Carpenter, J., delivered the opinion of duty to a particular person. If, for in the court: stance, the defendants in this suit had misrepresented to the purchasers the weight or breeding of these hogs, they would have incurred a liability only to those purchasers. The declaration in this case alleges that defendants unlawfully sold certain hogs to a firm of live-stock dealers, knowing that said hogs were "afflicted with a dangerous | See Necker v. Harvey, 49 Mich. 517, 14 N. and infectious disease;" that they did not notify said firm of this fact; that said firm, in ignorance of the fact that said hogs were so infected, sold and delivered them to plaintiffs, who, without negligence on their part, placed them in a pen with their sound swine, which contracted the disease and died. The defendants pleaded the general issue. The case came on for trial before a jury, and, after the plaintiffs had introduced some testimony, and offered to prove that the intervening purchasers "were without knowledge of any diseased condition of the hogs, and that there were no facts or circumstances that would have put them upon such notice," the trial court directed a verdict for the defendants upon the ground that the plaintiffs had no cause of action. The question in thise case relates solely to the correctness of this ruling. See W. 503. In such cases the wrongdoer is not liable for damages sustained by a third person; not because there intervenes a human agency between the wrong and the damages, but because the third person was in no sense wronged, or, for another and quite as correct reason, because the damages did not result from the wrong. On the other hand, there are wrongs naturally calculated, through the intervention of an innocent human agency, to injure third persons. In such cases both reason and authority hold the wrongdoer responsible for such injuries. The case of Craft v. Parker, W. & Co. 96 Mich. 245, 21 L. R. A. 139, 55 N. W. 812, is such a case. There the defendants, who were engaged in the business of selling meats in the city of Detroit, sold plaintiff's brother a roll of spiced bacon. The purchaser took it to the plaintiff's house, where he boardIt is the contention of the defendants' ed, and plaintiff's wife cooked it for breakcounsel, and it was the view of the trial fast. The bacon was in fact spoiled, and court, that there could be no recovery, be- unfit for food, and made plaintiff sick. On cause the act of a third person intervened the assumption that defendant knew that between defendants' wrong and plaintiffs' the meat was purchased for consumption, injury. Is such intervention a sufficient de- and was negligent in selling it, it was held fense? In considering this question it should that plaintiff had a cause of action. be remembered that plaintiffs' claim is not also Brown v. Marshall, 47 Mich. 576, 41 based upon the ground of a breach of de- Am. Rep. 728, 11 N. W. 392; Thomas v. fendants' contract with the firm to whom Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455; they sold the hogs. It is based upon the Nitro-glycerine Case, 15 Wall. 524, 21 L. theory that defendants committed a wrong ed. 206; Griggs v. Fleckenstein, 14 Minn. 81, in selling as sound hogs which they knew to 100 Am. Dec. 199, Gil. 62. In Filer v. Smith, be afflicted with a contagious disorder. Nor 96 Mich. 355, 35 Am. St. Rep. 603, 55 N. W. should we forget that the act of the inter- 1002, this court, speaking through Mr. Jusvening third person was in no sense wrong- tice McGrath, said: "The general rule of ful, because, as already stated, plaintiffs of law is that whoever does an illegal or wrongfered to prove that the intervening pur- ful act is answerable for all the consechasers "were without knowledge of any dis-quences that ensue in the ordinary and nateased condition of the hogs, and that there were no facts or circumstances that would have put them upon notice." We cannot, therefore, apply in this case the rule often stated in text-books and decisions, that one is not responsible for consequences result-age were the necessary or legal and natural ing from the wrongful act of another person. consequence of the wrongful act." Assuming, Griffin v. Jackson Light & P. Co. 128 Mich. as contended by defendants (see also Thom653, 55 L. R. A. 318, 92 Am. St. Rep. 496, as v. Winchester, 6 N. Y., at p. 410, 57 Am. 87 N. W. 888. But it cannot be said that Dec. 460), that the principle which holds a there is a general rule of law which ex- wrongdoer liable for consequences, though empts one from the consequences of a wrong human agencies intervene between the wrong merely because between the wrong and its and those consequences, applies only when consequences there intervenes an innocent the wrong committed is one imminently human agency. It is true that many acts dangerous to human life, it is nevertheless are wrong simply because they violate a applicable in this case. Defendants, in sell ural course of events, though those consequences be immediately brought about by intervening agents, provided such agents were set in motion by the primary wrongdoer, or provided those acts causing the dam ing hogs known to be infected with a dangerous and infectious disease, committed a wrong imminently dangerous to human life (in recognition of this fact out legislature has made such sale a crime. See § 5638, Comp. Laws 1897); and it is settled (see Griggs v. Fleckenstein, 14 Minn. 81, 100 Am. Dec. 199, Gil. 62) that, when one commits a wrong imminently dangerous to human life, the principle under consideration extends his liability to damages to property. Were the damages sustained by plaintiffs a legal consequence of defendants' wrong? The rule by which it is to be determined whether or not a particular consequence results from a certain wrong is a subject of dispute. It has been held that the wrongdoer is responsible for all consequences naturally resulting from his wrong, whether he could have anticipated those consequences or not. Sutherland, Damages, § 16; Wharton, Neg. § 77; Stevens v. Dudley, 56 Vt. 158. On the other hand, it is held that his responsibility is limited to such consequences as a person of average intelligence and knowledge should have anticipated. Pollock, Torts, p. 28. As the application in this case of either rule leads to the same re sult, it is unnecessary to determine which is correct. As a natural result of the wrong done by defendants, the persons to whom they sold the hogs did, in ignorance of their condition, sell them to plaintiffs, and plaintiffs, relying upon their appearance, and without negligence, placed them where their other hogs became infected and died. The damage to plaintiff's was a consequence which defendants, as persons of average intelligence and knowledge, should have anticipated. They should have supposed, either that the purchasers would themselves butcher these hogs, or that they would sell them to some person who would treat them as they appeared to be. If we are right in the foregoing views, plaintiffs, if they establish their case as made in their declaration and opening statement, are entitled to recover from the defendants sufficient to compensate them for all the damagcs resulting to them from defendants' wrong. These damages include, not only the value of the hogs purchased, but the value of those which contracted the contagion and died. See Eaton v. Winnie, 20 Mich. 156, 4 Am. Rep. 377. It results from these views that the judgment of the court below should be reversed, and a new trial granted. The other Justices concur. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan v. DETROIT UNITED RAILWAY. (........Mich.........) 1. Before a municipal ordinance requiring the equipment of street cars with air brakes will be declared unreasonable it should be made clearly to appear that there is no necessity for a more effective brake than those in use, or that the air brake will not be so. 2. 3. or That the preponderance of oral testimony is to the effect that an dinance requiring air brakes on street cars is unreasonable is not sufficient to justify the court in annulling it if there is nothing to show that similar results might not be secured by their use on street, as on railroad, cars, since the court will take judicial notice that such brakes are in general use on the latter, and generally effective. That the equipment of street cars with air brakes will require a large outlay of money is not sufficient to nullify the ordinance requiring it. (November 9, 1903.) ERTIORARI to the Recorder's Court for the City of Detroit to review a judgment directing defendant to comply with an ordinance requiring it to equip its cars with air or electric brakes. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Brennan, Donnelly, & Van de Mark, Charles D. Joslyn, and Henry L. Lyster, for plaintiff in certiorari: The evidence introduced in this case shows clearly that the present brake equipment on reliable and more efficient than any air or the cars of plaintiff in certiorari is more electric brake which, at the present time, can be found upon the market, and that there would therefore be no object in equipping its cars with the so-called automatic brakes. Any ordinance that will require a corporation to add, in addition to its already reliable equipment, one that is less reliable, is unreasonable, and therefore must be held invalid. Yonkers v. Yonkers R. Co. 51 App. Div. NOTE. For other cases in this series as to validity of ordinances regulating the equipment or running of street cars, see State, Cape May, D. B. & S. P. R. Co., Prosecutor, v. Cape May, 36 L. R. A. 653 (fenders on cars); State, Cape May, D. B. & S. P. R. Co., Prosecutor, v. Cape May, 36 L. R. A. 656 (limiting speed); State, Cape May, D. B. & S. P. R. Co., Prosecutor, v. Cape May, 36 L. R. A. 657 (requiring car to come to full stop before crossing intersecting street); State, Trenton Horse R. Co., Prosecutor. v. Trenton, 11 L. R. A. 410 (requiring both driver and agent on car); and South Covington & C. Street R. Co. v. Berry, 15 L. R. A. 604 (re. quiring both driver and conductor on cars). Brooklyn v. Nassau Electric R. Co. 38 App. Div. 365, 56 N. Y. Supp. 609. The plaintiff in certiorari is bound to provide brakes and other appliances for its cars and keep them in repair. 271, 64 N. Y. Supp. 955; United Traction | have become so known as to require its Co. v. Watervliet, 35 Misc. 392, 71 N. Y. adoption. Supp. 977; Brooklyn v. Nassau Electric R. Co. 38 App. Div. 365, 56 N. Y. Supp. 609; Toronto v. Toronto Street R. Co. 15 Ont. App. Rep. 30; Toledo, W. & W. R. Co. v. Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37, 16 Am. Rep. 611; Brooklyn Crosstown R. Co. v. Brooklyn, 37 Hun, 413; Shelbyville v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. 146 Ind. 66, 44 N. E. 929; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Connersville, 147 Ind. 277, 37 L. R. A. 175, 62 Am. St. Rep. 418, 46 N. E. 579; Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217, 33 Am. Rep. 239; Toledo, W. & W. R. Co. v. Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37, 16 Am. Rep. 611; Hawes v. Chicago, 158 Ill. 653, 30 L. R. A. 225, 42 N. E. 373; McFarlane v. Chicago, 185 Ill. 242, 57 N. E. 12; Stafford v. Chippewa Valley Electric R. Co. 110 Wis. 331, 85 N. W. 1036; Zumault v. Kansas City & Independence Air Line, 71 Mo. App. 670. The mere declaration of the common council does not make the air or electric brake a more reliable or safer equipment than the hand brake. Re Sam Kee, 31 Fed. 680; Re Tie Loy, 26 Fed. 611; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064; Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, 19 L. ed. 984; Quintini v. Bay St. Louis, 64 Miss. 483, 60 Am. Rep. 62, 1 So. 625. Thompson v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Co. 16 Utah, 281, 40 L. R. A. 172, 67 Am. St. Rep. 621, 52 Pac. 92; Musser v. Lancaster City Street R. Co. 176 Pa. 621, 35 Atl. 206; Gannon v. New Orleans City & L. R. Co. 48 La. Ann. 1002, 20 So. 223; Little Rock Traction & Electric Co. v. Morrison, 69 Ark. 289, 62 S. W. 1045; Wynn v. Central Park, N. & E. River R. Co. 10 App. Div. 13, 41 N. Y. Supp. 595; Roberts v. Spokane Street R. Co. 23 Wash. 325, 54 L. R. A. 184, 63 Pac. 506; McNamara v. Brooklyn City R. Co. 11 Misc. 667, 32 N. Y. Supp. 913. But it is only obliged to equip its cars as a reasonable, prudent person would do. Hogan v. Citizens' R. Co. 150 Mo. 36, 51 S. W. 473; McGinnis v. Canada Southern Bridge Co. 49 Mich. 466, 13 N. W. 819; Hewitt v. Flint & P. M. R. Co. 67 Mich. 61, 34 N. W. 659; Illick v. Flint & P. M. R. Co. 67 Mich. 632, 35 N. W. 708; Shadford v. Ann Arbor Street R. Co. 111 Mich. 390, 69 N. W. 661. The necessity of having a hand brake on cars equipped with any kind of automatic Mr. John J. Speed, aiso for plaintiff in brake, and being obliged to resort to it certiorari: when the automatic fails to work, is in itself a great vice. The police authority is not an arbitrary or despotic power that may be exercised without a sufficient public purpose. Burlington v. Burlington Street R. Co. 49 Iowa, 144, 31 Am. Rep. 145; State, Hudson Teleph. Co., Prosecutor, v. Jersey City, 49 N. J. L. 303, 60 Am. Rep. 619, 8 Atl. 123; Northwestern Teleph. Exch. Co. v. Minneapolis, 81 Minn. 140, 53 L. R. A. 175, 83 N. W. 527, 86 N. W. 69; Binghamton v. Binghamton & P. D. R. Co. 61 Hun, 479, 16 N. Y. Supp. 225; Kalamazoo v. Michigan Traction Co. 126 Mich. 525, 85 N. W. 1067. The presumption that public officers have done their duty, like the presumption of innocence, is undoubtedly a legal presumption, but it does not supply proof of a substantive fact. United States v. Ross, 92 U. S. 281, 23 L. ed. 707; Binghamton v. Binghamton & P. D. R. Co. 61 Hun, 479, 16 N. Y. Supp. 225. We must presume, in order to sustain this ordinance, that the cars are not the best style in use on street railways, for the reason that the brakes are dangerous, and therefore their continued use is injurious to the public; also that a better device has been invented, and, if invented, its merits Roberts v. Spokane Street R. Co. 23 Wash. 325, 54 L. R. A. 184, 63 Pac. 506. Messrs. Timothy E. Tarsney, P. J. M. Hally, and Charles E. Love, for the People: The ordinance which at the present time controls the cars running on Jefferson avenue contained the following section: It is hereby reserved to the common council of the city of Detroit the right to make such further rules, orders, or regulations as may from time to time be deemed necessary to protect the interest, welfare, or accommodation of the public in relation to street railways. This ordinance, when accepted by these corporations, constitutes a contract between which the parties are irrevocably bound. the city and the corporation by the terms of Mich. 78, 39 Mich. 543; Detroit Citizens' Ft. Wayne & E. R. Co. v. Detroit, 34 Street R. Co. v. Detroit, 125 Mich. 673, 84 Am. St. Rep. 589, 85 N. W. 96, 86 N. W. 809; Detroit Citizens' Street R. Co. v. Board of Public Works, 126 Mich. 554, 85 N. W. 1072. The court is not concerned in the reason that the man who has the right to say yes or no has for saying the one or the other. Gibson v. Carnage, 39 Mich. 49, 33 Am. | public grounds, and spaces within the said Rep. 351. The ordinance gave the right to require power brakes. city shall be used and enjoyed." This is sufficient to authorize the regulation. St. Louis v. St. Louis R. Co. 89 Mo. 44, Port Huron & N. W. R. Co. v. Richards, 58 Am. Rep. 82, 1 N. W. 305; City & 90 Mich. 577, 51 N. W. 680; Union Street Suburban R. Co. v. Savannah, 77 Ga. 731, R. Co. v. Saginaw Circuit Judge, 113 Mich. 4 Am. St. Rep. 106; State v. Canal & C. R. 694, 71 N. W. 1073; People ex rel. Wolcott Co. 50 La. Ann. 1189, 56 L. R. A. 287, 24 v. Plainfield Ave. Gravel-Road Co. 105 Mich. So. 265; Newcomb v. Norfolk Western Street 9, 62 N. W. 998; Rapid R. Co. v. Mt. Clem- R. Co. 179 Mass. 449, 61 N. E. 42; State v. ens, 118 Mich. 133, 76 N. W. 318; Traverse | Hadeyhaim, 42 La. Ann. 483, 21 Am. St. City Gas Co. v. Traverse City, 130 Mich. 17, Rep. 388, 7 So. 621; Faith v. Tower Grove 89 N. W. 574; Rice v. Detroit, Y. & A. A. & L. R. Co. 105 Mo. 537, 13 L. R. A. 74, 16 R. Co. 122 Mich. 677, 48 L. R. A. 84, 81 S. W. 913; Dry Dock, E. B. & B. R. Co. v. N. W. 927; Kissane v. Detroit, Y. & A. A. New York, 47 Hun, 221; Broadway & S. R. Co. 121 Mich. 175, 79 N. W. 1104; Coy Ave. R. Co. v. New York, 49 Hun, 126, 1 N. v. Detroit, Y. & A. A. R. Co. 125 Mich. 616, Y. Supp. 646; Union R. Co. v. Cambridge, 85 N. W. 6; Philadelphia v. Ridge Ave. 11 Allen, 287; State, Trenton Horse R. Co., Pass. R. Co. 143 Pa. 444, 22 Atl. 695; Prosecutor, v. Trenton, 53 N. J. L. 132, 11 Grosse Pointe v. Detroit & L. St. C. R. Co. L. R. A. 410, 20 Atl. 1076; New York v. Dry 130 Mich. 363, 90 N. W. 42; Taylor v. Bay Dock, E. B. & B. R. Co. 133 N. Y. 104, 28 City Street R. Co. 80 Mich. 77, 45 N. W.335; | Am. St. Rep. 609, 30 N. E. 563; State, Cape Jackson & S. Traction Co. V. Railroad May, D. B. & S. P. R. Co., Prosecutor, v. Cape Comrs. 128 Mich. 164, 87 N. W. 133; De- May, 59 N. J. L. 404, 36 L. R. A. 657, 36 Atl. troit, Ft. W. & B. 1. R. Co. v. Railroad 678; Lewis v. Cincinnati Street R. Co. 10 Comrs. 127 Mich. 219, 62 L. R. A. 149, 86 N. Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 53; Fielders v. North W. 842; Detroit v. Ft. Wayne & E. R. Co. Jersey Street R. Co. 67 N. J. L. 76, 50 Atl. 90 Mich. 646, 51 N. W. 688; Detroit v. Ft. 533. Wayne & B. I. R. Co. 95 Mich. 456, 20 L. R. A. 79, 35 Am. St. Rep. 580, 54 N. W. 958; Kalamazoo v. Michigan Traction Co. 126 Mich. 525, 85 N. W. 1067; Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' Street R. Co. 184 U. S. 368, 46 L. ed. 592, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 43 L. ed. 702, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465; Getchell & M. Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Des Moines Union R. Co. 115 Ohio, 734, 87 N. W. 670; Belleville v. Citizens' Horse R. Co. 152 Ill. 171, 26 L. R. A. 681, 38 N. E. 584; Louisville City R. Co. v. Louisville, 8 Bush, 415; Philadelphia v. Ridge Ave. Pass. R. Co. 143 Pa. 444, 22 Atl. 695; Sternberg v. State, 36 Neb. 307, 19 L. R. A. 570, 54 N. W. 553; St. Louis & M. River R. Co. v. Kirkwood, 159 Mo. 239, 53 L. R. A. 300, 60 S. W. 110; 2. Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. p. 849, § 706; Pawcatuck Valley Street R. Co. v. Westerly, 22 R. I. 307, 47 Atl. 691. Where express legislative authority exists for an ordinance the question of its reasonableness is not a matter for judicial interference. People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 288, 2 L. R. A. 721, 16 Am. St. Rep. 578, 41 N. W. 275; Grand Rapids v. Braudy, 105 Mich. 670, 32 L. R. A. 116, 55 Am. St. Rep. 472, 64 N. W. 29; Wabash R. Co. v. Defiance, 167 U. S. 88, 42 L. ed. 87, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 748. The finding of the trial court is conclusive. Jackson v. People, 9 Mich. 111, 77 Am. Dec. 491; Hyde v. Nelson, 11 Mich. 353; Linn v. Roberts, 15 Mich. 443; Lynch v. People, 16 Mich. 472; Brown v. Blanchard, 39 Mich. 790; State Bank v. Whittle, 41 Mich. 365, 1 N. W. 957; Sheldon v. Stewart, 43 Mich. 574, 5 N. W. 1067; Powers v. O'Brien, 44 Mich. 317, 6 N. W. 679; Genesee County Sav. Bank v. Michigan Barge Co. 52 Mich. 164, 17 N. W. 790; Rowe v. Kellogg, 54 Mich. 207, 19 N. W. 957; Fellows v. Canney, 75 Mich. 445, 42 N. W. 958; Crawford v. Byrnes, 112 Mich. 599, 71 N. W. 152. Hooker, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court: The defendant is a street railway company, and was convicted and fined in the recorder's court of the city of Detroit for the violation of an ordinance of said city. The cause is herc upon certiorari. There is no doubt of the violation of the ordinance. The cause being tried without a jury, the court determined the question of the reasonableness of said ordinance, which appears to have turned upon questions of fact. Counsel for the defendant say in their brief, that "there can be but one question for this court to decide; i. e., Is it a reasonable regulation to require the defendant company to equip its cars with air or electric brakes?" The railroad was constructed un The charter of the city provides that the council shall also have power "to control, prescribe, and regulate the manner in which the highways, streets, avenues, lanes, alleys, der the statutes existing at different times, when different sections were built; the pres- | mony tending to show that it had several ent status of the company being the outcome hundred cars in the city, and that it would of various purchases or consolidations, or cost $350,000 to equip them with the preboth. All of said statutes required the con- scribed brakes; that many of sich cars were sent of the city authorities, and this was single-truck cars; that it was replacing given in the various instances. The follow-those as rapidly as it could consistently with ing reservation of power is contained in such consent, and is applicable to the present case: "It is hereby reserved to the common council of the city of Detroit the right to make such further rules, orders, or regulations as may from time to time be deemed necessary to protect the interest, welfare, or accommodation of the public in relation to street railways." In the same connection should be read §§ 6425 and 6447 of the Compiled Laws, viz.: "All companies or corporations formed for such purpose shall have the exclusive right to use and operate any street railway constructed, owned, or held by them: Provided, that no such company or corporation shal! be authorized to construct a railway under this act through the streets of any town or city without the consent of the municipal authorities of such town or city and under such regulations and upon such terms and conditions as said authorities may from time to time prescribe." "Provided further, that, after such consent shall have been given and accepted by the company or corporation to which the same is granted, such authorities shall make no regulations or conditions whereby the rights or franchises so granted shall be destroyed or unreasonably impaired, or such company or corporation be deprived of the right of constructing, maintaining, and operating such railway in the street, in such consent or grant named, pursuant to the terms thereof." "After any city, village, or township shall have consented, as in this act provided, to the construction and maintenance of any street railway therein or granted any rights and privileges to any such company, and such consent and grant have been accepted by the company, such township, city, or village shall not revoke such consent, nor deprive the company of the rights and privi leges so conferred." double truck cars; that, while said brakes would be useful upon large suburban cars, which make few stops, they are not well adapted to use upon cars which make frequent stops, such as cars run upon city lines exclusively, or to small single-truck cars; that all cars are equipped with sufficient hand brakes, and that they cannot be safely dispensed with; that they are more certain in their action than the brakes prescribed, and consequently safer; that their average efficiency is greater, and that no city is known to have all of its railroad cars equipped with air or electric brakes; that such brakes are in an experimental stage; that they have been repeatedly tried and discarded in cities; and that, if used, they increase the danger of accident, both by reason of the uncertainty of their action when an attempt is made to use them, and the uncertainty in the minds of motormen which brake had better be used in cases of emergency. There was testimony offered in opposition. The object of this ordinance is to compel the equipment of street cars with the means of stopping with certainty and expedition. We may take judicial notice that this is desirable, for we are judicially cognizant of the fact that the use of street cars is necessarily attended by imminent danger to citizens who are upon the highway, as well as passengers. It is contended that this ordinance is invalid: First, because it can be said not to provide for brakes which will tend to lessen danger; second, because its enforcement will require an outlay large in comparison with the benefits which would result from the use of such brakes as are required by it. A large amount of testimony was taken upon both these questions, and this was passed upon by the trial judge, who has held the ordinance valid. It is past controversy that the city may regulate the conduct of defendant's business to the extent of requiring reasonable safeThe ordinance provides as follows: "Sec- guards against danger. Nellis, Street Surtion 1. On and after May 1st, 1902, no street face Roads, pp. 206, 208, 219; Kalamazoo car or cars shall be operated or run on any v. Michigan Traction Co. 126 Mich. 525, 85 street, avenue, or highway in the city of De- N. W. 1067; Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' troit, unless the same be equipped with air Street R. Co. 184 U. S. 368, 46 L. ed. 592, or electric brakes." Section 2 provides that 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410; Lake Shore & M. S. no street railway company, nor any officers R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 43 L. ed. thereof, "shall run or operate, or permit to 702, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465; Chicago & A. R. be run or operated, any car upon or in any Co. v. Carlinville, 200 Ill. 314, 60 L. R. A. street or avenue in said city, unless the same 394, 93 Am. St. Rep. 190, 65 N. E. 730, and is equipped with air brakes." Section 3 pro- other cases cited in briefs of counsel. Many vides the penalty. regulations are permissible, although in all Counsel for the defense introduced testi- or most instances they involve some luita |