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discovery of fugitive criminals he is prac- Hence for a short time a man may be easily tically infallible. It is a commonly accepted trailed in the woods or in the open country notion that he will start from the place by the effluvia in his wake. But in a city, where a crime has been committed, follow and after the lapse of considerable time, the for miles the track upon which he has been trailing is obviously more difficult, and set, find he culprit, confront him, and, often manifestly impossible. But difficulmirabile dictu, by accusing bay and mien ties do not deter the bloodhound from purdeclare, “Thou art the man.” This strange suing his business. He trails as best he can. misbelief is with some people apparently in. He always follows some scent, and he goes corrigible. It is a delusion which abundant somewhere. Undoubtedly nice and delicate actual experience has failed to dissipate. It questions are time and again presented to lives on from generation to generation. It him for decision. But the considerations has still the attractiveness of a fresh crea- that induced him in a particular case to tion. “Time writes no wrinkles on its brow." adopt one conclusion rather than another But it is nevertheless a delusion,—an evj. cannot go to the jury. The jury cannor dent and obvious delusion. The sleuthhound know whether the reasons on which he acted of fiction is a marvelous dog, but we find were good or bad; whether they were all on nothing quite like him in real life. We re- one side, or evenly balanced; nor whether pudiate utterly the suggestion that there is his faith in the identity of the scent which any common knowledge of the bloodhound's he followed was strong or weak. In atcapacity for trailing which would justify us tempting to separate one smell from ten, in accepting his conclusions as trustworthy twenty, fifty, or a hundred similar smells under circumstances like those disclosed by with which it is intermixed and commingled, the present record. The burglary was com- it is highly probable, if not quite certain, mitted on the morning of July 5th, before that the bloodhound undertakes a task altodaylight. The trailing did not commence gether beyond his capacity. Like other until about 5 in the afternoon. In the dogs, he has his limitations, and they must meantime the trail, near the scene of the be recognized in courts of justice, if not crime, had been walked over, closely paral- elsewhere. That the conclusions of the leled, and crossed, directly and obliquely, bloodhound are generally too unreliable to perhaps, a hundred times. And the sun had be accepted as evidence in either civil or been shining on it steadily for more than criminal cases is, we believe, the teaching twelve hours. The situation the dogs had of that common knowledge and ordinary exto deal with was an exceptionally difficult perience which we may rightfully bring to one, and it was, we think, reversible error the examination of this subject. If such ev. to accept their conclusion as legal evidence idence were held to be legal evidence, it of defendant's guilt. To get a nearer and would, standing alone, sustain a conviction ; clearer view of the nature of the evidence and courts, in this golden age of enlightenerroneously admitted, let us consider closely ment, would now and again be under the what trailing is. The path of every human humiliating necessity of adjudging that being through the world, at every step, from some citizen be deprived of his property, his the cradle to the grave, is strewn with the liberty, or his life, because, forsooth, within putrescent excretions of his body. This twenty-four or forty hours after the comwaste matter is in process of decomposition. mission of a crime, a certain dog indicated It is being resolved into its constituent ele- by his conduct that he believed the scent of ments, and its power to make an impression some microscopic particles supposed to have on the olfactory nerves of a dog or other been dropped by the perpetrator of the crime animal becomes fainter and fainter with was identical with, or closely resembled, the lapse of time. Under favorable conditions, scent of the person who had been accused and such as free exposure to the air and sun, put upon trial. There are, we know, some every compound particle is rapidly sep. cases in this country which held that this arated into its original parts, and when the kind of evidence is competent, but it seems dissolution is complete its characteristic the judicial history of the civilized world is scent is gone. The bloodhound is endowed against them. The bloodhound is, we admit, with a remarkably keen scent. He has frequently right in his conclusions, but that. great ability for differentiating smells. His he is frequently wrong is a fact well atmethod of trailing is simple and well under- tested by experience. What he does in trailstood. Particles of waste matter given off ing may be regarded as the declaration of a by a particular individual fall to the disinterested party, but, so regarded, the ground, and while undergoing chemical authorities are opposed to its admission. It change come in contact with the olfactory is unsafe evidence, and both reason and in. nerves of the dog, and produce an impression stinct condenın it. which he is able to recognize, as distinct The judgment is reversed, and the cause and different from all other impressions.'remanded for further proceedings.


Walter K. F. VILA et al.

ing a sale thereof, and the confirmation of

the sale made under such orders.

10. In the absence of statutory authorGRAND ISLAND ELECTRIC LIGHT, ICE,

ity, courts of equity do not possess & COLD STORAGE COMPANY

jurisdiction over corporate bodies to the And

extent of, on the application of private parRexford E. HULETT et al., Interveners,

ties, appointing a receiver, sequestrating th

property and business, and selling the same Appts.

through the instrumentality of such receiv.

er, and thereby wind up the affairs and ter(........Neb.........)

minate the business, and indirectly dissolve

the corporation. •1. A receivership is a purely ancillary remedy, and cannot be maintained in

(March 18, 1903.) a proceeding instituted solely for that pur

pose. 2. Unless expressly authorized by stat- of the District Court for Hall County

ute, a court has no jurisdiction to ap- appointing a receiver for the defendant corpoint a receiver of corporate property upon poration and confirming his sale of its propgrounds which would not be sufficient were the owner a natural person.

erty. Reversed. 3. A receiver cannot be appointed at

The facts are stated in the opinions. the instance of a mere mortgagee for Messrs. Charles G. Ryan and R. C.

property not covered by the mortgage. Glanville, for appellants: 4. Jurisdiction to appoint a receiver of

There was no "action pending" within the corporate property cannot be conferred by the mere consent of the corporation,

meaning of § 267 of the Code. The petition where neither equitable nor statutory grounds states nothing upon which to pend such an exist, and where other parties, whose rights action. are affected, have not been notified; nor is a A receiver is an indifferent person appointstockhoider concluded by such an order.

ed by the court to receive and protect the On Rehearing. 15. The question of whether a petition property or fund in litigation pendente lite. states a

of action, or discloses The appointment is not the ultimate end and grounds suficient for the granting of equita- object of the suit, but is merely a provisional ble relief, may be raised at any stage of the remedy or auxiliary proceeding. proceedings in the appellate court, up to and including the aling of a motion for a re

State ex rel. Merriam v. Ross, 122 Mo. hearing.

435, 23 L. R. A. 538, 25 S. W. 947; High, 6. A prayer for general equitable re- Receivers, & l; Brown v. Rauch, 1 Wash.

lief, coupled with that of one for specific 497, 20 Pac. 785.
relief, cannot be extended so as to warrant
the granting of relief not embraced within

The relief granted must respond to the and comprehended by the allegations of fact issues pleaded, or is null. contained in the pleading.

State ex rel. Emerson v. Dickinson, 59 7. The appointment of a receiver in an Neb. 753, 82 N. W. 16; Truesdell v. Sarles,

equitable action is ordinarily an ancil: 104 N. Y. 167, 10 N. E. 139.
lary remedy provisional in character, and
incidental to the main object or purpose of

The ambiguous prayer did not make the the suit.

petition good, nor aid the statement of fact. 8. Save in certain classes of suits in

Stephens v. Harding, 48 Neb. 659, 67 N. equity which constitute well-recos-W. 746; F'ox v. Graves, 46 Neb. 816, 65 N. nized exceptions, the jurisdiction

of courts of equity does not warrant the appoint

W. 887. ment of a receiver to take charge of and ad- There is nothing in the pleadings, nothing minister the property and business of a cor- in our statutes, nothing in general equity poration in an independent action, where that is the main object and purpose of the practice as now followed by our courts, to suit and the sole and only relief asked for.

authorize the order of March 5 or support 9. Petition in the case at bar exam- the decree of May 6, where for the first time

ined, construed, and held defective in sub- the storage company was found to be in. stance, and insufficient to support the orders of the court appointing a receiver to take solvent, without pleading or proof. change of and sequestrate the property and Clark v. National Linseed Oil Co. 45 C. C. business of the defendant corporation, direct. | A. 53, 105 Fed. 787. *Headnotes by LOBINGIER, C.

A court of equity will not appoint a refRehearing headnotes by HOLCOMB, J. ceiver of a corporation in the absence of

NOTE.-As to power to appoint receiver of statutory provisions, unless the same relief corporation where no other relief is asked, see

would be granted any unincorporated assoalso Supreme Sitting, O. of 1. H. v. Baker, 20 ciation of natural persons; since one is only L. R. A. 210, and note; Whitney v. Hanover appointed as a necessary measure to the enNat. Bank, 23 L. R. A. 531 ; State ex rel. Merriam v. Ross, 23 L. R. A. 534 ; and Wallace v.

forcement of some recognized equitable Pierce-Wallace Pub. Co. 38 L. R. A, 122. right.

Barber v. International Co. 73 Conn. 587, | There was no “action pending" when the 48 Atl. 758.

receiver was originally appointed. This ainounted to an involuntary bank. Jones v. Bank of Leadrille, 10 Colo. 464, ruptcy proceeding. This kind of an action 17 Pac. 272. can only be brought in the proper bank- A court of equity, as such, has no jurisdicruptcy courts.

tion over corporate bodies for the purpose Ibid.

of winding up their concerns. The laborers had liens, as set out in their French Bank Case, 53 Cal. 550; Neall v. cross-petitions, which should have been pre- Hill, 16 Cal. 145, 76 Am. Dec. 508; Davis ferred over the claims of all other credit- v. Flagstaff Silver Min. Co. 2 Utah, 92; ors, the plaintiff included.

Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Union Mills PlasFosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235, 25 L. ed. ter Co. 3 L. R. A. 90, 37 Fed. 286; Barry 339; Drennen v. Mercantile Trust & Deposit v. Briggs, 22 Mich. 201; Belmont v. Erie Co. 115 Ala. 592, 39 L. R. A. 623, 67. Am. St. R. Co. 52 Barb. 637; People v. Weigley, 155 Rep. 72, 23 So. 164; Lee v. Pennsylvania Ill. 491, 40 N. E. 300; Republican Moun. Traction Co. 105 Fed. 405; Farmers' Loan tain Silver Mines v. Brown, 24 L. R. A. 776, & T. Co. v. American Waterworks Co. 107 7 C. C. A. 412, 19 U. S. App. 203, 58 Fed. Fed. 23; Moore v. Southern States Land & 645; French v. Gifford, 30 Iowa, 153; Clark Timber Co. 83 Fed. 399; Killian v. Eoving- v. Raymond, 84 Iowa, 251, 50 N. W. 1068; haus, 110 U. S. 568, 28 L. ed. 246, 4 Sup. Ct. State v. Ross, 2 Ohio N. P. 368; Hutchinson Rep. 232; Merchants' Nat. Bank v. McDon-v. Wright, 109 La. 29, 33 So. 57; Wallace ald, 63 Neb. 363, 88 N. W. 492, 89 N. W. v. Pierce-Wallace Pub. Co. 101 Iowa, 313, 770; Roberts v. Johnson, 5 Colo. App. 406, 38 L. R. A. 122, 63 Am. St. Rep. 389, 70 N. 39 Pac. 596; Hall v. Johnson, 21 Colo. 414, W. 216; Wheeler v. Pullman Iron d Steel 42 Pac. 660; Noyes v. Brace, 8 S. D. 190, 65 Co. 143 Ill. 197, 17 L. R. A. 818, 32 N. E. N. W. 1071; Ramsdell v. Citizens' Electric 420; Link Belt Machinery Co. v. Hughes, Light & P. Co. 103 Mich. 89, 61 N. W. 275; 195 III

. 413, 59 L. R. A. 673, 63 N. E. 186; Potts v. New Jersey Arms & Ordinance Co. Schack v. McKey, 100 Ill. App. 294; Jones 17 N. J. Eq. 395; Smith v. Western U. Teleg. 272; Supreme Sitting, O. of I. H. v. Baker,

v. Bank of Leadville, 10 Colo. 464, 17 Pac. Co. 3 McCrary, 130, 11 Fed. 1; Shelbyville 134 Ind. 293, 20 L. R. A. 210, 33 N. E. 1128; Water Co. v. People, 140 Ill. 545, 16 L. R. A. Beach, Priv. Corp. § 772; State ex rel. Inde505, 30 N. E. 678; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. pendent Dist. Teleg. Co. v. Second Judicial v. St. Joseph & D. C. R. Co. 3 Dill. 412, Fed. Dist. Court, 15 Mont. 324, 27 L. R. A. 395, Cas. No. 4,669; Brown v. Rauch, 1 Wash. 48 Am. St. Rep. 682, 39 Pac. 316; Neall 497, 20 Pac. 785.

v. Hill, 16 Cal. 145, 76 Am. Dec. 508. Even if plaintiff claimed under a chattel The result of this case was, in effect, a mortgage he had no right of possession ex- dissolution of the corporation, and equity cept for the purpose of foreclosing it. has no jurisdiction to dissolve a corporation

Marseilles Mfg. Co. v. Perry, 62 Neb. 715, except it is conferred by statute. 87 N. W. 544.

Thompson v. Greeley, 107 Mo. 585, 17 S. He could not foreclose until his mortgage W. 962; St. Louis, K. & S. R. 06. v. Wear, had been filed.

135 Mo. 230, 33 L. R. A. 341, 36 S. W. 357, Loeb v.

Milner, 21 Neb. 400, 32 N. W. 658; Hovelman v. Kansas City Horse R. Co. 205; Hall v. Aitkin, 25 Neb. 365, 41 N. W.79 Mo. 639; Morawetz, Priv. Corp. last ed. 192.

88 282, 283; Republican Mountain Silver The petition filed by the plaintiff did not Mines v. Broun, 24 L. R. A. 776, 7 C. C. A. state a cause action.

412, 19 U. S. App. 203, 58 Fed. 644; Fischer Kemper, H. & McD. Dry Goods Co. v.

v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. 129, 42 Pac. 561; Renshaw, 58 Neb. 514, 78 N. W. 1071.

Barber v. International Co. 73 Conn. 587, 48 The decree did not conform with or re

Atl. 759; Merchants' Nat. Bank v. McDonspond to anything found in the petition. ald, 63 Neb. 363, 88 N. W. 492, 89 N. W.

770. This makes the decree a nullity. Rockford Watch Co. v. Manifold, 36 Neb. trate the property of a corporation by means

A court of equity has no power to seques801, 55 N. W. 236; Lincoln Nat. Bank v. of a receiver. Virgin, 36 Neb. 735, 38 Am. St. Rep. 747,

Cook, Corp. ed. 1898, § 629; United States 55 N. W. 218; Lipp v. Horbach, 12 Neb. Trust Co. v. New York, W. 8. & B. R. Co. 371, 11 N. W. 431; State ex rel. Emerson 101 N. Y. 478, 5 N. E. 316; Decker v. Gard. v. Dickinson, 59 Neb. 753, 82 N. W. 16; ner, 124 N. Y. 334, 11 L. R. A. 480, 26 N. E. Truesdell v. Sarles, 104 N. Y. 167, 10 N. E. 814; Crombie v. Order of Solon, 157 Pa. 588, 139; Stephens v. Harding, 48 Neb. 659, 6727 Atl. 710; Oldham v. Mt. Sterling Improv. N. W. 746; Fox v. Graves, 46 Neb. 816, 65 Co. 103 Ky. 529, 45 S. W. 779; Mason v. N. W. 887.

Supreme Ct. Equitable League, 77 Md. 483, 63 L. R. A.

39 Am. St. Rep. 433, 27 Atl. 171; Heap v.ceiver other than the one named by the apHeap Mfg. Co. 97 Mich. 147, 56 N. W. 349; plicant, without giving formal notice. Hinckley v. Pfister, 83 Wis. 64, 53 N. W. Farmers' & M. Bank v. German Nat. 21; Worth Mfg. Co. v. Bingham, 54 C. C. A. Bank, 59 Neb. 229, 80 N. W. 820. 119, 116 Fed. 785; State Invest. & Ins. Co. When this property was in the hands of v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. 135, 35 Pac. the receiver it was in the custody of the 549; Dudley v. Dakota Hot Springs Co. 11 law, and is to be administered by the court S. D. 559, 79 N. W. 839.

for the benefit of all the company's creditA suit by a creditor of an insolvent cor- ors. poration for the appointment of a receiver Veith v. Ress, 60 Neb. 52, 82 N. W. 116. cannot be maintained as a suit by a general The receiver cannot be sued or summoned creditor to wind up the defendant's affairs, as garnishee in respect to the property in since for that purpose the jurisdiction of his possession by virtue of his trust. the proper bankruptcy court should be in- Mocre v. Southern States Land d Timber voked.

Co. 83 Fed. 399; Moran v. Sturges, 154 U. Barber v. International Co. 73. Conn. 587, S. 256, 38 L. ed. 981, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1019; 48 Atl. 759.

Shepherd v. Pepper, 133 U. S. 626, 33 L. ed. A thing cannot be done indirectly that is 706, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 438; High, Receivforbidden directly.

ers, pp. 310, 311; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Ketcham v. McNamara, 72 Conn. 709, 50 Southern States Land & Timber Co. 30 C. L. R. A. 641, 46 Atl. 146; Harbaugh v. Cos. C. A. 349, 52 U. S. App. 675, 86 Fed. 711; tello, 184 Ill. 110, 75 Am. St. Rep. 147, 56 Steele v. Walker, 115 Ala. 485, 67 Am. St. N. E. 363; Parmenter Mfg. Co. v. Hamilton, Rep. 62, 21 So. 942; Jackson v. Lahee, 114 172 Mass. 178, 70 Am. St. Rep. 258, 51 N. Ill. 287, 2 N. E. 172; Fidelity Ins. Trust & E. 529; 8. C. Westcott Co. v. Berry, 69 8. D. Co. v. Roanoke Iron Co. 81 Fed. 439; N. H. 505, 45 Atl. 352; First Nat. Bank v. Connecticut River Bkg. Co. v. Rockbridge Wure, 95 Me. 388, 50 Atl. 24; Re F. A. Hall Co. 73 Fed. 709. Co. 121 Fed. 992; Re Bruss-Ritter Co. 90 Each of the appellants, having entered Fed. 651; Re Macon Sash, Door o Lumber his appearance and invoked the powers of Co. 112 Fed. 323.

the court in his behalf with respect to the Messrs. W. H. Thompson and V. 0. execution by the receiver of his trust, cannot Strickler, for appellees:

afterwards be heard to object to the jurisA court has the power to order its re- diction of the court. ceiver to make a sale of the property in his Veith v. Ress, 60 Neb. 52, 82 N. W. 116; hands in any case where the court thinks Commonwealth Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Hayden it is for the best interests of the parties. Bros. 60 Neb. 636, 83 Am. St. Rep. 545,

High, Receivers, s 192; Beach, Receivers, 83 N. W. 922; Hawkins v. Glenn, 131 U. S. { 727; 20 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 145; 319, 33 L. ed. 184, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 739; Jackson v. Lahee, 114 Ill. 287, 2 N. E. 172; Jackson v. Lahee, 114 Ill. 287, 2 N. E. 172. Farmers' & M. Bank v. German Nat. Bank,

On rehearing. 59 Neb. 229, 80 N. W. 820; Crane v. Ford, Independently of statutory provisions, Hopk. Ch. 114; Walker v. Morris, 14 Ga. equity has jurisdiction to appoint a 323; McLane v. Placerville & 8. Valley R. ceiver over corporate property in the followCo. 66 Cal. 606, 6 Pac. 748; De Visser v. ing cases : (1) At the suit of those who Blackstone, 6 Blatchf. 235, Fed. Cas. No. have a lien upon the corporate property; 3,840; First Nat. Bank v. Shedd, 121 U. S. (2) at the suit of creditors who have ob74, 30 L. ed. 877, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 807; Mel- tained judgment, and have exhausted all len v. Moline Malleable Iron Wor's, 131 U. legal remedies to collect it; (3) at the suit S. 352, 33 L. ed. 178, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 781; of a creditor or stockholder of a moneyed Davis y. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 21 L. ed. 447. corporation interested in its funds, if the

The court could appoint a receiver on its creditor has a lien, where there is a breach own motion.

of duty on the part of directors, and a Elk Fork Oil & Gas Co. v. Foster, 39 C. C. threatened loss of funds or security; (4) A. 615, 99 Fed. 495; Earle v. Earle, 27 Neb. where the corporation is dissolved, and has 277, 20 Am. St. Rep. 667, 43 N. W. 118; no officer to attend to its affairs. Cochran v. Cochran, 42 Neb. 612, 60 N. W. Consolidated Tank-Line Co. v. Kansas 942; Morrissey v. Broomal, 37 Neb. 778, 56 City Varnish Co. 43 Fed. 204; Wayne Pike N. W. 383; Disher v. Disher, 45 Neb. 100, Co. v. Hammons, 129 Ind. 368, 27 N. E. 487; 63 N. W. 368; Flentham v. Steward, 45 Supreme Sitting, O. of I. H. v. Baker, 134 Neb. 641, 63 N. W. 924; McDaniel v. Lee, Ind. 293, 20 L. R. A. 210, 33 N. E. 1128; 37 Mo. 207.

State v. Northern O. R. Co. 18 Md. 193; Notice of the appointment may be waived Davis v. United States Electric Power & by voluntary appearance, and when such L. Co. 77 Md. 35, 25 Atl. 982; Baywood v. waiver is had the court may appoint a re- Lincoln Lumber Co. 64 Wis. 639, 26 N. W.


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184; Cameron v. Groveland Improv. Co. 20 Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308, 19 L.
Wash. 169, 72 Am. St. Rep. 26, 54 Pac. ed. 931.
1128; Fidelity Title & T. Co. v. Schenley The court has jurisdiction of the subject-
Park & H. R. Co. 189 Pa. 363, 69 Am. St. matter in cases of this kind. Simply the
Rep. 815, 42 Atl. 140; United States Rubber sale of the corporation's property was
Co. v. American Oak Leather Co. 27 C. C. sought, and that the proceeds be applied to
A. 118, 53 U. S. App. 444, 82 Fed. 248; the payment of its debts. This in no man-
Doe v. Northwest Coal & Transp. Co. 64 ner dissolved the corporation, or sought to.
Fed. 928.

Boston Invest. Co. v. Pacific Short Lino It was the rule at common law that an in- Bridge Co. 104 Iowa, 311, 73 N. W. 839; dependent action could be brought against Barber v. International Co. 73 Conn. 590, an insolvent corporation and its property 48 Atl. 758; Beach, Priv. Corp. 1189. sequestered through the appointment of a The mortgagee has his option, upon conreceiver, and held and applied to the pay. dition broken, to maintain a bill in equity ment of the debts owing by the corporation, for a foreclosure of the mortgage, or to obby any creditor having a lien thereon. tain possession of the mortgaged property,

Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, through the appointment of a receiver. 21 How. 112, 16 L. ed. 38; Macon & W. R. Shaw v. Norfolk County R. Co. 5 Gray, Co. v. Parker, 9 Ga. 378; Blanchard v. 162. Cauthorne, 4 Sim. 566; Fripp v. Chard R. The appointment of receivers originated Co. 21 Eng. L. & Eq. 53; Adler v. Milwau- in the courts of chancery in England, and kee Patent Brick Mfg. Co. 13 Wis. 63; Spear has naturally descended to all courts which v. Grant, 16 Mass. 9; Vose v. Grant, 15 have jurisdiction in equity, as a part of Mass. 505; Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason, 308, their inherent power. Fed. Cas. No. 17,944; Ward v. Griswoldville Gluck & B. Receivers, § 10, p. 30; 2 Mfg. Co. 16 Conn. 593; Mann v. Pentz, 3 Waterman, Corp. $8 355, 356; Ohio Civ. N. Y. 415; Nathan v. Whitlock, 9 Paige, Proc. (Seney) pp. 244–248. 152; Henry v. Vermillion & A. R. Co. 17 Courts of equity and common law are not Ohio, 187; Ogilvie v. Knox Ins. Co. 22 How. limited as to jurisdiction by statutes. 380, 16 L. ed. 349; High, Receivers, 3d ed. Earle v. Earle, 27 Neb. 277, 20 Am. St. p. 263, § 303 ; Toule v. American Bldg. Rep. 667, 43 N. W. 118; Jennings v. Simp Loan of Invest. Soc. 60 Fed. 131; Sage v. son, 12 Neb. 558, 11 N. W. 880; Monroe v. Memphis & L. R. R. Co. 125 U. S. 361, 31 L. Reid, 46 Neb. 317, 64 N. W. 983; 2 Beach, ed. 694, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 887; Quincy, M. & Priv. Corp. p. 1192, $ 762; Houell v. West. P. R. Co. v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 82, 36 ern R. Co. 94 U. S. 463, 24 L. ed. 254; Legg L. ed. 632, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 787; Hollins v. v. Mathieson, 2 Giff. 71; Wildy v. Mid Brierfield Coal & 1. Co. 150 U. S. 371, 37 L. Pants R. Co. 16 Week. Rep. 409. ed. 1113, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 127; Barber v.

Receivers may be appointed to prevent International Co. 73 Conn. 590, 48 Atl. 758. forfeitures. If it is necessary that a statutory enact

Wait, Insolvent Corp. p. 212, $ 256. ment be had in order that jurisdiction might

Even prior to default. exist in the courts of this state, the enact- Id. p. 213, § 257; Long Dock Co. v. . ment of g 266, 1 5, p. 1282, Comp. Stat. Mallery, 12 N. J. Eq. 432. 1901, would be sufficient to warrant the ap

Or to preserve the property. pointment of a receiver in this case as an

Thompson v. Natchez Water & Seicer Co. independent action brought for that pur-York & N. E. R. Co. 22 Blatchf. 72, 19 Fed.

68 Miss. 423, 9 So. 821; Brassey v. New pose. Ponca Mill Co. v. Mikesell, 55 Neb. 101,

663; Doe v. Northwest Coal & Transp. Co. 75 N. W. 46.

64 Fed. 928; Sutton Mfg. Co. v. Hutchinson, If the court had jurisdiction,—that is, if

11 C. C. A. 320, 24 U. S. App. 145, 63 Fed. it was such a case as the court had a right & Pipe Works, 7 C. C. A. 603, 18 U. S. App.

498; Oconto Water Co. v. National Foundry to hear and determine,—its order making 380, 59 Fed. 19; Trust & Deposit Co. v. the appointment of a receiver would not be Spartanburg Waterworks Co. 91 Fed. 324; absolutely void, even if the petition was in Temple v. Glasgow, 25 C. C. A. 540, 42 U. fact defective, but would simply be an error, S. App. 417, 80 Fed. 441; Connecticut River which might have been corrected if the Bkg. Co. v. Rockbridge Co. 73 Fed. 709; proper proceeding had been had for reversal. Brown, B. & Co. v. Lake Superior Iron Co.

Dickerson v. Cass County Bank, 95 Iowa, 134 U. S. 530, 33 L. ed. 1021, 10 Sup. Ct. 392, 64 N. W. 397; Reinach v. Atlantic & Rep. 604; Texas Consol. Compress & Mfg. G. W. R. Co. 58 Fed. 33; Re James, 99 Cal. A880. v. Storrow, 34 C. C. A. 182, 92 Fed. 374, 37 Am. St. Rep. 60, 33 Pac. 1123. 12; Ponca Mill Co. v. Mikesell, 55 Neb.

Jurisdiction over the res is obtained by 98, 75 N. W. 46; Veith v. Ress, 60 Neb. its seizure under process of the court. 52, 82 N. W. 116; Barbour v. National

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