permitted to join the combination. The evidence shows that the defendants in error after the formation of the association made efforts to purchase tile from manufacturers in Indiana with whom they had before been doing business, and that their orders were declined, and they were notified that they could not purchase goods from the manufacturers unless they became members of the association. They could not obtain tile from the local dealers in San Francisco unless they paid the "list" price, which was more than double the price which members of the association were required to pay. except monopolize, any part of the trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations." The combination in the case before the court was not one such as might lawfully have been made between the residents of a single state for the purpose of regulating the methods of conducting their business or fixing the prices of goods or for other legitimate purposes, such as was sustained by the court in United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 156 U. S. 1, 39 L. ed. 325, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249, where it was held that an agreement between manufacturers in a state bore no distinct relation to commerce We think that, in the light of these facts, between the states or with foreign nations; the association clearly comes within the but it is one that brings within its scope, prohibition of the act of Congress. It has not only local dealers, but all the wholesale a direct tendency to restrain trade between dealers in the same kind of goods in all the different states, and to create a monop- the states. Said the court in United States oly. In principle it would be the same if v. E. C. Knight Co. 156 U. S. 16, 39 L. ed. it were an association between all the manu- 330, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255: It is not essenfacturers of the United States in that line tial that the result of the combination be of goods and a single dealer in California, a complete monopoly. It is sufficient if it whereby all other resident dealers were shut merely tends to that end and to deprive out and all competition between local deal the public of the advantages which flow ers extinguished. Section 1 of the act of from competition. The local members were July 2, 1890 (26 Stat. at L. 209, chap. 647, bound by the articles of the association U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3200), provides not to sell goods to nonmembers as follows: "Every contract, combination at prices which were more than double in the form of trust or otherwise, or con- the prices which the members paid and spiracy in restraint of trade or commerce which all dealers had paid before the assoamong the several states or with foreign ciation was formed, and the manufacturers nations is hereby declared to be illegal;" were bound not to sell to nonmembers at and it proceeds to denounce a penalty any price or under any conditions. against anyone who shall make any such testimony indicated that the defendants in contract or engage in any such combina- error had been in constant competition tion or conspiracy. Interstate commerce with the San Francisco firms which entered "includes the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities" (Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 203, 29 L. ed. 161, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 382, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 828); and every agreement which has the tendency to restrain the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities is brought with in the prohibition of the statute. (Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 238, 44 L. ed. 146, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 96.) The combination in the case before the court evidently tended to restrain trade. The defendants in error who had been regular pur-association had they chosen to do so, and chasers of goods from the manufacturers were shut out from dealing with them from the time when the association was formed. Their orders to the manufacturers for goods were rejected for the express reason, and for no other reason than, that they were not members of the association. The into the association, and had bid against that thereby they might have availed themselves of the privileges of membership. To this it is sufficient to say that it does not appear that they would have been admitted to membership if they had applied. Under the by-laws they were not eligible, for the reason that they did not at all times carry The tendency of the combination was the requisite amount of stock, and if they also to create a monopoly in the hands of had possessed the necessary amount of stock the local members thereof. Section 2 of they had no assurance that they were "acthe act includes within its prohibition ceptable" to the members. On the contrary, "every person who shall monopolize, the fact that they were not invited to enter Or attempt to monopolize, or the combination when it was formed was a spire with any other person or persons to distinct intimation to them that they were con not acceptable. But it is immaterial wheth- | live stock instead of agents for the sale er they would or would not have been ad- thereof. There was no association or committed into the combination.. To protect bination between such purchasers and the their business and secure their legal rights vendors of the stock, and no monopoly they were not obliged to submit an applica- was created or was intended to be thereby tion for membership in such a combination created. The association itself transacted with the possibility of its rejection, or to no business. The court said: "Those who submit themselves to the rules and ex- are members thereof compete among themactions of the association. It is clear, also, selves and with others who are not memthat the tendency of the combination was bers for the purchase of the cattle, while to prevent others from engaging in the the association itself has nothing whatever business. No one could become a member to do with transportation nor with fixing who had not "an established business," and the prices for which the cattle may be purit is too evident to admit of denial that chased or thereafter sold. A lessno one could establish a business in compe- ening of the amount of the trade is neither tition with the members of the association the necessary nor direct effect of its formawho possessed such advantage in dealing | tion, and in truth the amount of that trade with the manufacturers. It is earnestly contended that the case in its principle comes within the doctrine of Hopkins v. United States, 171 U. S. 578, 43 L. ed. 290, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40, and Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604, 43 L. ed. 300, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 50, but we think it is clearly distinguishable from those cases. has greatly increased since the association was formed, and there is not the slightest evidence that the market prices of cattle have been lowered by reason of its existence. There is no feature of monopoly in the whole transaction." The difference between those cases and the case at bar is apparent. The resident In the Hopkins Case the asso-members of the Tile, Mantel, & Grate Association, which was claimed to have been ciation, while they may compete with themformed in violation of the act, was a local selves, have no competition with those who voluntary association of men whose business are not members for the latter are practiit was to receive at Kansas City consign- cally excluded from doing business within ments of cattle shipped from owners in vari- the portion of the state of California which ous states, and to feed, prepare for market, is included in the prescribed area; and, inand sell the same, and pay the owners their stead of being a combination between purportion of the proceeds after deducting chasers only, as was the fact in the Andercharges and expenses. The rules of the son Case, it is a combination between manuassociation forbade members to buy stock facturers and buyers of different states, from one who was not a member or to trans- which brings together, on the one hand, act business with any person who violated all the wholesale dealers in the United its rules and regulations. The court held States in that line of goods, and, on the that the business of the members of the as- other hand, the chosen few who are persociation was not interstate commerce, and mitted to obtain goods and supply the local that the agreements or contracts relating to demand. their business were not in restraint of interstate trade, for the reason that trade between the states was not affected by the combination, which was a purely local one, comprising only members of the state in which it was formed. The Anderson Case was similar to the Hopkins Case, with the exception that the members of the association were purchasers of certain classes of We find no ground for disturbing the finding of the circuit court concerning the amount of the attorney's fee to be allowed to the defendants in error. The judgment is affirmed. Affirmed by Supreme Court of United States February 23, 1904. can impose such conditions upon its existence as it pleases. Ex parte Christensen, 85 Cal. 208, 24 Pac. 747; State ex rel. Marion v. Reynolds, 14 Mont. 383, 36 Pac. 449; Bergman v. Cleveland, 39 Ohio St. 651; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273. Messrs. T. J. O'Donnell and Milton Smith, for appellee: In this state proceedings under an ordinance are not criminal, but civil. Durango v. Reinsberg, 16 Colo. 327, 26 Pac. 820; Hughes v. People, 8 Colo. 539, 9 Pac. 50; Greeley v. Hamman, 12 Colo. 97, 20 Pac. 1; Oshkosh v. Schwartz, 55 Wis. 487, 13 N. W. 552; Ex parte Hollwedell, 74 Mo. 395; Kansas v. Clark, 68 Mo. 589. We are not asking merely to have a prosecution restrained. We are asking to have the fire and police board restrained from arresting us, and stationing police officers upon our premises, and to prevent the destruction of our property. Where there is a destruction of property rights, or the in stay a criminal prosecution, where there is no adequate remedy at law by the restitution of the property, or where there is no way of determining the amount of the damages. M. Schandler Bottling Co. v. Welch, 42 Fed. 563; Sheridan v. Colvin, 78 Ill. 237; Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 558. Equity will not, by injunction, restrain a prosecution at law, when the question is the same at law as in equity; and an injunction will not issue to restrain a prosecution for a violation of a city ordinance on the ground that the ordinance is invasion of civil rights, an injunction will valid, or on the ground of irreparable injury, or to prevent a multiplicity of suits. Denver v. Beede, 25 Colo. 172, 54 Pac. 624; Bainbridge v. Reynolds, 111 Ga. 758, 36 S. E. 935; Paulk v. Sycamore, 104 Ga. 24, 41 L. R. A. 772, 30 S. E. 417; Forcheimer v. Port of Mobile, 84 Ala. 127, 4 So. 112; Waters-Peirce Oil Co. v. Little Rock, 39 Ark. 412; New Home Sewing Machine Co. v. Fletcher, 44 Ark. 139; Garrison There would be no way of restoring this v. Atlanta, 68 Ga. 64; Des Plaines v. Poyer, saloon business if it was allowed to be de123 Ill. 348, 14 N. E. 677; Yates v. Bata-stroyed by the fire and police board. via, 79 Ill. 500; Schwab v. Madison, 49 Ind. 329; Dodge v. Council Bluffs, 57 Iowa, 560, 10 N. W. 886; Brown v. Catlettsburg, 11 Bush, 435; Hottinger v. New Orleans, 42 La. Ann. 629, 8 So. 575; Kansas City Cable R. Co. v. Kansas, 29 Mo. App. 89; Morris Canal & Bkg. Co. v. Jersey City, 12 N. J. Eq. 258; Davis v. American Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 75 N. Y. 362; West v. New York, 10 Paige, 539; St. Peter's Episcopal Church v. Washington, 109 N. C. 21, 13 S. E. 700. The ordinances are not void; they do not constitute the slightest infringement upon the constitutional rights of women, as those rights are lawfully tested and properly understood. Phillips v. Denver, 19 Colo. 183, 34 Pac. 902; Ex parte Hayes, 98 Cal. 555, 20 L. R. A. 701, 33 Pac. 337; Foster v. Police Comrs. 102 Cal. 483, 37 Pac. 763. Port of Mobile v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 84 Ala. 115, 4 So. 106; Atlanta v. Gate City Gaslight Co. 71 Ga. 126. To prevent the invasion of civil rights is as much the province of a court of equity as to prevent the destruction of private property. Austin v. Austin City Cemetery Asso. 87 Tex. 336, 28 S. W. 528; Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 226, 33 Am. Rep. 239; Sylvester Coal Co. v. St. Louis, 130 Mo. 330, 32 S. W. 649; Wood v. Brooklyn, 14 Barb. 433; Platte & D. Canal & Mill Co. v. Lee, 2 Colo. App. 192, 29 Pac. 1036; Re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 222, 31 L. ed. 410, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 482; Montgomery v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 84 Ala. 132, 4 So. 626; Davis v. Fasig, 128 Ind. 271, 27 N. E. 726. If, by reason, of the acts of the fire and police board, Cronin's business was destroyed, or if it was so damaged that it The governing power may prohibit the would not afford him a livelihood for himmanufacture and traffic in liquor altogether, self and family, by reason of the fact that provided it does not interfere with inter- the stationing of policemen in and about state commerce; and, if the governing his premises, thereby driving away trade, power can prohibit a thing altogether, it and the arresting of patrons as they come to his place, was indulged in, he would have no adequate remedy at law. Sylvester Coal Co. v. St. Louis, 130 Mo. 328, 32 S. W. 649; M. Schandler Bottling Co. v. Welch, 42 Fed. 565; McInerney v. Denver, 17 Colo. 302, 29 Pac. 516; Bruner v. San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. 92 Cal. 239, 28 Pac. 341; 19 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 514; Worley v. Columbia, 88 Mo. 106; Trammell v. Russellville, 34 Ark. 105, 36 Am. Rep. 1; Walsh v. New York & B. Bridge, 96 N. Y. 439. The police power is limited by constitutional provisions of the United States, and other fundamental laws. Rights guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be violated. If it is obnoxious to vested rights and unreasonable, the courts will declare the law | void; it must be exercised so that all are affected by it, and not one class favored and another class imposed upon. Tiedeman, Pol. Power, § 2; 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 742; Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, 19 L. ed. 984; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389, 17 N. E. 343; Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636; People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377, 52 Am. Rep. 34, 2 N. E. 29; Toledo, W. & W. R. Co. v. Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37, 16 Am. Rep. 611; Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. 70 Ill. 192, 22 Am. Rep. 71; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; Platte & D. Canal & Mill. Co. v. Lee, 2 Colo. App. 184, 29 Pac. 1036; Platte & D. Canal & Mill. Co. v. Dowell, 17 Colo. 376, 30 Pac. 68. When a constitution guarantees to every person the same privileges and immunities, any act of the legislature passed with the view of protecting the public morals or the public health must apply to all individuals, unless those individuals are under some legal disability. Any act of the legislature whereby it discriminates against women is void. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. ed. 588; Des Plaines v. Poyer, 123 Ill. 348, 14 N. E. 677. The sale of intoxicating liquors is not an unlawful business. There is no constitutional provision prohibiting the sale of liquor to either men or women. Unless there is a constitutional prohibition a woman has as much right, under the Constitution of the United States and of the state of Colorado, and the laws of the state of Colorado, to enter a saloon and purchase a drink of whisky as a man. To prevent a saloon keeper from selling to a woman if she has the right to purchase, and then, under an ordinance, fine him for so doing, takes his property with out due process of law: Re Maguire, 57 Cal. 604, 40 Am. Rep. 125. The right of a person to engage in any business permitted by law is a substantial right guaranteed to him by the Constitution of the United States. Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064; Re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415, 47 L. R. A. 52, 58 Pac. 1071; Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 29 L. R. A. 79, 40 N. E. 454. An ordinance, to be valid as an exercise of police power, must be a reasonable regulation. Chicago v. Netcher, 183 Ill. 104, 48 L. R. A. 261, 55 N. E. 707; May v. People, 1 Colo. App. 157, 27 Pac. 1010; Lake View v. Letz, 44 Ill. 82; Butchers' Union S. H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. 111 U. S. 757, 28 L. ed. 591, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652. Campbell, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court: The district court issued a permanent writ of injunction restraining the defendants below appellants here, from enforcing the provisions of §§ 745 and 746 of article 15 of the general ordinances of the city of Denver, upon the ground that they are unconstitutional, and that plaintiff had no adequate remedy at law. They read: "Sec. 745. Each and every liquor saloon, dram shop, or tippling-house keeper, who shall have or keep, in connection with or as part of such liquor saloon, dram shop, or tippling house, any wine room or other place, either with or without door or doors, curtain or curtains, or screen of any kind, into which any female person shall be permitted to enter from the outside, or from such liquor saloon, dram shop, or tippling house, and there be supplied with any kind of liquor whatsoever, shall, upon conviction, be fined as hereinafter provided. "Sec. 746. No person having plate where intoxicating or malt liquors charge or control of any liquor saloon, or are sold or given away, or any place adjacent thereto or connected therewith in any manner whatsoever, either by doors or otherwise, shall suffer or permit any female person to be or remain in such liquor saloon, dram shop, tippling house, or other place where intoxicating or malt liquors are sold or given away, for the purpose of there being supplied with any kind of liquor whatsoever. No person owning or having charge or control of any liquor saloon, dram shop, or tippling house shall employ or procure, or cause to be employed or procured, any female person to wait or in any manner attend on any person in any dram shop, tippling house, or liquor saloon, or in any place adjacent thereto or connected there- | plaint one calling for the interposition of with, where intoxicating or malt liquors are a court of equity? Second, is the charter sold or given away, nor shall any female provision constitutional? person be or remain in any dram shop, tippling house, liquor saloon, or place adjacent thereto or connected therewith, and wait or attend on any person, or solicit drinks in any such place." an 1. The plaintiff does not contend that he is entitled to equitable relief by injunction unless the charter is void. Since, as appears later in the opinion, we hold it valid, it is not absolutely necessary to decide This ordinance was before our court of whether the admitted facts of the comappeals in Walker v. People, 5 Colo. App. plaint warrant the granting of an injune38, 37 Pac. 29, and in Denver v. Domedian, tion. This court does not look with favor 15 Colo. App. 36, 60 Pac. 1107. In the upon the practice of restraining municipal former case, under the evidence, and in the authorities from executing municipal orlatter, upon the stipulated facts, it was dinances which so vitally concern the tranheld that the cases as made did not come quillity of the community and good order within the prohibition. In speaking of these of society. While it is true, as said in the regulations, however, Mr. Justice Wilson, case of Denver v. Beede, 25 Colo. 172, 54 in the latter case, said: "We agree that Pac. 624, that in exceptional cases a court the ordinance is a good one, that its ob- of equity will restrain a prosecution at law jects are most praiseworthy, and that its when the legal question involved is the rigid enforcement would meet with the ap- same at law as in equity, such is not the proval of every good citizen." The ques- general rule; and a clear case should be tion of its constitutionality was not there made out before such extraordinary relief mooted, but this expression of Judge Wil- is awarded. It is not necessary here to inson, if only dictum, is an indication of what dicate in what cases such relief will, and his view would be had its validity been as- in what it will not, be given. But it is sailed. The chief object of the ordinance doubtful if this complaint is so essentially was there said to be to suppress the evils different from that in the Beede Case as to incident to the "frequenting of saloons by render inapplicable the rule there females, and the attendant results so of nounced. We mention this point for the fensive to decency and the moral sense of purpose of again emphasizing our view that the public." The power to make these par- only in extreme and exceptional cases ticular regulations was expressly conferred should a court of equity interfere with muby the general assembly upon the city coun-nicipal authorities in the enforcement of cil of the city of Denver by the 5th clause such ordinances. of subdiv. 12 of § 20 of the charter, which 2. So far as the question at issue is conprovides "that no liquor saloon, dram shop, cerned, these sections of the ordinance pracor tippling house shall have or keep in tically prevent a saloon keeper from perconnection with or as part of such saloon, mitting women to frequent what are called tippling house, or dram shop, any wine wine rooms, there to be supplied with liqroom or other place, either with or with- uor; and it is only with respect to that out doors, curtain or curtains, or screen feature of the ordinance that we of any kind, into which any female person present concerned, although it may be that shall be permitted to enter from the out- the principles which govern this particular side, or from such tippling house or dram clause of the enactment equally apply to shop, and there be supplied with any kind the others. As we understand the arguof liquor whatsoever." Plaintiff does not ment of his counsel, plaintiff's position is deny that he has kept a wine room into that these sections are unreasonable be which he permits women to enter and there cause they discriminate against women be supplied with liquor, and suffers them to solely on account of their sex; that they remain therein for that purpose, contrary to are unconstitutional, in that they deprive the specific provisions of these sections. In- defendant of his property without deed, he admits that he has violated the process of law, destroy his right to purordinance in both particulars, and pro- sue a lawful calling, and deny to him the poses, unless prevented by the municipal equal rights and privileges which every authorities, to continue to do so. So that citizen has, both under the Federal and our the principal question in the case is as to state Constitutions; that they violate § the constitutionality of the charter, rather 423, Mills's Anno. Stat., which preserves to than that of the ordinance for the latter all the citizens of the state equal enjoy confessedly is authorized by the charter. ment of accommodations, advantages, faThe ordinance is good if the charter provi-cilities, and privileges of inns, restaurants, sion is constitutional. Two questions are churches, barber shops, public conveyances, pressed by plaintiff for determination: theaters, and other places of public reFirst, was the case as made by the com- sort or amusement. With respect to the are at due |