City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N. J. Eq. | out any resort to violence, and such threats 759, 53 Atl. 230. and intimidation may be made the subject of injunction.

United States v. Kane, 23 Fed. 748; Toledo, A. A. & N. M. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co. 19 L. R. A. 387, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 522, 54 Fed. 730; Barr v. Essex Trades Council, The facts are as follows: Plaintiffs are 53 N. J. Eq. 101, 30 Atl. 881; Allis Chal- electrical contractors and engineers, and mers Co. v. Reliable Lodge, 111 Fed. 264; their business consists in installing wires Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 49 L. R. A. and other electrical apparatus in buildings 475, 80 Am. St. Rep. 17, 81 N. W. 1003. and structures, and such business and afThreats and intimidation can occur with-fairs as are incidental thereto. It is alleged

plated and necessary for the carnival and fair to be given by the association. The complaint further alleges that at the time said threats were made by the Trades Council the association was intending to make contracts for the electrical work to plaintiffs; that, but for the intimidation and threats of the Trades Council, the contracts for such work would have been let to them, in the performance of which plaintiffs would have made a profit. The same facts are alleged in the complaints in the other two ac

in the complaint in this connection (sub- [ be unable to obtain men for the construction stantially the same allegations being found of the booths and other buildings contemin the complaint in each of four of the actions) that plaintiffs have built up a large and profitable business in their line; that the customers with whom they are doing it are necessary and essential to the successful conduct of the same; that such business is a source of profit, and from which they earn a livelihood; that defendant Building Trades Council is an unincorporated association consisting of a large number of delegates from numerous other associations, known as "labor unions," all of which are located in the city of Minneapolis; that each labor | tions, except as to the carnival association; union or organization selects a certain number of delegates, who represent and act for it, who become members of and constitute the Building Trades Council, which, so composed, possesses and exercises control over all the unions so represented; that, by virtue of an arrangement between the unions, any action taken or order given by the Trades Council is binding and obligatory upon each of the several unions so represented, and forming part of the council; that each individual member assumes an obligation to abide by and obey all orders emanating from the Trades Council, in default of which he subjects himself to a fine of $5; that one of the unions so associated with the Trades Council is the International Brotherhood of Electrical Engineers of America, Local Union No. 292; that this brotherhood is composed of employees of firms engaged in a business similar to that of plaintiffs; that, in the language of the union, certain firms and corporations are known as "fair," and others as "unfair;" that those classified as “unfair" are such as employ nonunion labor, and those classified as "fair" limit their employees to union laborers; that defendant Building Trades Council has recently placed all of the plaintiffs upon the "unfair" list; that defendants have entered into a conspiracy and combination for the purpose of injuring the business of plaintiffs, and in pursuance of which defendants have appeared before prospective customers, and threatened such customers that, if they attempted to do business with plaintiffs, defendants would make it impossible to transact business with them; that on May 15, 1903, defendants, in pursuance of such conspiracy and combination, appeared before a committee in charge of the affairs of the Minneapolis Industrial & Amusement Asso-plaints. It specifically denies that defendciation, and declared that if it should give ants, or any of them, have entered into any contracts for certain electrical wiring, which conspiracy or combination for the purpose of the association desired to have done, to injuring or destroying the business of plainplaintiffs, or either of them, the Trades tiffs, or that, pursuant to a conspiracy or Council would see that the association would combination, defendants, or any of them,

and on this subject, namely, the particular interference with plaintiffs' business complained of, it is alleged in the Gugler Manufacturing Company Case that plaintiff in that action was engaged in carrying out a contract with one Smith, the proprietor of the Brunswick hotel, in Minneapolis; that the contract required plaintiff to install wires and other electrical apparatus in the building; that other artisans, consisting of carpenters, plasterers, and painters, were engaged in and about the same building; that a representative of the Trades Council called upon Smith, and notified him that, if plaintiff was permitted to continue work on the building, the council would order all union men under its control, and employed in and about the building, to quit work, and that the council would see to it that Smith would be unable to complete the contract. Smith then notified plaintiff of these threats and representations, and urged upon it the necessity of canceling its contract for the electrical work upon such building, which plaintiff thereafter, in view of the situation, consented to do. In the Hartig & Hellier Case, a state of affairs is presented very similar to the Gugler Case. The complaints further allege that plaintiff's have no adequate remedy at law, and that defendants are insolvent and unable to respond in damages, and concludes with a prayer that defendants be restrained and enjoined from carrying out the threats complained of. The answer in each case admits all the allegations of the complaints respecting the organization of defendant Trades Council, its objects and purposes, its connection with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers of America, and in all other material respects denies generally the allegations of the com

have appeared before prospective customers | rectly involved in any case heretofore before of plaintiffs, or any other person or persons, us, we shall briefly consider some of the leor made any of the threats set forth in the gal principles applicable thereto. complaint or otherwise.

employer and employee, the subject has been brought to the attention of the courts frequently, and in various phases. An examination of the reports discloses no little conflict in the authorities, but the rule announced in the two early cases just referred to is not the modern law. A strike for the purpose of securing better wages or otherwise bettering the condition of the

Probably the first case to be found in the The actions came on before the court be- books presenting the question whether it is low on plaintiffs' application for a temporary an unlawful conspiracy for a number of eminjunction enjoining and restraining defend-ployees to quit their employment unless ants, and each of them, from the threatened their demand for higher wages be complied acts, and were heard upon the pleadings and with arose in England in 1721. Tubwomen affidavits in support and in denial of the al- v. Brewers of London, 3 Columbia Law Rev. legations of the complaints. After due con- 447. It was there held a criminal conspirsideration, the court made an order that a acy for two or more persons to band themtemporary injunction issue in each action selves together for the purpose of enforcing restraining and enjoining defendants, and their demands for higher wages. It was each of them, from doing the certain acts conceded that one might thus abandon his hereinafter referred to. It appears from the employment, unless his demand was comaffidavits, in addition to the matter pleaded, plied with, but that it was unlawful for sevthat plaintiffs, with a number of other elec- eral to conspire together for that purpose. trical contractors, formed an association The same rule was applied in an early case among themselves, and entered into an agree- (1809) in New York in an action entitled ment with each other, agreeing, among other Case of Journeymen Cordwainers, reported things, upon uniform conditions of service, in Yates Sel. Cas. 111. But few reported a scale of wages, and that there should be no cases are found between the dates of those discriminating in respect to the persons em- decisions and a comparatively recent period ployed because they might or might not be wherein questions like those here involved members of some labor union or organiza- have been considered; though in recent tion; in short, they proposed to employ non-years, owing to the continued strife between union labor if, in their judgment, their interests suggested it. No controversy ever arose, so far as appears in the record, between plaintiffs and any of their employees, or defendants, as representatives of labor unions, as to the amount of wages paid or to be paid their employees. The whole controversy rests on the effort of defendants to compel plaintiffs to employ union labor only. It is urged that the efforts made in this di-strikers is not unlawful, though the result rection were legitimate, and were resorted to thereof is a combination between the strikfor the purpose of furthering the interests ing employees, and results incidentally in of those represented by the Trades Council the injury of others. Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Holand the electrical union, and without mali- lis, 54 Minn. 224, sub nom. Bohn Mfg. Co. cious intent to injure the business of plain- v. Northwestern Lumbermen's Asso. 21 L. R. tiffs; that, if injury in fact resulted to A. 337, 40 Am. St. Rep. 319, 55 N. W. 1119. plaintiffs, it was incidental to the exercise The courts very generally refuse to interof a lawful right by defendants. The com- fere by injunction to prevent such action. plaints allege facts showing a boycott, and But a boycott, as generally understood, is the order of the trial court granting a tem- held by nearly all the authorities to be an porary injunction must be deemed, for the unlawful conspiracy, and subject to repurposes of this review, as a finding that the straint by a court of equity. A boycott may facts so alleged are true. While the affi- be defined to be a combination of several perdavits filed in support of the complainants sons to cause a loss to a third person by do not make out a strong case against de- causing others against their will to withfendants, we are not required on this ap- draw from him their beneficial business inpeal to go further than would be necessary tercourse through threats that, unless a in reviewing the findings of the trial court compliance with their demands be made, the in ordinary actions, and only to the extent persons forming the combination will cause of determining whether the affidavits fairly loss or injury to him; or an organization tend to support the allegations of the com- formed to exclude a person from business replaints. We therefore adopt the allegations lations with others by persuasion, intimidaof the complaints as the basis for further tion, and other acts which tend to violence, consideration of the appeal. As the partic-and thereby cause him, through fear of reular questions presented have not been di- Isulting injury, to submit to dictation in the

management of his affairs. Such acts con- | lished a profitable business, and that de stitute a conspiracy, and may be restrained fendants had conspired to induce others not by injunction. Cyc. Law, 995; Crump v. to deal with him, it not appearing that their Com. 84 Va. 927, 10 Am. St. Rep. 895, 6 interference with his business was to S. E. 620; Toledo, A. A. & N. M. R. Co. v. further any legitimate interests of their Pennsylvania Co. 19 L. R. A. 387, 5 Inters. own, but done maliciously to injure him, Com. Rep. 522, 54 Fed. 730; Barr v. Essex that it was a conspiracy and actionable. Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101, 30 Atl. The court there said: "But one man singly, 881; State v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 273, 59 Am. or any number of men jointly, having no Rep. 710, 9 Atl. 559; Gatzow v. Buening, legitimate interest to protect, may not law106 Wis. 1, 49 L. R. A. 475, 80 Am. St. Rep. fully ruin the business of another by ma17, 81 N. W. 1003; Casey v. Cincinnati liciously inducing his patrons and third Typographical Union No. 3, 12 L. R. A. parties not to deal with him." The decision 193, 45 Fed. 135; Frank v. Herold, 63 N. in that case is in line with the authorities J. Eq. 443, 52 Atl. 152. In Hopkins v. Ox- generally, and places this court with the ley Stave Co. 28 C. C. A. 99, 49 U. S. weight of authority in holding that boycotts App. 709, 83 Fed. 912, Judge Thayer, speak- are illegal. The case of Bohn Mfg. Co. v. ing for the court of appeals of the eighth Hollis, 54 Minn. 224, sub nom. Bohn Mfg. circuit, said: "While the courts have in- Co. v. Northwestern Lumbermen's Asso. 21 variably upheld the right of individuals to L. R. A. 337, 40 Am. St. Rep. 319, 55 N. form labor organizations for the protection W. 1119, is not here in point. In that case of the interests of the laboring classes, and certain retail dealers in lumber agreed with have denied the power to enjoin the members each other not to deal with wholesale dealof such associations from withdrawing ers who sold building material direct to . either singly or in a body, even consumers or contractors. It appeared that where such withdrawal involves a breach the plaintiff therein had sold certain maof contract, yet they have very generally terial to contractors, and the defendants condemned those combinations usually threatened to inform all members of the termed 'boycotts,' which are formed for the retail association of the fact, and plaintiff purpose of interfering, otherwise than by brought that action to restrain them from lawful competition, with the business affairs so doing, on the ground that it was a conof others, and depriving them, by means of spiracy to injure its business. The court threats and intimidation, of the right to held otherwise, but the decision is clearly conduct the business in which they happen put on the ground that the action of the reto be engaged, according to the dictates of tail dealers was, in effect, a strike, and not their own judgments." In the case of restrainable in equity. They intended only Moores v. Bricklayers' Union No. 1, 23 to inform members of their association of Ohio L. J. 48, it appears that a labor union the action of plaintiff in selling direct to became involved in some controversy with the contractors, and there was no claim one Parker concerning various matters, and, made of any boycott, as in the case at bar. in order to bring Parker to their terms, the union notified materialmen that anyone selling to him would be boycotted. Moores, plaintiff in the action, persisted in selling to Parker notwithstanding this notice, and the union promptly notified all of Parker's customers or prospective customers that none of its members would work Moores's material, thereby causing serious damage to the business of Moores. There were no acts Quinn v. Leathem, 70 L. J. P. C. N. S. or threats of violence shown, but the court Intimidation and coercion are essential held that the acts of the members elements of a boycott. It must appear that of the union amounted to an unlaw- the means used are threatening and intended ful conspiracy, and a recovery against to overcome the will of others and compel them was upheld. While the question them to do or refrain from doing that which of boycott was not involved in the case they would or would not otherwise have of Ertz v. Produce Exchange, 79 Minn. 140, done. What amounts to coercion, intimida48 L. R. A. 90, 79 Am. St. Rep. 433, 81 N. tion, or threats of injury, must necessarily W. 737, the principles of the law applicable depend upon the facts of each particular thereto were involved and discussed by the case. Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 51 L. court. It was there held, upon facts show- R. A. 339, 79 Am. St. Rep. 330, 57 N. E. ing that a dealer in farm produce had estab-1011; Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 9

The rule on this subject is the same in England as in this country. Temperton v. Russell [1893] 1 Q. B. 715. A careful examination of the English cases to which our attention has been called, and of others, discloses that Allen v. Flood [1898] A. C. 1, 17 English Ruling Cases, 284, has been departed from by the House of Lords, and does not now express the law of that country.

76.

calling, by means of which he earns a livelihood and endeavors to better his condition, and to provide for and support himself and those dependent upon him, is property within the meaning of the law, and entitled to protection as such; and as conducted by the merchant, by the capitalist, by the contractor or laborer, is, aside from the goods, chattels, money, or effects employed and used in connection therewith, property in every sense of the word. Labor may organize, as capital does, for its own protection and to further the interests of the laboring class. They may strike, and persuade and induce others to join them, but when they resort to unlawful means to cause injury to others with whom they have no relation, contractual or otherwise, the limit permitted by the law is passed, and they may be restrained.

Am. St. Rep. 689, 17 N. E. 307. In Barr v. | trarily assailed." A person's occupation or Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101, 30 Atl. 881, it was said that "the clear weight of authority undoubtedly is that a man may be intimidated into doing or refraining from doing [a particular act] by fear . . of loss of life or injury to health or limb; and the extent of this fear need not be abject, but only such as to overcome his judgment, or induce him not to do, or to do, that which otherwise he would have done or left undone." Intimidation, within the meaning of the law, is not necessarily limited to threats of violence to person or property. A combination between persons merely to regulate their own conduct and affairs is allowable, and a lawful combination, though others may be indirectly affected thereby; but a combination to do in jurious acts, expressly directed to another by way of intimidation or constraint, either of himself or of persons employed, or seek ing to be emlpoyed, by him, is outside of allowable competition, and unlawful. Vegelain v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 97, 35 L. R. A. 722, 57 Am. St. Rep. 443, 44 N. E. 1077. The interference is held by many of the authorities unlawful although it does not affect existing contract relations. The wrongful interference with one's business and prospective customers is as much an infringement of his rights as though contractual relations actually existed and were interfered with. Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N. J. Eq. 759, 53 Atl. 230; Addison, Torts, 7.

It follows from what has been said that the learned trial court was justified in holding that defendants were guilty of a boycott, and ordering the issuance of a temporary injunction restraining them therefrom. We come, then, to the question whether the contention of defendants, to the effect that the order of the trial court is too broad and restrains acts other than of boycotting, is well taken. The order of the court is as follows:

"Said injunction shall specifically enjoin said defendants and each of them, their members, agents, and employees, from in any manner interfering with the business of plaintiffs by means of threats or intimidation, of any kind or nature, directed against the customers or prospective customers of said plaintiffs.

"Said injunction shall specifically enjoin the said defendant council and brotherhood, their members, agents, and employees, and each and every one of them, from interfering with the customers or prospective customers of plaintiff's by threats of any kind or nature, and particularly from notifying such customers or prospective customers and patrons of plaintiffs that plaintiffs are unfair.

In restraining boycotts, the authorities proceed on the theory that they are unlawful interferences with property rights. The Constitution of our state guarantees liberty to every citizen, and a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character; and the rights so guaranteed are fundamental, and can be taken away only by the law of the land, or interfered with, or the enjoyment thereof modified, only by lawful regulations adopted as necessary for the general public welfare. As remarked by Judge Bradley in the "Slaughter-House Cases," 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. ed. 394: "For the preservation, exercise, and enjoyment of "Said injunction shall specifically enjoin these rights, the individual citizen, as a said defendant council and brotherhood, necessity, must be left free to adopt such their members, agents, representatives, and calling, profession, or trade as may seem employees, and each and every one of them, to him most conducive to his welfare. from going upon the premises where plain... This right to choose one's calling is tiffs are engaged or employed, for the puran essential part of that liberty which it is pose of interfering with the business of the object of the government to protect; plaintiffs, and, pursuant to said purpose, and a calling, when chosen, is a man's prop- from ordering and directing or notifying erty and right. Liberty and property are men belonging to the various allied unions not protected where these rights are arbi- to desist from work upon said premises by