The monopolize, any part of the trade or com- except permitted to join the combination. evidence shows that the defendants in error after the formation of the association made efforts to purchase tile from manufacturers in Indiana with whom they had before been doing business, and that their orders were declined, and they were notified that they could not purchase goods from the manufacturers unless they became members of the association. They could not obtain tile from the local dealers in San Francisco unless they paid the "list" price, which was more than double the price which members of the association were required to pay. We think that, in the light of these facts, the association clearly comes within the prohibition of the act of Congress. It has a direct tendency to restrain trade between the different states, and to create a monopoly. In principle it would be the same if it were an association between all the manufacturers of the United States in that line of goods and a single dealer in California, whereby all other resident dealers were shut out and all competition between local deal ers extinguished. Section 1 of the act of July 2, 1890 (26 Stat. at L. 209, chap. 647, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3200), provides as follows: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations is hereby declared to be illegal;" and it proceeds to denounce a penalty any price or under any conditions. against anyone who shall make any such contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy. Interstate commerce "includes the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities" (Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 203, 29 L. ed. 161, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 382, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 828); and every agreement which has the tendency to restrain the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities is brought with in the prohibition of the statute. (Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 238, 44 L. ed. 146, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 96.) The combination in the case before the court evidently tended to restrain trade. The defendants in error who had been regular pur-association had they chosen to do so, and chasers of goods from the manufacturers were shut out from dealing with them from the time when the association was formed. Their orders to the manufacturers for goods were rejected for the express reason, and for no other reason than, that they were not members of the association. The testimony indicated that the defendants in error had been in constant competition with the San Francisco firms which entered into the association, and had bid against them on contracts for work. The forma tion of the association shut off all such competition. The defendants in error were powerless to compete with local firms which possessed such advantages over them. The necessary effect of the combination was to crowd out of business every local dealer who was not a member, and thereby to create a monopoly in the hands of those who were. It is argued that the defendants in error might have joined the that thereby they might have availed themselves of the privileges of membership. To this it is sufficient to say that it does not appear that they would have been admitted to membership if they had applied. Under the by-laws they were not eligible, for the reason that they did not at all times carry The tendency of the combination was the requisite amount of stock, and if they also to create a monopoly in the hands of had possessed the necessary amount of stock the local members thereof. Section 2 of they had no assurance that they were "acthe act includes within its prohibition ceptable" to the members. On the contrary, "every person who shall monopolize, the fact that they were not invited to enter or attempt to monopolize, or the combination when it was formed was a con spire with any other person or persons to distinct intimation to them that they were thereof. There was no association or combination between such purchasers and the vendors of the stock, and no monopoly was created or was intended to be thereby created. The association itself transacted no business. not acceptable. But it is immaterial wheth- | live stock instead of agents for the sale er they would or would not have been admitted into the combination. To protect their business and secure their legal rights they were not obliged to submit an application for membership in such a combination with the possibility of its rejection, or to submit themselves to the rules and exactions of the association. It is clear, also, that the tendency of the combination was to prevent others from engaging in the business. No one could become a member who had not "an established business," and it is too evident to admit of denial that no one could establish a business in competition with the members of the association who possessed such advantage in dealing with the manufacturers. The court said: "Those who are members thereof compete among themselves and with others who are not members for the purchase of the cattle, while the association itself has nothing whatever to do with transportation nor with fixing the prices for which the cattle may be purchased or thereafter sold. A lessening of the amount of the trade is neither the necessary nor direct effect of its formation, and in truth the amount of that trade has greatly increased since the association was formed, and there is not the slightest evidence that the market prices of cattle have been lowered by reason of its existence. There is no feature of monopoly in the whole transaction." ciation, while they may compete with themselves, have no competition with those who are not members for the latter are practically excluded from doing business within the portion of the state of California which is included in the prescribed area; and, instead of being a combination between purchasers only, as was the fact in the Anderson Case, it is a combination between manufacturers and buyers of different states, which brings together, on the one hand, all the wholesale dealers in the United States in that line of goods, and, on the other hand, the chosen few who are permitted to obtain goods and supply the local demand. It is earnestly contended that the case in its principle comes within the doctrine of Hopkins v. United States, 171 U. S. 578, 43 L. ed. 290, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40, and Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604, 43 L. ed. 300, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 50, but we The difference between those cases and think it is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar is apparent. The resident those cases. In the Hopkins Case the asso-members of the Tile, Mantel, & Grate Association, which was claimed to have been formed in violation of the act, was a local voluntary association of men whose business it was to receive at Kansas City consignments of cattle shipped from owners in various states, and to feed, prepare for market, and sell the same, and pay the owners their portion of the proceeds after deducting charges and expenses. The rules of the association forbade members to buy stock from one who was not a member or to transact business with any person who violated its rules and regulations. The court held that the business of the members of the association was not interstate commerce, and that the agreements or contracts relating to their business were not in restraint of interstate trade, for the reason that trade between the states was not affected by the combination, which was a purely local one, comprising only members of the state in which it was formed. The Anderson Case was similar to the Hopkins Case, with the exception that the members of the association were purchasers of certain classes of We find no ground for disturbing the finding of the circuit court concerning the amount of the attorney's fee to be allowed to the defendants in error. The judgment is affirmed. Affirmed by Supreme Court of United States February 23, 1904. NOTE-AS to constitutionality of discrimina- | also Gastineau v. Com. 49 L. R. A. 111, and tion against women in police regulations, see note. PPEAL by defendants from a decree of the District Court for Arapahoe County in favor of plaintiff in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of a municipal ordinance. Reversed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. H. M. Orahood, Halsted L. Ritter, and N. B. Bachtell, for appellants: can impose such conditions upon its existence as it pleases. Ex parte Christensen, 85 Cal. 208, 24 Pac. 747; State ex rel. Marion v. Reynolds, 14 Mont. 383, 36 Pac. 449; Bergman v. Cleveland, 39 Ohio St. 651; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273. Messrs. T. J. O'Donnell and Milton Smith, for appellee: In this state proceedings under an ordinance are not criminal, but civil. Durango v. Reinsberg, 16 Colo. 327, 26 Pac. 820; Hughes v. People, 8 Colo. 539, 9 Pac. 50; Greeley v. Hamman, 12 Colo. 97, 20 Pac. 1; Oshkosh v. Schwartz, 55 Wis. 487, 13 N. W. 552; Ex parte Hollwedell, 74 Mo. 395; Kansas v. Clark, 68 Mo. 589. stay a criminal prosecution, where there is no adequate remedy at law by the restitution of the property, or where there is no way of determining the amount of the damages. M. Schandler Bottling Co. v. Welch, 42 Fed. 563; Sheridan v. Colvin, 78 Ill. 237; Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 558. We are not asking merely to have a prosecution restrained. We are asking to have Equity will not, by injunction, restrain the fire and police board restrained from a prosecution at law, when the question is arresting us, and stationing police officers the same at law as in equity; and an in- upon our premises, and to prevent the dejunction will not issue to restrain a prose-struction of our property. Where there is cution for a violation of a city ordinance a destruction of property rights, or the inon the ground that the ordinance is invasion of civil rights, an injunction will valid, or on the ground of irreparable injury, or to prevent a multiplicity of suits. Denver v. Beede, 25 Colo. 172, 54 Pac. 624; Bainbridge v. Reynolds, 111 Ga. 758, 36 S. E. 935; Paulk v. Sycamore, 104 Ga. 24, 41 L. R. A. 772, 30 S. E. 417; Forcheimer v. Port of Mobile, 84 Ala. 127, 4 So. 112; Waters-Peirce Oil Co. v. Little Rock, 39 Ark. 412; New Home Sewing Machine Co. v. Fletcher, 44 Ark. 139; Garrison There would be no way of restoring this v. Atlanta, 68 Ga. 64; Des Plaines v. Poyer, saloon business if it was allowed to be de123 Ill. 348, 14 N. E. 677; Yates v. Bata-stroyed by the fire and police board. via, 79 Ill. 500; Schwab v. Madison, 49 Ind. 329; Dodge v. Council Bluffs, 57 Iowa, 560, 10 N. W. 886; Brown v. Catlettsburg, 11 Bush, 435; Hottinger v. New Orleans, 42 La. Ann. 629, 8 So. 575; Kansas City Cable R. Co. v. Kansas, 29 Mo. App. 89; Morris Canal & Bkg. Co. v. Jersey City, 12 N. J. Eq. 258; Davis v. American Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 75 N. Y. 362; West v. New York, 10 Paige, 539; St. Peter's Episcopal Church v. Washington, 109 N. C. 21, 13 S. E. 700. The ordinances are not void; they do not constitute the slightest infringement upon the constitutional rights of women, as those rights are lawfully tested and properly understood. Phillips v. Denver, 19 Colo. 183, 34 Pac. 902; Ex parte Hayes, 98 Cal. 555, 20 L. R. A. 701, 33 Pac. 337; Foster v. Police Comrs. 102 Cal. 483, 37 Pac. 763. Port of Mobile v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 84 Ala. 115, 4 So. 106; Atlanta v. Gate City Gaslight Co. 71 Ga. 126. To prevent the invasion of civil rights is as much the province of a court of equity as to prevent the destruction of private property. Austin v. Austin City Cemetery Asso. 87 Tex. 336, 28 S. W. 528; Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 226, 33 Am. Rep. 239; Sylvester Coal Co. v. St. Louis, 130 Mo. 330, 32 S. W. 649; Wood v. Brooklyn, 14 Barb. 433; Platte & D. Canal & Mill Co. v. Lee, 2 Colo. App. 192, 29 Pac. 1036; Re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 222, 31 L. ed. 410, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 482; Montgomery v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 84 Ala. 132, 4 So. 626; Davis v. Fasig, 128 Ind. 271, 27 N. E. 726. If, by reason, of the acts of the fire and police board, Cronin's business was destroyed, or if it was so damaged that it The governing power may prohibit the would not afford him a livelihood for himmanufacture and traffic in liquor altogether, self and family, by reason of the fact that provided it does not interfere with inter- the stationing of policemen in and about state commerce; and, if the governing his premises, thereby driving away trade, power can prohibit a thing altogether, it and the arresting of patrons as they come to his place, was indulged in, he would have no adequate remedy at law. Sylvester Coal Co. v. St. Louis, 130 Mo. 328, 32 S. W. 649; M. Schandler Bottling Co. v. Welch, 42 Fed. 565; McInerney v. Denver, 17 Colo. 302, 29 Pac. 516; Bruner v. San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. 92 Cal. 239, 28 Pac. 341; 19 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 514; Worley v. Columbia, 88 Mo. 106; Trammell v. Russellville, 34 Ark. 105, 36 Am. Rep. 1; Walsh v. New York & B. Bridge, 96 N. Y. 439. The police power is limited by constitutional provisions of the United States, and other fundamental laws. Rights guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be violated. If it is obnoxious to vested rights and unreasonable, the courts will declare the law void; it must be exercised so that all are affected by it, and not one class favored and another class imposed upon. Tiedeman, Pol. Power, § 2; 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 742; Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, 19 L. ed. 984; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389, 17 N. E. 343; Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636; People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377, 52 Am. Rep. 34, 2 N. E. 29; Toledo, W. & W. R. Co. v. Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37, 16 Am. Rep. 611; Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. 70 Ill. 192, 22 Am. Rep. 71; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; Platte & D. Canal & Mill. Co. v. Lee, 2 Colo. App. 184, 29 Pac. 1036; Platte & D. Canal & Mill. Co. v. Dowell, 17 Colo. 376, 30 Pac. 68. When a constitution guarantees to every person the same privileges and immunities, any act of the legislature passed with the view of protecting the public morals or the public health must apply to all individuals, unless those individuals are under some legal disability. Any act of the legislature whereby it discriminates against women is void. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. ed. 588; Des Plaines v. Poyer, 123 III. 348, 14 N. E. 677. Re Maguire, 57 Cal. 604, 40 Am. Rep. 125. The right of a person to engage in any business permitted by law is a substantial right guaranteed to him by the Constitution of the United States. Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064; Re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415, 47 L. R. A. 52, 58 Pac. 1071; Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 29 L. R. A. 79, 40 N. E. 454. An ordinance, to be valid as an exercise of police power, must be a reasonable regulation. Chicago v. Netcher, 183 Ill. 104, 48 L. R. A. 261, 55 N. E. 707; May v. People, 1 Colo. App. 157, 27 Pac. 1010; Lake View v. Letz, 44 Ill. 82; Butchers' Union S. H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. 111 U. S. 757, 28 L. ed. 591, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652. Campbell, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court: The district court issued a permanent writ of injunction restraining the defendants below appellants here, from enforcing the provisions of §§ 745 and 746 of article 15 of the general ordinances of the city of Denver, upon the ground that they are unconstitutional, and that plaintiff had no adequate remedy at law. They read: "Sec. 745. Each and every liquor saloon, dram shop, or tippling-house keeper, who shall have or keep, in connection with or as part of such liquor saloon, dram shop, or tippling house, any wine room or other place, either with or without door or doors, curtain or curtains, or screen of any kind, into which any female person shall be permitted to enter from the outside, or from such liquor saloon, dram shop, or tippling house, and there be supplied with any kind of liquor whatsoever, shall, upon conviction, be fined as nereinafter provided. "Sec. 746. No person . . having plate where intoxicating or malt liquors charge or control of any liquor saloon, or are sold or given away, or any place adjaThe sale of intoxicating liquors is not an cent thereto or connected therewith in any unlawful business. There is no constitumanner whatsoever, either by doors or othtional provision prohibiting the sale of erwise, shall suffer or permit any female liquor to either men or women. Unless person to be or remain in such liquor sathere is a constitutional prohibition a wo-loon, dram shop, tippling house, or other man has as much right, under the Constitution of the United States and of the state of Colorado, and the laws of the state of Colorado, to enter a saloon and purchase a drink of whisky as a man. To prevent a saloon keeper from selling to a woman if she has the right to purchase, and then, under an ordinance, fine him for so doing, takes his property with out due process of law: place where intoxicating or malt liquors are sold or given away, for the purpose of there being supplied with any kind of liquor whatsoever. No person owning or having charge or control of any liquor saloon, dram shop, or tippling house shall employ or procure, or cause to be employed or procured, any female person to wait or in any manner attend on any person in any dram shop, tippling house, or liquor saloon, or in any place adjacent thereto or connected there- | plaint one calling for the interposition of with, where intoxicating or malt liquors are a court of equity? Second, is the charter sold or given away, nor shall any female provision constitutional? person be or remain in any dram shop, tippling house, liquor saloon, or place adjacent thereto or connected therewith, and wait or attend on any person, or solicit drinks in any such place." 1. The plaintiff does not contend that he is entitled to equitable relief by injunction unless the charter is void. Since, as appears later in the opinion, we hold it valid, it is not absolutely necessary to decide whether the admitted facts of the complaint warrant the granting of an injunetion. This court does not look with favor upon the practice of restraining municipal authorities from executing municipal ordinances which so vitally concern the tranquillity of the community and good order of society. While it is true, as said in the case of Denver v. Beede, 25 Colo. 172, 54 Pac. 624, that in exceptional cases a court of equity will restrain a prosecution at law when the legal question involved is the same at law as in equity, such is not the general rule; and a clear case should be made out before such extraordinary relief is awarded. It is not necessary here to indicate in what cases such relief will, and in what it will not, be given. But it is doubtful if this complaint is so essentially different from that in the Beede Case as to render inapplicable the rule there nounced. We mention this point for the purpose of again emphasizing our view that only in extreme and exceptional cases should a court of equity interfere with municipal authorities in the enforcement of such ordinances. an This ordinance was before our court of appeals in Walker v. People, 5 Colo. App. 38, 37 Pac. 29, and in Denver v. Domedian, 15 Colo. App. 36, 60 Pac. 1107. In the former case, under the evidence, and in the latter, upon the stipulated facts, it was held that the cases as made did not come within the prohibition. In speaking of these regulations, however, Mr. Justice Wilson, in the latter case, said: "We agree that the ordinance is a good one, that its objects are most praiseworthy, and that its rigid enforcement would meet with the approval of every good citizen." The question of its constitutionality was not there mooted, but this expression of Judge Wilson, if only dictum, is an indication of what his view would be had its validity been assailed. The chief object of the ordinance was there said to be to suppress the evils incident to the "frequenting of saloons by females, and the attendant results so of fensive to decency and the moral sense of the public." The power to make these particular regulations was expressly conferred by the general assembly upon the city council of the city of Denver by the 5th clause of subdiv. 12 of § 20 of the charter, which provides "that no liquor saloon, dram shop, or tippling house shall have or keep in connection with or as part of such saloon, tippling house, or dram shop, any wine room or other place, either with or without doors, curtain or curtains, or screen of any kind, into which any female person shall be permitted to enter from the outside, or from such tippling house or dram shop, and there be supplied with any kind of liquor whatsoever." Plaintiff does not deny that he has kept a wine room into which he permits women to enter and there be supplied with liquor, and suffers them to remain therein for that purpose, contrary to the specific provisions of these sections. Indeed, he admits that he has violated the ordinance in both particulars, and proposes, unless prevented by the municipal authorities, to continue to do so. So that the principal question in the case is as to the constitutionality of the charter, rather than that of the ordinance for the latter all the citizens of the state equal enjoyconfessedly is authorized by the charter. The ordinance is good if the charter provision is constitutional. Two questions are pressed by plaintiff for determination: First, was the case as made by the com 2. So far as the question at issue is concerned, these sections of the ordinance practically prevent a saloon keeper from permitting women to frequent what are called wine rooms, there to be supplied with liquor; and it is only with respect to that feature of the ordinance that we are at present concerned, although it may be that the principles which govern this particular clause of the enactment equally apply to the others. As we understand the argument of his counsel, plaintiff's position is that these sections are unreasonable because they discriminate against women solely on account of their sex; that they are unconstitutional, in that they deprive defendant of his property without due process of law, destroy his right to pursue a lawful calling, and deny to him the equal rights and privileges which every citizen has, both under the Federal and our state Constitutions; that they violate § 423, Mills's Anno. Stat., which preserves to ment of accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, restaurants, churches, barber shops, public conveyances, theaters, and other places of public resort or amusement. With respect to the |