be sufficient (Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U. S. 589, 45 L. ed. 1015, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730); or if the court decides a Federal question which it assumes is distinctly presented to it in some way. Home for Incurables v. New York, 187 U. S. 155, 47 L. ed. 117, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 84; Sweringen v. St. Louis, 185 U. S. 46, 46 L. ed. 799, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 569. Jurisdiction may be maintained where a definite issue as to the possession of the right is distinctly deducible from the record and necessarily disposed of, but this cannot be made out by resort to judicial knowledge. Powell v. Brunswick County, 150 U. S. 433, 37 L. ed. 1134, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 166; Mountain View Min. & Mill. Co. v. McFadden, 180 U. S. 533, 45 L. ed. 656, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488; Arkansas v. Kansas & T. Coal the principle that the court which first acquires jurisdiction of the subject-matter of an action will retain it until the controversy is finally determined. Missouri P. R. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 160 U. S. 556, 40 L. ed. 536, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389. No decision upon a Federal question was involved in a decree of a state court enforcing a contract for the transfer and use of an inventor's right, notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of the United States dismissing a suit for the infringement of the patent, where the state court held that the subject-matter of the two suits was so different that the prosecution of the one did not interfere with the prosecution of the other. Marsh v. Nichols, S. & Co. 140 U. S. 344, 35 L. ed. 413, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 798. A state court, in refusing to regard garnishment proceedings in a Federal court as a bar to an action against the garnishee, does not so pass upon a Federal question as to give the Supreme Court of the United States jurisdiction, where the notice of garnishment may have been issued and served after jurisdiction had attached in the state court, and the abandonment of such proceedings was the reason given by the state court for refusing to entertain the objection. Missouri P. R. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 160 U. S. 556, 40 L. ed. 536, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389. A ruling of a state court sustaining a demurrer to a replication in which plaintiff alleged that the decision by the Land Depart ment of a question of fact on the hearing of a protest filed by him and others against defendants' original mineral entry was res judicata in an adverse suit in which defendants rely on a subsequent entry involves no decision of a Federal question, but is a mere determination that one who was not a party could not claim the advantages of a party. Beals V. Cone, 188 U. S. 184, 47 L. ed. 435, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 275. A decision by a state court settling a boundary line on general principles of law amounts to a decision against a right set up under the supposed decision of the register and receiver of the Land Office in ejectment, where it was claimed that the boundaries of the land were settled otherwise by such officials acting under the authority of acts of Congress. Doe cr dem. Barbarie v. Mobile, 9 How. 451, 13 L. ed. 212. Co. 183 U. S. 185, 46 L. ed. 144, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 47. Counsel by their specification of errors, under rule 21, assert the Federal questions to be that the decision of the supreme court of California was against a title, right, privilege, or immunity claimed by plaintiff in error under the treaty between the United States and Hawaii. And that the decision was in contravention of § 1 of article 4 of the Constitution. 1. We do not find that any claim under the treaty was made in the trial court, and the rule of practice of the supreme court of California is that it will not pass on questions raised for the first time in that court, and which might and should have been raised in the trial court. Stoddard V. Treadwell, 29 Cal. 281; King v. Meyer, 35 The refusal of the state court to consider the effect as an estoppel of a prior adjudication in a Federal court, a question which, though not presented in the printed brief of counsel, was fairly presented by the pleadings, proofs, and assignments of errors, and was necessarily involved in the determination of the case, is equivalent to a decision upon the Federal right involved therein. Des Moines Nav. & R. Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co. 123 U. S. 552, 31 L. ed. 202, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 217. State legislation or authority generally. To give the Supreme Court of the United States jurisdiction to review a decision or a state court in a land contest on the theory that such decision must have been in favor of the validity of a state statute drawn in question as repugnant to the Federal Constitution, the title of the successful party must have been dependent upon such statute. Williams v. Norris, 12 Wheat. 117, 6 L. ed. 571. A decision upon the validity of a state statute is not necessarily involved in a judgment of a state court because its authority to enter such judgment rested solely upon that statute. The Victory, 6 Wall. 382, 18 L. ed. 848. No decision as to the repugnancy to the Federal Constitution of a state statute provid ing for the addition of 50 per cent to the amount of a verdict is involved in the holding of a state court that a party who has availed himself of the provision of such statute for the assessment of damages by a jury is estopped from contesting its validity. Electric Co. V. Dow. 166 U. S. 489, 41 L. ed. 1088, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 645. The judgment of a state court sustaining the validity of the New York mileage book act which was claimed to violate the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution does not present a Federal question, where the court held that the statute did not require the issuance of mileage tickets covering interstate transportation. Erie R. Co. v. Purdy, 185 U. S. 148, 46 L. ed. 847, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 605. A decision of a state court that an insolvent foreign building and loan association is estopped to set up the invalidity of a state statute requiring such association to make a deposit of securities for the benefit of resident stockholders as a condition of doing business, Cal. 646; Deady v. Townsend, 57 Cal. 298; | decisions. That case involved a decree, in Williams v. McDonald, 58 Cal. 527; Ander- respect of which there was a general allegason v. Black, 70 Cal. 226, 231, 11 Pac. 700. tion that it was rendered against dead perNeither the pleading of the decree of disons, as well as in the absence of necessary vorce nor of the statute of Hawaii provid- | parties who had no notice of the suit; and ing for the forfeiture of Mrs. McGrew's we held that such general allegations did rights in the policy of insurance, as construed by the supreme court of Hawaii, nor of both together, amounted to specially asserting any right under the treaty. Those averments did not assert that claim in the trial court in such manner as to bring it to the attention of that court, nor, indeed, to show that any right under the treaty was present in the mind of counsel. To give them that effect would be in the teeth of our decision in F. G. Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler County, and numerous other by the action of the board of directors in mak- not meet the statutory requirement that the final judgment of a state court may be reexamined here if it denies some title, right, privilege, or immunity "specially set up or claimed" under the Constitution or authority of the United States. Mr. Justice Harlan said: "This statutory requirement is not met if such declaration is so general in its character that the purpose of the party to assert a Federal right is left to mere interence. It is the settled doctrine of this court that the jurisdiction of the circuit which statutes were contended to be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U. S. 238, 46 L. ed. 171, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 120. 21 Sup. State legislation impairing contract obligations. A decision of a state court that a notice of protest left at the former residence in loyal territory of an indorser who had abandoned such residence and gone within the confederate lines is insufficient to charge him, if his change of residence was known, or might with reasonable diligence have been known, to the holder. rests upon principles of general law alone, independent of any question as to the constitutionality of the ordinance of secession. Allen v. McVeigh, 107 U. S. 433, 27 L. ed. 572, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 558; Bank of Old Dominion v. McVeigh, 98 U. S. 332, 25 L. ed. 110. But jurisdiction exists to review the judgment of a state court sustaining a demurrer to a plea which draws in question nothing but the validity of a state statute authorizing the construction of a dam across a navigable river, as its consistency with, or repugnancy to, the Constitution of the United States necessarily arises, and must have been determined, by such decision. Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. 2 Pet. 245, 7 L. ed. 412. And a judgment of a state court against the cashier of a national bank for his failure to comply with certain requirements of a state law is reviewable in the Supreme Court of the United States, where his defense was that he was amenable to no law but a law of Congress, and that a state legislature had no power to prescribe his duty, as the judgment could not have been rendered without holding, and in effect deciding, that this plea was bad. v. Dowley, 94 U. S. 527, 24 L. ed. 181. Waite The state court cannot be held to have decided a question as to the impairment of the obligation of a contract unless it has given effect to subsequent state legislation claimed to have accomplished that result. Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 388, 30 L. ed. 1059, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 916; Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 207. 41 L. ed. 132, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1023; New Orleans Waterworks Co. V. Louisiana Sugar Ref. Co. 125 U. S. 18, 31 L. ed. 607, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 741; Winona & St. P. R. Co. v. Plainview, 143 U. S. 371, 36 L. ed. 191, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 530. Effect cannot be deemed to have been given to a legislative enactment claimed to impair the obligation of a contract by a decision of a state court enforcing a liability voluntarily assumed under such statute. Winona & St. P. R. Co. v. Plainview, 143 U. S. 371, 36 L. ed. 191, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 530. A decision of a state court upholding a municipal tax on a bridge on the ground that the bridge company, by accepting its franchise from the city, voluntarily agreed that the bridge should be subject to taxation, rests upon a ground broad enough to dispose of the case without reference to the Federal question involved in the contention that the tax ordinances of the city impaired the obligations of its charter from the state, and of a contract which the bridge company entered into with a railroad company for the maintenance and operation of the bridge. Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 141 U. S. 679, 35 L. ed. 900, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 114. A decision of a state court that a creditor of an insolvent, by accepting the benefit of a composition offer under a state statute, waived any right to object to the validity of such statute as impairing contract obligations rests upon a non-Federai ground broad enough to support its judgment denying his right to recover the balance of his debt without reference to the Federal question. Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361, 37 L. ed. 1111. 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 131. The effect upon cases of this character of the A writ of error to review a judgment of a state court ousting a corporation from its franchise for violation of the statutes of the state relating to the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine will not be dismissed on the ground that adequate support for the judgment, irrespective of any substantial Federal question, is afforded by the finding of the state court that the corporation had violated a statute in refusing to furnish samples as therein required. where the judgment of the court was based upon the consideration given by it to all the asserted violations of the statutes jointly,rule that, where the state court rests its judg . courts of the United States must appear affirmatively from the record, and that it is not sufficient that it may be inferred argumentatively from the facts stated. Upon like grounds, the jurisdiction of this court to re-examine the final judgment of a state court cannot arise from mere inference, but only from averments so distinct and positive as to place it beyond question that the party bringing a case here from such court intended to assert a Federal right." This also disposes of the suggestion that the offering in evidence of the judgment in the suit by the administrator, and of evidence of its payment, raised a Federal question under the treaty, for no such ground was taken in relation to that evidence, to ment upon non-Federal grounds sufficient to support it, the Supreme Court of the United States is without jurisdiction, needs carefully to be noted, where the ground on which the state court rests its decision is that the contract did not exist, or did not confer the right claimed. The question depends for its solution upon a determination whether or not the state court did in fact give effect to the subsequent state legislation. Where the state court decides that an alleged contract never existed because of the want of a compliance with a state statute, and renders judgment wholly without reference to the subsequent statute, which is alleged to have impaired the obligation of the contract, the Supreme Court of the United States cannot review such judgment. Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 207, 41 L. ed. 132, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1023. The same is true when the state court bases its judgment entirely upon the effect and construction of the statutes claimed to create the contract, and upon grounds which would have been equally controlling if the later acts had not been passed. Kreiger v. Shelby R. Co. 125 U. S. 39, 31 L. ed. 675, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 752. So, where the state court rested its judgment enforcing the payment of taxes on railway property, not upon the ground that such property was rendered taxable by any law passed subsequent to the company's charter, but that under the terms of the charter itself such property was taxable, the Supreme Court of the United States is without jurisdiction to review that judgment. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. v. Todd County, 142 U. S. 282, 35 L. ed. 1014, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281. The ruling of a state court adverse to a claim under a judgment because the notes for which such judgment was rendered were given for a loan of confederate money, and the transactions which resulted in the acquisition of the notes were had between enemies during the Civil War in violation of the proclamation of the President forbidding commercial intercourse with the enemy, is not the subject of review by the Supreme Court of the United States, where such ruling was based upon its previous adjudications, and not upon the provision in the state Constitution subsequently adopted prohibiting enforcement of contracts founded upon confederate money. Stevenson v. Williams, 19 say nothing of the fact that Mrs. McGrew was not a party to that suit. In the bill of exceptions there is an enumeration of certain objections to the entry of judgment and certain errors of law alleged to have occurred during the trial, and to have been excepted to by defendant, which embraces the objection that the decision of the trial court was against law, because, among other things, the findings of fact did not determine the issues raised by the allegation in the answer quoted in the statement preceding this opinion, and that the court erred in sustaining the objection of plaintiff to the introduction of evidence of payment by the company to the administrator of the amount due on the policy. But there is no reference to the treaty, and all given in renewal of obligations arising from the sale of a slave is void under the settled principles of the jurisprudence of the state, tested by which the contract was void when made, without passing upon the validity, under the Federal Constitution, of a provision of the state Constitution, subsequently adopted, annulling contracts for the sale of persons, Its judgment cannot be reviewed in the Supreme Court of the United States. Worthy v. Marston, 14 Wall. 10, 20 L. ed. 826. But where the state court does give effect to the subsequent law, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction, although the state court may have placed its decision upon the ground that the contract did not confer the right claimed. A decision of a state court upholding taxes imposed under a state law claimed to impair a contract contained in the charter of the corporation exempting it from taxation, though rested upon the ground that the exemption claimed was not granted by such charter, is reviewable in the Supreme Court of the United States. Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v. Thomas, 132 U. S. 174, 33 L. ed. 302; Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v. Levee Comrs. 132 U. S. 190, 33 L. ed. 308, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 74. A decision of a state court that a statutory exemption from taxation is not a valid contract, but is void because conflicting with the state Constitution in force when it was enacted; and that, therefore, no contract right was violated in subjecting the property to taxation under a later act,-is reviewable in the Supreme Court of the United States. Northwestern University v. Illinois, 99 U. S. 309, 25 L. ed. 387. And a decision of a state court which gives effect to state statutes subjecting the property of a railroad company to taxation that are claimed to impair the obligation of a charter exemption from taxation is reviewable in the Supreme Court of the United States, although such decision was rested on the ground that the exemption ciause was invalid because in conflict with the state Constitution, and be cause of its vagueness and uncertainty. Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Tennessee, 153 U. S. 486, 38 L. ed. 793, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 968. The decision of a state court which gives effect to a state revenue law, and holds that a contract does not confer a right of exemption Wall. 572, 22 L. ed. 162. from its operation, may involve a Federal And where the state court holds that a note question, although the state court concedes that this no more set up the claim than the an- with § 709 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, swer itself. In fact, the question was not even raised in the supreme court, though, if so, the court was not then bound to regard it. Reference was made in the briefs in the supreme court to the treaty, but those references did not specially set up or claim any right as secured by the treaty, nor were the briefs made part of the record by any certificate or entry duly made, and our attention has not been called to any statute or rule of court in California making them such. In the petition for rehearing it was said that the treaty made the decision in Carter v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. controlling, and if that could be considered as a compliance the contract is valid, but denies, merely, that the particular property in question was braced within its terms. Wilmington & W. R. Co. v. Alsbrook, 146 U. S. 279, 36 L. ed. 972, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 72. em Where it is claimed that the obligation of a contract of exemption from taxation has been impaired by the general tax laws of the state. and the state court justifies such impairment on the ground of the surrender of such exemption by long acquiescence in the imposition of taxes, the Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction to review that decision. Given v. Wright, 117 U. S. 648, 29 L. ed. 1021, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 907. A decision by the state court that an act of Congress granting land to Ohio for the construction of canals did not constitute a contract for the perpetual maintenance of such canals, and could not, therefore, be impaired by a state statute abandoning a canal and leasing it to a railroad company, is reviewable in the Supreme Court of the United States. Walsh v. Columbus H. Valley & A. R. Co. 176 U. S. 469, 44 L. ed. 548, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 393. A decision of a state court adverse to a claim of an exclusive franchise granted by an inferior court acting under legislative authority, which could not be impaired by subsequent legislation without violating the contract clause of the Federal Constitution, is reviewable in the Supreme Court of the United States, although the state court disposed of the case by deciding that the state statutes did not authorize the inferior court to grant such an exclusive franchise, and in so doing gave a construction to a state statute. Wright v. Nagle, 101 U. 791, 25 L. ed. 921. S. A decision of a state court invalidating certain state bonds because in excess of the limit of state indebtedness prescribed by the state Constitution is reviewable in the Supreme Court of the United States, where it was contended in the state court that such bonds were founded on an obligation which existed prior to the adoption of the constitutional provision. Williams v. Louisiana, 103 U. S. 637, 26 L. ed. 593. p. 575), which we do not think it could, it came too late, and the petition was denied without an opinion. In doing so that court adhered to the usual course of its judgments, and its action cannot be revised by us. If the supreme court of California had seen fit on that petition to entertain the contention of plaintiff in error as asserting a Federal right, and had then decided it adversely, the case would have occupied a different position. Where a state court refuses to give effect to the judgment of a court of the United States, rendered upon a point in dispute, and with jurisdiction of the case and the parties, it denies the validity of an authority exercised under the United States; and which shail be so expressed on their face" was held in McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U. S. 102, 43 L. ed. 382, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 134, to give effect to certain subsequent statutes which tended to embarrass the coupon holders in the exercise of the right granted by the funding act, and, therefore, to be reviewable by the Supreme Court of the United States, although the state court in its opinion only incidentally referred to these statutes, and placed its decision distinctly on the ground that the funding act was void in so far as it related to the coupon contract. "Suppose, for illustration," says Mr. Justice Brewer, "a state legislature should pass an act exempting the property of a particular corporation from all taxation, and that a subsequent legislature should pass an act subjecting that corporation to the taxes imposed by the city in which its property was located; and that, on the first presentation to the highest court of the state of the question of the validity of taxes levied under and by virtue of this last act that court should in terms hold these city taxes valid notwithstanding the general clause of exemption found in the prior statute. In that event no one would question that this court had jurisdiction to review such judgment, and inquire as to the scope of the contract of exemption created by the first statute. Suppose, further, that this court should hold that the first statute was valid and broad enough to exempt from all taxation, city as well as state, and adjudge the last act of the legislature void as in conflict with the prior; and that thereafter the city should again attempt to levy taxes upon the corporation; and that, upon a challenge of those taxes, the state court should say nothing in respect to the last act, but simply rule that the original act exempting the property of the corporation from taxation was void,-could it fairly be held that this court was without jurisdiction to review that judgment, a judgment which directly and necessarily operated to give force and effect to the last statute subjecting the property to city taxes? Could it be said that the silence of the state court in its opinion changed the scope and effect of the decision? In other words, Can it be that the mere language in which the state court phrases its opinion takes from or adds to the jurisdiction of this court to review its A decision of the supreme court of appeals of Virginia, which denied the validity of the provision of a statute of that state for the refunding of the public debt, that coupons of re-judgment? Such a construction would always funding bonds should be receivable "for all taxes, debts, dues, and demands due the state, place it in the power of a state court to determine our jurisdiction. Such, certainly, has where a state court refuses to give effect to | did not involve the assertion of an absolute the judgment of a court of another state it right under the treaty. refuses to give full faith and credit to that judgment. The one case falls within the first class of cases named in § 709 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 575), and the other within the third class. The supreme court of Hawaii in its second opinion in the administrator's case said that the company, not having brought Mrs. McGrew in by interplea, must rely on the courts of California taking the same view that the courts of Hawaii did, but did not intimate that the courts of California were compelled by treaty to take that view. Where a judgment of another state is pleaded in defense, and issue is made upon it, it may well be ruled that that sets up a right under the 3d subdivision, because the Nor can this failure to claim under the effect of the judgment is the only question treaty be supplied by judicial knowledge. in the case; but here the plea of the decree We so held in Mountain View Min. & Mill. of divorce and the statute did not neces- Co. v. McFadden, 180 U. S. 533, 45 L. ed. sarily suggest or amount to a claim under 656, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488, where we ruled the treaty. They were properly admitted that judicial knowledge could not be rein evidence under the state law for what sorted to to raise controversies not prethey might be worth as a defense, but that'sented by the record; and Professor Thayer's not been the understanding, and such, certainly, would seem to set at naught the purpose of the Federal Constitution to prevent a state from nullifying, by its legislation, a contract which it has made, or authorized to be made. Louisiana Sugar Ref. Co. 125 U. S. 18, 31 L. ed. 607, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 741, "applying to cases of contracts the settled rules, that, in order to give this court jurisdiction of a writ of error to a state court, a Federal question must have been, expressly or in effect, decided by that court; and, therefore, that, when the record shows that a Federal question and another question were presented to that court, and its decision turned on the other question only, this court has no jurisdiction,-may be summed up as follows: When the state court decides against a right claimed under a contract, and there was no law subsequent to the contract, this court clearly has no | jurisdiction. When the existence and the construction of a contract are undisputed, and the state court upholds a subsequent law, on the ground that it did not impair the obligation of the admitted contract, it is equally clear that this court has jurisdiction. When the state court holds that there was a contract conferring certain rights, and that a subsequent law did not impair those rights, this court has jurisdiction to consider the true construction of the supposed contract; and, if it is of opinion that it did not confer the rights affirmed by the state court, and therefore its obligation was not impaired by the subsequent law, it may on that ground affirm the judgment. So, when the state court upholds the subsequent law, on the ground that the contract did not It is one of the duties cast upon this court by the Constitution and laws of the United States to inquire whether a state has passed any law impairing the obligation of a prior contract. No duty is more solemn and imperative than this, and it seems to us that we should be recreant to that duty if we should permit the form in which a state court expresses its conciusions to override the necessary effect of its decision. It must also be borne in mind that this is not a case in which, after a statute asserted to be the foundation of a contract, acts are passed designed and tending to destroy or impair the alleged contract rights, and the first time the question is presented to the highest court of the state it takes no notice of the subsequent acts, but inquires simply as to the validity of the alleged contract. Here it appears that the state courts had repeatedly held the act claimed to create a contract valid, and had passed upon the validity of subsequent acts designed and calculated to destroy and impair the rights given by such contract, sustaining some and annulling others. Some of those judgments had been brought to this court, and by it the validity of the original act had been uniformly and repeatedly sustained, and the invalidity of sub-confer the right claimed, this court may insequent and conflicting acts adjudged; and now, at the end of many years of litigation, with these subsequent statutes still standing on the statute books unrepealed by any legislative action, the state court, with only a casual reference to those later statutes, goes back to the original act, and, reversing its prior rulings, adjudges it void, thus, in effect, putting at naught the repeated decisions of this court as well as its own. Under such circumstances it seems to us that it would be a clear evasion of the duty cast upon us by the Constitution of the United States to treat all this past litigation and prior decisions as mere nullities, and to consider the question as a matter de novo. It would be shutting our eyes to palpable facts to say that the court of appeals of Virginia has not by this decision given effect to these subsequent statutes." "The result of the authorities," says Mr. Justice Gray in New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. quire whether the supposed contract did give the right, because, if it did, the subsequent law cannot be upheld. But when the state court gives no effect to the subsequent law, but decides, on grounds independent of that law, that the right claimed was not conferred by the contract, the case stands just as if the subsequent law had not been passed, and this court has no jurisdiction." The judgment of a state court enforcing a cause of action provided by a state statute in case of a default in payment over an objection that the statute, as construed by the authorities, impaired the obligation of a contract, gives effect to such statute so as to render the judgment reviewable in the Supreme Court of the United States, although it rests on the ground that payments previously made, and accepted by the state, are void; and the court Houston & T. C. did not mention the statute. R. Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 66, 44 L. ed. 673, |