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Carpenter, J., delivered the opinion of duty to a particular person. If, for inthe court:
stance, the defendants in this suit had misThe declaration in this case alleges that represented to the purchasers the weight or defendants unlawfully sold certain hogs to breeding of these hogs, they would have ina firm of live-stock dealers, knowing that curred a liability only to those purchasers. said hogs were "afflicted with a dangerous See Necker v. Harvey, 49 Mich. 517, 14 N. and infectious disease;" that they did not W. 503. In such cases the wrongdoer is not notify said firm of this fact; that said firm, liable for damages sustained by a third perin ignorance of the fact that said hogs were son; not because there intervenes a human so infected, sold and delivered them to plain- agency between the wrong and the damages, tiffs, who, without negligence on their part, but because the third person was in no sense placed them in a pen with their sound swine, wronged, or, for another and quite as corwhich contracted the disease and died. The rect reason, because the damages did not redefendants pleaded the general issue. The sult from the wrong. On the other hand, case came on for trial before a jury, and, there wrongs naturally calculated, after the plaintiffs had introduced some tes through the intervention of an innocent hutimony, and offered to prove that the inter- man agency, to injure third persons. In vening purchasers "were without knowledge such cases both reason and authority hold of any diseased condition of the hogs, and the wrongdoer responsible for such injuries. that there were no facts or circumstances The case of Craft v. Parker, W. & Co. 96 that would have put them upon such no. Mich. 245, 21 L. R. A. 139, 55 N. W. 812, tice," the trial court directed a verdict for is such a case. There the defendants, who the defendants upon the ground that the were engaged in the business of selling meats plaintiff's had no cause of action. The ques. in the city of Detroit, sold plaintiff's brother tion in thise case relates solely to the cor- a roll of spiced bacon. The purchaser took rectness of this ruling.
it to the plaintiff's house, where he boardIt is the contention of the defendants' ed, and plaintiff's wife cooked it for breakcounsel, and it was the view of the trial fast. The bacon was in fact spoiled, and court, that there could be no recovery, be- unfit for food, and made plaintiff sick. On cause the act of a third person intervened the assumption that defendant knew that between defendants' wrong and plaintiffs' the meat was purchased for consumption, injury. Is such intervention a sufficient de- and was negligent in selling it, it was held feuse? In considering this question it should that plaintiff had a cause of action. See be remembered that plaintiffs' claim is not also Brown v. Marshall, 47 Mich. 576, 41 based upon the ground of a breach of de- Am. Rep. 728, 11 N. W. 392; Thomas v. fendants' contract with the firm to whom Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455; they sold the hogs. It is based upon the Nitro-glycerine Case, 15 Wall. 524, 21 L. theory that defendants committed a wrong ed. 206; Griggs v. Fleckenstein, 14 Minn. 81, in selling as sound hogs which they knew to 100 Am. Dec. 199, Gil. 62. In Filer v. Smith, be afflicted with a contagious disorder. Nor 96 Mich. 355, 35 Am. St. Rep. 603, 55 N. W. should we forget that the act of the inter-1002, this court, speaking through Mr. Jusvening third person was in no sense wrong. tice McGrath, said: "The general rule of ful, because, as already stated, plaintiffs of law is that whoever does an illegal or wrong. fered to prove that the intervening pur- ful act is answerable for all the consechasers “were without knowledge of any dis-quences that ensue in the ordinary and nateased condition of the hogs, and that there ural course of events, though those consewere no facts or circumstances that would quences be immediately brought about by have put them upon notice.” We cannot, intervening agents, provided such agents therefore, apply in this case the rule often were set in motion by the primary wrongdostated in text-books and decisions, that oncer, or provided those acts causing the damis not responsible for consequences result. age were the necessary or legal and natural ing from the wrongful act of another person. consequence of the wrongful act.” Assuming, Griffin v. Jackson Light & P. Co. 128 Mich. as contended by defendants (see also Thom. 653, 55 L. R. A. 318, 92 Am. St. Rep. 496, as v. Winchester, 6 N. Y., at p. 410, 57 Am. 87 N. W. 888. But it cannot be said that Dec. 460), that the principle which holds a there is a general rule of law which ex- wrongdoer liable for consequences, though empts one from the consequences of a wrong human agencies intervene between the wrong merely because between the wrong and its and those consequences, applies only when consequences there intervenes an innocent the wrong committed is one imminently humau agency. It is true that many acts dangerous to human life, it is nevertheless are wrong simply because they violate al applicable in this case. Defendants, in sell
Pollock, Torts, p. 28. As the application in CERTIORARI to the Recorder's Court for
ing hogs known to be infected with a danger- PEOPLE of the State of Michigan ous and infectious disease, committed a wrong imminently dangerous to human life DETROIT UNITED RAILWAY. (in recognition of this fact out legislature has made such sale a crime. See § 5638,
(........ Mich.........) Comp. Laws 1897); and it is settled (see
1. Before a municipal ordinance Griggs v. Fleckenstein, 14 Minn. 81, 100 Am.
quiring the equipment of street cars Dec. 199, Gil. 62) that, when one commits with air brakes will be declared una wrong imminently dangerous to human reasonable it should be made clearly to
appear that there is no necessity for a more life, the principle under consideration ex
effective brake than those in use, or that tends his liability to damages to property. the air brake will not be so.
Were the damages sustained by plaintiffs 2. That the preponderance of oral tesa legal consequence of defendants' wrong ?
timony is to the effect that an requiring
brakes The rule by which it is to be determined
unreasonable is not whether or not a particular consequence re- sufficient to justify the court in annulling it sults from a certain wrong is a subject of if there is nothing to show that similar redispute. It has been held that the wrong
sults might not be secured by their use on
street, as on railroad, cars, since the court doer is responsible for all consequences
will take judicial notice that such brakes are naturally resulting from his wrong, whether in general use on the latter, and generally he could have anticipated those consequences
effective. not. Sutherland, Damages, § 16; 3. That the equipment of street cars
with air brakes will require a large Wharton, Neg. § 77; Stevens v. Dudley, 56
outlay of money is not sufficient to nullify Vt. 158. On the other hand, it is held that the ordinance requiring it. his responsibility is limited to such consequences as a person of average intelligence
(November 9, 1903.) and knowledge should have anticipated.
the City of Detroit to review a judgment this case of either rule leads to the same re
directing defendant to comply with an orsult, it is unnecessary to determine which dinance requiring it to equip its cars with is correct. As a natural result of the air or electric brakes. Affirmed. wrong done by defendants, the persons to The facts are stated in the opinion. whom they sold the hogs did, in ignorance Messrs. Brennan, Donnelly, & Van de of their condition, sell them to plaintiffs, Mark, Charles D. Joslyn, and Henry and plaintiff's, relying upon their appear. L. Lyster, for plaintiff in certiorari: ance, and without negligence, placed them
The evidence introduced in this case shows where their other hogs became infected and clearly that the present brake equipment on died. The damage to plaintiff's was a conse- reliable and more efficient than any air or
the cars of plaintiff in certiorari is more quence which defendants, as persons of
electric brake which, at the present time, average intelligence and knowledge, should
can be found upon the market, and that have anticipated. They should have sup- there would therefore be no object in posed, either that the purchasers would equipping its cars with the so-called autothemselves butcher these hogs, or that they matic brakes. would sell them to some person who would Any ordinance that will require a cortreat them as they appeared to be. If we poration to add, in addition to its already are right in the foregoing views, plaintiff's, reliable equipment, one that is less reliable, if they establish their case as made in their is unreasonable, and therefore must be held
invalid. declaration and opening statement, are en
Yonkers v. Yonkers R. Co. 51 App. Div. titled to recover from the defendants suf
NOTE.- For other cases in this series as to ficient to compensate them for all the dam
validity of ordinances regulating the equipagcs resulting to them from defendants' ment or running of street cars, see State, Cape wrong. These damages include, not only May, D. B. & S. P. R. Co., Prosecutor, v. Cape
May, 36 L. R. A. 653 (fenders on cars) ; State, the value of the hogs purchased, but the Cape May, D. B. & S. P. R. Co., Prosecutor, v. value of those which contracted the con- Cape May, 36 L. R. A. 656 (limiting speed); tagion and died. See Eaton v. Winnie, 20 State, Cape May, D. B. & S. P. R. Co., Prosecu.
tor, v. Cape May, 36 L. R. A. 657 (requiring car Mich. 156, 4 Am. Rep. 377.
to come to full stop before crossing intersecting It results from these views that the judg- street); State, Trenton Horse R. Co., Prosecutment of the court below should be reversed, or. v. Trenton, 11 L. R. A. 410 (requiring both
driver and agent on car); and South Covington and a new trial granted.
& C. Street R. Co. v. Berry, 15 L. R. A. 604 (re. The other Justices concur.
quiring both driver and conductor on cars).
271, 64 N. Y. Supp. 955; United Traction have become so known as to require its Co. v. Watervliet, 35 Misc. 392, 71 N. Y. adoption. Supp. 977; Brooklyn v. Nassau Electric R. Brooklyn v. Nassau Electric R. Co. 38 Co. 38 App. Div. 365, 56 N. Y. Supp. 609; App. Div. 365, 56 N. Y. Supp. 609. Toronto v. Toronto Street R. Co. 15 Ont. The plaintiff in certiorari is bound to App. Rep. 30; Toledo, W. & W. R. Co. v. provide brakes and other appliances for its Jacksonville, 67 Il. 37, 16 Am. Rep. 611; cars and keep them in repair. Brooklyn Crosstown R. Co. v. Brooklyn, 37 Thompson v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Co. Hun, 413; Shelbyville v. Cleveland, C. C. 16 Utah, 281, 40 L. R. A. 172, 67 Am. St. & St. L. R. Co. 146 Ind. 66, 44 N. E. 929; Rep. 621, 52 Pac. 92; Musser v. Lancaster Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Conners- City Street R. Co. 176 Pa. 621, 35 Atl. 206; ville, 147 Ind. 277, 37 L. R. A. 175, 62 Am. Gannon v. New Orleans City & L. R. Co. 48 St. Rep. 418, 46 N. E. 579; Baltimore v. La. Ann. 1002, 20 So. 223; Little Rock Radecke, 49 Md. 217, 33 Am. Rep. 239; Traction & Electric Co. v. Morrison, 69 Ark. Toledo, W. & W. R. Co. v. Jacksonville, 67 | 289, 62 S. W. 1045; Wynn v. Central Park, Ill. 37, 16 Am. Rep. 611; Hawes v. Chicago, N. & E. River R. Co. 10 App. Div. 13, 41 158 III. 653, 30 L. R. A. 225, 42 N. E. 373 ; N. Y. Supp. 595; Roberts v. Spokane Street McFarlane v. Chicago, 185 Ill. 242, 57 N. E. R. Co. 23 Wash. 325, 54 L. R. A. 184, 63 12; Stafford v. Chippewa Valley Electric R. Pac. 506; McNamara v. Brooklyn City R. Co. 110 Wis. 331, 85 N. W. 1036; Zumault Co. 11 Misc. 667, 32 N. Y. Supp. 913. v. Kansas City of Independence Air Line, 71 But it is only obliged to equip its cars Mo. App. 670.
as a reasonable, prudent person would do. The mere declaration of the common coun- Hogan v. Citizens' R. Co. 150 Mo. 36, 51 cil does not make the air or electric brake S. W. 473; Actinnis v. Canada Southern a more reliable or safer equipment than the Bridge Co. 49 Mich. 466, 13 N. W. 819; hand brake.
Fleuitt v. Flint & P. H. R. Co. 67 Mich. Re Sam Kee, 31 Fed. 680; Re Tie Loy, 61, 34 N. W. 659; Ilick v. Flint & P. M. R. 26 Fed. 6ll; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. Co. 67 Mich. 632, 35 N. W. 708; Shadford S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064; v. Ann Arbor Street R. Co. 111 Mich. 390, Yates v. Miluaukee, 10 Wall. 497, 19 L. ed. 69 N. W. 661. 984; Quintini v. Bay St. Louis, 64 Miss. The necessity of having a hand brake on 483, 60 Am. Rep. 62, 1 So. 625.
cars equipped with any kind of automatic Mr. John J. Speed, aiso for plaintiff in brake, and being obliged to resort to it certiorari:
when the automatic fails to work, is in itThe police authority is not an arbitrary self a great vice. or despotic power that may be exercised Roberts v. Spokane Street R. Co. 23 Wash. without a sufficient public purpose.
325, 54 L. R. A. 184, 63 Pac. 506. Burlington v. Burlington Street R. Co. Messrs. Timothy E. Tarsney, P. J. M. 49 Iowa, 144, 31 Am. Rep. 145; State, Hud- Hally, and Charles E. Love, for the Peoson Teleph. Co., Prosecutor, v. Jersey City, ple: 49 N. J. L. 303, 60 Am. Rep. 619, 8 Atl. The ordinance which at the present time 123; Northwestern Teleph. Exch. Co. v. controls the cars running on Jefferson aveMinneapolis, 81 Minn. 140, 53 L. R. A. 175, nue contained the following section: It is 83 N. W. 527, 86 N. W. 69; Binghamton v. hereby reserved to the common council of Binghamton & P. D. R. Co. 61 Hun, 479, the city of Detroit the right to make such 16 N. Y. Supp. 225; Kalamazoo v. Michigan further rules, orders, or regulations as may Traction Co. 126 Mich. 525, 85 N. W. 1067. from time to time be deemed necessary to
The presumption that public officers have protect the interest, welfare, or accommodone their duty, like the presumption of dation of the public in relation to street innocence, is undoubtedly a legal presump
railways. tion, but it does not supply proof of a
This ordinance, when accepted by these substantive fact.
corporations, constitutes a contract between United States v. Ross, 92 U. S. 281, 23 the city and the corporation by the terms of L. ed. 707; Binghamton v. Binghamton &
which the parties are irrevocably bound. P. D. R. Co. 61 Hun, 479, 16 N. Y. Supp. Mich. 78, 39 Mich. 543; Detroit Citizens'
Ft. Wayne & E. R. Co. v. Detroit, 34 225.
Street R. Co. v. Detroit, 125 Mich. 673, 84 We must presume, in order to sustain Am. St. Rep. 589, 85 N. W. 96, 86 N. W. this ordinance, that the cars are not the 809; Detroit Citizens' Street R. Co. v. Board best style in use on street railways, for the of Public Works, 126 Mich. 554, 85 N. W. reason that the brakes are dangerous, and 1072. therefore their continued use is injurious The court is not concerned in the reason to the public; also that a better device has that the man who has the right to say yes been invented, and, if invented, its merits or no has for saying the one or the other.
Gibson v. Carnage, 39 Mich. 49, 33 Am. / public grounds, and spaces within the said Rep. 351.
city shall be used and enjoyed.” This is The ordinance gave the right to require sufficient to authorize the regulation. power brakes.
St. Louis v. St. Louis R. Co. 89 Mo. 44, Port Huron & N. W. R. Co. v. Richards, 58 Am. Rep. 82, 1 N. W. 305; City 90 Mich. 577, 51 N. W. 680; Union Street Suburban R. Co. v. Savannah, 77 Ga. 731, R. Co. v. Saginaw Circuit Judge, 113 Mich. 4 Am. St. Rep. 106; State v. Canal & C. R. 694, 71 N. W. 1073; People ex rel. Wolcott Co. 50 La. Ann. 1189, 56 L. R. A. 287, 24 v. Plainfield Ave. Gravel-Road Co. 105 Mich. So. 265; Newcomb v. Norfolk Western Street 9, 62 N. W. 998; Rapid R. Co. v. Mt. Clem- R. Co. 179 Mass. 449, 61 N. E. 42; State v. ens, 118 Mich. 133, 76 N. W. 318; Traverse Hadeyhaim, 42 La. Ann. 483, 21 Am. St. City Gas Co. v. Traverse City, 130 Mich. 17, Rep. 388, 7 So. 621; Faith v. Tower Grove 89 N. W. 574; Rice v. Detroit, Y. & A. A. & L. R. Co. 105 Mo. 537, 13 L. R. A. 74, 16 R. Co. 122 Mich. 677, 48 L. R. A. 84, 81 S. W. 913; Dry Dock, E. B. & B. R. Co. v. N. W. 927; Kissane v. Detroit, Y. & A. A. New York, 47 Hun, 221; Broadway & s. R. Co. 121 Mich. 175, 79 N. W. 1104; Coy Ave. R. Co. v. New York, 49 Hun, 126, 1 N. v. Detroit, Y. & A. A. R. Co. 125 Mich. 616, Y. Supp. 646; Union R. Co. v. Cambridge, 85 N. W. 6; Philadelphia v. Ridge Ave. 11 Allen, 287; State, Trenton Horse R. Co., Pass. R. Ca. 143 Pa. 444, 22 Atl. 695; Prosecutor, v. Trenton, 53 N. J. L. 132, 11 Grosse Pointe v. Detroit & L. St. C. R. Co. L. R. A. 410, 20 Atl. 1076; New York v. Dry 130 Mich. 363, 90 N. W. 42; Taylor v. Bay Dock, E. B. & B. R. Co. 133 N. Y. 104, 28 City Street R. Co. 80 Mich. 77, 45 N.W.335; Am. St. Rep. 609, 30 N. E. 563; State, Cape Jackson & S. Traction Co. v. Railroad May, D. B. & S. P. R. Co., Prosecutor, v.Cape Comrs. 128 Mich. 164, 87 N. W. 133; De- May, 59 N. J. L. 404, 36 L. R. A. 657, 36 Atl. troit, Ft. W. & B. I. R. Co. v. Railroad 678; Lewis v. Cincinnati Street R. 'Co. 10 Comrs. 127 Mich. 219, 62 L. R. A. 149, 86 N. Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 53; Fielders v. North W. 842; Detroit v. Ft. Wayne & E. R. Co. Jersey Street R. Co. 67 N. J. L. 76, 50 Atl. 90 Mich. 646, 51 N. W. 688; Detroit v. Ft. 533. Wayne & B. I. R. Co. 95 Mich. 456, 20 L. R. A. The finding of the trial court is conclu. 79, 35 Am. St. Rep. 580, 54 N. W. 958; Kal- sive. amazoo v. Michigan Traction Co. 126 Mich. Jackson v. People, 9 Mich. 111, 77 Am. 525, 85 N. W. 1067; Detroit v. Detroit Cit. Dec. 491; Hyde v. Nelson, 11 Mich. 353; izens' Street R. Co. 184 U. S. 368, 46 L. ed. Linn v. Roberts, 15 Mich. 443; Lynch v. 592, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410; Lake Shore & People, 16 Mich. 472; Brown v. Blanchard, M. S. R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 43 L. ed. 39 Mich. 790; State Bank v. Whittle, 11 702, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465; Getchell & M. Mich. 365, 1 N. W. 957; Sheldon v. Stewart, Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Des Moines Union R. 43 Mich. 574, 5 N. W. 1067; Powers v. O'. Co. 115 Ohio, 734, 87 N. W. 670; Belleville Brien, 44 Mich. 317, 6 N. W. 679; Genesce v. Citizens' Horse R. Co. 152 Ill. 171, 26 L. County Sav. Bank v. Michigan Barge Co. R. A. 681, 38 N. E. 584; Louisville City R. 52 Mich. 164, 17 N. W. 790; Rowe v. KelCo. v. Louisville, 8 Bush, 415; Philadelphia logg, 54 Mich. 207, 19 N. W. 957; Fellows v. Ridge Ave. Pass. R. Co. 143 Pa. 444, 22 v. Canney, 75 Mich. 445, 42 N. W. 958; Atl. 695; Sternberg v. State, 36 Neb. 307, Crawford v. Byrnes, 112 Mich. 599, 71 N. 19 L. R. A. 570, 54 N. W. 553; St. Louis & W. 152. M. River R. Co. v. Kirkwood, 159 Mo. 239, 53 L. R. A. 300, 60 S. W. 110; 2. Dill. Mun. Hooker, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of Corp. 4th ed. p. 849, $ 706; Pawcatuck Val- the court: ley Street R. Co. v. Westerly, 22 R. I. 307, The defendant is a street railway com: 47 Atl. 691.
pany, and was convicted and fined in the Where express legislative authority exists recorder's court of the city of Detroit for the for an ordinance the question of its reason- violation of an ordinance of said city. The ableness is not a matter for judicial inter- cause is here upon certiorari. ference.
There is no doubt of the violation of the People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 288, 2 L. ordinance. The cause being tried without a R. A. 721, 16 Am. St. Rep. 578, 41 N. W. jury, the court determined the question of 275; Grand Rapids v. Braudy, 105 Mich. the reasonableness of said ordinance, which 670, 32 L. R. A. 116, 55 Am. St. Rep. 472, appears to have turned upon questions of 64 N. W. 29; Wabash R. Co. v. Defiance, fact. Counsel for the defendant say in their 167 U. S. 88, 42 L. ed. 87, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. brief, that “there can be but one question 748.
for this court to decide; i. e., Is it a reasonThe charter of the city provides that the able regulation to require the defendant comcouncil shall also have power “to control, pany to equip its cars with air or electric prescribe, and regulate the manner in which brakes ?" The railroad was constructed unthe highways, streets, avenues, lanes, alleys, der the statutes existing at different times, when different sections were built; the pres- mony tending to show that it had several ent status of the company being the outcome hundred cars in the city, and that it would of various purchases or consolidations, or cost $350,000 to equip them with the preboth. All of said statutes required the con- scribed brakes; that many of such cars were sent of the city authorities, and this was single-truck cars; that it was replacing given in the various instances. The follow- those as rapidly as it could consistently with ing reservation of power is contained in such double truck cars; that, while said brakes consent, and is applicable to the present would be useful upon large suburban cars, case: “It is hereby reserved to the common which make few stops, they are not well council of the city of Detroit the right to adapted to use upon cars which make fremake such further rules, orders, or regula- quent stops, such as cars run upon city lines tions as may from time to time be deemed exclusively, or to small single-truck cars; necessary to protect the interest, welfare, that all cars are equipped with sufficient or accommodation of the public in relation hand brakes, and that they cannot be safeto street railways.” In the same connec- ly dispensed with; that they are more certion should be read $$ 6425 and 6447 of the tain in their action than the brakes preCompiled Laws, viz.:
scribed, and consequently safer; that their “All companies or corporations formed for average efficiency is greater, and that no city such purpose shall have the exclusive right is known to have all of its railroad cars to use and operate any street railway con- equipped with air or electric brakes; that structed, owned, or held by them: Provided, such brakes are in an experimental stage; that no such company or corporation shall that they have been repeatedly tried and be authorized to construct a railway under discarded in cities; and that, if used, they this act through the streets of any town or increase the danger of accident, both by reacity without the consent of the municipal son of the uncertainty of their action when authorities of such town or city and under an attempt is made to use them, and the unsuch regulations and upon such terms and certainty in the minds of motormen which conditions as said authorities may from time brake had better be used in cases of emerto time prescribe.”
gency. There was testimony offered in op“Provided further, that, after such con- position. The object of this ordinance is to sent shall have been given and accepted by compel the equipment of street cars with the the company or corporation to which the means of stopping with certainty and expesame is granted, such authorities shall make dition. We may take judicial notice that no regulations or conditions whereby tie this is desirable, for we are judicially cognirights or franchises so granted shall be de- zant of the fact that the use of street cars stroyed or unreasonably impaired, or such is necessarily attended by imminent dancompany or corporation be deprived of the ger to citizens who are upon the highway, as right of constructing, maintaining, and op- well as passengers. It is contended that this erating such railway in the street, in such ordinance is invalid: First, because it can consent or grant named, pursuant to the be said not to provide for brakes which will terms thereof."
tend to lessen danger; second, because its "After any city, village, or township shall enforcement will require an outlay large in have consented, as in this act provided, to comparison with the benefits which would the construction and maintenance of any result from the use of such brakes as are street railway therein or granted any rights required by it. A large amount of testiand privileges to any such company, and mony was taken upon both these questions, such consent and grant have been accepted and this was passed upon by the trial judge, by the company, such township, city, or vil- who has held the ordinance valid. lage shall not revoke such consent, nor de. It is past controversy that the city may prive the company of the rights and privi: regulate the conduct of defendant's business leges so conferred."
to the extent of requiring reasonable safeThe ordinance provides as follows: "Sec- guards against danger. Nellis, Street Surtion 1. On and after May 1st, 1902, no street face Roads, pp. 206, 208, 219; Kalamazoo car or cars shall be operated or run on any v. Michigan Traction Co. 126 Mich. 525, 85 street, avenue, or highway in the city of De- N. W. 1067; Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' troit, unless the same be equipped with air Street R. Co. 184 U. S. 368, 46 L. ed. 592, or electric brakes." Section 2 provides that 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410; Lake Shore & M. S. no street railway company, nor any officers R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 43 L. ed. thereof, “shall run or operate, or permit to 702, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465; Chicago & A. R. be run or operated, any car upon or in any Co. v. Carlinville, 200 Ill. 314, 60 L. R. A. street or avenue in said city, unless the same 394, 93 Am. St. Rep. 190, 65 N. E. 730, and is equipped with air brakes.” Section 3 pro- other cases cited in briefs of counsel. Many vides the penalty.
regulations are permissible, although in all Counsel for the defense introduced testi. or most instances they involve some limita