VI. Summary.

As a matter of law, the right of employers to combine for blacklisting purposes, or of an employer to circulate a blacklist among its various employing agents, seems to be, in the absence of malice, undoubted. But the presence of that element, according to the trend of the decisions, gives an injured employee a right of action. The difficulty arises, then, in determining, in each instance, whether malice exists, or what is sufficient to constitute it. Where a number of employers combine for bi..cklisting purposes, whether that fact alone is not some evidence of malice is a theory which has been at least suggested.

tional, in State er rel. Scheffer v. Justus, 85 | by a liability for such sum as will fully comMinn. 279, 56 L. R. A, 757, 88 N. W. 759, on pensate the employee for the damage sustained, the ground that it was class legislation, having in addition to exemplary damages, in Indiana. application only to corporations or partner- But the statutes of Georgia, Indiana, Montana, ships as distinguished from individual em- Virginia, Wisconsin, and Iowa expressly proployers; and also it was insisted that an em- vide that the employer is not thereby prevented ployer of labor has the natural right, under from furnishing, upon request, a truthful statethe Constitution, state and Federal, to give ment of the cause of the employee's discharge. such advice and information as he desires with Other states in which statutes in some form respect to his employees, whether they have opposed to the practice of blacklisting exist are, been discharged for cause or without cause, Washington, Utah, Florida, Connecticut, and or whether they have voluntarily left the em- Nevada. ployment. In regard to the first contention, the court construed the statute to refer to all employers, whether corporations, partnerships, or individuals, and as to the second contention, the court says: “An employee who voluntarily leaves his employment is one who has the right to do so. He violates no contract obligations. Presumably, he is an employee in good standing, and leaves because it is to his advantage so to do; and, if he seeks employment elsewhere, he is entitled to the presumption that his reputation as an employee has been unharmed by the fact of his leaving. The fact that such an employee voluntarily abandons his employment does not give the employer a right to prejudice his employment elsewhere. Under such circumstances, a communication designed to prevent such employment is presumably a reflection upon the standing of the employee. It is no answer to say that the employer may have cause for making such communication; that it may be to the advantage of the new employer, and for the mutual advantage of all such employers, to have notice of the character of the employee. If there is any valid reason for such communication, it would be available only as a matter of defense. The act does not attempt to interfere with the right of an employer to discharge an employee for cause or without cause. It does not seek to prohibit an employer from communicating to other employers the nature and character of his employees, when the facts would be for their interest. While such interference by an employer is not expressly characterized as malicious, that intent is necessarily implied. It is the purpose of this law to protect employees in the enjoyment of those natural rights and privileges guaranteed them by the Constitution, viz., the right to sell their labor and acquire property thereby. The act is valid," etc.

The circulation of a blacklist for the purpose of preventing discharged employees from securing employment with other employers is made a misdemeanor in North Dakota, Oklahoma, Kansas, Missouri, Indiana, Montana, Virginia, and Texas; and is made punishable by a fine and liability for all damages sustained in Iowa; by a liability for treble damages to be recovered in a civil action, in Georgia; by a fine to be paid into the state treasury for the benefit of the school fund, in Wisconsin; and 63 L. R. A.

The statutes passed in a number of the states seem to have been drawn up consistently along these lines, prohibiting, as they do, in almost every instance, the blacklisting of dis charged employees when done "for the purpose of preventing such discharged employees from obtaining employment," but expressly providing, in a number of states, that the statute shall not be so construed as to prohibit the employer from giving any prospective employer of the discharged employee a truthful statement of the reason for the discharge. In Minnesota, where the statute was judicially construed, the court shows that the employer's rights are not thereby curtailed, but that the employee is protected only against malice, which, however, would be presumed to have existed when injuries result to him from the exercise by the employer of the privilege of imparting information as to his discharged employee, by way of blacklisting, but which imputation the employer may clear himself of, if he can, as a matter of defense. This construction is certainly all that the employee could ask, and is, perhaps, also fair and just to the employer, requiring only of him that he abstain from improper motives in the conduct of his business and in his relations toward his employees.

As far as shown by the decisions, equity has so far refrained from restraining the maintenance or continuance of a blacklist, on the ground that no illegal situation is thereby presented, and that the remedy, if any, is at law. M. M. M.

1.

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT.

George SCHEIFERT et al.

v.

John BRIEGEL et al.

Joseph HIRSCHMAN et al., Appts.

( . . . . . . . . Minn...

.)

47, 46 L. ed. 800, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563; Security Land & Exploration Co. v. Burns, 87 Minn. 97, 94 Am. St. Rep. 684, 91 N. W. 304; Hanson v. Rice, 88 Minn. 273, 92 N. W. 982; Shell v. Matteson, 81 Minn. 38, 83 N. W. 491.

Messrs. George A. MacKenzie and W.

Riparian owners of a non-naviga- | H. Leeman, for appellant Hirschman:

ble lake, the waters of which have disappeared, own that portion of the lake bed inclosed by extending Hines from the points where the side division lines of each respective tract cross the meandered line to the center of the lake.

The common law is in force in this state, as to the rights of riparian owners in the bed of meandered lakes.

The patentee of land bordering on a meandered lake takes the title to the middle thereof.

2. When such lake is of irregular shape, and originally contained no inlet or Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 198, 18 L. R. outlet, the inequalities caused by the broken A. 670, 38 Am. St. Rep. 541, 53 N. W. 1139; shore line should be equitably adjusted be-Shell v. Matteson, 81 Minn. 38, 83 N. W. tween the contiguous owners by disregarding 491. such irregularities, or by treating the lake as composed of separate bodies of water, according to the conditions.

3.

A

In all cases where a lake is circular in form and free from indentations and projections in the shore line, so as not to obstruct or interfere with extending the outgoing lines from the shore to a common point in the center of the lake, such method of divi

Where such lake bed slopes to the center, and the shore line is broken and irregular, it is not a proper method of division to establish central points and central lines in different portions of the lake, and extend the side lines of the different riparian division would seem to be the most practical, sions to such central points and central lines approximately dividing the land according to the lake frontage of each tract. Such divi

sion is not equitable, and not according to law.

(July 3, 1903.)

PPEAL by Joseph Hirschman, John Briegel, and Swan Rydeen from an order of the District Court for Sibley County overruling a motion for new trial of an order running boundary lines through a lake which had become dry. Reversed.

The facts are stated in the opinion, and the plats referred to therein are on the opposite' page.

Mr. Albert L. Young, for appellant Briegel:

A surveyor cannot be allowed, under any circumstances, to fix private rights or lines by any theory of his own.

Jones v. Lee, 77 Mich. 35, 43 N. W. 855. The title of each shore owner extends to the center of the lake, the boundary lines of his tract extending from the shore or meander line, on lines converging to a point in

the center of the lake bed.

Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 35 L. ed. 428, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, 838; Lamprey V. State, 52 Minn. 181, 18 L. R. A. 670, 38 Am. St. Rep. 541, 53 N. W. 1139; French Glenn Live Stock Co. v. Springer, 185 U. S.

*Headnotes by LEWIS, J.

NOTE. As to division of water front and flats between adjoining riparian owners, see, in this series, Northern Pine-Land Co. v. Bigelow, 21 L. R. A. 776, and note.

and in fact the only, way to establish the boundary lines between the several owners.

Where the shore or meander line of a lake

is irregular in form, or where there are indentations or projections in the shore line, or where a lake is very long in comparison with its width, some other method of establishing the dividing lines in the lake bed must necessarily be adopted. All of the dividing lines should be extended to the middle of the lake, but not necessarily to one

common center.

In such cases the most practical rule would be to establish one or more center lines extending through the middle of the lake, and then extend the outgoing lines from the shore or meander line to the nearest point on the center line.

Ridgway v. Ludlow, 58 Ind. 248; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 35 L. ed. 428, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, 838.

Messrs. John Lind and A. Ueland, for appellant Rydeen:

If the lake is of considerable greater length than width, the center, as in a river, must be a line, not a point.

Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 35 L. ed. 428, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, 838; Webber v. Pere Marquette Boom Co. 62 Mich. 626, 30 N. W. 469; Grand Rapids Ice & Coal Co. v. South Grand Rapids Ice & Coal Co. 102 Mich. 227, 25 L. R. A. 815, 47 Am. St. Rep. 516, 60 N. W. 681.

The partition lines between the owners should be run in accordance with the rule applicable to rivers, treating the established

Plat of Sections 17, 18, 19, and 20 in Township 112, Range 31 West of the 5th Pr. Mer. Minn. Showing Subdivisions of Said Sections According to Government Field Notes, and Shooing Subdivisions of Lake Therein between Riparian Owners, Known as Lake Swan in County of Sibley and State of Minnesota.

S

FIG. 1.

center line or lines as the middle of the teson, 81 Minn. 38, 83 N. W. 491, the only stream.

question involved was the constitutionality of chapter 257, Laws 1897, and that act was held unconstitutional upon the ground that the riparian owners held title to the center of the lake. In Hanson v. Rice, 88 Minn. 273, 92 N. W. 982, the inquiry was whether or not one of the owners should be re

Lewis, J., delivered the opinion of the stricted to the full government subdivision

prey v. State, 52 Minn. 181, 18 L. R. A. 670, 38 Am. St. Rep. 541, 53 N. W. 1139, it was stated that shore owners take to the center of the lake, but in that case there was under consideration merely the questionner in which the waters receded from time whether the shore owner was entitled to to time was not taken into account. that portion of the land exposed between the cause of the irregular shape of the lake, a meander line and the water, which had per-division made by running the side lines of ceptibly receded, as against a patentee of the various fractions to the center would be the land from the United States government, and the question as to what should constitute the center of the lake, and when that method should be varied or strictly applied, was not before the court. In Shell v. Mat

to combine two systems,-one running the | Boston Mill Corp. 6 Pick. 158, the cove was side lines to the center points of the lake, circular, and the distance across its mouth and the other to run them to center lines, shorter than the shore line of the upland, which, theoretically, were the thread or mid- and the division was made by causing the dle of the stream. The application of the side lines to converge upon the base line at center-line principle to this lake presents the mouth of the cove so as to divide the acvery serious difficulties. In the first place, cumulation proportionately. Again, in the we discover no rule according to which the case of Emerson v. Taylor, 9 Me. 42, 23 Am. center lines were established, except that Dec. 531, there was a conflict of interests, they were run from the three principal and the base line was drawn between the points, F, D, and E, Fig. 1, to the center two points where the side lines of division point C, as nearly as possible equidistant crossed the high-water mark, and from such from the adjacent shore. The question base line, at right angles to it, lines were arises at once, What better reason is there extended to low-water mark, and, the shore for running a center line from F, in the being on a curve, the various extensions manner indicated, than from the bay in lot thus made left a surplus or loss, which was 11, section 18, or from the bay in lots 8 and divided evenly between the adjoining par9, section 18? And, if the center line may cels. A review of many of the New England properly begin at the shore line F, why cases upon this subject will be found in a should not the center line D be extended to note to the Northern Pine-Land Co. v. Bigthe shore at the west line of lot 4, section elow, 21 L. R. A. 776. In all of them the 20, and why should not the center line ter- courts were dealing with the space left bare minating at E be extended to the shore be by the receding waters, or with land which tween lots 3 and 4, or between 2 and 3? It had accumulated, the main body of water is evident that these lines were drawn and being still in existence. The principle runcenter points located without reference to ning through the decisions is that the ri any natural condition of the original lake, parian owner actually owns that part of the either in respect to depth or natural current, accretion which lies between the points and, so far as we are able to see, resulted in where the division lines cross the margin in arbitrary division without regard to the le-a gal rights of the owners.

There is no doubt that the division must be made according to the principle applicable to accretions or relictions, as noticed in Hanson v. Rice, 88 Minn. 273, 92 N. W. 982. As before stated, where the shores of a lake are comparatively even, and the lake is either round or long, few difficulties arise in applying one of the principles of division above mentioned; but where the shore line is uneven, and the body of water of an irregular shape, the difficulty comes in avoiding a conflict of different interests. In the New England states many questions have arisen in reference to the division of lands which have accumulated along the seashore between low and high water mark, and the courts have aimed to establish a principle which would result in giving the riparian owners an equal division in the accumulated soil. For instance, in Gray v. Deluce, 5 Cush. 9, in dividing the flats which had accumulated in a cove between high and low water, a base line was run across the mouth of the cove, and parallel lines were drawn at right angles with the base lines from the ends of the division lines of the channel to low-water mark. In that case the flat to be divided was of the same width as the channel, and the result was that each proprietor was given an equal division, and the division lines could, therefore, be extended without variation. But in the case of Rust v.

straight direction to the center of the channel, and, if there is no channel, then converging to a common center. Cases have arisen where, from the very nature of the situation, these general rules could not be strictly applied. As stated in Walker v. Boston & M. R. Co. 3 Cush. 1: "Many coves, inlets, and estuaries of rivers are so irregular and various in outline, and so traversed by crooked and meandering creeks and channels, from which the sea does not ebb, that it is utterly impossible to apply to them any of the rules which have been applied to other cases." The difficulty to be anticipated in dividing up the bed of a lake where there is no center line is stated by Mr. Justice Campbell in Lincoln v. Davis, 53 Mich. 389, 51 Am. Rep. 116, 19 N. W. 103: “In carrying out lines of ownership in narrow streams, it is easy to find the general course of the stream, and to draw lines perpendicular to that course from the terminal shore lines. But on lakes all lines from the shore tend to converge in some central part of the lake, and, while irregularity of shape prevents drawing them to a common center, they must all, if protracted, cross each other in a perplexing way. The rule adopted in such waters, where the whole surface could be appropriated, has always been to divide the water area in proportion to the shore frontage, and never to attempt any division by lines run from the shore, except over such parts of the lake as are substantially ad