in the public highways which is used in the in delivering message; causing loss of sale

exercise of the franchise; but such property of goods.

TELEPHONES.
Parties Plaintiff to Suit to Enforce Tel-
ephone Company's Duty, under
Municipal Ordinance as to Rates
for Service, see ACTION OR SUIT, 4.
Injury to Third Person from Inade-
quately Insulated Wire, see ELEC-
TRICAL USES AND APPLIANCES, 1.

1. The residents of a municipal corporation may enforce for their own benefit conditions as to rates to be charged by a telephone company, imposed by a municipal ordinance granting the use of the streets and accepted by the company, where the rates were expressly imposed for their benefit. Chas. Simon's Sons Co. v. Maryland Teleph. & Teleg. Co. (Md.) 727

2. A telephone company which accepts the conditions as to rates to be charged by it, imposed by a municipal corporation as a condition to its use of the streets for its conduits, cannot complain that the rates are not reasonable. Id.

3. The duty to furnish service at specified rates may be imposed by a municipal corporation having statutory authority to regulate the use of its streets for telephone wires as a condition to the use of such streets by a telephone company.

Id.

4. A definition of telephone service as ordinary grounded-wire service, in a statute providing maximum rates for such service, has no effect in determining the meaning of the word in a contract subsequently made between a municipal corporation and the telephone company for service to be furnished to citizens of the municipality.

Id.

5. In determining the kind of telephone which a corporation undertook to furnish in consideration of the right to use conduits in the highways of a municipal corporation,

3. The constitutional provision for an impartial jury is violated, in a prosecution for manslaughter by recklessly driving over a traveler on the highway, by permitting thereon a witness who, to the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney, knew that accused was recklessly driving on the highway imstances and conditions surrounding the par-mediately preceding the commission of the ties to the contract at the time it was made. offense, a short distance from where it was

the court is entitled to know the circum

NOTES AND BRIEFS.

Id.

Telephones; ordinance establishing rates of; construction of; power of city to regulate rates; right of city to enforce contract

as to rates.

TIME.

729

committed; and it is immaterial that the statute forbids jurors to communicate private knowledge or information to fellow jurors, or be governed thereby in giving a verdict. State v. Stentz (Wash.) Questions of law and fact.

807

4. Whether or not the loss of control of a horse which shies in a highway so as to

For Payment of Annuities, see ANNUI- bring the vehicle into collision with one TIES, 2.

traveling in the opposite direction was mo

For Payment of Legacies, see EXECU-mentary or uncontrollable is a question for TORS AND ADMINISTRATORs, 6.

TOLL BRIDGE.

See BRIDGES, 1, 2.

TORT.

See also CASE, 1.

the jury. Neal v. Rendall (Me.)

668

5. Whether or not one participating in bicycle races which are part of the festivities of a holiday is guilty of negligence in failing to look out for the approach of street cars on a track which he is obliged to cross, and in failing to attempt to stop

when he discovers one approaching, are of the face value of his stock. De Koven questions for the jury. Harrington v. Los v. Alsop (Ill.) Angeles Ry. Co. (Cal.)

238

6. The question, What is the proximate cause of an injury? is ordinarily a question for the jury. Cole v. German Sav. & L. Soc. (C. C. A. 8th C.) 416

7. Where, at the close of the trial in an action for personal injury, there is no sub stantial evidence upon which the jury can properly find that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury, it is the duty of the court peremptorily to instruct the jury to return a verdict for the defendant. Instructions.

Id.

8. Inconsistent or irrelevant instructions should not be given. Tower v. Whip (W. Va.) 937

9. A charge in a homicide case is not subject to the criticism that it makes a conjunction or combination of circumstances essential to the reduction of the grade of the crime to manslaughter, where the facts stated are merely those relied on for that purpose. White v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 660

NOTES AND BRIEFS.

Trial; who entitled to the right to open and close in will contest. 320

Personal knowledge of facts to be proved as affecting competency of juror :-(I.) Early law as to knowledge of jurors; (II.) what knowledge will disqualify: (a) in gen eral; (b) knowledge indicating bias; (III.) summary. 807 Discretion of child on railroad track as question for jury. 657

587 2. Stock dividends declared after the death of a stockholder who has devised his stock in trust to pay the net income to a life tenant and the principal to a remainderman are to be held for the benefit of the remainderman, whether the earnings which they represent accrue before or after the death of the testator.

Id.

3. The right to subscribe to additional stock at par, accorded to persons holding shares of stock in trust to pay the net income to life tenants and the principal to a remainderman, is part of the capital to be held for the benefit of the remainderman, whether the shares are actually subscribed for, or the right is sold for a valuable consideration.

Id.

4. A settlement of an estate in trust will not be set aside because of the failure of the settlor to understand its legal import, where he has ratified it by giving the trustee directions as to the payment of proceeds and filing a bill to procure the appointment of a new trustee, at least after the lapse of more than ten years after its execution. Ricards v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. (Md.)

145

5. Incapability of the life tenant of a settlement in trust for the benefit of a woman and her children to bear children cannot be proved by expert medical testiand life beneficiary to terminate the trust mony for the purpose of enabling the settlor and cut off the children's contingent interests. Id.

6. A trustee is not liable in his official capacity for an injury to a person who was Negligence as question for jury; contrib- struck while walking on a sidewalk by chips utory negligence as one of law or fact. 507 of stone on account of the negligence of the Question for court or jury as to negli-trustee's servants, who were engaged in chisgence and proximate cause of accident. 417 eling stone on the premises of which he held Proximate cause of death as question for the legal title as trustee. Parmenter v. jury. 426 Barstow (R. I.) 227 Court passing on weight of testimony; question whether person had ceased to do business in certain county as one for jury.

430

Question for court as to sufficiency of facts to put carrier on notice of danger. 498

TRUNK RAILWAY.

See RAILROADS, 1, 2.

TRUSTS.

1. Money earned by a corporation during a stockholder's lifetime, but not distributed as dividends until after his death, is income, and goes to a life tenant under his will. and not to a remainderman, although the dividend amounts to 20 per cent

NOTES AND BRIEFS.

Trusts; setting aside deed of trust be. cause of failure of parties thereto to understand its legal effect; right to terminate fect of objection of trustees; right of cestui trust by mutual consent of grantors; efque trust to demand conveyance of legal title where entire beneficial interest has vested in her. 145 Liability of trustee for negligence of servants. 227

Liability of trustee for torts or negligence of servants:-(I.) In general; (II.) receivers: (a) in general; (b) personal liability; (c) official liability; (d) hability as common carriers when operating rail

roads: (1) Henderson v. Walker; (2) Tur- | less he owns them, or is licensed to do so;

ner v. Cross; (e) liability as public offi-
cers; (f) the exception to the rule made by
statute in Indiana; (III.) conclusions. 227
UNIFORMITY OF TAXATION.
See TAXES, 3.

UNIONS.

See LABOR ORGANIZATIONS.

VESTED REMAINDERS.
See WILLS.

VETERANS.

Exemption from License Tax as Constituting a Denial of Equal Protection of the Laws, see CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11.

NOTES AND BRIEFS.

the title of their owner is not burdened by any servitude in favor of the owner of the upland to build wharves out into navigable water. Cobb v. Lincoln Park Comrs. (Ill.)

264

2. Riparian owners of a non-navigable lake, the waters of which have disappeared, own that portion of the lake bed inclosed by extending lines from the points where the side division lines of each respective tract cross the meandered line, to the center of the lake. Scheifert v. Briegel (Minn.) 296

3. In dividing between the riparian owners the bed of a lake which has become dry and which is of irregular shape, and which originally contained no inlet or outlet, the inequalities caused by the broken shore line should be equitably adjusted between the contiguous owners by disregarding such ir

Veterans; discrimination in favor of, in regularities, or by treating the lake as com

statute.

VOTERS AND ELECTIONS.

179

A member of the Western Branch of the National Home for Disabled Vounteer Soldiers, while maintained therein at public expense, is not deprived of the right to acquire a residence there for voting purposes, by Kan. Const. art. 5, § 3, providing that for voting purposes no person while kept at any almshouse or asylum at public expense shall, by reason of his presence, be deemed to have gained a residence. Cory v. Spencer (Kan.) 275

NOTES AND BRIEFS. Voters and elections; right of student to acquire residence for voting purposes; veteran in soldiers' home acquiring residence. 275 WAGES.

NOTES AND BRIEFS. Wages; equitable remedy to subject future earnings to judgment after return of no property found. 673

posed of separate bodies of water, according to the conditions. Id.

4. Where the bed of a lake which has become dry slopes to the center, and the shore line is broken and irregular, it is not a proper method of division as between riparian owners to establish central points and central lines in different portions of the lake, and extend the side lines of the different riparian divisions to such central points and central lines, approximately dividing the land according to the lake frontage of each tract. Id.

WHARVES. natures have been duly proved, may be 1. The legislature may grant to a board shown to have made statements contradictof park commissioners the title to the sub-ory of the fact contained in the attestation merged land along the shore of a navigable clause of the will, and to be of bad reputalake so as to prevent the owner of the up- tion for honesty and integrity, for the purland from constructing wharves out to the pose of impeaching the effect of proof of line of navigability without their consent. their signatures. Cobb v. Lincoln Park Comrs. (Ill.)

264

Id.

6. After the proof of the signature of an 2. A statute prohibiting the construc- attesting witness in a will contest, propotion of wharves into navigable waters with-nent cannot give evidence that the witness out the consent of the Secretary of War had been offered money to leave the state, does not amount to a positive declaration by one to whom the contestant had agreed that such consent will confer a right to do to sell his interest in the property which he so regardless of the local laws, and against would receive from the estate as heir of testhe consent of the owner of submerged land tator. Id. on which it is proposed to build.

NOTES AND BRIEFS.

See also WATERS.

Id.

Devise and legacy.

7. A bequest to one for life, and at her death to be equally divided among her children, creates a contingent remainder in the

Wharves; right of riparian owner on nav- children. Allison v. Allison (Va.) 920 igable water to build.

WILLS.

266

8. The devise of a remainder at the death of a life tenant, to be divided among testator's heirs at law, refers to heirs living

Parol Evidence to Explain Ambiguity, at the death of the testator, and not at the

see EVIDENCE, 14, 15.

Time for Payment of Legacy, see EXEO

UTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 6.

See also ANNUITIES; EXECUTORS AND
ADMINISTRATORS; TRUSTS.

1. A devise of real estate by description partly false may be effective if what remains after rejecting the false part of the description reasonably corresponds with real estate indicated by extrinsic evidence. Pate Bushong (Ind.)

V.

death of the life tenant.

Id.

10. The widow will not share in the distribution under a devise of the residue of testator's estate, real, personal, and mixed, 593 to his heirs at law,-especially where, at the time of making the will, he had no intention of being married, so that he could not be presumed to have intended to include his widow among his heirs at law. Id.

2. A mistake as to the section in which land is located, or as to its position within the section, will not defeat an attempted devise of land, where testator attempts to dispose of all his land, and the size and char- 11. The residuary devise is vested where acteristics of the tracts are accurately testator gives property to his wife for life, stated, so that there can be no doubt as to "and at her death to go to her child or chilwhat land is referred to. Id. dren," where, at testator's death, there is a child who stands ready to go into possession and enjoyment of the legacy at the death of the life tenant.

Id.

3. The contestants have the right to open and close a proceeding to contest the validity of a will, where, under the statutory procedure, the contest is not initiated until the will is before the court, and is instituted by the filing of objections thereto, the issues upon which are to be raised by proponents, and which may be a mere general denial. Farleigh v. Kelley (Mont.)vided for, and not pretermitted, by the will,

319

4. The weight of the signature of the contesting witness to a will cannot be strengthened by declarations not made under oath, purporting to account for the suppression of the will,—at least where they are coupled with evidence that is clearly incompetent. Id.

5. Subscribing witnesses to a will who are out of the jurisdiction, and whose sig

12. A child taking a vested remainder after the life estate of his mother is the representative of the class of children of the latter who are to take at her death, although not expressly named, which is pro

within the meaning of a statute providing that, if a will be made while testator has a child living, and a child be born afterwards, such after-born child, in case he is not provided for by the will, but only pretermitted, shall succeed to such portion of the testator's estate as he would have been entitled to had testator died intestate. Id.

13. A life estate only is given to a widow by a will giving her all testator's "real es