discovery of fugitive criminals he is prac- | Hence for a short time a man may be easily tically infallible. It is a commonly accepted trailed in the woods or in the open country notion that he will start from the place by the effluvia in his wake. But in a city, where a crime has been committed, follow and after the lapse of considerable time, the for miles the track upon which he has been trailing is obviously more difficult, and set, find the culprit, confront him, and, often manifestly impossible. But difficulmirabile dictu, by accusing bay and mien ties do not deter the bloodhound from purdeclare, "Thou art the man." This strange suing his business. He trails as best he can. misbelief is with some people apparently in- He always follows some scent, and he goes corrigible. It is a delusion which abundant somewhere. Undoubtedly nice and delicate actual experience has failed to dissipate. It questions are time and again presented to lives on from generation to generation. It him for decision. But the considerations has still the attractiveness of a fresh crea- that induced him in a particular case to tion. "Time writes no wrinkles on its brow." adopt one conclusion rather than another But it is nevertheless a delusion,-an evi- cannot go to the jury. The jury cannot dent and obvious delusion. The sleuthhound know whether the reasons on which he acted of fiction is a marvelous dog, but we find were good or bad; whether they were all on nothing quite like him in real life. We reone side, or evenly balanced; nor whether pudiate utterly the suggestion that there is his faith in the identity of the scent which any common knowledge of the bloodhound's he followed was strong or weak. In atcapacity for trailing which would justify us tempting to separate one smell from ten, in accepting his conclusions as trustworthy twenty, fifty, or a hundred similar smells under circumstances like those disclosed by with which it is intermixed and commingled, the present record. The burglary was com- it is highly probable, if not quite certain, mitted on the morning of July 5th, before that the bloodhound undertakes a task altodaylight. The trailing did not commence gether beyond his capacity. Like other until about 5 in the afternoon. In the dogs, he has his limitations, and they must meantime the trail, near the scene of the be recognized in courts of justice, if not crime, had been walked over, closely paral- elsewhere. That the conclusions of the leled, and crossed, directly and obliquely, bloodhound are generally too unreliable to perhaps, a hundred times. And the sun had be accepted as evidence in either civil or been shining on it steadily for more than criminal cases is, we believe, the teaching twelve hours. The situation the dogs had of that common knowledge and ordinary exto deal with was an exceptionally difficult perience which we may rightfully bring to one, and it was, we think, reversible error the examination of this subject. If such evto accept their conclusion as legal evidence idence were held to be legal evidence, it of defendant's guilt. To get a nearer and would, standing alone, sustain a conviction; clearer view of the nature of the evidence and courts, in this golden age of enlightenerroneously admitted, let us consider closely ment, would now and again be under the what trailing is. The path of every human humiliating necessity of adjudging that being through the world, at every step, from some citizen be deprived of his property, his the cradle to the grave, is strewn with the liberty, or his life, because, forsooth, within putrescent excretions of his body. This twenty-four or forty hours after the comwaste matter is in process of decomposition. mission of a crime, a certain dog indicated It is being resolved into its constituent ele- by his conduct that he believed the scent of ments, and its power to make an impression some microscopic particles supposed to have on the olfactory nerves of a dog or other been dropped by the perpetrator of the crime animal becomes fainter and fainter with was identical with, or closely resembled, the lapse of time. Under favorable conditions, scent of the person who had been accused and such as free exposure to the air and sun, put upon trial. There are, we know, some every compound particle is rapidly sep- cases in this country which held that this arated into its original parts, and when the kind of evidence is competent, but it seems dissolution is complete its characteristic the judicial history of the civilized world is scent is gone. The bloodhound is endowed against them. The bloodhound is, we admit, with a remarkably keen scent. He has frequently right in his conclusions, but that. great ability for differentiating smells. His he is frequently wrong is a fact well atmethod of trailing is simple and well under- tested by experience. What he does in trailstood. Particles of waste matter given off ing may be regarded as the declaration of a by a particular individual fall to the disinterested party, but, so regarded, the ground, and while undergoing chemical authorities are opposed to its admission. It change come in contact with the olfactory is unsafe evidence, and both reason and innerves of the dog, and produce an impression stinct condemn it. which he is able to recognize, as distinct The judgment is reversed, and the cause and different from all other impressions. 'remanded for further proceedings. Walter K. F. VILA et al. บ. GRAND ISLAND ELECTRIC LIGHT, ICE, & COLD STORAGE COMPANY And Rexford E. HULETT et al., Interveners, Appts. (........Neb.........) 1. A receivership is a purely ancillary remedy, and cannot be maintained in a proceeding instituted solely for that pur pose. 2. Unless expressly authorized by statute, a court has no jurisdiction to appoint a receiver of corporate property upon grounds which would not be sufficient were the owner a natural person. 3. A receiver cannot be appointed at the instance of a mere mortgagee for property not covered by the mortgage. 4. Jurisdiction to appoint a receiver of corporate property cannot be conferred by the mere consent of the corporation, where neither equitable nor statutory grounds exist, and where other parties, whose rights are affected, have not been notified; nor is a stockholder concluded by such an order. On Rehearing. †5. The question of whether a petition states a cause of action, or discloses grounds sufficient for the granting of equitable relief, may be raised at any stage of the proceedings in the appellate court, up to and including the filing of a motion for a rehearing. 6. A prayer for general equitable relief, coupled with that of one for specific relief, cannot be extended so as to warrant the granting of relief not embraced within and comprehended by the allegations of fact contained in the pleading. ancil 7. The appointment of a receiver in an equitable action is ordinarily an lary remedy provisional in character, and incidental to the main object or purpose of the suit. 8. Save in certain classes of suits in equity which constitute well-recognized exceptions, the jurisdiction of courts of equity does not warrant the appointment of a receiver to take charge of and administer the property and business of a corporation in an independent action, where that is the main object and purpose of the suit and the sole and only relief asked for. 9. Petition in the case at bar examined, construed, and held defective in substance, and insufficient to support the orders of the court appointing a receiver to take change of and sequestrate the property and business of the defendant corporation, direct Headnotes by LOBINGIER, C. Rehearing headnotes by HOLCOMB, J. NOTE-As to power to appoint receiver of corporation where no other relief is asked, see also Supreme Sitting, O. of I. H. v. Baker, 20 L. R. A. 210, and note; Whitney v. Hanover Nat. Bank, 23 L. R. A. 531; State ex rel. Mer riam v. Ross, 23 L. R. A. 534; and Wallace v. Pierce-Wallace Pub. Co. 38 L. R. A. 122. ing a sale thereof, and the confirmation of the sale made under such orders. 10. In the absence of statutory authority, courts of equity do not possess jurisdiction over corporate bodies to the extent of, on the application of private parties, appointing a receiver, sequestrating the property and business, and selling the same through the instrumentality of such receiver, and thereby wind up the affairs and terminate the business, and indirectly dissolve the corporation. A1 (March 18, 1903.) PPEAL by interveners from a judgment of the District Court for Hall County appointing a receiver for the defendant corporation and confirming his sale of its property. Reversed. The facts are stated in the opinions. Messrs. Charles G. Ryan and R. C. Glanville, for appellants: There was no "action pending" within the meaning of § 267 of the Code. The petition states nothing upon which to pend such an action. A receiver is an indifferent person appointed by the court to receive and protect the property or fund in litigation pendente lite. The appointment is not the ultimate end and object of the suit, but is merely a provisional remedy or auxiliary proceeding. State ex rel. Merriam v. Ross, 122 Mo. 435, 23 L. R. A. 538, 25 S. W. 947; High, Receivers, § 1; Brown v. Rauch, 1 Wash. 497, 20 Pac. 785. The relief granted must respond to the issues pleaded, or is null. State ex rel. Emerson v. Dickinson, 59 Neb. 753, 82 N. W. 16; Truesdell v. Sarles, 104 N. Y. 167, 10 N. E. 139. The ambiguous prayer did not make the petition good, nor aid the statement of fact. Stephens v. Harding, 48 Neb. 659, 67 N. W. 746; Fox v. Graves, 46 Neb. 816, 65 N. W. 887. There is nothing in the pleadings, nothing in our statutes, nothing in general equity practice as now followed by our courts, to authorize the order of March 5 or support the decree of May 6, where for the first time the storage company was found to be insolvent, without pleading or proof. Clark v. National Linseed Oil Co. 45 C. C. A. 53, 105 Fed. 787. A court of equity will not appoint a receiver of a corporation in the absence of statutory provisions, unless the same relief would be granted any unincorporated association of natural persons; since one is only appointed as a necessary measure to the enforcement of some recognized equitable. right. Barber v. International Co. 73 Conn. 587,| 48 Atl. 758. This amounted to an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding. This kind of an action can only be brought in the proper bankruptcy courts. Ibid. The laborers had liens, as set out in their cross-petitions, which should have been preferred over the claims of all other creditors, the plaintiff included. There was no "action pending" when the receiver was originally appointed. Jones v. Bank of Leadville, 10 Colo. 464, 17 Pac. 272. A court of equity, as such, has no jurisdiction over corporate bodies for the purpose of winding up their concerns. French Bank Case, 53 Cal. 550; Neall v. Hill, 16 Cal. 145, 76 Am. Dec. 508; Davis v. Flagstaff Silver Min. Co. 2 Utah, 92; Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Union Mills Plaster Co. 3 L. R. A. 90, 37 Fed. 286; Barry v. Briggs, 22 Mich. 201; Belmont v. Erie R. Co. 52 Barb. 637; People v. Weigley, 155 Ill. 491, 40 N. E. 300; Republican Mountain Silver Mines v. Brown, 24 L. R. A. 776, 7 C. C. A. 412, 19 U. S. App. 203, 58 Fed. 645; French v. Gifford, 30 Iowa, 153; Clark Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235, 25 L. ed. 339; Drennen v. Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co. 115 Ala. 592, 39 L. R. A. 623, 67. Am. St. Rep. 72, 23 So. 164; Lee v. Pennsylvania Traction Co. 105 Fed. 405; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. American Waterworks Co. 107 Fed. 23; Moore v. Southern States Land & Timber Co. 83 Fed. 399; Killian v. Eoving-v. Raymond, 84 Iowa, 251, 50 N. W. 1068; haus, 110 U. S. 568, 28 L. ed. 246, 4 Sup. Ct. State v. Ross, 2 Ohio N. P. 368; Hutchinson Rep. 232; Merchants' Nat. Bank v. McDon-V. Wright, 109 La. 29, 33 So. 57; Wallace ald, 63 Neb. 363, 88 N. W. 492, 89 N. W. 770; Roberts v. Johnson, 5 Colo. App. 406, 39 Pac. 596; Hall v. Johnson, 21 Colo. 414, 42 Pac. 660; Noyes v. Brace, 8 S. D. 190, 65 N. W. 1071; Ramsdell v. Citizens' Electric Light & P. Co. 103 Mich. 89, 61 N. W. 275; Potts v. New Jersey Arms & Ordinance Co. 17 N. J. Eq. 395; Smith v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 3 McCrary, 130, 11 Fed. 1; Shelbyville Water Co. v. People, 140 Ill. 545, 16 L. R. A. 505, 30 N. E. 678; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. St. Joseph & D. C. R. Co. 3 Dill. 412, Fed. Cas. No. 4,669; Brown v. Rauch, 1 Wash. 497, 20 Pac. 785. Even if plaintiff claimed under a chattel mortgage he had no right of possession except for the purpose of foreclosing it. v. Pierce-Wallace Pub. Co. 101 Iowa, 313, 38 L. R. A. 122, 63 Am. St. Rep. 389, 70 N. W. 216; Wheeler v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co. 143 Ill. 197, 17 L. R. A. 818, 32 N. E. 420; Link Belt Machinery Co. v. Hughes, Schack v. McKey, 100 Ill. App. 294; Jones 195 Ill. 413, 59 L. R. A. 673, 63 N. E. 186; 272; Supreme Sitting, O. of I. H. v. Baker, v. Bank of Leadville, 10 Colo. 464, 17 Pac. 134 Ind. 293, 20 L. R. A. 210, 33 N. E. 1128; Beach, Priv. Corp. § 772; State ex rel. Independent Dist. Teleg. Co. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 15 Mont. 324, 27 L. R. A. 395, 48 Am. St. Rep. 682, 39 Pac. 316; Neall v. Hill, 16 Cal. 145, 76 Am. Dec. 508. The result of this case was, in effect, a dissolution of the corporation, and equity has no jurisdiction to dissolve a corporation Marseilles Mfg. Co. v. Perry, 62 Neb. 715, except it is conferred by statute. 87 N. W. 544. Thompson v. Greeley, 107 Mo. 585, 17 S. He could not foreclose until his mortgage W. 962; St. Louis, K. & S. R. Co. v. Wear, had been filed. Loeb v. Milner, 21 Neb. 400, 32 N. W. 205; Hall v. Aitkin, 25 Neb. 365, 41 N. W. 192. 135 Mo. 230, 33 L. R. A. 341, 36 S. W. 357, 658; Hovelman v. Kansas City Horse R. Co. 79 Mo. 639; Morawetz, Priv. Corp. last ed. §§ 282, 283; Republican Mountain Silver The petition filed by the plaintiff did not Mines v. Brown, 24 L. R. A. 776, 7 C. C. A. state a cause of action. Kemper, H. & McD. Dry Goods Co. v. Renshaw, 58 Neb. 514, 78 N. W. 1071. 412, 19 U. S. App. 203, 58 Fed. 644; Fischer v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. 129, 42 Pac. 561; Barber v. International Co. 73 Conn. 587, 48 Atl. 759; Merchants' Nat. Bank v. McDon re-ald, 63 Neb. 363, 88 N. W. 492, 89 N. W. The decree did not conform with or spond to anything found in the petition. This makes the decree a nullity. Rockford Watch Co. v. Manifold, 36 Neb. 801, 55 N. W. 236; Lincoln Nat. Bank v. Virgin, 36 Neb. 735, 38 Am. St. Rep. 747, 55 N. W. 218; Lipp v. Horbach, 12 Neb. 371, 11 N. W. 431; State ex rel. Emerson v. Dickinson, 59 Neb. 753, 82 N. W. 16; Truesdell v. Sarles, 104 N. Y. 167, 10 N. E. 139; Stephens v. Harding, 48 Neb. 659, 67 N. W. 746; Fox v. Graves, 46 Neb. 816, 65 N. W. 887. 770. A court of equity has no power to sequestrate the property of a corporation by means of a receiver. Cook, Corp. ed. 1898, § 629; United States Trust Co. v. New York, W. S. & B. R. Co. 101 N. Y. 478, 5 N. E. 316; Decker v. Gardner, 124 N. Y. 334, 11 L. R. A. 480, 26 N. E. 814; Crombie v. Order of Solon, 157 Pa. 588, 27 Atl. 710; Oldham v. Mt. Sterling Improv. Co. 103 Ky. 529, 45 S. W. 779; Mason v. Supreme Ct. Equitable League, 77 Md. 483, plicant, without giving formal notice. Farmers' & M. Bank v. German Nat. Bank, 59 Neb. 229, 80 N. W. 820. 39 Am. St. Rep. 433, 27 Atl. 171; Heap v.ceiver other than the one named by the apHeap Mfg. Co. 97 Mich. 147, 56 N. W. 349; Hinckley v. Pfister, 83 Wis. 64, 53 N. W. 21; Worth Mfg. Co. v. Bingham, 54 C. C. A. 119, 116 Fed. 785; State Invest. & Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. 135, 35 Pac. 549; Dudley v. Dakota Hot Springs Co. 11 S. D. 559, 79 N. W. 839. A suit by a creditor of an insolvent corporation for the appointment of a receiver cannot be maintained as a suit by a general creditor to wind up the defendant's affairs, since for that purpose the jurisdiction of the proper bankruptcy court should be invoked. When this property was in the hands of the receiver it was in the custody of the law, and is to be administered by the court for the benefit of all the company's credit ors. Veith v. Ress, 60 Neb. 52, 82 N. W. 116. The receiver cannot be sued or summoned as garnishee in respect to the property in his possession by virtue of his trust. Moore v. Southern States Land & Timber Co. 83 Fed. 399; Moran v. Sturges, 154 U. Barber v. International Co. 73. Conn. 587, S. 256, 38 L. ed. 981, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1019; 48 Atl. 759. Shepherd v. Pepper, 133 U. S. 626, 33 L. ed. A thing cannot be done indirectly that is 706, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 438; High, Receivforbidden directly. Ketcham v. McNamara, 72 Conn. 709, 50 L. R. A. 641, 46 Atl. 146; Harbaugh v. Costello, 184 Ill. 110, 75 Am. St. Rep. 147, 56 N. E. 363; Parmenter Mfg. Co. v. Hamilton, 172 Mass. 178, 70 Am. St. Rep. 258, 51 N. E. 529; E. C. Westcott Co. v. Berry, 69 N. H. 505, 45 Atl. 352; First Nat. Bank v. Ware, 95 Me. 388, 50 Atl. 24; Re F. A. Hall Co. 121 Fed. 992; Re Bruss-Ritter Co. 90 Fed. 651; Re Macon Sash, Door & Lumber Co. 112 Fed. 323. | ers, pp. 310, 311; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Southern States Land & Timber Co. 30 C. C. A. 349, 52 U. S. App. 675, 86 Fed. 711; Steele v. Walker, 115 Ala. 485, 67 Am. St. Rep. 62, 21 So. 942; Jackson v. Lahee, 114 III. 287, 2 N. E. 172; Fidelity Ins. Trust & S. D. Co. v. Roanoke Iron Co. 81 Fed. 439; Connecticut River Bkg. Co. v. Rockbridge Co. 73 Fed. 709. Each of the appellants, having entered his appearance and invoked the powers of the court in his behalf with respect to the Messrs. W. H. Thompson and V. O. execution by the receiver of his trust, cannot Strickler, for appellees: afterwards be heard to object to the jurisdiction of the court. A court has the power to order its receiver to make a sale of the property in his hands in any case where the court thinks it is for the best interests of the parties. High, Receivers, § 192; Beach, Receivers, § 727; 20 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 145; Jackson v. Lahee, 114 Ill. 287, 2 N. E. 172; Farmers' & M. Bank v. German Nat. Bank, 59 Neb. 229, 80 N. W. 820; Crane v. Ford, Hopk. Ch. 114; Walker v. Morris, 14 Ga. 323; McLane v. Placerville & S. Valley R. Co. 66 Cal. 606, 6 Pac. 748; De Visser v. Blackstone, 6 Blatchf. 235, Fed. Cas. No. 3,840; First Nat. Bank v. Shedd, 121 U. S. 74, 30 L. ed. 877, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 807; Mellen v. Moline Malleable Iron Works, 131 U. S. 352, 33 L. ed. 178, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 781; Davis y. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 21 L. ed. 447. The court could appoint a receiver on its own motion. Elk Fork Oil & Gas Co. v. Foster, 39 C. C. A. 615, 99 Fed. 495; Earle v. Earle, 27 Neb. 277, 20 Am. St. Rep. 667, 43 N. W. 118; Cochran v. Cochran, 42 Neb. 612, 60 N. W. 942; Morrissey v. Broomal, 37 Neb. 778, 56 N. W. 383; Disher v. Disher, 45 Neb. 100, 63 N. W. 368; Flentham v. Steward, 45 Neb. 641, 63 N. W. 924; McDaniel v. Lee, 37 Mo. 207. Notice of the appointment may be waived by voluntary appearance, and when such waiver is had the court may appoint a re Veith v. Ress, 60 Neb. 52, 82 N. W. 116; Commonwealth Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Hayden Bros. 60 Neb. 636, 83 Am. St. Rep. 545, 83 N. W. 922; Hawkins v. Glenn, 131 U. S. 319, 33 L. ed. 184, Sup. Ct. Rep. 739; Jackson v. Lahee, 114 Ill. 287, 2 N. E. 172. On rehearing. Independently of statutory provisions, equity has jurisdiction to appoint a receiver over corporate property in the following cases: (1) At the suit of those who have a lien upon the corporate property; (2) at the suit of creditors who have obtained judgment, and have exhausted all legal remedies to collect it; (3) at the suit of a creditor or stockholder of a moneyed corporation interested in its funds, if the creditor has a lien, where there is a breach of duty on the part of directors, and a threatened loss of funds or security; (4) where the corporation is dissolved, and has no officer to attend to its affairs. Consolidated Tank-Line Co. v. Kansas City Varnish Co. 43 Fed. 204; Wayne Pike Co. v. Hammons, 129 Ind. 368, 27 N. E. 487; Supreme Sitting, O. of I. H. v. Baker, 134 Ind. 293, 20 L. R. A. 210, 33 N. E. 1128; State v. Northern C. R. Co. 18 Md. 193; Davis v. United States Electric Power & L. Co. 77 Md. 35, 25 Atl. 982; Haywood v. Lincoln Lumber Co. 64 Wis. 639, 26 N. W. 184; Cameron v. Groveland Improv. Co. 20 Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308, 19 L. ed. 931. The court has jurisdiction of the subjectmatter in cases of this kind. Simply the sale of the corporation's property was sought, and that the proceeds be applied to the payment of its debts. This in no manner dissolved the corporation, or sought to. Boston Invest. Co. v. Pacific Short Line It was the rule at common law that an independent action could be brought against an insolvent corporation and its property sequestered through the appointment of a receiver, and held and applied to the pay-dition broken, to maintain a bill in equity ment of the debts owing by the corporation, for a foreclosure of the mortgage, or to obby any creditor having a lien thereon. tain possession of the mortgaged property, through the appointment of a receiver. Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, 21 How. 112, 16 L. ed. 38; Macon & W. R. Co. v. Parker, 9 Ga. 378; Blanchard v. Cawthorne, 4 Sim. 566; Fripp v. Chard R. Co. 21 Eng. L. & Eq. 53; Adler v. Milwaukee Patent Brick Mfg. Co. 13 Wis. 63; Spear v. Grant, 16 Mass. 9; Vose v. Grant, 15 Mass. 505; Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason, 308, Fed. Cas. No. 17,944; Ward v. Griswoldville Mfg. Co. 16 Conn. 593; Mann v. Pentz, 3 N. Y. 415; Nathan v. Whitlock, 9 Paige, 152; Henry v. Vermillion & A. R. Co. 17 Ohio, 187; Ogilvie v. Knox Ins. Co. 22 How. 380, 16 L. ed. 349; High, Receivers, 3d ed. p. 263, § 303; Towle v. American Bldg. Loan & Invest. Soc. 60 Fed. 131; Sage v. Memphis & L. R. R. Co. 125 U. S. 361, 31 L. ed. 694, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 887; Quincy, M. & P. R. Co. v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 82, 36 L. ed. 632, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 787; Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & I. Co. 150 U. S. 371, 37 L. ed. 1113, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 127; Barber v. International Co. 73 Conn. 590, 48 Atl. 758. If it is necessary that a statutory enactment be had in order that jurisdiction might exist in the courts of this state, the enactment of § 266, ¶ 5, p. 1282, Comp. Stat. 1901, would be sufficient to warrant the appointment of a receiver in this case as an independent action brought for that pose. Ponca Mill Co. v. Mikesell, 55 Neb. 75 N. W. 46. Shaw v. Norfolk County R. Co. 5 Gray, 162. The appointment of receivers originated in the courts of chancery in England, and has naturally descended to all courts which have jurisdiction in equity, as a part of their inherent power. Gluck & B. Receivers, § 10, p. 30; 2 Waterman, Corp. §§ 355, 356; Ohio Civ. Proc. (Seney) pp. 244-248. Courts of equity and common law are not limited as to jurisdiction by statutes. Earle v. Earle, 27 Neb. 277, 20 Am. St. Rep. 667, 43 N. W. 118; Jennings v. Simp son, 12 Neb. 558, 11 N. W. 880; Monroe v. Reid, 46 Neb. 317, 64 N. W. 983; 2 Beach, Priv. Corp. p. 1192, § 762; Howell v. Western R. Co. 94 U. S. 463, 24 L. ed. 254; Legg v. Mathieson, 2 Giff. 71; Wildy v. MidHants R. Co. 16 Week. Rep. 409. Receivers may be appointed to prevent forfeitures. Wait, Insolvent Corp. p. 212, § 256. Id. p. 213, § 257; Long Dock Co. v. Or to preserve the property. Thompson v. Natchez Water & Sewer Co. pur-York & N. E. R. Co. 22 Blatchf. 72, 19 Fed. 68 Miss. 423, 9 So. 821; Brassey v. New 663; Doe v. Northwest Coal & Transp. Co. 101, 64 Fed. 928; Sutton Mfg. Co. v. Hutchinson, 11 C. C. A. 320, 24 U. S. App. 145, 63 Fed. If the court had jurisdiction,—that is, if 498; Oconto Water Co. v. National Foundry it was such a case as the court had a right & Pipe Works, 7 C. C. A. 603, 18 U. S. App. to hear and determine, its order making 380, 59 Fed. 19; Trust & Deposit Co. v. the appointment of a receiver would not be Spartanburg Waterworks Co. 91 Fed. 324; absolutely void, even if the petition was in Temple v. Glasgow, 25 C. C. A. 540, 42 U. fact defective, but would simply be an error, S. App. 417, 80 Fed. 441; Connecticut River which might have been corrected if the Bkg. Co. v. Rockbridge Co. 73 Fed. 709; proper proceeding had been had for reversal. Brown, B. & Co. v. Lake Superior Iron Co. Dickerson v. Cass County Bank, 95 Iowa, 134 U. S. 530, 33 L. ed. 1021, 10 Sup. Ct. 392, 64 N. W. 397; Reinach v. Atlantic & Rep. 604; Texas Consol. Compress & Mfg. G. W. R. Co. 58 Fed. 33; Re James, 99 Cal. Asso. v. Storrow, 34 C. C. A. 182, 92 Fed. 374, 37 Am. St. Rep. 60, 33 Pac. 1123. 12; Ponca Mill Co. v. Mikesell, 55 Neb. Jurisdiction over the res is obtained by 98, 75 N. W. 46; Veith v. Ress, 60 Neb. its seizure under process of the court. 52, 82 N. W. 116; Barbour v. National |