. But § 10, as there passed upon, was bill. Section 16 of article 4 makes such considered as standing by itself, and with appropriations an independent subject of out reference to its connection with the bal- legislation, and consequently § 2 is void. ance of the act. No decision was there If the act were otherwise constitutional, § 2,

being distinct and separable from the bal- | end that he might be discharged from the ance of the act, would not affect the same, custody of the sheriff, who is detaining him and could be eliminated so as to allow the by reason of a mittimus issued by the crimremainder of the act to stand. But in inal court of Cook county. Upon considerview of the considerations already presentation of the petition, a writ was awarded, ed, the whole of the act, including § 2, commanding the sheriff to cause the relator must fall.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Crim inal Court of Cook County is reversed.

Carter and Boggs, JJ., do not concur in the conclusion reached by the majority of the court.

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois ex rel.
Anton BOENERT

v.

to be brought before the court, together with the cause of his detention. A returr was duly made to the writ at the February term, 1903, showing that the relator was held by virtue of a warrant of commitment from the criminal court of Cook county, directing the sheriff to convey the relator to the penitentiary at Joliet. The relator replied to the return, alleging that the judgment on which the warrant of commitment was issued was null and void because the court had no jurisdiction to pronounce it, and because it was beyond the power of

Thomas E. BARRETT, Sheriff of Cook the court to enter.

County.

(202 III. 287.)

1. Jurisdiction to impose sentence up

on one convicted of crime is lost

by permitting him to go at large upon his own recognizance pending a motion for new trial, and taking no further action in the case un

til after the expiration of several terms of

court. 2. A trial court has no jurisdiction indefinitely to suspend sentence after conviction of crime, or to release the pris oner on parole, when the legislature has adopted a plan to give persons convicted of crimes an opportunity to reform by providing a system of parole and boards to administer

it.

3. The right to take advantage of the loss of jurisdiction to impose sentence by permitting the convict to go at large for an unreasonable time upon his own

recognizance is not lost by acting upon the

favor conferred by the court.

(April 24, 1903.)

new

On

The facts, as they appear from the record, are as follows: The relator, Anton Boenert, was indicted in the criminal court of Cook county at the June term, 1898, for larceny and embezzlement, and on entering into a recognizance of $1,000, with two sureties, for his appearance, was released from custody. Afterwards, at the April term, 1900, the relator was tried by a jury, and found guilty of grand larceny, April 12, 1900. He immediately moved for a trial, and was remanded into custody. May 5, 1900, being the last day of the April term, on motion of the relator, the motion for a new trial was continued, and he was recognized, without sureties, in the sum of $500, to appear before the criminal court of Cook county on May 7, 1900, and from day to day and from term to term, and from day to day of each term, until the final sentence or order of the court, to answer upon the indictment pending, and he was, on his own recognizance, released from custody. The next record in the case

APPLICATION for a writ of habeas corpus is of the October term, 1902. On October

to secure petitioner's release from the custody of the sheriff of Cook County in which he was detained by reason of a mittimus issued by the Criminal Court. Petitioner discharged.

Statement by Carter, J.:

At the December term, 1902, of this court, the relator presented his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, directed to Thomas E. Barrett, sheriff of Cook County, to the

NOTE. AS to validity of suspension of sentence after conviction, see, in this series, note to People v. Cummings, 14 L. R. A. 285; also State v. Voss, 8 L. R. A. 767; People ex rel. Forsyght v. Court of Sessions, 23 L. R. A. 856; Re Webb, 27 L. R. A. 356; State v. Crook, 29 L. R. A. 260; Weber v. State, 41 L. R. A. 472; People ex rel. Smith v. Allen, 41 L. R. A. 473; and Neal v. State, 42 L. R. A. 190.

31, 1902, the same judge before whom the relator was tried and convicted, and who allowed him to depart on his own recognizance, overruled his motion for a new trial. Relator then moved in arrest of judgment, and this motion was continued to The motion was finally overruled November November 5, 1902, and he was remanded. 11th, and relator sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary. He immediately applied. for 2 writ of habeas corpus to the circuit court of Cook county. On a hearing the petition was dismissed. He then applied to this court, as already stated.

Mr. Joseph B. David, for relator:

The criminal court was without jurisdiction to pronounce judgment November 11,

1902, on the verdict rendered April 12, | Most Excellent Majesty, directed to the 1900, and therefore such judgment is abso- | Secretary of State's office, stating that, from lutely void.

People ex rel. Smith v. Allen, 155 Ill. 61, 41 L. R. A. 473, 39 N. E. 568; Weaver v. People, 33 Mich. 296.

The judgment is in violation of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and of § 2, art. 2, of the Constitution of the state of Illinois.

Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 28 L. ed. 569, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 663; Eden v. People, 161 Ill. 296, 32 L. R. A. 659, 43 N. E. 1108.

favorable circumstances appearing at the trial, he recommends him to His Majesty's mercy and to a pardon, upon condition of transportation or some slight punishment. The recommendation is always attended to." Christian's note to 4 Bl. Com. 404.

There can be no doubt that a court has the right, in a criminal cause, to delay pronouncing judgment for a reasonable time,. for the purpose of hearing and determining motions for a new trial or in arrest of judgment, or to give the defendant time to

Messrs. Charles S. Deneen and F. L. perfect an appeal or writ of error, or for Barnett for defendant.

Carter, J., delivered the opinion of the

court:

It is strenuously urged for the relator that the long interval of two years and five months that intervened between his release on his own recognizance while his motion for a new trial was pending, and the final disposition of that motion and his remandment to custody, which was followed nearly a month later by a sentence to the penitentiary, was tantamount to an abandonment of the proceeding and a release from further imprisonment, and that the court thereby lost jurisdiction to enter up a judgment

on the verdict.

SO

At common law, upon every conviction in the court of King's bench of a crime, cap ital or not capital, whether by verdict or confession, the party had four days to move in arrest of judgment, if there were many days remaining of the term, and, if not, then the longest time that could be had in the term. 2 Hawk. P. C. chap. 48. The power of granting a respite belongs, of common right, to every tribunal which is invested with authority to award execution; but it is commonly granted where the defendant pleads a pardon, which, though defective in point of form, sufficiently manifests the intention of the Crown to remit the sentence, where it seems doubtful whether the offense is not included in some general act of grace, or whether it amounts to so high a crime as that charged in the indictment. The judge sometimes also allows it before judgment, or at least intimates his intention to do so, as when he is not satisfied with the verdict and entertains doubts as to the prisoner's guilt, or when a doubt arises if the crime be not within clergy, or when, from some favorable circumstances, he intends to recommend the prisoner to mercy. 1 Chitty, Crim. Law, 758; 2 Hawk. P. C. chap. 51, § 8; 2 Hale, P. C. chap. 58, p. 412. “If the judge thinks it proper to reprieve a capital convict, he sends a memorial or certificate to the King's

other proper causes; but to suspend indefinitely the pronouncing of the sentence after conviction, or to suspend indefinitely the execution of the judgment after sentence pronounced, is not within the power of the court. To allow such a power would place the criminal at the caprice of the judge. If the judge can delay the sentence one year, he could delay it for fifteen years, or any length of time. In United States v. Wilson, 46 Fed. 748, the defendant pleaded guilty to adultery, and, upon his promise to obey the laws upon that subject, it was "ordered that the sentence be suspended and until further orders of this court, and that said defendant be released and his bail exonerated." Two years later the order was revoked and he was sentenced. The court held that it was beyond the power of the court that the entry of the first order was error, to suspend sentence for an indefinite time,

and that the court could not correct such error at another term.

On a

In People v. Blackburn, 6 Utah, 347, 23 Pac. 759, one Dodds was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter; and on his motion, by an order entered, reciting that good and sufficient reasons were made to appear therefor, sentence was suspended during good behavior. Blackburn, the successor of the judge who entered this order, refused to fix a time to pronounce judgment. proceeding for a mandate to the judge, the court said: "It is the duty of the court to keep control of the case, and within a reasonable time to proceed to give judg ment, and in doing so to exercise such discretion as the statute governing the particular offense commits to the court. The authority to wholly relieve parties from a conviction for crime is not given to the courts, but belongs to the pardoning power.” The court held that the court below had determined to inflict the lightest penalty, and, that being purely nominal, he had refused to pass sentence at all. See also Re Flint, 25 Utah, 338, 71 Pac. 531.

In Weaver v. People, 33 Mich. 296, the defendant pleaded guilty, sentence was sus

pended until the next term, and he was al- the prisoner to bail on recognizance to aplowed to go on his own recognizance. Noth pear when required, to receive sentence. A ing further was done for two years and six stay of sentence may be granted where a months, when he was sentenced. The court certiorari is sued out or where a writ of said: "Sentences may be suspended for va- error is obtained for the purpose of review rious purposes. It may be for the purpose by the higher courts. Temporary stay may of allowing steps to be taken for a new also be granted where steps are taken for a trial or other relief, or it may be with a new trial; but all these are steps in the view of letting the offender go without pun- progress of the case taken for the purpose ishment. The release of a defendant on his of bringing about a change in the result. own recognizance and without sureties, in It thus appears that over a year a merely nominal amount, signifies usually elapsed after Reilly was convicted of the the latter purpose. It at least is a plain crime of larceny from the person before he assertion of the judge that he did not re- was sentenced. During a large portion of gard the offense as one that should receive the time he had been suffered to go at large a severe punishment. The failure to take upon his own recognizance. If the judge steps during the October term of 1874 was entertained serious doubts of his guilt, he a practical abandonment of the prosecution, should have recommended the governor to and corroborates the opinion that such must pardon the respondent; and, if he enterhave been understood as the object of the tained no serious doubts of his guilt, he suspension, and, as the record stands, it is should have pronounced judgment, instead fairly to be inferred it was intentional." of setting the criminal at large upon his And in that case the judgment was reversed own recognizance. If such power can be and the defendant discharged, but in the exercised by a judge, it incorporates into subsequent case of People v. Reilly, 53 Mich. our administration of the criminal law the 260, 18 N. W. 849, the same court appears ticket of leave' system of the English to have been equally divided as to the power judicature, without its surveillance and to suspend sentence. In this case Reilly was checks, and places the criminal at the caconvicted of robbery October 22, 1881, and price of the judge, subject to be called up moved for a new trial; but on February for sentence at any time. If the judge can 10, 1882, sentence was indefinitely suspend- delay sentence one year, I do not see why ed, and he was admitted to bail on his own he may not fifteen years. An exercise of recognizance in the sum of $500, to appear such power in this age would be no less rein court February 14, 1882, and from day volting to our sense of justice than was to day and from term to term, then and the exercise of such power in the reign there to receive the sentence of the court. of James I., when he sent Sir Walter RaFebruary 14th the motion for a new trial leigh to the block fifteen years after his was denied. About seven months afterwards conviction." Campbell, J., said: "I think he was arrested on another charge, but was the court lost all power to sentence the renot tried, and on November 28, 1882, he spondent by the discharge, on his own recogwas sentenced to imprisonment for five nizance, for so long a period, and that the years. Sherwood, J., said: “Under the third | sentence cannot be sustained without pracassignment of error the respondent's counsel tically overruling our previous holdings." claim that the suspension of sentence was In a still later case (People v. Brown, 54 so long that the court lost jurisdiction to Mich. 15, 19 N. W. 571), Chief Justice make the sentence he did. Under our prac- Cooley delivering the opinion, in commenttice, courts may, for good cause, suspending upon a petition to the judge of the sentence a reasonable length of time after lower court to suspend sentence, said: The trial and conviction." Champlin, J., said: "I do not think it is competent for a circuit judge or other judicial officer to suspend indefinitely the sentence which the law makes it his duty to impose upon a person duly convicted, or who may plead guilty in his court. The effect of suspending sentence operates as a quasi pardon. It relieves the offender, for the time being, from the punishment which the law has prescribed shall be inflicted. The pardoning power, under our Constitution, is reposed in the governor, and not in the judges. The Constitution having vested this power in the governor, it cannot be exercised by the circuit judges indirectly by letting

petitioners "formally request the judge himself, a high state official, and the chief conservator of law and public order in that part of the state, to grasp at power not confided to him, and usurp authority in the interest of a doubly convicted offender. That there may be no misapprehension on this point, it is only necessary to understand exactly what it was the judge was requested to do. In terms, it was to suspend sentence. Now, it is no doubt competent for a criminal court, after conviction, to stay for a time its sentence, and many good reasons may be suggested for doing so, such as to give opportunity for a motion for a new trial or in arrest, or to enable the judge to