In State v. Schmidtz, 65 Iowa, 556, 22 N. W. 673, this language is used in the decision: "The law under which the permit was issued provides in express terms that if the defendant sold liquors for unlawful purposes the permit should be revoked. He received and accepted the permit under such condition. He was not, therefore, deprived of property when the permit was revoked. Hurber v. Baugh, 43 Iowa, 514. Therefore it cannot be said that the defendant has been deprived of property without due process of law.

We quote extensively from La Croix v. Fairfield County, 49 Conn. 591: "The present complainant insists that the general assembly have no more power to confer the jurisdiction mentioned upon the county commissioners as a board that they have to confer the same jurisdiction upon them as a court, because he claims that his license is a contract between him and the state, vesting in him the right from the 2d day of November, 1881, until the 31st day of October, 1882, to sell intoxicating liquors in his saloon at Westport, unless during that period he has violated or shall violate some provision of the laws in relation to such liquors, and shall be convicted of such violation in due course of law. And he also insists that his license is property for which he has paid a valuable consideration, and of which he cannot be deprived but by the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the verdict of a jury. There is a clear preponderance of authority in support of the doctrine that licenses like that of the complainant are not contracts between the state and the parties licensed, and are not property in any constitutional sense.

They form, moreover, a part of the internal police system of the state, are granted in the exercise of the police power which is inherent in every sovereignty, and cannot be in any manner alienated, and may at any time be revoked by legislative authority. In the case of Calder v. Kurby, 5 Gray, 597, a license to sell intoxicating liquors had been granted for a certain period.

Before the period had expired the license was annulled. It was urged upon the argument in behalf of the plaintiff that the license was a contract and within the protection of the Constitution of the United States. But the court overruled the claim. Mr. Justice Bigelow in giving the opinion says: 'The whole argument of the counsel for the plaintiff is founded on a fallacy. A license authorizing a person to re

The

It bears no resemblance to an act of incorporation, by which, in consideration of the supposed benefits to the public, certain rights and privileges are granted by the leg. islature to individuals, under which they embark their skill, enterprise, and capital. The statute regulating licensed houses has a very different scope and purpose. The effect of a license is merely to permit a person to carry on the trade under certain regulations, and to exempt him from the penalties provided for unlawful sales. It therefore contained none of the elements of a contract. The sum paid for it was merely nominal, and there was no agreement, either express or implied, that it should be irrevocable. On the contrary, it is manifest that this statute, like those authorizing the licensing of theatrical exhibitions and shows, sales of fireworks and the like, was a mere police regulation, intended to regulate trade, prevent injurious practices, and promote the good order and welfare of the community, and liable to be modified and repealed whenever, in the judgment of the legislature, it failed to accomplish these objects.' supreme court of New Hampshire, in the case of State v. Holmes, 38 N. H. 225, came to the same conclusion as the court of Massachusetts upon the same course of reasoning. The chief justice in giving the opinion says: 'It is an essential ingredient of a legal license that it confers no right or estate or vested interest, but is at all times revocable at the pleasure of the party who grants it. Nor has the word any popular use which differs from the legal definition. In both the legal and the popular sense the term "license" implies no right or estate conveyed or ceded, no binding contract between parties, but mere license and liberty to be enjoyed as a matter of indulgence, at the will of the party who gives the license.' The same doctrine is recognized and enforced by the court of appeals of the state of New York in the case of Metropolitan Bd. of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657. The court in that case declares that licenses to sell intoxicating liquors are not contracts between the state and the persons licensed, giving to the latter vested rights, protected on general principles and by the Constitution of the United States against subsequent legislation; nor are they property in any legal or constitutional sense; that they have neither the qualities of a contract or of property, but are merely temporary permits to do what otherwise would be an offense against a general law; that they form a portion of the internal police system of the state; are issued in the exercise of its police powers, and are subject to the direc

summoned the relator to show cause before them why his license should not be revoked, as prescribed by § 4, chap. 549 [p. 861], Laws N. Y. 1873. The relator appeared before the board and protested against further proceedings on the ground that the board had no jurisdiction, and that the complaint preferred alleged no violation of the cxcise law. These objections were overruled by the board; and thereupon relator filed a motion in the supreme court of the second judicial department of New York at a special term for a writ of prohibition to compel the board to desist from proceeding to revoke the relator's license. The motion was there denied. The case then went to the supreme court of the same judicial department at the general term, and there the order of the special term denying the motion was affirmed. The relator then took the case to the court of appeals, and there the order of the general term was affirmed," and it was held that the power to license and to cancel licenses is vested in the legislature, and that the mode and manner in which it shall be done rests in the legislative discretion.

In State v. Holmes, 38 N. H. 225, it was held that a license to sell spirituous liquors granted under an act of the legislature gave no vested right, and was revoked and an nulled by the repeal of the statute before the expiration of the time limited by the license.

In Martin v. State, 23 Neb. 377, 36 N. W. 557, Reese, Ch. J., delivering the opinion of the court, says: "But it is contended that, before the mayor and council can legally revoke the license, notice must be given to the licensee, in order that he may show cause, if any exists, why the license should not be revoked. In support of this contention, it is insisted that the license is a franchise, or public right, vested in the individual, and for which he has paid a consideration, and therefore it has all the necessary elements of property, under the provision of the Constitution that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with out due process of law.' Const. § 3, art. 1. There is no vested right in a license to sell intoxicating liquors which the state may not take away at pleasure. Pleuler v. State, 11 Neb. 575, 10 N. W. 481. Such licenses are not contracts between the state or municipality issuing them and the licensee, but are mere temporary permits to do what otherwise would be unlawful. Metropolitan Bd. of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657. They are subject to the direction of the government, which may revoke them as it deems fit, and may be abrogated by the adoption of a municipal ordinance prohibiting the

sale of liquors. Columbus v. Cutcomp, 61 lowa, 672, 17 N. W. 47.

We quote from a part of the opinion by Durfee, Ch. J., in Child v. Bemus, 17 R. I. 231, 12 L. R. A. 57, 21 Atl. 539: "The defendant's first point is that the city council, in conferring upon the mayor power to revoke, exceeded their authority under the charter. The authority given by the charter is expressed in broad terms. It is to make laws, ordinances, and regulations relative to hackney carriages and licensing them. The language seems to us to be broad enough to authorize, not only the granting of licenses, but also the granting of them subject to a power of revocation. And we see no reason why such power may not be vested by ordinance in the mayor. It is argued that the licensee has a vested right in his license beyond the city council's power to forfeit. Assuming that this would be so if the power to revoke were not reserved, it seems to us that when, as here, the license is granted under an ordinance that gives or reserves the power, it is to be regarded as subject to the power and terminable by its exercise. The license is in the nature of a privilege to perform a public service or function for reward, which service or function, for the public good and to secure its orderly and efficient performance, must be subjected to certain regulations. These regulations must be obeyed, and therefore the power to revoke the license is highly important.

The defendant contends that the city council, if it was authorized to confer the power, was not authorized to confer it to be exercised without first giving notice to the licensee and allowing him an opportunity to be heard. We acknowledge that an exercise after notice and hearing would better suit our notions of proper procedure than an exercise without them. The ordinance prescribes no procedure, but leaves the matter wholly to the mayor's discretion. Is the ordinance on this account so unreasonable or oppressive that it is void? The complainant cites Com. v. Kinsley, 133 Mass. 578. In that case it was decided that a statute authorizing the selectmen in towns to grant licenses to keep tables for playing at pool for hire, and providing that 'such licenses may be revoked at the pleasure of the authority granting it,' is constitutional. The license was revoked there without notice. A licensee,' says the court, 'takes his license subject to such conditions as the legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license was that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure.' Here especially it is to be remembered that the power was given for administrative, not judicial, purposes. While the mayor may revoke a li

Mass. 70; Com. v. Adams, 109 Mass. 344; Com. v. Fredericks, 119 Mass. 199."

In Grand Rapids v. Braudy, 105 Mich. 670, 32 L. R. A. 116, 55 Am. St. Rep. 472, 64 N. W. 29, the court says: "The only other provision we need to notice is that giving the power to revoke the license arbitrarily. . Has the common council the right to insist, as a condition precedent to the issue of the license, that the applicant shall agree that his license may be revoked at the will of the council? is the question presented. The necessity of a rigid control over this business in our large cities is clear. Convictions are difficult, though the public authorities may be well convinced. . . . The business is not necessary to the welfare of society or the public. The common council, with the knowledge of all the facts before them to a greater extent than courts can possibly have, have determined that it is well, in their judgment, to require these conditions. While the exercise of any arbitrary power may seem harsh, still we are of the opinion that this requirement is not so unreasonable as to require the courts to declare it void."

In Com. v. Kinsley, 133 Mass. 579, the court states: "A license had been duly granted to the defendant, and it had been revoked by the selectmen without giving him notice of their intention to revoke it. The keeping of a pool table for hire is one of the many things affecting the public morals, which the legislature can either absolutely prohibit or can regulate, and one common form of regulation is by requiring a license. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license was that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege, within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights, art 12. Com. v. Blackington, 24 Pick. 352; Calder v. Kurby, 5 Gray, 597; Com. v. Col

The note on page 519 of 15 Fed. [Re Watson], citing authorities, is to the effect that a license to sell liquor is issued as a part of the police system of the state, and is subject to modification or revocation, at the will of the licensor. Under note 2, § 363, 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. followed by a list of cases, it is said that "licenses to sell liquors are not contracts between the state and the person licensed, giving the latter vested rights, and partaking of the nature of contracts, but are merely temporary permits to do what otherwise would be an offense, issued in the exercise of police powers, and subject to the direction of government, which may revoke them as it deems fit." Other cases in point are Schwuchow v. Chicago, 68 Ill. 444; Wiggins v. Chicago, 68 Ill. 372; State v. Cooke, 24 Minn. 247, 31 Am. Rep. 344; Hurber v. Baugh, 43 Iowa, 514; Laing v. Americus, 86 Ga. 756, 13 S. E. 107; Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co. 94 U. S. 535, 24 L. ed. 148; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 374, 27 L. ed. 423, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 257; Sights v. Yarnalls, 12 Gratt. 292; Low v. Pilotage Comrs. R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 314; Com. v. Brennan, 103 Mass. 70; Com. v. Certain Intoxicating Liquors, 115 Mass. 153.

History tells us that from the early days of Egypt, Greece, and Rome the leading nations of the world have maintained restrictions upon the use of wine. The common law of England regulated the sale of ardent spirits, and the same policy has been pursued in this country from colonial days. Custom from time immemorial and the cases cited indicate that the legislature, in the exercise of police power belonging to the state, could prohibit entirely, or impose such conditions as it deemed best for the issuance and annulment of permits to sell intoxicating liquors. They saw fit to authorize the city council to revoke licenses for the reasons and in the manner stated before. The one in question was granted to and accepted by the petitioner under these conditions and after their enactment. It is the rule that, where parties contract or act in contemplation of a statute then in force, its provisions are deemed to constitute a part of the agreement, just as though they had been incorporated in it. Hutchins v. Durham, 118 N. C. 468, 32 L. R. A. 706, 24 S. E. 723, citing Koonce v. Russell, 103 N. C. 179, 9 S. E. 316; Cooley, Const. Lim. p. 265; McCless v. Meekins, 117 N. C. 34, 23 S. E. 99; Strickland v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 154 Pa. 348, 21 L. R. A. 224, 26 Atl. 431.

From a general review of the authorities it appears that a license for the sale of li