was the department concerned with the man- | plied in this state in the court of chancery ufacture of depilatories. During the first by Chancellor Runyon in Salomon v. Hertz, two or three weeks he was in the employ of the Grasselli Company he did no work, but immediately upon his employment, Frazier, the superintendent of its plant at Tremley, questioned him "in regard to what he knew about the manufacture of depilatories," and Goss informed Frazier of the complainants' method of manufacture, and described fully the complainants' apparatus. Frazier reported to the defendant company the information obtained from Goss, with a sketch of the apparatus, and the manner in which it should be made and put up. This sketch was made by Frazier, and corrected by Goss. The Grasselli Company approved of Frazier's plan, and directed him to put up the shed to contain the apparatus. He was proceeding with this work when stopped by the injunction.

40 N. J. Eq. 400, 2 Atl. 379. Salomon v. Hertz, Peabody v. Norfolk, and 0. & W. Thum Co. v. Tloczynski are the leading American cases. These cases established the principle that employees of one having a trade secret, who are under an express contract, or a contract implied from their confidential relation to their employer, not to disciose that secret, will be enjoined from divulging the same to the injury of their employer, whether before or after they have left his employ; and that other persons who induce the employee to disclose the secret, knowing of his contract not to disclose the same, or knowing that his disclosure is in violation of the confidence reposed in him by his employer, will be enjoined from making any use of the information so obtained, although they might have reached the same result independently by their own experiments or efforts. We approve the principle thus established.

We find in this case, as already stated, that an express contract between the complainants and Goss for secrecy is proved. Two questions remain: (1) Did Stone possess a secret process for the manufacture of depilatories? (2) Did the Grasselli Chemical Company, obtain knowledge of that secret process from Goss under such circumstances that it should be enjoined from making use of it?

The complainants allege that Goss was under a contract with them not to reveal the secrets of manufacture. Goss denies this contract. We agree with the vice chancellor that the contract is established by the weight of evidence. The right of a manufacturer whose goods are made by an unpatented secret process, to protection by injunction against the divulging of his secret in a proper case, is now established by a wellconsidered line of cases in England and in several states. The leading case is Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare, 241, 20 L. J. Ch. N. S. 513, decided by Vice Chancellor Turner in 1851, 1. The ingredients used in the manufacand Affirmed in court of appeal by Lord ture of Stone's depilatories were well known, Cranworth, 21 L. J. Ch. N. S. 248. The and had been used for that purpose for principle has since been applied to cases years before the XXX and XXXX were put in various aspects in the English courts. upon the market, and the same ingredients Merryweather v. Moore [1892] 2 Ch. 518, were used by the Grasselli Chemical Com61 L. J. Ch. N. S. 505; Lamb v. Evans pany in the manufacture of a depilatory. It [1892] 3 Ch. 462, 61 L. J. Ch. N. S. 681, is urged that the only advantage possessed Affirmed on appeal, in 62 L. J. Ch. N. S. 404. by the complainants arose out of skill in A leading case in this country is Peabody handling, and not out of a secret process, v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 96 Am. Dec. 664. and that there was no secret either in the inIn New York the principle is established in gredients or in the method of compounding Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N. Y. 30, 16 Am. St. them. The defendants combined the ingrediRep. 740, 23 N. E. '12; Eastman Co. v. ents by a different method from any other Reichenback, 47 N. Y. S. R. 435, 20 N. Y. in use, and the result was a product of a difSupp. 110; National Gum & Mica Co. v. ferent character. The complainants' process Braendly, 27 App. Div. 219, 51 N. Y. Supp. of manufacture was considerably more com93; Little v. Gallus, 39 App. Div. 646, 57 plicated than the defendants.' The secret N. Y. Supp. 104; Tode v. Gross, 127 N. Y. consisted in a knowledge of the proper meth480, 13 L. R. A. 652, 24 Am. St. Rep. 475, od of mixing the ingredients, and treating 28 N. E. 469. In Michigan it was adopted them, in order to produce a product of propin a very well-considered opinion in O. & W. er consistency. The difference between mere Thum Co. v. Tloczynski, 114 Mich. 149, 38 skill in manipulation and a process of L. R. A. 200, 68 Am. St. Rep. 469, 72 N. W. manufacture is illustrated by a recent case 140. In Pennsylvania, Fralich v. Despar, in the United States Supreme Court. Car165 Pa. 24, 30 Atl. 521. In Indiana, Wester-negie Steel Co. v. Cambria Iron Co. 185 U. S. velt v. National Paper & Supply Co. 154 403, 46 L. ed. 968, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 698. Ind. 673, 57 N. E. 552. In the Federal In this case the process which was held courts, C. F. Simmons Medicine Co. v. Sim- patentable consisted in retaining a quantity mons, 81 Fed. 163. The rule has been ap- of molten iron in a reservoir, to serve as a

basis for mixing the varying products of the | between him and his employees. The deblast furnaces preparatory to converting the fendant company is a party to Goss's fraudsame into steel. The difficulty to be over- ulent disclosure of the secret, and the comcome was a lack of uniformity in the molten plainants were entitled to an injunction remetal. The use of a reservoir in which the straining the Grasselli Chemical Company varying products of the blast furnaces had from making any use of the information been mixed was known prior to the patent thus obtained from Goss. The injunction involved in that case, but the importance should not be refused because the process of always maintaining in the reservoir a was such that it would probably have been sufficient quantity of molten metal to "dom- discovered by independent experiments in inate" (to use the court's expression) the the manipulation of the ingredients of whole mass had not been before appreciated. which the products of both parties were The majority of the court held that the alike composed. The Grasselli Chemical process was therefore patentable. There the Company, by its own conduct, has put itself ingredients were the same, the idea of mix-in such a position that it may even lose the ing the molten metal of different qualities advantage of future independent experiwas not new, and the only novelty was the ments. It would be quite impossible hereretention in the reservoir of a "dominant after to decide how much of the improvement mass" sufficiently large to control the aver- in the product of the Grasselli Chemical age character of the product from time to Company would be attributable to its own time. If such an improvement was patent- independent efforts, and how much to the able, it is clear that a process of treating knowledge of Stone's process, fraudulently the ingredients, as complicated as that in- acquired by it. Every doubt must be revolved in the present case, resulting in a solved against the parties to a fraudulent product of a novel character, is a process act. If the defendant thereby suffers, it which, if kept secret, is entitled to the pro- suffers only by reason of having been a tection of the court. The evidence is con- party to Goss's fraudulent disclosure of the vincing that the complainants made efforts secret. The legal principle governing the to keep the process secret, and had succeed-case is, in effect, the same that was applied ed until Goss revealed the secret to the by this court to a case of fraudulent inGrasselli Chemical Company. Since we are termixture of goods. Jewett v. Dringer, 30 satisfied that Stone had a secret process of N. J. Eq. 291. manufacturing a depilatory, and that Goss was under a contractual obligation not to disclose the secret, the complainants are clearly entitled to an injunction against Goss. The question remains whether the injunction should go also against the Grasselli Chemical Company.

2. The evidence satisfies us that the Grasselli Chemical Company knew that Stone was manufacturing a superior article to its own; that it had been for some time trying to discover Stone's method of manufacture; that it had entered into correspondence with Goss and employed him while he was still in Stone's service; and that, immediately upon his coming into the employ of the defendant company, it sought through Frazier to learn Stone's secret, and, having learned it, was about to make use of it to manufacture a similar substance by Stone's process, to be sold in competition with his. These facts leave no doubt that the Grasselli Chemical Company acted in fraud of Stone's rights in the effort to learn his secret by inducing his employee to divulge the same. Even though they did not know of the contract, they must have known of the confi dential character of Stone's business, and the confidential character of the relation

It was argued in behalf of the appellants that the disclosure of the complainants' secret, necessarily made during the trial, would render an injunction nugatory. This difficulty was expressed by Lord Eldon in an early case. Newbery v. James, 2 Meriv. 446, 451. To obviate it as far as possible, the testimony in this case was taken in camera; and care was taken to print only enough copies of this portion of the evidence to supply the members of the court. It has not been found necessary in this opinion to describe the process, and we see no reason why this disclosure to the court, necessarily made for the purpose of the case, should deprive the complainants of their right to relief. The defendants were already possessed of the secret, and they cannot now take advantage of a disclosure made in order to secure relief against them. Such a disclosure is no publication to the world, and, although it may endanger the complainants' secret, it does not deprive them of the right to enjoin the defendants from making use of it. The doubts felt by Lord Eldon have not prevented the courts from giving such protection as they could in the later cases cited above.

The decree should be affirmed, with costs.

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS.

Sarah SHIPMAN, Respt.,

v.

PROTECTED HOME CIRCLE, Appt.

(174 N. Y. 398.)

1. A finding of suicide implies the intentional act of a sane person.

2. The adoption of a by-law by a mu

tual benefit society relieving itself from liability for death benefits in cases of suicide applies to existing members who have agreed to be bound by all rules that may be enacted, since there is no vested right to insurance covering such a risk, and the agreement that the insured shall not intentionally cause his own death is a fundamental, though unexpressed, part of the original contract. 3. A stipulation by an insured that his interest shall revert to the insurer in case his death shall be caused by any illegal act of his own applies to suicide, which is

a crime at common law. 4. A beneficiary in a

mutual benefit

certificate acquires no vested interest in either the certificate or the money to be paid under it, since he takes subject to whatever change may be made in the contract under the constitution and by-laws of the association.

5. The suicide of the assured will terminate the rights of the beneficiary in a mutual benefit certificate, the same as it would the rights of his legal representative.

A

(April 9, 1903.)

PPEAL by defendant from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Fourth Department, affirming a judgment of the Chautauqua County Circuit in plaintiff's favor in an action brought to enforce payment of the amount alleged NOTE. AS to effect of suicide to avoid policy of insurance containing no provision as to suicide, see also, in this series, Patterson v. Natural Premium Mut. L. Ins. Co. 42 L. R. A. 253;

A. 576.

to be due on a mutual benefit certificate. Modified and affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Messrs. A. W. Williams and Adelbert Moot, with Messrs. Van Dusen & Martin, for appellant:

The rights of the parties to this action are to be governed and controlled by the terms This conof the contract between them. tract is found in the Constitution of the defendant association, the application and agreement upon admission thereto, and the certificate thereafter issued.

Hellenberg v. District No. 1, I. O. of B. B. 94 N. Y. 584; Sanger v. Rothschild, 123 N. Y. 579, 26 N. E. 3; Sabin v. Phinney, 134 N. Y. 428, 31 N. E. 1087; Masonic Mut. Ben. Soc. v. Burkhart, 110 Ind. 189, 10 N. E. 79, 11 N. E. 449; Supreme Lodge, K. of P. v. Knight, 117 Ind. 489, 3 L. R. A. 409, 20 N. E. 479; Poultney v. Bachman, 31 Hun, 49; Hutchinson v. Supreme Tent, K. of M. 68 Hun, 355, 22 N. Y. Supp. 80; People ex rel. Goett v. Grand Lodge, A. O. U. W. 32 Misc. 528, 67 N. Y. Supp. 330.

The amendment as to suicide adopted by the defendant association is within the power to amend, is reasonable, and applied to William N. Shipman at the time of his death.

Bacon, Ben. Soc. new ed. § 82; St. Mary's Beneficial Soc. v. Burford, 70 Pa. 321; Su

preme Tent, K. of M. v. Hammers, 81 Ill. App. 560; Bigelow v. Berkshire L. Ins. Co. 93 U. S. 284, 23 L. ed. 918; De Gogorza v.

Knickerbocker L. Ins. Co. 65 N. Y. 232; Supreme Commandery, K. of G. R. v. Ains3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. p. 1064; worth, 71 Ala. 436, 46 Am. Rep. 332; Supreme Lodge, K. of P. v. La Malta, 95 Tenn. 157, 30 L. R. A. 838, 31 S. W. 493; Hughes v. Wisconsin Odd Fellows' Mut. L. Ins. Co. 98 Wis. 292, 73 N. W. 1015; State ex rel. Schrempp v. Grand Lodge A. O. U. W. 70 Mo. App. 456; Daughtry v. Knights of Pythias, 48 La. Ann. 1203, 20 So. 712;

Ritter v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 42 L. R. A. 583, Affirmed in 42 L. ed. U. S. 693; Seiler v. Economic Life Asso. 43 L. R. A. 537; and Campbell v. Supreme Conclave I. O. H. 54 L. R. As to effect of suicide to avoid policy contain-Borgards v. Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co. 79 Mich. ing provision rendering it void if insured dies in violation of, or attempt to violate, any criminal law, see Darrow v. Family Fund Soc. 6 L. R. A. 495.

As to effect on rights of members of beneficial association of change in rules or by-laws, see Supreme Lodge, K. of P. v. Knight, 3 L. R. A. 409, and note; Hobbs v. Iowa Mut. Ben. Asso. 11 L. R. A. 299; Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. La Malta, 30 L. R. A. 838; Thibert v. Supreme Lodge, K. of H. 47 L. R. A. 136; Bragaw v.

Supreme Lodge K & L. of H. 54 L. R. A. 602;

Strauss v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. 54

L. R. A. 605; Peterson v. Gibson, 54 L. R A. 836; and Gaut v. Supreme Council A. L. of H. 55 L. R. A. 465.

440, 44 N. W. 856; Supreme Lodge, K. of P. v. Knight, 117 Ind. 489, 3 L. R. A. 409, 20 N. E. 479: Hobbs v. Iowa Mut. Ben. Asso. 82 Iowa, 107, 11 L. R. A. 299, 47 N. W. 983; West v. Grand Lodge, A. O. U. W. 14 Tex. Civ. App. 471, 37 S. W. 966; Stohr v. San Francisco Musical Fund Soc. 82 Cal. 557, 22 Pac. 1125; Fullenwider v. Supreme Council, R. L. 73 Ill. App. 322; Niblack, Ben. Soc. 2d ed. §§ 25-27; Supreme Lodge, K. of P. v. Clarke, 88 Ill. App. 600; Black, Constr. & Interpretation of Laws, 15; Brown v. Pendergast, 7 Allen, 427.

The amendment complained of is in no

sense retroactive; neither of any vested right.

is it subversive | which entered into the contract of insur

ance.

Bacon, Ben. Soc. 91 a; Poultney v. Parish v. New York Produce Exchange, Bachman, 31 Hun, 49; Sanger v. Roths- 169 N. Y. 34, 56 L. R. A. 149, 61 N. E. 977; child, 123 N. Y. 579, 26 N. E. 3; Bown | Weber v. Supreme Tent, K. of M. 172 N. Y. v. Supreme Council, C. M. B. A. 33 490, 65 N. E. 258; Roberts v. Grand Lodge, Hun, 263; Boasberg v. Cronan, 30 N. Y. A. O. U. W. 173 N. Y. 580, 65 N. E. 1122; S. R. 483, 9 N. Y. Supp. 664; St. Pat- Deuble v. Grand Lodge, A. O. U. W. 66 App. rick's Male Beneficial Soc. v. McVey, 92 Div. 323, 72 N. Y. Supp. 755; Weiler v. Pa. 510; Stohr v. San Francisco Musical | Equitable Aid Union, 92 Hun, 277, 36 N. Y. Fund Soc. 82 Cal. 557, 22 Pac. 1125; Wist | Supp. 734; McNeil v. Southern Tier Masonic v. Grand Lodge, A. O. U. W. 22 Or. 271, 29 Pac. 610; Supreme Tent, K. of M. v. Hammers, 81 Ill. App. 560; Supreme Commandery, K. of G. R. v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436, 46 Am. Rep. 332; De Gogorza v. Knickerbocker L. Ins. Co. 65 N. Y. 232; Bigelow v. Berkshire L. Ins. Co. 93 U. S. 284, 23 L. ed. 918; Supreme Lodge, K. of P. v. La Malta, 95 Tenn. 157, 30 L. R. A. 838, 31 S. W. 493; Covenant Mut. Life Asso. v. Tuttle, 87 Ill. App. 309; Bagley v. Grand Lodge, A. O. U. W. 131 Ill. 498, 22 N. E. 487.

The agreement as found in the record in this case existing between Mr. Shipman and the defendant fixes and determines the rights and liabilities of the parties to this action. It is free from ambiguity, doubt, or uncertainty, and, therefore, it is its own interpreter.

Relief Asso. 40 App. Div. 581, 58 N. Y. Supp. 119; Becker v. Berlin Ben. Soc. 144 Pa. 232, 22 Atl. 699; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Aberle, 19 App. Div. 79, 46 N. Y. Supp. 10; Engelhardt v. Fifth Ward Permanent Dime Sav. & L. Asso. 148 N. Y. 281, 35 L. R. A. 289, 42 N. E. 710; Starling v. Supreme Council R. T. of T. 108 Mich. 440, 66 N. W. 340; Becker v. Farmers' Mutual F. Ins. Co. 48 Mich. 610, 12 N. W. 874; Residence F. Ins. Co. v. Hannawold, 37 Mich. 103; Great Falls Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 45 N. H. 292; New England Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Butler, 34 Me. 451; Livingston v. Livingston, 74 App. Div. 261, 77 N. Y. Supp. 476; Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Withers, 177 U. S. 260, 44 L. ed. 762, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 611.

Death by suicide is no defense to a policy of life insurance payable to a beneficiary who does nothing towards the consummation of the act, and who does not derive title in any manner through the suicide, unless it is expressly stated in the contract of insurance that such risk is not assumed.

May, Ins. § 323.

Allen v. German American Ins. Co. 123 N. Y. 6, 25 N. E. 309; Clark v. Fey, 121 N. Y. 470, 24 N. E. 703; Tobias v. Lissberger, 105 N. Y. 404, 59 Am. Rep. 509, 12 N. E. 13; Norrington v. Wright, 115 U. S. 188, 29 L. ed. 366, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 12; Hill v. Blake, 97 N. Y. 220; Dwight v. Germania To make suicide by a sane person a deL. Ins. Co. 103 N. Y. 347, 57 Am. Rep. 729, fense to a policy which does not contain any N. E. 654; Bank of Montreal v. Recknagel, reference to the matter, the estate of the life 109 N. Y. 490, 17 N. E. 217; Lake v. McEl-insured must be enhanced by his death, as fatrick, 139 N. Y. 357, 34 N. E. 922; 53

Cent. L. J. 426.

The trial court having found that the deceased "committed suicide," the highest authorities still require a ruling that the suicide of deceased is fatal to any claim for insurance on his life.

Van Zandt v. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. 55 N. Y. 169, 14 Am. Rep. 215; Bigelow v. Berkshire L. Ins. Co. 93 U. S. 284, 23 L. ed.

918; Ritter v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 169 U. S. 139, 42 L. ed. 693, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 300; McClure v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 55 N. Y. 651; Weed v. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. 70 N. Y. 562, 1 Jones, Ev. § 186, Valentine v. Conner, 40 N. Y. 254, 100 Am. Dec. 476; Breasted v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 4 Hill, 75; Clift v. Schwabe, 3 C. B. 437; 4 Bl. Com. 189.

Mr. George J. Dikeman, for respondent:

where the policy is payable to the life insured, or to the executors, administrators, creditors, or assigns thereof.

Amicable Soc. v. Bolland, 4 Bligh N. R. 194, 2 Dow & C. 1; Breasted v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 4 Hill, 75, 8 N. Y. 299; Clift v. Schwabe, 3 C. B. 437; Bradley v. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. 45 N. Y. 422, 6 Am. Rep. 115; Van Zandt v. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. 55 N. Y. 169, 14 Am. Rep. 215; May, Ins. chap. 15, § 324; see also note to Hunter's

Case, 5 Mann. & G. 639.

fense to a policy upon his life which does Suicide by a sane person will be no denot contain any reference to the risk, if the estate of the life insured will not be enhanced by his death, as where the policy is payable to some third party who has an insurable interest in his life, but who does not take either as executor, administrator, creditor, or assign.

A corporation cannot so amend its by- Griswold v. Sawyer, 125 N. Y. 411, 26 N. laws as to affect injuriously any member E. 464; Dannhauser v. Wallenstein, 169 N. thereof, nor so as to withdraw any risk' Y. 199, 62 N. E. 160; Whitehead v. New

York L. Ins. Co. 102 N. Y. 143, 55 Am. Rep. 787, 6 N. E. 267; Holmes v. Gilman, 138 N. Y. 369. 20 L. R. A. 566, 34 N. E. 205; Bliss, Life Ins. § 348; Millard v. Brayton, 177 Mass. 533, 52 L. R. A. 117, 59 N. E. 436; Knickerbocker L. Ins. Co. v. Weitz, 99 Mass. 157; Chapin v. Fellowes, 36 Conn. 132, 4 Am. Rep. 49; Burt v. Union Cent. L. Ins. Co. 187 U. S. 362, 47 L. ed. 216, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 139, Affirming 59 L. R. A. 393, 44 C. C. A. 548, 105 Fed. 419; Hellenberg v. District No. 1, I. O. of B. B. 94 N. Y. 580; Fink v. Fink, 171 N. Y. 616, 64 N. E. 506; May, Ins. chap. 15, § 324; Richards, Ins. §§ 128, 184; Kerr, Ins. p. 394, § 150; Niblack, Ben. Soc. § 156; 3 Joyce, Ins. § 2653; 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. p. 1016; Patterson v. Natural Premium Mut. L. Ins. Co. 100 Wis. 118, 42 L. R. A. 253, 75 N. W. 980; Seiler v. Economic Life Asso. 105 Iowa, 87, 43 L. R. A. 537, 74 N. W. 941; Parker v. Des Moines Life Asso. 108 Iowa, 117, 78 N. W. 826; Morris v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co. 183 Pa. 563, 39 Atl. 52; Karow v. Continental Ins. Co. 57 Wis. 56, 46 Am. Rep. 17, 15 N. W. 27; Com. v. Wachendorf, 141 Mass. 270, 4 N. E. 817; McCoy v. Northwestern Mut. Relief Asso. 92 Wis. 577, 47 L. R. A. 681, 66 N. W. 697; Mills v. Rebstock, 29 Minn. 380, 13 N. W. 162; Kerr v. Minnesota Mut. Ben. Asso. 39 Minn. 174, 39 N. W. 312.

that compliance on my part with all the laws, rules, regulations, and requirements now in force or that may hereafter be enacted by the association is the express comdition upon which I am entitled to participate in the beneficiary fund, and to the amount named in the constitution and laws of the association. I further agree that should my death be caused by or through intemperance, or any illegal act of my own, all my right, title, and interest in the beneficiary fund shall revert to the association." When the plaintiff, after her husband's death, demanded payment of the amount specified in the certificate, it was refused by the defendant upon the ground that, by committing suicide the insured had forfeited all rights which he or his beneficiary might otherwise have had under the certificate of insurance. Thereupon this action was brought. At trial court it was held that the amended by-law above quoted was valid, but was not intended to apply to outstanding beneficiary certificates, and it was upon this theory that plaintiff was permitted to recover. The judgment entered upon this decision was affirmed at the appellate division without written opinion. Upon this appeal the correctness of this judgment is challenged by the defendant upon several grounds: (1) It is contended that under the amended by-law referred to the suicide of the insured worked a forfeiture of all

Werner, J., delivered the opinion of the benefits provided for in the contract. (2)

court:

The defendant is a co-operative life insurance corporation, organized under the laws of Pennsylvania, and doing business in this state. The plaintiff is the designated beneficiary in a certificate issued to her husband by the defendant in March, 1897, for the sum of $2,500, payable to the plaintiff upon the death of her husband. The latter came to his death by suicide in April, 1900, in the state of Pennsylvania. When the benefit certificate was issued, neither it nor the by-laws of the defendant contained any provision against suicide; but in May, 1897, the by-laws were amended by adding thereto a section which reads as follows: "The benefit certificate issued to a member shall become void and all benefits thereunder shall be forfeited in case the insured shall die by suicide, felonious or otherwise, sane or insane, or by his own hand, sane or insane: Provided, that in such case there shall be refunded to the beneficiary named in said certificate, the amount of all payments made, together with interest thereon at the rate of 3 per cent. per annum." The application, signed by plaintiff's husband, upon which the benefit certificate herein was issued, contained the following stipulation: "I do hereby agree

It is urged that, even if the amended by-law is not valid in its entirety, it is binding in the case at bar. (3) It is claimed that, if the amended by-law had never been enacted, the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under the facts of this case. We will briefly consider these points in the order in which they have been stated.

The plaintiff's husband, as we have seen, became a member of the defendant in March, 1897. The amended by-law under discussion was adopted in May, 1897. In the absence of a finding to the contrary, we must assume that its enactment was regular, and in accordance with the provisions of defendant's constitution. By the express terms of the contract between the plaintiff's husband and the defendant, the former agreed to comply with "all the laws, rules, regulations, and requirements now in force or that may be hereafter enacted" by the latter. Under these conditions all by-laws regularly adopted by the defendant became retrospective as well as prospective in their operation upon the plaintiff's husband, except as to rights which had become fixed or vested by the terms of the original contract. In the original contract there was no mention of death by self-destruction or suicide of a member, whether sane or insane. As the death of a