latter contention, it is sufficient merely tople the legislature may not contravene consay that if this section, when enacted, gave stitutional provisions, yet where the legis to women the right equally with men to frequent, saloons, and if such right depended solely upon statute, it was taken away by the general assembly when, at a later date, it adopted a charter for the city of Denver, whereby authority was conferred upon the city to deprive women of the enjoyment of the so-called right. lation is a proper exercise of the police power, and the courts can see that it is reasonably adapted to the permissible end in view, it may not be declared unconstitutional merely because it places some restrictions upon individuals generally, or certain classes, with respect to certain callings. Under the license laws of this state Probably plaintiff's theory may be made no one may engage in the business of selling still more clear by a summary of the ar- liquor without a license. He has no absogument of his counsel. He argues that the|lute right to sell at all. It is only a priv saloon keeper has as much right to sell liq-ilege he gets when a license is granted. The uor to women, and to allow them within his city of Denver, under its charter, has the place of business, whether in the saloon exclusive power to prohibit, restrain, tax, proper, or in a room adjacent thereto, as and regulate the sale of intoxicating li he has to sell to men, and to permit them quors. It may exercise that power to prowithin such places; that a woman has as hibit the sale altogether, or, if it see fit, it much right to buy and drink liquor as men, may regulate the sale and impose such conand, if so, the keeper of a saloon has the ditions as it deems necessary. Under these correlative right to sell to her with as much license laws, one may not engage in the lifreedom as to men; that since women have quor traffic as of common right, but may do been given the right of suffrage in this so only upon compliance with prescribed state, and in all respects stand upon a legal regulations; and if he applies for a license equality with men, they have the same under which only he may lawfully sell, he right as men to the pursuit of happiness is held to take that license with whatever and to avail themselves of all the rational restrictions or limitations are imposed by enjoyments that are open to their brothers, the authority which, and which only, can among which is the right to enter saloons give him the coveted privilege. One of the and there buy liquor. Otherwise ex- conditions which the charter of Denver repressed, counsel says, if a woman has a quires to be inserted in every liquor license right to go into a saloon and get a drink, is the one of which plaintiff complains. He the same as a man, which he insists is true, vigorously contends that the question is not the saloon keeper has a right to sell her one of morality at all, but merely whether that drink, and any ordinance which pre- or not, in the pursuit of a lawful calling, vents him from doing so is an invasion of one may be deprived of the right of selling his civil and property rights. If she, his property to whomsoever he pleases, and equally with a man, has the right to buy whether he may permit to enter his place of and the saloon keeper may not sell to her, business all persons, both female and male, he is deprived of a property right without who wish to buy. It is to be observed that due process of law; i. e., the right to carry no woman is here to assert her constituon a lawful business with customers en- tional right to frequent wine rooms or to titled to patronize him. If this ordinance buy liquor, and it is also pertinent to rewas passed under cover of the incidental mark that these particular sections do not powers of the city, and if it also appeared prohibit women from going into saloons or to the court to be unreasonable, unfair, par- from buying liquor. They are the only tial, arbitrary, or oppressive, it might be sections of the ordinance before us, and nullified. But if it is subject to such ob- neither contains a penalty for a violation jections only, which does not seem to us to thereof by women. Counsel says that § be true, still it could not be set aside upon 751, which is not found in the record, proany of those grounds, for the general as- vides a penalty to be visited upon females sembly has expressly given to the city coun- who remain in the places, or do the acts, cil authority to pass it in the form in which against which the prohibitions are aimed. it is expressed, and if constitutional it must However that may be, and it is not mastand. Phillips v. Denver, 19 Colo. 183, terial to the decision of the case in hand, 34 Pac. 902. The charter provision comes we are not reviewing a judgment pronounced clearly within the general police power, against a woman for violating any proviwhich every sovereign state, through its sion of these sections. The argument of legislative department, possesses; and counsel, therefore, in behalf of females, while, as counsel for plaintiff contends, un- against whom the alleged unwarranted disder the guise or pretense of passing laws crimination is made, would come with better for the protection of the public morals and grace were one of them here complaining. the general welfare and safety of the peo- Yet, as plaintiff in part bases his claim that he is deprived of his property and civil we refer to some leading decisions. The rights and denied the privileges of a citizen Supreme Court of the United States, in the of the United States upon the alleged fact case of Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. that he is not allowed to sell liquor to a 86, 34 L. ed. 620, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 13, has class that have the inalienable right to thus effectually disposed of plaintiff's argubuy, we have considered the point. If a ment: "The sale of such liquors in this discrimination is made against women sole- way [by retail] has therefore been, at all ly on account of their sex, it would not be times, by the courts of every state, congood; but if it is because of the immorality sidered as the proper subject of legislative that would be likely to result if the regula- regulation. Not only may a license be extion was not made, the regulation would be acted from the keeper of the saloon before a sustained. That injury to public morality glass of his liquors can be thus disposed of, would ensue if women were permitted but restrictions may be imposed as to the without restrictions to frequent wine rooms, class of persons to whom they may be sold, there to be supplied with liquor, is so ap- and the hours of the day and the days of the parent to the average person that argument week on which the saloons may be opened. to establish so plain a proposition is unnec- Their sale in that form may be absolutely essary. But if some people might not be prohibited. It is a question of public exwilling to concede this, it is enough to say pediency and public morality, and not of that the general assembly, speaking through Federal law. The police power of the state the city council, with whom the decision is fully competent to regulate the business, entirely resus, has so determined. Women, to mitigate its evils or to suppress it entherefore, may properly be excluded from wine rooms, as this ordinance provides; and if they have no constitutional right to insist upon being admitted to places there to be supplied with liquor when the effect would be demoralizing to society, a fortiori the saloon keeper may be prevented from furnishing them facilities for contributing to that result. Again, we say the selling of liquor is not a lawful calling in the city of Denver unless a license is secured for it, and it becomes such only when conducted as the license specifies. Plaintiff's whole argument proceeds upon false premises, and his conclusion is necessarily wrong. The right to sell liquor is not an inherent right of a citizen of the United States. The traffic in it is unlawful without a license, and it may be prohibited in Denver. It necessarily follows that all regulations for its sale and the privilege of selling when granted are solely within the lawful discretion of the city council, under the existing charter of the city. This ordinance does not operate as a discrimination between different licensees. It applies equally to every one of that class, and the fact that it restricts the classes or persons to whom sales may be made in cer tain places or localities does not make it in valid. All courts can readily see that the restrictions therein found and the classification made with respect to the persons permitted to frequent wine rooms for sup plying themselves there with liquor are based upon reasons that have their seat in the facts of nature, and that such regula tions are conducive to, and are reasonably adapted to secure, the wortny object of pre serving public morality. We might well stop here; but, to show how other courts view such contentions as plaintiff makes, tirely. There is no inherent right in a citizen to thus sell intoxicating liquors by retail. It is not a privilege of a citizen of the state or of a citizen of the United States." The supreme court of Indiana, in the case of Blair v. Kilpatrick, 40 Ind. 312, and in Welsh v. State, 126 Ind. 71, 9 L. R. A. 664, 25 N. E. 883, has held that a law providing for the granting of license to retail intoxicating liquors which requires that the vender shall be a male inhabitant of the state is not in conflict with the United States Constitution, which provides that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the citi zens of the several states. The supreme court of Ohio in Bergman v. Cleveland, 39 Ohio St. 651, decided that an ordinance which makes it an offense for the proprietor of a liquor saloon to employ females to serve his customers with such liquor is valid, and does not contravene any provision of the state or Federal Constitution. In Lodano v. State, 25 Ala. 64, it was held that the legislature is not restricted by the Constitution from imposing such conditions as it may deem proper in licensing the sale of liquor, or such as in their opinion the good of the community may require, both as regards the persons to whom saloon keepers may sell and the quantities in which liquor may be sold. The court of appeals of Missouri in State v. Cooper, 35 Mo. App. 532, upheld a law and ordinance which forbade the sale of intoxicating liquor to any student of the state university, or any school, college, or academy in the state. The laws of many states prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors to Inlians, minors, habitual drunkards, and other classes of people, and in many of the southern states before the Civil War sales to slaves and free negroes were forbidden. | human happiness, or trade and commerce, The holding in all the states has been uni--that neither produce immorality, sufform that such regulations, when deemed by fering, nor want. This business is, on the legislature necessary or proper in the principle, within the police power of the interests of good morals, may not be inter-state, and restrictions which may rightfered with by the courts. We conclude this fully be imposed upon it might be obnoxious brief review by referring to the authorities as an illegal restraint of trade when apwhich are collated in 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. plied to other pursuits. The city, then, had Law, 2d ed. pp. 210 et seq., and to Mugler a right to make it a condition that appelv. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205, lant's grocery should be closed on election 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273, the License Cases, 5 days, on Thanksgiving Days, fast days, How. 504, 12 L. ed. 256, and Ex parte holidays, Sundays, or other days, or might Christensen, 85 Cal. 208, 24 Pac. 747, where have imposed as a condition that appellant many cases are cited and exhaustive opin- should close his grocery at a particular ions of learned judges may be examined. In hour on each evening, and for a violation of Re Maguire, 57 Cal. 604, 40 Am. Rep. 125, any of these conditions have provided for a it was held that a regulation which prohib- forfeiture of his license. They had the ited women from being employed in saloons power to insert, as they have done, each to serve drinks, the same as men, was in and all of the prohibitions contained in his conflict with that clause of the California license; and the power grows out of the fact Constitution which expressly declared that that it was discretionary to prohibit such no person shall, on account of sex, be dis- sale of liquors, or license it on such terms qualified from entering upon or pursuing as they might choose." And as to the point any lawful business, vocation, or profession. that appellant in that case had accepted It would seem that plaintiff, as well as the a license from the city which contained cerdistrict court, relied strongly on this deci- tain restrictions which he sought to repudision. We have no such constitutional pro- ate, the court uses this language: "But, vision. But if we had we do not think it above all, appellant, by accepting and actwould be contravened by the ordinance in ing under this license, consented that the question; certainly not by the clause lim- mayor might, in his discretion, revoke it, iting the classes to whom sales may be and, having agreed to it, he now has no made. Whatever weight this case had as right to insist that it shall be adjudged an authority is weakened, if not destroyed, forfeited by a judicial tribunal,-by some by the subsequent cases in the same court process which does not occur to us as apof Ex parte Hayes, 98 Cal. 555, 20 L. R. A. plicable to that end." In the supreme 701, 33 Pac. 337, and Foster V. Police court of Kentucky in Gastineau v. Com., a Comrs. 102 Cal. 483, 37 Pac. 763, which recent case, reported in 49 L. R. A. p. 111, overruled it and declared such regulations 108 Ky. 473, 56 S. W. 705, a municipal orto be entirely proper and valid. In line dinance was declared void which made it a with the later decisions in California is misdemeanor for a woman to go into any State ex rel. Marion v. Reynolds, 14 Mont. building where liquor is sold or stand 383, 36 Pac. 449. A case quite in point is within 50 feet of such building. That is esthat of Schwuchow v. Chicago, 68 Ill. 444, sentially different from the case at bar. Inand, as the principles which govern this deed the reasoning of the court in its brief case are so well expressed there, we take the opinion clearly shows that an ordinance like liberty of quoting from the opinion. The that before us would be sustained: In a court, speaking by Mr. Justice Walker, note to the case, the learned annotator has said: "The legislature, then, having con- discussed the constitutionality of municipal ferred such power, it was for the common ordinances which were alleged to discrimcouncil to determine whether they would inate against women. From his collection wholly suppress the sale of intoxicating li- of authorities it would seem that if the requors, or grant the privilege on such terms striction of an occupation was, as we have and conditions as they might choose. And heretofore suggested, merely on account of the power was ample, under this grant, to sex, it might not be upheld; but if it was impose, as a condition, that when a license on account of the immorality that would is granted it should be liable to revocation result if the restriction was not made, the on the violation of the ordinances regulat- regulation would be valid. That the regu ing the traffic, or, having absolute control lations attacked here are a legitimate exerover the whole subject of granting licenses, cise of the police power of the state we have they may impose any other condition cal- no doubt; that their object is to protect the culated to protect the community, preserve morals of the community, to secure good ororder, and to suppress vice. These re- der, and advance the general welfare cannot straints are not like such as restrict the be gainsaid; that the right to sell liquor is ordinary avocations of life, which advance not an inherent right of a citizen of the of opinion that the regulations here complained of are not inhibited by any provision of the Federal or state Constitution. United States is beyond cavil; that plain- sued as of common right. We are clearly tiff has not been deprived of any property or civil right without due process of law, or denied any privilege belonging to a citizen of the United States, is equally clear. As so aptly expressed by the supreme court of Illinois in the Schwuchow Case, 68 Ill. 444, restraints and limitations upon the liquor traffic may be upheld which might not be sustained as to callings that may be pur The judgment is therefore reversed, and a judgment entered here dismissing the action. Affirmed by Supreme Court of United States January 4, 1904. GEORGIA SUPREME COURT. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Piff. in Err., v. Susie HOBBS. ) *1. Relatively to a female passenger on a railway train, who is partially blind, and who informs the conductor of her infirmity, and requests him to assist her in alighting from the train when it reaches her destination, which he promises to do, it is at least the duty of the carrier to stop the train at its station a sufficient length of time to enable her, without undue haste, to leave the train in safety; and if the conductor, despite his promise, signals the train ahead before the passenger has had a reasonable opportunity to reach the platform of the car, and she is in consequence carried beyond the station, and then put off at a point some distance therefrom, the carrier is liable to respond for all damages directly attributable to the tortious conduct of its conductor. (a) Such a promise, fairly construed, does not amount to an undertaking on the part of the conductor to enter the car in which the passenger is riding, assume charge of her bundles, and escort her from her seat down the aisle and out upon the platform, unless the passenger is so helpless as to require this extraordinary attention, and the conductor has notice that such is the case. (b) In the absence of appropriate pleadings, the passenger cannot, on the trial of an action against the carrier for being carried beyond her destination, rely on and make proof of a custom on the part of its conductors to lend especial assistance to lady passengers when traveling unattended. event would proof of such a custom be rele In no officials of the carrier had knowledge of the custom, and recognized it as one the observance of which ladies traveling without escort had a right to expect and demand as matter of right. 2. While it is the duty of a railway company to duly announce to passengers the approach of its trains to regular stations, in order that they may be prepared to promptly alight at their respective points of destination, yet a failure. to comply with this duty cannot count against the company, relatively to a passenger who is in no way misled thereby. 3. In view of the facts brought to light on the trial of the present case, it was erroneous to charge the jury upon the theory that the evidence warranted a finding that there were aggravating circumstances attending the tort alleged to have been committed upon the plaintiff by the defendant company. Evans v. Collier, 79 Ga. 315, 4 S. E. 264; vant, unless it were shown that the governing Williams v. Lewis, 69 Ga. 825; South Carolina & G. R. Co. v. Augusta S. R. Co. 111 Ga. 426, 36 S. E. 593. *Headnotes by SIMMONS, CH. J. NOTE. As to duty of carrier to accept blind person as passenger, see Zachery v. Mobile & O. R. Co. 36 L. R. A. 546, 41 L. R. A. 385. As to duty toward intoxicated passenger, see Missouri P. R. Co. v. Evans, 1 L. R. A. 476; Cincinnati, I. & St. L. & C. R. Co. v. Cooper, 6 L. R. A. 241; Fisher v. West Virginia & P. R. Co. 23 L. R. A. 758, 33 L. R. A. 69; Kingston v. Ft. Wayne & E. R. Co. 40 L. R. A. 131; and Wheeler v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 54 L. R. A. 955. As to duty toward infirm or sick passenger generally, see Croom v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 18 L. R. A. 602, and Weightman v. Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co. 19 L. R. A. 671. As to duty to passenger taken ill during journey, see Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Salzman, 31 L. R. A. 261; McCann v. Newark & S. O. R. Co. 33 L. R. A. 127, and Bageard v. Consolidated Traction Co. 49 L. R. A. 424. Western & A. R. Co. v. Earwood, 104 Ga. 127-130, 29 S. E. 913; Daniels v. Western & A. R. Co. 96 Ga. 786, 22 S. E. 956. Proper diligence on plaintiff's part was not shown. The cause of action was a failure to as- | unhandy; and that she was almost blind, sist petitioner in alighting. and could not find her way through such black darkness." The conductor, however, "entirely ignored each and all of her appeals, and told petitioner that he could not back his train, and that he must go, and did go and leave [her], at 2 o'clock Saturday morning, fully 1⁄4 of a mile east of the depot, in the cold rain, unprotected or unassisted, to grope her way alone in the dark Central R. Co. v. Dorsey, 106 Ga. 826, 32 S. E. 873; Nunn v. Georgia R. Co. 71 Ga. 710, 51 Am. Rep. 284. Messrs. James Beall and Edwards & and through the cold rain." Petitioner "sufAult for defendant in error. fered untold miseries and pains, through fear and exposure, on account of" being Simmons, Ch. J., delivered the opinion thus put off the train "at a place where she of the court: could get no help or assistance, there beAn action for damages was brought by ing no house near her, and she being in a Mrs. Susie Hobbs against the Southern strange place, in a strange country, a feRailway Company, the plaintiff relying for male, alone, and almost helpless, all of a recovery upon the following allegations of [which] defendant's agents and servants fact: On December 22, 1900, about 10 knew." She was forced to get off the train o'clock P. M., she took passage from Bir-at "a rough, rocky place," and between that mingham, Alabama, to Bremen, Georgia, point and the depot the company's track over the company's line of railway. Soon after its train left Birmingham, the conductor in charge thereof came to her and took up her ticket, "and petitioner then and there got said conductor to agree to assist petitioner in alighting from the train at Bremen, and to assist her to the depot;" she informing him that "she was traveling alone, and had more baggage than she could manage, and, besides, she was partially blind, wherefore it would be almost impossible to travel unassisted." The conductor "assured her that he would see her off the train all right." When the train reached Tallapoosa, Georgia, she repeated her request for assistance, and he "reassured her that he would take care of her, and requested that petitioner be not alarmed." The conductor "did not enter the car that she was in after the train left Waco, 3 miles west of Bremen," and neither he nor any "other person called out Bremen station, as the law requires, nor in no way informed petitioner that the train had arrived at Bremen." He "entirely ignored his promises and his duties to assist. petitioner from said train after the same stopped at Bremen, and [she] was forced to attempt to get off said train unassisted; just as she was attempting to get off of said train, the said conductor waved the engineer ahead, and the train moved off, and carried petitioner about 4 of a mile east of the depot before stopping." When the train was again stopped, she "appealed to said conductor to carry her back to the depot, telling him that it was his duty to back said train to the depot and let her get off; and . .. that she was afraid to undertake to go alone, and that she could not conveniently carry her baggage; that it was heavy and passed over a high embankment. It was 1. One of the grounds upon which the demurrer was based was that the promise of assistance which the plaintiff alleged had been made to her by the conductor amounted to no more than a voluntary undertaking on his part, and was in no way binding upon the company, since it was under no legal duty to render such assistance as he had |