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Prescott & A. C. R. Co. v. Atchison, T. & Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, S. F. Co. 73 Fed. 439.
26 L. ed. 238; Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. v. The Central Stock Yards Company has Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287, 45 L. ed 194, 21 exhibited no right to maintain this com- Sup. Ct. Rep. 115; Gulf, O. & 8. F. R. Co. v. plaint on account of the refusal of the Miami S. S. Co. 30 C. C. A. 142, 52 U. S. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company to App. 732, 86 Fed. 407. receive stock destined for the Central stock The delivery of the freight at the point of yards, whether anyone else would have the destination is as much a part of the comright to make the complaint or not. merce as the handling of it upon any other
This is a case which involves the duty ot part of the line of transportation. a connecting carrier in the matter of de- Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, livery of freight when it has reached its 114 U. S. 196, 29 L. ed. 158, 1 Inters. Com. destination. The Central stock yards, Ken- Rep. 382, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 826; Fielder v. tucky, is no more a distinct place from Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) Louisville than is the Bourbon stock yards, 42 S. W. 362; Council Bluffs v. Kansas City, Kentucky.
St. J. & C. B. R. Co. 45 lowa, 338, 24 Ain. The Louisville & Nashville Railroad Com Rep. 773. pany, in bringing live stock to Louisville, There is no power in any tribunal, state has the right to establish a live-stock depot or Federal, legislative or judicial, to rein Louisville, and insist in delivering all quire that the Louisville & Nashville Rail. live stock at that depot.
road Company deliver its cars to the South Butchers' & D. Stock Yards Co. v. Louis- ern Railway Company, for use by the latter ville & N. R. Co. 14 C. C. A. 290, 31 U. S. company in transporting freight to points App. 252, 67 Fed. 35; Onited States v. Ad on the line of the latter company. dyston Pipe & Steel Co. 46 L. R. A. 122, 29 Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Smith, 173 C. C. A. 141, 54 U. S. App. 723, 85 Fed. 271; U. S. 684, 43 L. ed. 858, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. Western & A. R. Co. v. Exposition Cotton 565; Oregon Short Line & U. N. R. Co. v. Vills, 81 Ga. 522, 7 S. E. 916; Nanson v. Northern P. R. Co. 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 249, jacob, 12 Mo. App. 125, Affirmed in 93 Mo. 51 Fed. 465, Affirmed in 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 331, 6 S. W. 246.
718, 9 C. C. A. 409, 15 U. S. App. 479, 61 It is not the duty of a railroad company, Fed. 158. either at common law, or under the Interstate Commerce Act, to accept freight
Day, Circuit Judge, delivered the opinion marked for a destination beyond the line of of the court: that company; nor is it, in any event, its duty
The discussion in this case has taken a wide to deliver its own cars containing such
range. In our opinion, it may be disposed freight to a connecting carrier, in order of in the solution of a few leading proposithat the freight may be transported without tions, the first being: Is there a right, in. change of cars to a point beyond the receiv. dependent of a statute, to require the rail. ing company's line.
road company to receive the live stock for Hutchinson, Carr. § 145; Muschamp v: shipment to the Central stock yards, and to Lancaster & P. Junction R. Co. 8 Mees. & deliver the cars at a point of connection W. 421; Myrick v. Michigan C. R. Co. 107 with the Southern railroad in Louisville for U. S. 106, 27 L. ed. 326, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 425; transportation thereto? It is apparent Little Rock & M. R. Co. v. St. Louis de 8. W. from a consideration of the testimony that R. Co. 26 L. R. A. 192, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. the Central Stock Yards Company is pri854, 11 C. C. A. 417, 27 U. S. App. marily the stock yards of the Southern 380, 63 Fed. 775; Little Rock & M. Railway Company. It is true the location R. Co. East Tennessee, V.
& G. is just beyond the city limits, but the busiR. Co. 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 454; Oreness to be transacted is the Louisville busigon Short Line & U. N. R. Co. v. North- ness in the sale and forwarding of stock ern P. R. Co. 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 718, 9 C. in these yards. The contract through which C. A. 409, 15 U. S. App. 479, 61 Fed. 158; the Central stock yards originated is in the Kentucky & I. Bridge Co. v. Louisville de N. R. Co. 2 L. R. X. 289, 2 Inters. Com. record, and there we find an agreement be. Rep. 351, 37 Fed. 629; Atchison, T. & 8. F. tween the Southern Railway Company and R. Co. v. Denver & N. 0. R. Có. 110 U. s. the Central Stock Yards Company in which
is recited the desire of the railroad com667, 28 L. ed. 291, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185.
The Kentucky Constitution can have no pany to establish a general stock depot “for force as applicable to that class of business the receiving and delivery of stock at Louisto which the bill of complaint in this suit ville, Kentucky.” After stipulations as to is in express terms confined, to wit, inter the reception and care of the stock, it is state shipments of cattle, or, in other words, further provided that the railroad company interstate commerce
will establish the premises of the stock.
yards company as its stock depot for the yards or employed another company or corpurpose of handling live stock to and from poration to supply the facilities for receivLouisville, and agrees not to sell, lease, oring and delivering live stock it was under use, or license to be used, any part of its obligation to the public to furnish." ground in or adjacent to Louisville for the There is no showing of the inadequacy of establishment of any other stock yards, or the Bourbon Stock Yards Company in the otherwise facilitate the establishment of matter of accommodations for receiving and any other stock yards in the city, and will caring for cattle. The defendant has there establish no other stock yards depot at or made provisions ample for the care of such near said city. The railroad company fur- stock with a company obligated to discharge ther agrees to establish Louisville rates to the duties in this behalf required by the and from the premises of the said company law of common carriers. Is the defendant on certain lines. It is apparent from these obliged by law to make Louisville delivery stipulations of the contract that the parties at other points by making connections for understood that the Central stock yards was other Louisville stock yards ? We think intended to be, as in fact it is, a Louisville this question must be answered in the negastock yards, to be used, as is recited in the tive. To all intents it was so answered by contract, in building up the live-stock busi- this court in Butchers' & D. Stock Yards ness to and from Louisville. We have no Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 14 C. C. A. question that the Central stock yard is as 290, 31 U. S. App. 252, 67 Fed. 35. In that distinctly a yard for the transaction of the case the railroad company had entered into business of receiving, keeping, and selling a contract with the Union Stock Yards Comof stock at Louisville as is the Bourbon pany, which made it the stock-yards depot stock yards, established for the same pur- of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Compose by contract with the defendant company at Nashville. A spur track had been pany. The question on this branch of the run down Front street, in Nashville, for the case is thus narrowed to the consideration accommodation of freight shippers not hanof the rights of the complainant to require aling live stock. About 40 feet from this of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Com- track the Butchers' & Drovers' Company pany shipments and transfers to the Central established an independent stock yards. Stock Yards Company, over the connection The Butchers' & Drovers' Company sought with the Southern railroad, of live stock a mandatory injunction to compel the railwhose destination is Louisville. The pecu- road company to build, or allow to be built, liar duties of a common carrie of live stock a side track connecting the spur track with are pointed out by Mr. Justice Field in the complainant's stock yards, there to deNorth Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Commercial liver and receive cattle consigned or shipped Nat. Bank, 123 U. S. 727, 31 L. ed. 287, by the complainant. The obtaining of the 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 266. The animals cannot right of way and the expense of building be turned loose, or left without food or the side track were not required of the deshelter in cars standing on the railroad fendant company, and are not elements tracks or sidings. They must be placed in essential to the disposition of the case in suitable quarters, where they can be fed the opinion rendered by Judge Taft. The and cared for under the charge of compe- contention of the railroad company that, tent agents. The nature of the property having established a live-stock depot in requires these services, essential to the dis- Nashville, for the reception and delivery of charge of the duty of the carrier in the safe stock in that city, it could not be compelled transportation and delivery of live stock. to receive and deliver from another depot For this purpose it is the duty of the car in the city, was sustained. Judge Taft rier to make provision by suitable yards quotes from the opinion of Judge Harlan and proper equipment and competent per. in Covington Stock-Yards Co. v. Keith, 139 sons to manage and control the care and U. S. 128, 35 L. ed. 73, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. delivery of the live stock. We perceive no 461, as follows: “We must not be underreason why this duty cannot be discharged stood as holding that the railroad company by contract with proper persons or
com- in this case was under any legal obligation panies who shall undertake the same under to furnish, or cause to be furnished, suitable the responsibility of the carrier. Such a and convenient appliances for receiving and contract was enforced in Terre Haute & I. delivering live stock at every point on its R. Co. v. Struble, 109 U. S. 381, 27 L. ed. line in the city of Covington where persons 970, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 270. Justice Harlan engaged in buying, selling, or shipping live observed in Covington Stock-Yards Co. v. stock chose to establish stock yards. In Keith, 139 U. S. 128-136, 35 L. ed. 73–77, respect to the mere loading and unloading 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 461, 464: “It did not con- of live stock, it is only required, by the cern them (the complainants] whether the nature of its employment, to furnish such railroad company itself maintained stock 'facilities as are reasonably sufficient for the
business at that city. So far as the record | reasonable prejudice or disadvantage in discloses, the yards maintained by the ap- any respect whatsoever. Every common pellants are, for the purposes just stated, carrier subject to the provisions of equal to all the needs, at that city, of ship this act shall, according to their pers and consignees of live stock; and, if spective powers,
afford all reasonable, the appellee had been permitted to use them proper, and equal facilities for the inwithout extra charge for mere ‘yardage,' terchange of traffic between their respecthey would have been without just grounds tive lines, and for the receiving, forwarding, of complaint in that regard, for it did not and delivering of passengers and property concern them whether the railroad company to and from their respective lines, and those itself maintained stock yards, or employed connecting therewith, and shall not disanother company or corporation to supply criminate in their rates and charges bethe facilities for receiving and delivering live tween such connecting lines; but this shall stock it was under obligation to the public not be construed as requiring any such comto furnish. But, as the appellant did not mon carrier to give the use of its tracks or accord to appellees the privileges they were terminal facilities to another carrier enentitled to from its principal, the carrier, gaged in like business.” [24 Stat. at L. 380, and as the carrier did not offer to establish chap. 104, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3155.] a stock yard of its own for shippers and The claim is that, having granted certain consignees, the court below did not err in rights and privileges to the Bourbon Stock requiring the railroad company and the re Yards Company, this section guarantees ceivers to receive and deliver live stock from equal privileges to the Central Stock Yards and to the appellees at their own stock Company. This construction of the act is yards in the immediate vicinity of the ap. not sustainable. It is the duty of the railpellant's yards, when the former were put road company to provide reasonable faciliin proper condition to be used for that pur- ties for the unloading and care of live stock. pose, under such reasonable regulations as This duty it might discharge by itself furthe railroad company might establish. It nishing sufficient facilities, or it might conwas not within the power of the railroad tract with others to make such provision. The company, by such an agreement as that of respondent has chosen the latter course. November 19, 1881, or by agreement in any By contract with the Bourbon Stock Yards form, to burden the appellees with charges Company it has provided facilities for the for services it was bound to render without care of stock received at Louisville. These any other compensation than the customary facilities cannot be denied to some and afcharges for transportation."
forded to others. But this is far from sayWe think this language is no less appli- ing that it was the purpose of the law to cable to the case under consideration. The dictate to common carriers the means by Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company which it shall discharge its obligations to has by contract arranged for the discharge shippers. To hold otherwise would be, havof its duties to shippers of live stock at the ing regard to the present case, to require Bourbon stock yards. The proof does not the railroad company to make connections show that these accommodations are inade with as many stock-yard companies as may quate, or the charges illegal. It would see fit to provide facilities equal to those doubtless be convenient, and promote the furnished by the company or its agents. business of dealers and shippers, if other This would be carrying the act far beyond facilities were afforded; but we find in the its terms and purposes. Kentucky & I. law nothing aside from a positive statute Bridge Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 2 L. R. that requires more ample provision at the A. 289, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 351, 37 Fed. 621. hands of the respondent.
These considerations dispose of this It is further alleged in the bill that the branch of the case. If it could be regarded refusal to make the desired shipping and as one involving the right to require one transfer of stock to the yards of the com- railroad to interchange traffic with another, plainant is a violation of g 3 of the Inter the position of the complainant would be state Commerce Act, which provides: "That equally untenable. At common law a railit shall be unlawful for any common carrier road company is only bound to transport subject to the provisions of this act to freight to its own terminus. The rule is make or give any undue or unreasonable thus stated in Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. preference or advantage to any particular Denver & N. 0. R. Co. 110 U. S. 667, 28 person, company, firm, corporation, or lo- L. ed. 291, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185: “At comcality, or any particular description of mon law a carrier is not bound to carry traffic, in any respect whatsoever, or to sub- except on his own line, and we think it ject any particular person, company, firm, quite clear that, if he contracts to go becorporation, or locality, or any particular yond, he may, in the absence of statutory description of traffic to any undue or un-'regulations to the contrary, determine for
himself what agencies he will employ. His , Rock M. R. Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & 8. contract is equivalent to an extension of his R. Co. 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 763, 41 Fed. 559; line for the purposes of the contract; and if Oregon Short Line & U. N. R. Co. v. Northhe holds himself out as a carrier beyond the ern P. R. Co. 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 249, 51 line, so that he may be required to carry Fed. 475; St. Louis Drayage Co. v. Louis
for all alike, he may, nevertheless, ville & N. R. Co. 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 137, confine himself in carrying to the particular | 65 Fed. 39; Allen v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. route he chooses to use. He puts himself 98 Fed. 16. in no worse position, by extending his route It is further alleged that the duty of with the help of others, than he would oc- complying with the complainant's demand cupy if the means of transportation em- rests upon the defendant company because ployed were all his own. He certainly may of the requirements of the Constitution of select his own agencies and his own asso- the state of Kentucky and the laws passed ciates for doing his own work.”
thereof. Assuming, without It is averred in the bill that the Southern deciding, that the Kentucky Constitution Railway Company has notified the respond and legislation require the defendant coment that it would be, and now is, willing to pany to receive, deliver, transport, and be responsible from points of physical con- transfer freight to any point that is in nection with the Louisville & Nashville rail. physical connection with the tracks of an. road for the delivery of such live stock and other company, so that the complainant has, the collection of all charges on the same, as to traffic originating in Kentucky, the and would promptly return to such points right to require that the shipment be reof connection all empty cars, and would ceived and transported in accordance account for all freight charges collected in with the prayer of the bill, the questhe usual way.
This may be true, and tion remains, Have the Kentucky Conwould possibly be a reasonable arrangement. stitution and statutes any operations But have the courts the right, in the ab- beyond the limits of that state? The sence of statute, to dictate to carriers the interstate commerce clause of the Federal contracts they shall make in the interchange Constitution has given rise to much litigaof trailic, and to require such to be carried tion and frequent construction by the Suout as the courts deem reasonable? The preme Court. It is thoroughly settled that billing and transfer of freight from outside the power of Congress to regulate compoints over the two railroads is a matter of merce is plenary, and no state has the right arrangement between them. The propor- to regulate purely interstate commerce. On tion of the joint tariff each shall receive, the other hand, the state has the right to the handling of cars, the liability of one to make provisions as to matters within its the other, and other matters, are to be de- own boundaries intended as aids to comtermined by the contract between the par- merce, not thereby regulating interstate ties. Each controls its own railroad, and traffic. Without undertaking to reconcile may determine for itself upon what terms or consider the numerous decisions, we may it will unite in a joint tariff. No arrange- refer to Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. ment exists with the Southern railroad for 691, 26 L. ed. 238. Mr. Justice Field, with the transportation and delivery of cars of his usual clearness, has called attention to live stock to the Central stock yards, if that the sound rules of construction to determine can be assumed to be a station on the line what is and what is not within the power of the Southern railroad; nor do we think of a state: “Perhaps some of the divera court of equity has the power to make gence of views upon this question among one, and supervise its execution; nor has former judges may have arisen from not this right been conferred upon the courts always bearing in mind the distinction beby the Interstate Commerce Act. This doc- tween commerce, as strictly defined, and its trine is so thoroughly established as to re- local aids or instruments or measures taken quire no more than the citation of the for its improvement. Commerce with forauthorities in support of it. Atchison, T. eign countries and among the states, strictly & 8. F. R. Co. v. Denver & N. 0. R. Co. considered, consists in intercourse and 110 U. S. 667, 28 L. ed. 291, 4 Sup. Ct. traffic, including in these terms navigation Rep. 185; Express Cases, 117 U. S. 1, 29 and the transportation and transit of per. L. ed. 791, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 542, 628; Pull sons and property, as well as the purchase, man's Palace Car Co. v. Missouri P. R. Co. sale, and exchange of commodities. For the 115 U. S. 587, 29 L. ed. 499, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. regulation of commerce, as thus defined, 194; Northern P. R. Co. v. Washington Ter- there can be only one system of rules, appliritory, 142 U. S. 492, 35 L. ed. 1092, 12 cable alike to the whole country; and the Sup. Ct. Rep. 283; Kentucky & I. Bridge authority which can act for the whole counCo. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 2 L. R. A. 289, try can alone adopt such a system. Action 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 351, 37 Fed. 567; Little upon it by separate states is not, therefore, permissible." Page 702, 102 U. S., page 162 U. S. 650, 40 L. ed. 1105, 16 Sup. Ct. 241, 26 L. ed.
But it is thoroughly well setIt is within the power of a state to re- tled that a state may not regulate interstate quire connecting tracks between two rail-commerce, using the terms in the sense of road companies at an intersection for the intercourse and the interchange of traffic transfer of cars used in the local business between the states. In the case at bar we of such lines of railroad. This may have think the relief sought pertains to the transbeen necessary for the accommodation of portation and delivery of interstate freight. state commerce. Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. It is not the means of making a physical v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287, 45 L. ed. 194, connection with other railroads that is 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 115. So it is competent | aimed at, but it is sought to compel the cars for a state to require a railroad company and freight received from one state to be to stop a certain number of trains each day delivered to another at a particular place at stations having a certain number of in- and in a particular way. If the Kentucky habitants, within the state. Such regula- Constitution could be given any such contions do not interfere with the delivery or struction, it would follow it could regulate transportation of passengers traveling be- interstate commerce. This it cannot do. tween states in such wise as to be regula- We reach the conclusion that no case was tions affecting interstate traffic. The stat- made justifying the relief prayed for, and ute simply amounted to requiring three that there was no error committed in distrains of the company to stop at the station missing the bill. named each day. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Judgment affirmed. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 43 L. ed. 702, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465. Likewise a state may Affirmed by Supreme Court of United require a telegraph company to deliver a States, February 23, 1904. message. Western U. Teleg. Co. v. James,
ARIZONA SUPREME COURT.
APPEALigby defendant from a judgment of
PHENIX LIGHT & FUEL COMPANY, Louisiana Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tweed, 7 Wall. Appt.,
54, 19 L. ed. 65; Fent v. Toledo, P. & W.
R. Co. 59 Ill. 349, 14 Am. Rep. 13; Toledo, Thomas D. BENNETT.
W. & W. R. Co. v. Muthersbaugh, 71 lll.
572; Schmidt v. Mitchell, 84 Ill. 199, 25 (........Ariz.........)
Am. Rep. 446; Scheffer v. Washington City,
V. M. & G. S. R. Co. 105 U. S. 249, 26 L. ed. Providing insalation sufcient to withstand lightning which may
1070; Haile v. Texas & P. R. Co. 23 L. R. A.
strike the wires is not within the obligation of an elec- 774, 9 C. C. A. 134, 23 U. S. App. 80, 60 tric lighting company in carrying its wires Fed. 557; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Barinto a building for the lighting of which it ker, 4 Colo. 344, 34 Am. Rep. 89; Bosch v. has contracted to furnish electricity.
Burlington & 11. R. Co. 44 Iowa, 402, 24 (October 31, 1903.)
Am. Rep. 754; Michigan C. R. Co. v. Bur. rows, 33 Mich. 6.
There is a broad distinction between the the District Court for Maricopa County act which gives occasion for damages arisin favor of plaintiff in an action brought to ing from other causes, which were not in the recover the value of some of plaintiff's prop contemplation of the parties when the con. erty which was alleged to have been de tract was made, and an act proximately stroyed by defendant's negligence. Re
causing the injury; and it is only for the versed.
latter that an action will lie. The facts are stated in the opinion.
Warucick v. Hutchinson, 45 N. J. L. 61. Messrs. Chalmers & Wilkinson and Herndon & Norris, for appellant:
In determining what is the proximate One is not to be held responsible in dam- cause, the true rule is that the injury must
be the natural and probable consequence of ages for the remote consequences of his act,
the negligence. or, indeed, for any but those which are prox
Seale v. Gulf, O. & 8. F. R. Co. 65 Tex. imate or natural and in contemplation of
274, 57 Am. Rep. 602; Brandon v. Gulf City the parties.
Cotton Press & Mfg. Co. 51 Tex. 121. NOTE. —As to liability of owner of electric Vessrs. A. C. Baker and Alfred wire for injury caused by lightning conveyed Franklin, for appellee: thereby to building, see also, in this series,
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should Jackson v. Wisconsin Teleph. Co. 26 L. R. A. 101, and Griffith v. New England Teleph. & be here invoked. Teleg. Co. 52 L. R. A. 919.
Aycocli v. Raleigh & A. Air-Line R. Co.