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was the department concerned with the man- | plied in this state in the court of chancery ufacture of depilatories. During the first by Chancellor Runyon in Salomon v. Hertz, two or three weeks he was in the employ of 40 N. J. Eq. 400, 2 Atl. 379. Salomon v. the Grasselli Company he did no work, but | Hertz, Peabody v. Norfolk, and 0. & W. immediately upon his employment, Frazier, Thum Co. v. Tloczynski are the leading the superintendent of its plant at Tremley, American cases. These cases established the questioned him "in regard to what he knew principle that employees of one having a about the manufacture of depilatories," and trade secret, who are under an express conGoss informed Frazier of the complainants' tract, or a contract implied from their conmethod of manufacture, and described fully fidential relation to their employer, not to the complainants' apparatus. Frazier re- disciose that secret, will be enjoined from diported to the defendant company the in- vulging the same to the injury of their formation obtained from Goss, with a sketch employer, whether before or after they have of the apparatus, and the manner in which left his employ; and that other persons who it should be made and put up. This sketch induce the employee to disclose the secret, was made by Frazier, and corrected by Goss. knowing of his contract not to disclose the The Grasselli Company approved of Frazier's same, or knowing that his disclosure is in plan, and directed him to put up the shed violation of the confidence reposed in him to contain the apparatus. He was proceed- by his employer, will be enjoined from making with this work when stopped by the in- ing any use of the information so obtained, junction.

although they might have reached the same The complainants allege that Goss was un- result independently by their own experider a contract with them not to reveal the ments or efforts. We approve the principle secrets of manufacture. Goss denies this thus established. contract. We agree with the vice chancellor We find in this case, as already stated, that the contract is established by the that an express contract between the comweight of evidence. The right of a manufac- plainants and Goss for secrecy is proved. turer whose goods are made by an unpatent- Two questions remain: (1) Did Stone posed secret process, to protection by injunc-sess a secret process for the manufacture of tion against the divulging of his secret in depilatories? (2) Did the Grasselli Chemia proper case, is now established by a well-cal Company. obtain knowledge of that secret considered line of cases in England and in process from Goss under such circumstances several states. The leading case is Morison that it should be enjoined from making use v. Moat, 9 Hare, 241, 20 L. J. Ch. N. S. 513, of it? decided by Vice Chancellor Turner in 1851, 1. The ingredients used in the manufacand Affirmed in court of appeal by Lord ture of Stone's depilatories were well known, Cranworth, 21 L. J. Ch. N. S. 248. The and had been used for that purpose for principle has since been applied to cases years before the XXX and XXXX were put in various aspects in the English courts. upon the market, and the same ingredients Merryweather v. Moore (1892] 2 Ch. 518, were used by the Grasselli Chemical Com61 L. J. Ch. N. S. 505; Lamb v. Evans pany in the manufacture of a depilatory. It [1892] 3 Ch. 462, 61 L. J. Ch. N. S. 681, is urged that the only advantage possessed Affirmed on appeal, in 62 L. J. Ch. N. S. 404. by the complainants arose out of skill in A leading case in this country is Peabody handling, and not out of a secret process, v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 96 Am. Dec. 664. and that there was no secret either in the inIn New York the principle is established in gredients or in the method of compounding Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N. Y. 30, 16 Am. St. them. The defendants combined the ingrediRep. 740, 23 N. E. '12; Eastman Co. v. ents by a different method from any other Reichenbach, 47 N. Y. S. R. 435, 20 N. Y. in use, and the result was a product of a difSupp. 110; National Gum & Mica Co. v. ferent character. The complainants' process Braendly, 27 App. Div. 219, 51 N. Y. Supp. of manufacture was considerably more com93; Little v. Gallus, 39 App. Div. 646, 57 plicated than the defendants.' The secret N. Y. Supp. 104; Tode v. Gross, 127 N. Y. consisted in a knowledge of the proper meth480, 13 L. R. A. 652, 24 Am. St. Rep. 475, od of mixing the ingredients, and treating 28 N. E. 469. In Michigan it was adopted them, in order to produce a product of propin a very well-considered opinion in 0. & W. er consistency. The difference between mere Thum Co. v. Tloczynski, 114 Mich. 149, 38 skill in manipulation and a process of L. R. A. 200, 68 Am. St. Rep. 469, 72 N. W. manufacture is illustrated by a recent case 140. In Pennsylvania, Fralich v. Despar, in the United States Supreme Court. Car165 Pa. 24, 30 Atl. 521. In Indiana, Wester- negie Steel Co. v. Cambria Iron Co. 185 U. S. velt v. National Paper & Supply Co. 154 403, 46 L. ed. 968, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 698. Ind. 673, 57 N. E. 552. In the Federal In this case the process which was held courts, C. F. Simmons Medicine Co. v. Sim- patentable consisted in retaining a quantity mons, 81 Fed. 163. The rule has been ap-'of molten iron in a reservoir, to serve as a

basis for mixing the varying products of the between him and his employees. The de. blast furnaces preparatory to converting the fendant company is a party to Goss's fraudsame into steel. The difficulty to be over- ulent disclosure of the secret, and the comcome was a lack of uniformity in the molten plainants were entitled to an injunction remetal. The use of a reservoir in which the straining the Grasselli Chemical Company varying products of the blast furnaces had from making any use of the information been mixed was known prior to the patent thus obtained from Goss. The injunction involved in that case, but the importance should not be refused because the process of always maintaining in the reservoir a was such that it would probably have been sufficient quantity of molten metal to "dom- discovered by independent experiments in inate" (to use the court's expression) the the manipulation of the ingredients of whole mass had not been before appreciated. which the products of both parties were The majority of the court held that the alike composed. The Grasselli Chemical process was therefore patentable. There the Company, by its own conduct, has put itself ingredients were the same, the idea of mix- in such a position that it may even lose the ing the molten metal of different qualities advantage of future independent experiwas not new, and the only novelty was the ments. It would be quite impossible hereretention in the reservoir of a "dominant after to decide how much of the improvement mass” sufficiently large to control the aver- in the product of the Grasselli Chemical age character of the product from time to Company would be attributable to its own time. If such an improvement was patent- independent efforts, and how much to the able, it is clear that a process of treating knowledge of Stone's process, fraudulently the ingredients, as complicated as that in acquired by it. Every doubt must be revolved in the present case, resulting in a solved against the parties to a fraudulent product of a novel character, is a process act. If the defendant thereby suffers, it which, if kept secret, is entitled to the pro- suffers only by reason of having been a tection of the court. The evidence is con party to Goss's fraudulent disclosure of the vincing that the complainants made efforts secret. The legal principle governing the to keep the process secret, and had succeed-case is, in effect, the same that was applied ed until Goss revealed the secret to the by this court to a case of fraudulent inGrasselli Chemical Company. Since we are termixture of goods. Jewett v. Dringer, 30 satisfied that Stone had a secret process of N. J. Eq. 291. manufacturing a depilatory, and that Goss It was argued in behalf of the appellants was under a contractual obligation not to that the disclosure of the complainants' disclose the secret, the complainants are secret, necessarily made during the trial, clearly entitled to an injunction against would render an injunction nugatory. This Goss. The question remains whether the in- difficulty was expressed by Lord Eldon in junction should go also against the Gras- an early case. Newbery v. James, 2 Meriv. selli Chemical Company.

446, 451. To obviate it as far as possible, 2. The evidence satisfies us that the Gras- the testimony in this case was taken in selli Chemical Company knew that Stone camera, and care was taken to print only was manufacturing a superior article to its enough copies of this portion of the eviown; that it had been for some time trying dence to supply the members of the court. to discover Stone's method of manufacture; It has not been found necessary in this that it had entered into correspondence with opinion to describe the process, and we see Goss and employed him while he was still no reason why this disclosure to the court, in Stone's service; and that, immediately necessarily made for the purpose of the upon his coming into the employ of the de- case, should deprive the complainants of fendant company, it sought through Frazier their right to relief. The defendants were to learn Stone's secret, and, having learned already possessed of the secret, and they it, was about to make use of it to manufac- cannot now take advantage of a disclosure ture a similar substance by Stone's process, made in order to secure relief against them. to be sold in competition with his. These Such a disclosure is no publication to the facts leave no doubt that the Grasselli world, and, although it may endanger the Chemical Company acted in fraud of Stone's complainants' secret, it does not deprive rights in the effort to learn his secret by them of the right to enjoin the defendants inducing his employee to divulge the same. from making use of it. The doubts felt by Even though they did not kn of the con- Lord Eldon have not prevented the courts tract, they must have known of the confi- from giving such protection as they could dential character of Stone's business, and in the later cases cited above. the confidential character of the relation T'he decree should be affirmed, with costs.

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS.

suicide

of

assured

same

as

Sarah SHIPMAN, Respt.,

to be due on a mutual benefit certificate.

Modified and affirmed. PROTECTED HOME CIRCLE, Appt.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Messrs. A. W. Williams and Adelbert (174 N. Y. 398.)

Moot, with Messrs. Van Dusen & Mar

tin, for appellant: 1. A finding of suicide implies the inten

The rights of the parties to this action are tional act of a sane person. 2. The adoption of a by-law by a mu

to be governed and controlled by the terms tual benefit society relieving itself from of the contract between them.

This conliability for death benefits in cases of suicide tract is found in the Constitution of the deapplies to existing members who have agreed fendant association, the application and to be bound by all rules that may be enacted, agreement upon admission thereto, and the since there is no vested right to insurance certificate thereafter issued. covering such a risk, and the agreement that the insured shall not intentionally cause his

Hellenberg v. District No. 1, 1. 0. of B. B. own death is a fundamental, though unex

94 N. Y. 584; Sanger v. Rothschild, 123 pressed, part of the original contract. N. Y. 579, 26 N. E. 3; Sabin v. Phinney, 3. A stipulation by an insured that his 134 N. Y. 428, 31 N. E. 1087; Masonic Mut.

interest shall revert to the insurer Ben. Soc. v. Burkhart, 110 Ind. 189, 10 in case his death shall be caused by any ille- N. E. 79, 11 N. E. 449; Supreme Lodge, gal act of his own applies to suicide, which is K. of P. v. Knight, 117 Ind. 489, 3 L. R. A.

a crime at common law. 4. A beneficiary in a mutual benefit 409, 20 N. E. 479; Poultney v.

Bachman, certificate acquires no vested interest 31 Hun, 49; Hutchinson v. Supreme Tent, in either the certificate or the money to be K. of M. 68 Hun, 355, 22 N. Y. Supp. 80; paid under it, since he takes subject to what. People ex rel. Goett v. Grand Lodge, A. 0. ever change may be made in the contract un. U. W. 32 Misc. 528, 67 N. Y. Supp. 330. der the constitution and by-laws of the asso

The amendment as to suicide adopted ciation. 5. The

by the defendant association is within the the

will terminate the rights of the beneficiary in a power to amend, is reasonable, and applied mutual benefit certificate, the

it to William N. Shipman at the time of his would the rights of his legal representative. death.

Bacon, Ben. Soc. new ed. § 82; St. Mary's (April 9, 1903.)

Beneficial Soc. v. Burford, 70 Pa. 321; SuA , . of the Appellate Division of the Su. App. 560; Bigelow v. Berkshire L. Ins. Co.

93 U. S. 284, 23 L. ed. 918; De Gogorza v. preme Court, Fourth Department, affirming Knickerbocker L. Ins. Co. 65 N. Y. 232; a judgment of the Chautauqua County Cir

3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. p. 1064; cuit in plaintiff's favor in an action brought to enforce payment of the amount alleged Supreme Commandery, K. of G. R. v. Ains

worth, 71 Ala. 436, 46 Am. Rep. 332; SuNOTE.-As to effect of suicide to avoid policy preme Lodge, K. of P. v. La Malta, 95 Tenn. of insurance containing Do provision as to sui- 157, 30 L. R. A. 838, 31 S. W. 493; Hughes cide, see also, in this series, Patterson v. Nat

v. Wisconsin Odd Fellous' Mut. L. Ins. Co. ural Premium Mut. L. Ins. Co. 42 L. R. A. 253; Ritter v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 42 L. R. A. 583, 98 Wis. 292, 73 N. W. 1015; State ex rel. Affirmed in 42 L. ed. U. S. 693; Seiler v. Schrempp v. Grand Lodge A. 0. U. W. 70 Economic Life Asso. 43 L. R. A. 537; and Mo. App. 456; Daughtry v. Knights of Campbell v. Supreme Conclave I. O. H. 54 L. R. Pythias, 48 La. Ann. 1203, 20 So. 712; A. 576.

As to effect of suicide to avoid policy contain: Borgards v. Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co. 79 Mich. ing provision rendering it void if insured dies 440, 44 N. W. 856; Supreme Lodge, K. of P. in violation of, or attempt to violate, any crim-v. Knight, 117 Ind. 489, 3 L. R. A. 409, 20 inal law, see Darrow v. Family Fund Soc. 6 L. N. E. 479; Hobbs v. Iowa Mut. Ben. Asso. R. A. 495.

82 Iowa, 107, 11 L. R. A. 299, 47 N. W. As to effect on rights of members of beneficial 983; West v. Grand Lodge, A. 0. U. W. 14 association of change in rules or by-laws, see Supreme Lodge, K. of P. v. Knight, 3 L. K. A. Tex. Civ. App. 471, 37 S. W. 966; Slohr v. 409, and note; Hobbs v. Iowa Mut. Ben. Asso. San Francisco Musical Fund Soc. 82 Cal. 11 L. R. A. 299 ; Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. La 557, 22 Pac. 1125; Fullenwider v. Supreme Malta, 30 L. R. A. 838 ; Thibert v. Supreme Council, R. L. 73 Ill. App. 3:2; Niblack, Lodge, K. of H. 47 L. R. A. 136; Bragaw v. Ben. Soc. 2d ed. $$ 25-27; Supreme Lodge, Supreme Lodge K & L. of H. 54 L. R. 602;

K. cf P. v. Clarke, 88 Ill. App. 600; Black, Strauss v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. 54 L. R. A. 605 ; Peterson v. Gibson, 54 L. R A.

Constr. & Interpretation of Laws, 15; 836 ; and Gaut v. Supreme Council A. L. of H. Brown v. Pendergast, 7 Allen, 427. 53 L. R. A. 465.

The amendment complained of is in no 63 L. R. A.

ance.

sense retroactive; neither is it subversive, which entered into the contract of insur. of any vested right.

Bacon, Ben. Soc. 91 a; Poultney v. Parish v. New York Produce Erchange, Bachman, 31 Hun, 49; Sanger v. Roths-169 N. Y. 34, 56 L. R. A. 149, 61 N. E. 977; child, 123 N. Y. 579, 26 N. E. 3; Bown Weber v. Supreme Tent, K. of N. 172 N. Y. v. Supreme Council, C. M. B. A. 33 490, 65 N. E. 258; Roberts v. Grand Lodge, Hun, 263; Boasberg v. Cronan, 30 N. Y. A. 0. U. W. 173 N. Y. 580, 65 N. E. 1122; S. R. 483, 9 N. Y. Supp. 664; St. Pat- Deuble v. Grand Lodge, A. 0. U. W. 66 App. rick's Male Beneficial Soc. v. McVey, 92 Div. 323, 72 N. Y. Supp. 755; Weiler v. Pa. 510; Stohr v. San Francisco Musical Equitable Aid Union, 92 Hun, 277, 36 N. Y. Fund Soc. 82 Cal. 557, 22 Pac. 1125; Wist Supp. 734; McNeil v. Southern Tier Masonic v. Grand Lodge, A. 0. U. W. 22 Or. 271, 29 Relief Asso. 40 App. Div. 581, 58 N. Y. Pac. 610; Supreme Tent, K. of M. v. Ham- Supp. 119; Becker v. Berlin Ben. Soc. 144 mers, 81 Ill. App. 560; Supreme Command Pa. 232, 22 Atl. 699; Farmers' Loan & T. cry, K. of G. R. v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436, Co. v. Aberle, 19 App. Div. 79, 46 N. Y. 46 Am. Rep. 332; De Gogorza v. Knicker- Supp. 10; Engelhardt v. Fifth Ward Perbocker L. Ins. Co. 65 N. Y. 232; Bigelow v. manent Dime Sav. & L. Asso. 148 N. Y. 281, Berkshire L. Ins. Co. 93 U. S. 284, 23 L. ed. 35 L. R. A. 289, 42 N. E. 710; Starling v. 918; Supreme Lodge, K. of P. v. La Malta, Supreme Council R. T. of T. 108 Mich. 440, *95 Tenn. 157, 30 L. R. A. 838, 31 S. W. 493; 66 N. W. 340; Becker v. Farmers' Mutual Covenant Alut. Life Asso. v. Tuttle, 87 Ill. F. Ins. Co. 48 Mich. 610, 12 N. W. 874; ResiApp. 309; Bagley v. Grand Lodge, A. 0. U. dence F. Ins. Co. v. Hannaxold, 37 Mich. 103; W. 131 Ill. 498, 22 N. E. 487.

Great Falls Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 45 The agreement as found in the record in N. H. 292; New England Aut. F. Ins. Co. v. this case existing between Mr. Shipman and Butler, 34 Me. 451; Livingston v. Livingthe defendant fixes and determines the ston, 74 App. Div. 261, 77 N. Y. Supp. 476; rights and liabilities of the parties to this Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Withers, 177 U. action. It is free from ambiguity, doubt, S. 260, 44 L. ed. 762, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 611. or uncertainty, and, therefore, it is its own Death by suicide is no defense to a policy interpreter.

of life insurance payable to a beneficiary Allen v. German American Ins. Co. 123 who does nothing towards the consummation N. Y. 6, 25 N. E. 309; Clark v. Fey, 121 N. of the act, and who does not derive title in Y. 470, 24 N. E. 703; Tobias v. Lissberger, any manner through the suicide, unless it 105 N. Y. 404, 59 Am. Rep. 509, 12 N. E. is expressly stated in the contract of insur13; Norrington v. Wright, 115 U. S. 188, ance that such risk is not assumed. 29 L. ed. 366, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 12; Hill v. May, Ins. § 323. Blake, 97 N. Y. 220; Dwight v. Germania

To make suicide by a sane person a deL. Ins. Co. 103 N. Y. 347, 57 Am. Rep. 729, fense to a policy which does not contain any 8 N. E. 654; Bank of Montreal v. Recknagel, reference to the matter, the estate of the life 109 N. Y. 490, 17 N. E. 217; Lake v. McEl-insured must be enhanced by his death, as fatrick, 139 N. Y. 357, 34 N. E. 922; 53 where the policy is payable to the life inCent. L. J. 426.

sured, or to the executors, administrators, The trial court having found that the de creditors, or assigns thereof. ceased “committed suicide,” the highest au

Amicable Soc. v. Bolland, 4 Bligh N. R. thorities still require a ruling that the sui- 194, 2 Dow & C. 1; Breasted v. Farmers' cide of deceased is fatal to any claim for Loan & T. Co. 4 Hill, 75, 8 N. Y. 299; Clift insurance on his life.

v. Schwabe, 3 C. B. 437; Bradley v. Mutual Van Zandt v. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. 55 Ben. L. Ins. Co. 45 N. Y. 422, 6 Am. Rep. N. Y. 169, 14 Am. Rep. 215; Bigelow v. 115; Van Zandt v. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. Berkshire L. Ins. Co. 93 U. S. 284, 23 L. ed. 55 N. Y. 169, 14 Am. Rep. 215; May, Ins. 918; Ritter v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 169 U. S. chap. 15, § 324; see also note to Hunter's

Case, 5 Mann. & G. 639. 139, 42 L. ed. 693, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 300; YcClure v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 55 N. Y. 651; fense to a policy upon his life which does

Suicide by a sane person will be no deWeed v. Hlutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. 70 N. Y. not contain any reference to the risk, if the 562, 1 Jones, Ev. § 186, Valentine v. Conner, estate of the life insured will not be en40 N. Y. 254, 100 Am. Dec. 476; Breasted v. hanced by his death, as where the policy is Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 4 Hill, 75; Clift v. payable to some third party who has an inSchwabe, 3 C. B. 437; 4 Bl. Com. 189. surable interest in his life, but who does Mr. George J. Dikeman, for respond- not take either as executor, administrator,

creditor, or assign. A corporation cannot so amend its by- Griswold v. Sawyer, 125 N. Y. 411, 26 N. laws as to affect injuriously any member E. 464; Dannhauser v. Wallenstein, 169 N. thereof, nor as to withdraw any risk'Y. 199, 62 N. E. 160; Whitehead v. New

ent:

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was

York L. Ins. Co. 102 N. Y. 143, 55 Am. Rep. that compliance on my part with all the 787, 6 N. E. 267; Holmes v. Gilman, 138 N. Jaws, rules, regulations, and requirements 1. 369, 20 L. R. A. 506, 34 N. E. 205; Bliss, now in force or that may hereafter be enLife Ins. § 348; Millard v. Brayton, 177 acted by the association is the express comMass. 533, 52 L. R. A. 117, 59 N. E. 436; dition upon which I am entitled to particiKnickerbocker L. Ing. Co. v. Weitz, 99 Mass. pate in the beneficiary fund, and to the 157; Chapin v. Fellowes, 36 Conn. 132, 4 amount named in the constitution and laws Am. Rep. 49; Burt v. Union Cent. L. Ins. of the association. I further agree that Co. 187 U. S. 362, 47 L. ed. 216, 23 Sup. Ct. should my death be caused by or through inRep. 139, Affirming 59 L. R. A. 393, 44 temperance, or any illegal act of my own, C. C. A. 518, 105 Fed. 419; Hellenberg v. all my right, title, and interest in the beneDistrict No. 1, 1. 0. of B. B. 94 N. Y. 580; | ficiary fund shall revert to the association.” Fink v. Fink, 171 N. Y. 616, 64 N. E. 506; When the plaintiff, after her husband's May, Ins. chap. 15, § 324; Richards, Ins. death, demanded payment of the amount $$ 128, 184; Kerr, Ins. p. 394, $ 150; Nib- specified in the certificate, it was refused by lack, Ben. Soc. § 156; 3 Ins. $ 2653; the defendant upon the ground that, by com3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. p. 1016; mitting suicide the insured had forfeited all Patterson v. Natural Premium Mut. L. Ins. rights which he or his beneficiary might Co. 100 Wis. 118, 42 L. R. A. 253, 75 N. W. otherwise have had under the certificate of 980; Seiler v. Economic Life Asso. 105 insurance. Thereupon this action Iowa, 57, 43 L. R. A. 537, 74 N. W. 941; brought. At trial court it was held that the Parker v. Des Moines Life Asso. 108 Iowa, amended by-law above quoted was valid, but 117, 78 N. W. 826; Morris v. State Mut. Life was not intended to apply to outstanding Assur. Co. 183 Pa. 563, 39 Atl. 52; Karow beneficiary certificates, and it was upon this v. Continental Ins. Co. 57 Wis. 56, 46 Am. theory that plaintiff was permitted to reRep. 17, 15 N. W. 27; Com. v. Wachendorf, cover. The judgment entered upon this de141 Mass. 270, 4 N. E. 817; McCoy v. North- cision was ailirmed at the appellate division western Vut. Relief Asso. 92 Wis. 577, 47 without written opinion. Upon this appeal L. R. A. 681, 66 N. W. 697; Mills v. Reb- the correctness of this judgment is chalstock, 29 Minn. 380, 13 N. W. 162; Kerr v. lenged by the defendant upon several Minnesota Vut. Ben. Asso. 39 Minn. 174, 39 grounds: (1) It is contended that under N. W. 312.

the amended by-law referred to the suicide

of the insured worked a forfeiture of all Werner, J., delivered the opinion of the benefits provided for in the contract. (2) court:

It is urged that, even if the amended by-law The defendant is a co-operative life in- is not valid in its entirety, it is binding in surance corporation, organized under the the case at bar. (3) It is claimed that, if laws of Pennsylvania, and doing business in the amended by-law had never een enacted, this state. The plaintiff is the designated the plaintiff would not be entitled to recovbeneficiary in a certificate issued to her hus- er under the facts of this case. We will band by the defendant in March, 1897, briefly consider these points in the order for the sum of $2,500, payable to the in which they have been stated. plaintiff upon the death of her husband. The plaintiff's husband, as we have seen, The latter came to his death by sui- became a member of the defendant in March, cide in April, 1900, in the state of 1897. The amended by-law under discussion Pennsylvania. When the benefit certificate was adopted in May, 1897. In the absence of was issued, neither it nor the by-laws of the a finding to the contrary, we must assume defendant contained any provision against that its enactment was regular, and in acsuicide; but in May, 1897, the by-laws were cordance with the provisions of defendant's amended by adding thereto a section which constitution. By the express terms of the reads as follows: “The benefit certificate contract between the plaintiff's husband and issued to a member shall become void and the defendant, the former agreed to comply all benefits thereunder shall be forfeited in with "all the laws, rules, regulations, and case the insured shall die by suicide, felo- requirements now in force or that may be nious or otherwise, sane or insane, or by his hereafter enacted” by the latter. Under own hand, sane or insane: Provided, that these conditions all by-laws regularly adoptin such case there shall be refunded to the ed by the defendant became retrospective as beneficiary named in said certificate, the well as prospective in their operation upon amount of all payments made, together with the plaintiff's husband, except as to rights interest thereon at the rate of 3 per cent. which had become fixed or vested by the per annum." The application, signed by ternis of the original contract. In the origplaintiff's husband, upon which the benefit inal contract there was no mention of death certificate herein was issued, contained the by self-destruction or suicide of a member, following stipulation: “I do hereby agree' whether sane or insane. As the death of á

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