original and inherent jurisdiction, it was not, and is not, ousted of its exercise by statutes which confer like power on courts of law by process of garnishment; and, as they insist, it is well settled that "the enlargement of jurisdiction of courts of law, or the recognition and enforcement by them of equitable rights and interest, even when conferred in terms by statute, does not, in the absence of statutory prohibition, take away or impair the original jurisdiction of the chancery court." But it is not well or at all settled, and it is not true in point of legal fact, that the chancery court ever had or has original jurisdiction at the suit of a corporation creditor to coerce the payment by stockholders of their subscriptions to its capital. Such debts to a corporation stand on the part of the court to determine the disputed question as to the jurisdiction of courts of equity, upon which so eminent judges have differed, for the statute of California permits all choses in action and equitable assets to be reached by law. In Pacific Bank v. Robinson, 57 Cal. 520, 40 Am. Rep. 120, it was said that what was now accomplished in reaching property not directly liable to execution for the satisfaction of a judgment, in proceedings supplementary to execution, in which the defendant might be compelled upon examination in such proceedings to deliver such property in satisfaction of the judgment, was effected, under the old system of practice, by a proceeding in equity, known as the creditor's bill; that after a judgment creditor had exhausted his remedy at law, by the issuance of a fieri facias, which was returned nulla bona, he had the right to invoke the jurisdiction of a court of equity to aid him, upon the principle of compelling a discovery of assets, tangible or intangible, and applying them to satisfy his execution. In Douglass v. Huston, 6 Ohio, 156, the court said, in speaking of the complainant's judgment that it would be a debt due the judgment debtor from his debtor, which might, in a proper case, be applied in equity to the satisfaction of the complainant's judgment, that it would be the ordinary case of a creditor pursuing the choses in action of his debtor, in equity, where no means of satisfaction could be found at law; and that this would be according to the common practice in equity, and to the Ohio statute. upon the same footing as indebtedness generally. In the absence of statutes on the subject, no court, whether of law or equity, has any power to reach and subject this class of a debtor's property to the satisfaction of demands against him. At the common law, choses in action of the debtor were not leviable, and the process of garnishment was unknown. There was under that system an indirect method of reaching such assets by the attachment of the debtor defendant's person and his incarceration until the judgment against him was satisfied; the theory being that this process would coerce him to a realization upon choses in action belonging to him, and to the application of the funds arising from their collection to the judgment under which to remedy this defect in the law, and to authorize the administration of justice through the medium of chancery, by a course of procedure more liberal than had been hitherto recognized, the statute in question was enacted. In Ex parte Hardy, 68 Ala. 341 the majority of the court rendered a judgment discharging the relator on habeas corpus after he had been committed for contempt in not obeying a decree commanding him to pay a judgment against him in favor of the complainant, or deliver for that purpose sufficient bonds found to be in his possession, upon the ground that it was virtually an imprisonment for debt, and as such prohibited by the Declaration of Rights. Brickell, Ch. J., dissented and wrote a very exhaustive opinion favoring the doctrine that choses in action and equitable interests of a debtor which were not capable of being reached on execution might, after return thereof unsatisfied, be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment by a court of equity. This opinion is a collation of all the principal authorities, both English and American, upon the particular subject under consideration, and also cites Chase v. Searles, 45 N. H. 511; Child v. Brace, 4 Paige, 309; Dunlevy v. Tallmadge, 32 N. Y. 457, as favoring the theory that statutes in regulation or enlargement of the remedy have not raised a presumption that the jurisdiction was not pre-existing, or been construed as conferring any new jurisdiction. In Petefish v. Buck, 56 Ill. App. 149, the court stated that it did not regard the ruling in Tompkins v. Fonda, 4 Paige, 448, infra, VII. a, as resting upon the particular provisions of the statute, but as declaratory of a general and fundamental doctrine of equity. In Tantum v. Green, 21 N. J. Eq. 364, the court said that it was not necessary to decide whether, independent of the statute of 1845 (Nixon Dig. 116, § 81, Rev. p. 120, § 88) and the act to prevent fraudulent trusts and assignments (Id. 297, Rev. p. 393, § 23), a judgment creditor, after having exhausted his remedy at law, could maintain a bill in chancery to reach the choses in action of a judgment debtor, which are not subject to levy by virtue of an execution on the judgment, but inclined to the opinion that such a bill could be maintained before the passage of those statutes. In Alabama, by the act of January, 1844, things in action belonging to a judgment debtor, against whom an execution has been returned unsatisfied, may be reached by a bill in chancery to discover and apply the same, or its proceeds, in satisfaction of the judgment. Brown V. Bates, 10 Ala. 432. The court said that it was held in that state, long previous to that act, that a judgment creditor who had exhausted his legal remedies might go into equity for the purpose of subjecting the equitable estate of the debtor, or other interests that could not be made available at law. But that in such case it was necessary that the allegations should be specific, and the bill should be relieved from the imputation of being speculative and vague; and that bills thus restricted as to the scope of their inquiries often failed to admit complete justice to be administered to the complainant; and that,' IV. See also Monroe v. Reid, 46 Neb. 316, 64 N. W. 983, and Ludes v. Hood, 29 Kan. 49, infra, upon any theory that such court has or had original jurisdiction in the premises, or could have been resorted to before the statute giving the right at law, but upon the idea that by reason of fraud and the like the legal remedy to enforce the right conferred by the statute has become inadequate thereto, some ground of equity interposition has arisen. Of course, if a chose in action belonging to the debtor has become impressed with a trust in favor of the creditor, chancery, in the absence of statute, has jurisdiction to subject it to the debt; and it is upon that principle, as we shall see, that the present bill is really sought to be maintained; but, as we shall further see, that doctrine does not obtain in this case. he is attached and imprisoned. But that | And when chancery is thus invoked it is not proceeding has no place in our law, and, if a creditor relies upon any other process as a means of applying the choses in action of his debtor to the payment of his claim, he must be able to point out some statutory provision giving the process or remedy he invokes, and he must pursue such remedy either according to the terms of the statute and in the forum prescribed by it, or he must show that the legal right conferred upon him by the statute has been so clogged and impeded of enforcement in the statutory forum-the court of law in garnishment proceedings-as that he is entitled, upon some recognized principle of equity jurisdiction in aid of legal rights, to call to his assistance the powers of the chancery court. Independent of statutory provision, equity | eign attachment, the practical effect and result has no jurisdiction to reach and subject choses were, that the debtor could substantially defy in action to a judgment after return of no the creditor by putting his properties into property found. Watkins v. Dorsett, 1 Bland | equitable estates; and that, to remedy this deCh. 530. fect of the law, the act of October 18, 1832, chap. 11 (transferred into § 4287 of the Code), was enacted; the 1st section of which provided that choses in action, among other things, might be subjected in chancery, founded on judgment at law, fieri facias, and return of In Burt v. Hoettinger, 28 Ind. 217, the subject of the action was land which was attempted to be reached by a proceeding supplementary to execution under the statute. But in the course of the opinion the court said that the remedy | given by the statute under which the proceed- nulla bona. ings were had, was, in many cases, a substitute for a creditor's bill; indeed, in subjecting the debtor's choses in action to the payment of his debts, which, before its passage could not be done, in Indiana, except by proceedings in attachment, it gave to the creditor a new right. For other Indiana cases maintaining the doctrine that, previous to the enactment of the statute, jurisdiction in equity of the matter being considered did not exist, see supra, II. In Ewing v. Cantrell, Meigs, 364, the court said that, in consequence of the decision of that court in Erwin v. Oldham, 6 Yerg. 185, 27 Am. Dec. 459, supra, II., the statute was passed to subject stock, choses in action, etc., to the satisfaction of the claims of creditors. IV. Effect of statutory enactment to abrogate the original rule. Without doubt it will be generally conceded that, where the statute or Code provides an action in equity in all respects similar to the original suits in equity, and that choses in action may be subjected therein, there can be no In Cosby v. Ferguson, 3 J. J. Marsh. 264, it is decided that, under the statute of Kentucky of 1821, a chose in action was subjected to the payment of debts by the chancellor, but the right to have such a chose in action so sub-question but that the original jurisdiction will jected depended entirely upon the statute, and but for it the judgment debtor's interest in a chose in action would have been intangible by his creditors. And in Cosby v. Ross, 3 J. J. Marsh. 290, 20 Am. Dec. 140, it was accordingly held that, as in that case the deed was executed prior to the statute of 1821, which subjected choses in action to the payment of debts, in equity, the creditor had no right, legal or equitable, to subject the claim for the purchase money for the satisfaction of precedent debts. Although in New York, and to a certain extent in England, attempts were made to establish the jurisdiction of the court of chancery to collect the choses in action of the judgment debtor, and apply them to the payment of his debts, it was a new branch of equity jurisdiction, not established before the Revolution, and in New Jersey had never been assumed by the court of chancery until conferred by statute. Whitney v. Robbins, 17 N. J. Eq. 360. In Graham v. Merrill, 5 Coldw. 622, the court said that, by virtue of the decision in Erwin v. Oldham, 6 Yerg. 185, 27 Am. Dec. 458, supra, II., and under the operations of the law abolishing imprisonment for debt, and the law as to the kind of estates leviable by fieri facias and for be merged in that provided by the enactment; since all that was ever claimed could be done under the original jurisdiction may be by virtue of the statute. But while this course has been adopted in some of the jurisdictions, in others a more summary proceeding or action has been provided, as more expeditious and less expensive, variously denominated equitable garnishment or attachment, and, in nearly all of the states, proceedings supplementary to execution. And the question has arisen as to the effect of the institution of these latter remedies to interfere with the original equity jurisdiction to subject choses in action. Where the statute, either expressly or by clear and unmistakable implication, provides that the enactment shall be in lieu of the former equitable remedy (assuming that it existed), the new remedy will be necessarily substituted in place of the old one. But the weight of authority appears to be in favor of the notion that, when the statute contains nothing which indicates an intention on the part of the lawmaking power to abrogate or abridge the original jurisdiction, the latter will remain and be operative. In some of the states the statutes or Codes provide for both the equity suit and the new proceeding, and in such, the remedies are held to be concurrent. Recurring to the main proposition,-that | embodied here with advantage, but we conchancery had no original jurisdiction to sub- tent ourselves with some of the most pertiject choses in action of a debtor to the nent parts of it. In stating the case before claims of his creditor,—we refer to and col- the court and the question for decision, the late some of the authorities sustaining it. opinion proceeds thus: "The cause thus In Donovan v. Finn, Hopk. Ch. 59, 14 Am. considered presents these facts: A creditor Dec. 531, there is a most able and elaborate has obtained judgment against his debtor in examination and consideration of the au- a court of law, an execution has been issued thorities, and discussion of the question, against the property of the debtor, and the leading up to and sustaining the proposition sheriff has returned that none is found. The embodied in the headnote, that "property debtor has property consisting in a debt due not subject to execution at law, such as to him, and the creditor by judgment now choses in action, cannot be reached in equity asks this court to compel the debtor of his unless the case is otherwise of equitable debtor to make payment to him in satisfacjurisdiction, as where the property was tion of the judgment. Has this court jurisfraudulently converted into choses in action diction in such a case, or power to give reto defraud creditors." The whole of the lief? To apply existing laws to new cases very learned opinion in that case might be is the duty of courts of justice, and it is edy did not supersede it or destroy it. The proceedings in aid of execution were not intended to be substituted for actions in the nature of creditors' bills; while they may be made to serve, in the main, the same purpose, they often furnish an incomplete and imperfect remedy; and where, on the facts, such an action is proper, the one in the nature of a creditor's bill will be entertained. Monroe v. Reid, 46 Neb. 316, 64 N. W. 983. To the same effect, Ludes v. Hood, 29 Kan. 49. The remedy, in equity, to reach and apply assets of a judgment debtor to the payment of the judgment after return of no property found has not been abrogated by the statutes of Oregon providing for the attachment of such assets. Sabin v. Anderson, 31 Or. 487, 49 Pac. 870; Matlock v. Babb, 31 Or. 516, 49 Pac. 873. Nor have the proceedings supplementary to execution, provided by statute, superseded the equitable jurisdiction. Matlock v. Babb, 31 Or. 516, 49 Pac. 873. Originally the court of chancery, in the exercise of its equitable power, had jurisdiction of creditor's bills brought for the purpose of reaching equitable assets which the defendant had put in the hands of third parties, after the judgment creditor had exhausted his remedy at law by the return of his execution, and such remedy is not abrogated by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in regard to proceedings supplementary to execution, the same not being adequate as a complete remedy. Feldenheimer v. Tressel, 6 Dak. 265, 43 N. W. 94. Under the New York Code the remedy by supplementary proceeding to reach a chose in action, and apply the same in satisfaction of a judgment after return of no property, is not exclusive, but is cumulative and concurrent with that by creditor's suit. Bennett v. McGuire, 58 Barb. 625; Catlin v. Doughty, 12 How. Pr. 457; Hart v. Albright, 28 Abb. N. C. 74, 18 N. Y. Supp. 718; Taylor v. Persse, 15 How. Pr. 417. Statutes in relation to supplementary proceedings on execution are not to be construed as merely prescribing the practice or mode of procedure upon bills in the nature of creditors' bills. And such statutes do not take the place suits. Enright v. Grant, 5 Utah, 334, 15 Pac. 268. The proceeding supplemental to execution, provided in §§ 264-267 of the Code, does not interfere with the right to institute an action against a corporation, judgment debtor, and its stockholders to enforce payment due from the latter of the sums due from them respectively for unpaid stock. Bronson v. Wilmington N. C. L. Ins. Co. 85 N. C. 411. In Rapp v. Whittier, 113 Cal. 429, 45 Pac. 703, it was claimed by the defendant that, the complaint being in the nature of a creditor's | of, and are not a substitute for, the creditors' bill to subject property of the judgment debtor to the payment of the judgment after execution returned unsatisfied, the action did not lie; that the provisions of the statute for proceedings supplementary to execution totally supplanted an action of that character; but the court held that, inasmuch as the appellant asserted title under a transfer of property by a bill of sale from the judgment debtor and adversely to him, it would have profited the plaintiff nothing to pursue the course provided by the statute; in the face of that claim he could not, by supple mentary proceedings, reach the fund held by the defendant. That in such a case those proceedings do not supersede the remedy by action, for the reason that they are not adequate to accomplish the purpose of the action. The bill of sale purported to convey all the assets of the judgment debtor. An original suit brought by creditors in the nature of a creditor's bill is a well-recognized subject of equitable jurisdiction, both in England and in this country, wherein the courts will proceed, according to the established principles and course of equity, to sequestrate and administer the estate of a debtor, and apply it to the liquidation of the indebtedness. Where a judg-remedy exists at common law, and a new remedy is given by the statute, and there are no negative words in the statute indicating that the new remedy is to be exclusive, the presumption is that it is meant to be cumulative, and a party may, at his option, pursue either the statutory or common-law remedy; and the statute of Utah providing for proceedings supplementary to execution is not a substitute for creditors' The right to an equitable action by a ment creditor to reach and apply in satisfaction of his judgment, after return of an execution thereon unsatisfied, choses in action or a fund created by them, and have the same applied in satisfaction of his judgment, existed prior to the enactment of the statute of Nebraska which provided the supplemental proceedings, and still exists. The statutory rem not an encroachment; and the application | sively in the courts of law." And after disof established principles, of equity to new cussing English and American cases bearing cases in this court is not an extension of its jurisdiction. But this court has no power to assume any jurisdiction really new, and extending beyond the limits of its established authority. It is apparent that this case does not belong to any general head of equitable jurisdiction, such as frauds, trusts, accidents, mistakes, accounts, or the specific performance of contracts. Here is neither fraud, nor trust, nor accident, nor any other ingredient of equitable jurisdiction. It is the simple case of two debtors and two creditors, of whom one is both debtor and creditor, a case in which the rights and the remedies of the respective parties have hitherto been enforced exclu suits having the same object. Enright v. Grant, 5 Utah, 332, 15 Pac. 268. The statute of a state, which gives a remedy for reaching the property and estate of the judgment debtor and for the examination of the debtor himself in a proceeding supplementary to the suit in which the judgment was obtained, does not in any way affect the equity jurisdiction of the Federal courts. Byrd v. Badger, McAil. 443, Fed. Cas. No. 2,266; Frazer v. Colorado Dressing & Smelting Co. 2 McCrary, 11, 5 Fed. 163. The provisions of § 322 of the Civil Code respecting the liability of stockholders does not take away the right of the creditors of a corporation to pursue the subscribers to the capital stock in equity for their unpaid subscriptions. Harmon v. Page, 62 Cal. 448. See also Donnell v. Portland & O. R. Co. 73 Me. 567, supra, II.; Sargent v. Salmond, 27 Me. 539, infra, VI.; Washington Sav. Bank v. Butchers & D. Bank, 107 Mo. 133, 17 S. W. 644, infra, VII. b. In North Carolina the bill in equity to enforce satisfaction of a judgment out of the property of the judgment debtor when an execution could not reach it has been abolished, and nothing is substituted in its place, but the proceedings supplemental to the execution and in aid of it. Rand v. Rand, 78 N. C. 12. Proceedings supplemental, established by the Code, are a substitute therefor, and constitute the only manner of obtaining the relief formerly had under a creditor's bill. Graham v. La Crosse & M. R. Co. 10 Wis. 459; Re Remington, 7 Wis. 643. But the remedy by creditor's bill was afterwards restored by chap. 303 of the Laws of 1860. Winslow v. Dousman, 18 Wis. 456; Williams v. Sexton, 19 Wis. 42; Pierce v. Milwaukee Constr. Co. 38 Wis. 253. By the repeal of the statute of Colorado, the provisions of the Code are substituted for all the relief which was contemplated by the creditor's bill, and the action of the legislature indicates a purpose, not merely to provide a substitute for the former proceeding, but to make the new system the exclusive remedy, and, since the adoption of the Code, the remedies therein provided for subjecting the property and choses in action of a judgment debtor to execution must be pursued whenever adequate for the purpose; and a bill in the nature of a creditor's bill cannot be maintained in such cases. And so the promise on the point, Chancellor Sanford proceeds: "According to our distribution of jurisdictions, suits for the recovery of ordinary debts are appropriated to the courts of common law; and the proceedings for enforcing the judgments rendered in such suits are alike allotted to those courts. In any such case, where the subject of the suit is exclusively of legal cognizance, a court of equity has no jurisdiction to enforce the judgment by its own methods of proceeding, or to give a better remedy than the law gives. If the remedies of the law are imperfect, equity, as has been often said in the English chancery, has no jurisdiction to give execution in aid of the infirmity of the law. When any fact of a purchaser of a trust estate which a judgment debtor had conveyed to the trustees, to pay the surplus over his debt made to the trustee at the time of the sale to him, constituted a simple contract with the trustee for the benefit of the cestui que trust (the judgment debtor), who could have maintained an action in his own name against the purchaser for its recovery; and, this being so, it was equally within the reach of his judgment creditor by statutory proceeding. Hexter v. Clifford, 5 Colo. 168. In Hinsdale v. Sinclair, 83 N. C. 343, the court said that a supplemental proceeding was in part a susbtitute for the ca. sa. under the former system, to have which it was a prerequisite to show the nonexistence of property which could be reached by a fi. fa., and the existence of property which could not be reached by a fi. fa. In California there is no statute law providing for an action or suit in equity to reach property of a judgment debtor after an execution has been returned unsatisfied; and in Adams V. Hackett, 7 Cal. 201; Pacific Bank v. Robinson, 57 Cal. 520, 40 Am. Rep. 120; and Staples v. May, 87 Cal. 178, 25 Pac. 346,--it was held that proceedings supplementary to execution were intended as a substitute for a creditor's bill in equity. It would seem almost superfluous to say that all the cases which hold that the remedy in equity to reach and apply assets of a judgment debtor to the payment of the judgment after return of no property found has not been abrogated by the statutes assume that such remedy existed previous to the adoption of the statute; and, therefore, are, at the least, indirect authorities to the effect that the original equitable jurisdiction did then exist. V. Statutory remedy less adequate. A person having money in his hands, the property of a judgment debtor, is liable, with the judgment debtor, to a suit in equity, in favor of the judgment creditor, after the return of an execution nulla bona, to reach such money and apply the same upon the judgment; and such creditor's action may be maintained in a Federal court notwithstanding an act by the state which allows a creditor to sue the debtor of his debtor, as the remedy in chancery, where all parties may be brought before the court, is more complete and adequate, as the sum actually due giving equitable jurisdiction intervenes in the transactions between creditor and debtor, such a fact becomes a foundation of relief in this court; but in any ordinary case, free from fraud or injustice, the execution of the judgment and the methods of compelling satisfaction are confined to the courts of law. When a creditor comes to this court for relief, he must come, not merely to obtain judgment or satisfaction of a judgment, but he must present facts which form a case of equitable jurisdiction. He must show that the debtor has made some fraudulent disposition of his property, or that the case stands infected with some trust, collusion, or injustice, against which it is the province of this court to give relief. In such cases this court has jurisdiction, not for the purmay be there, in such cases, ascertained with more certainty and facility. United States v. Howland, 4 Wheat. 108, 4 L. ed. 526. Whenever it appears that the remedy by bill in equity to reach a chose in action is more effectual, adequate, and complete than a statutory proceeding, the equity action may be maintained. Baxter v. Moses, 77 Me. 465, 52 Am. Rep. 783, 1 Atl. 350. See also Feldenheimer v. Tressel, 6 Dak. 265, 43 N. W. 94, supra, IV.; Thompson v. Nixon, 3 Edw. Ch. 457, infra, VII. c; Geist v. St. Louis, 156 Mo. 643, 57 S. W. 766, infra, X. VI. Existence of legal remedy. In McGough v. Insurance Bank, 2 Ga. 151, 46 Am. Dec. 382, the plaintiffs had recovered a judgment against the bank, and execution thereon had been returned nulla bona. The defendant bank had obtained judgments against a third party, and executions thereon had been levied on a large amount of the latter's property. The plaintiffs had caused summons of garnishment to be issued and served on the third party requiring him to answer what he was indebted to the bank, and afterwards filed a bill in equity alleging that they were advised that the garnishment remedy was ineffectual for the protection of their rights, and that it would not arrest the progress of the executions against the garnishee in favor of the bank, and that the bank was insolvent, and would, if it collected the money due it from the garnishee, apply it to liens having no priority, over those of the plaintiffs. A demurrer to the bill was sustained upon the ground, among others, that the bill charged no issuable facts which would justify the interposition of equity to control the legal rights of the bank over its assets. The subject under consideration was not properly considered, but the inference seems to run through the opinion that, but for the right of the plaintiffs to the garnishment process, they might have reached the judgments belonging to their judgment debtor in equity. Where, by virtue of a statute of garnishment, choses in action may be reached in a proceeding therefor, a judgment creditor, after return of no property found, cannot maintain an action in equity to subject such choses in action to the payment of the judgment. Cargill v. Kountze Bros. 86 Tex. 386, 24 L. R. A. 183, 22 S. W. 1015, 25 S. W. 13. pose of giving a species of execution which the courts of law do not afford, but for the purpose of giving relief in the particular cases allotted to its jurisdiction; and when the cause, by reason of such facts, is properly here, the court proceeds, upon all the circumstances of the case, to give final and equitable relief. . When it is said that a debtor may now convert all his effects into stocks, credits, or other things in action, and may in his own name, or the name of a friend, hold his property in these forms, in defiance of his creditors, our laws are reproached by a vague assertion which is partly true and is to a much greater extent erroneous. All conveyances made to defraud creditors are void both in law and equity. When the fraud appears to a court If an equitable attachment for a debtor's property is prohibited by statute, the property cannot be reached in equity and the statute avoided merely by a change in the form of proceedings. A suit in equity to reach and apply property consisting of a chose in action to the satisfaction of the judgment after return of no property found cannot be maintained, either under the general equity jurisdiction, or under a statute which permits such suit in case the property "cannot be come at to be attached or taken on execution in a suit at law," where the property is in its nature attachable by a trustee process, but cannot be attached in the particular case because of a statute prohibiting the collecting of that particular kind of debt by attachment, "either by trustee process or otherwise." Venable V. Rickenberg, 152 Mass. 64, 8 L. R. A. 623, 24 N. E. 1083. Where a judgment debtor, for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, gave certain notes of a third party to his son, who afterwards exchanged them with the third party for notes made payable to the son, an action may be maintained by the judgment creditor against the judgment debtor, his son, and the maker of the notes, to apply the amount of the notes in payment of the judgment, notwithstanding the statute of garnishment, the latter not being appropriate or available because the apparent creditor of the maker of the notes was the son. Bowling v. Amis, 58 Ga. 400. See Harmon v. Page, 62 Cal. 448, supra, IV., and infra, VII. b. VII. Effect of discharge from imprisonment under insolvent law. In some of the cases in this note the court or judge has given as a reason for holding that equity would reach a chose in action after return of no property found, that, within the jurisdiction of the court, imprisonment for debt had been abolished, and that because of such abolition the legal remedy to force a judgment debtor to apply his choses in action in payment of the judgment was lost, and that, acting upon the well-known general rule that where the law is deficient equity will supply a remedy, the equitable remedy, which might not have existed before the abolition of the imprisonment for debt, arose immediately upon the happening of that Occurrence. H |