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MINES.

Jurisdiction of Equity to Interfere with
Enforcement of Ordinance,
EQUITY, 5.

see

Regulating Use of Street by Railroad Company as Constituting a Grant of Franchise, see RAILROADS, 3. Validity of Ordinance Requiring Equipment of Street Cars with Air Brakes, see STREET RAILWAYS, 1-3.

The owner of a gas well situated near a public highway may lawfully open it for the purpose of allowing the gas to blow the water out of it, although the noise thereby made is clearly such as to frighten the horses of persons riding or driving along the highway; but in doing so he must exercise care not to inflict injury thereby upon such persons or their property. Snyder v. 1. The power of a municipal corporation Philadelphia Co. (W. Va.) 896 to light its streets includes power to procure a plant for that purpose, if necessary. Fawcett v. Mt. Airy (N. C.) 870

MONEY IN COURT.

NOTES AND BRIEFS.

Money in court; equitable remedy to subject to judgment after return of no prop erty found.

MONOPOLIES.

673

A combination prohibited by the act of Congress of July 2, 1890, is constituted by an association to unite all "acceptable dealers" engaged in a certain business in a certain city and within 200 miles therefrom and all American manufacturers of their supplies, the rules of which exclude unacceptable persons from membership, and prohibit their purchasing supplies at less than list prices, which are more than double what members of the association pay. W. W. Montague & Co. v. Lowry (C. C. App. 9th C.) 58

MORTGAGE.

2. The expense of erecting and operating plants for supplying water and electric light for municipal use and sale to persons residing in the municipality is a necessary one, within the meaning of a constitutional provision permitting municipal corporations to incur such expenses without submitting the proposition to its voters.

Id.

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4. Power to require the cutting of weeds
on city lots is conferred upon a municipal
corporation by a charter empowering it to
abate nuisances on private property to se-
Permitting Mortgagee to Take Pos- cure the general health of the inhabitants,
session of Chattels as Constituting and to pass such ordinances as may be ex-
an Act of Bankruptcy, see BANK-pedient in maintaining the health and wel-
RUPTCY, 1.
fare of the city.

Appointment of Receiver at Instance of Liability for damages.
Mortgagee, see RECEIVERS, 5.

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Id.

5. By furnishing a lot and building for the use of a school district within its limits, a municipal corporation does not become responsible to the public or patrons of the school for its safe condition, and no recovery can be had against it in case the school ground is on a different grade from that of the street, and is supported by a retaining wall without barriers to prevent children from falling into the street, in consequence of which a child is jostled from the wall by other children at play and injured. Ernst v. West Covington (Ky.)

652

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self government; impairment of, by statute for taxation of special franchises; imposing duty of assessing property upon state officers, and depriving local assessors of right to assess.

cense.

884

Powers of city councils; strict construction of charter; power to revoke liquor li338 Right to designate meaning of terms employed in ordinance; right to require cutting of weeds on city lots. 779

Injury to Person on Railroad Track, see
RAILROADS, 4, 5.

Injury to Person by Street Car, see
STREET RAILWAYS, 4-6.

Liability of Trustee for Negligence of
Servants, see TRUSTS, 6.

See also HIGHWAYS.

1. Recovery for injuries sustained in an effort to save the life of a person placed in a position of peril by the negligence of another is not defeated by the contributory Right to regulate rates of public-service negligence of the person whose rescue is atcorporation; ordinance fixing maximum tempted. Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. rates for telephone company; construction Lynch (Ohio)

of.

728

Ordinance requiring air brakes on street cars; validity of; where equipment less reliable than one in use; effect of reservation, in ordinance as to running of cars, of right to make further regulations; question of reasonableness as matter for judicial interference; where express legislative authority for ordinance exists; sufficiency of charter power to prescribe manner in which highways and streets shall be used. 746 Injunction to restrain prosecution for violation of ordinance; where ordinance claimed to be invalid; imposing conditions upon right to traffic in liquor as invasion of constitutional rights; necessity that ordinance be reasonable; nature of proceedings under ordinance. 62 Power to provide lights and water supply; expense of, as “necessary;" judicial control over discretion of.

870

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504 2. That one who is injured in attempting to rescue another placed in a position of peril by the negligence of a third person is an employee of such negligent person, does not affect his right to recover for his injuries.

Id.

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5. Intent to injure is not necessary to render one liable under the rule that he is responsible for an injury who has the last clear chance to avoid it. Id.

6. To bring one within the operation of the rule that one having the last clear chance to avoid an injury is liable for it, notwithstanding the negligence of the person injured, it is not necessary that he should know that injury is inevitable if he fails to exercise care, but it is enough if the circumstances known to him are such as to convey to the mind of a reasonable person a question as to whether the other person will be liable to escape the threatened injury.

Id.

7. That a person who has negligently placed himself in peril negligently fails to

discover that fact does not relieve one who, knowing of the peril, negligently injures him, from the operation of the rule that the one having the last clear chance to avoid an injury is liable for it.

Id.

33. Presumption of, see EVIDENCE, 8–10. Liability of Master for injury to Third Person by Negligence of Servants, see MASTER AND SERVANT, 20-23. Of Sheep Inspector in Dipping Sheep 8. Persons using horses on the highway for Disinfection, see OFFICERS, 1. in close proximity to a gas well, and seeing Proximate Cause of Injury, see PROXI- an agent of the owner at or near it, have the right to presume that he will not open

MATE CAUSE.

See CARRIERS, 1-4.

it without warning or first looking for trav- | NEWSPAPER TRAIN.
elers on the road, and are not guilty of con-
tributory negligence in failing to turn and
fly from it, or in failing to give warning of
their presence. Snyder v. Philadelphia Co.
(W. Va.)
896

NOTES AND BRIEFS.

NEW TRIAL.

A new trial of an indictment against a physician for causing the death of a woman upon whom he attempted to produce an abortion should not be granted for newly discovered evidence which consists of stateelec-ments of a nurse in his employ as to declarations of deceased, where there is nothing to show that he could not, by reasonable dilithe trial. State v. Power (Wash.) gence, have discovered the evidence before 902

Negligence; liability for remote consequences of act; rule for determining proximate cause; negligence in permitting tric wire to remain out of place.

219

Liability of one committing negligent act for accident following but not resulting

from act.

875

NOTES AND BRIEFS.

In operation of elevator; proximate cause of injury; effect of concurring negligence New trial; for newly discovered evidence; of third person; elevator owner as common discretion of court as to. 903 carrier. 417

Of loss under Insurance Policy, see IN-
SURANCE, 1.

NOTICE.

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OATH.

Failure

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of

Judge to Take, Effect upon Validity of Judgment, see COURTS, 5.

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PAROL EVIDENCE.

writ and the declaration can be taken by Affecting Writings, see EVIDENCE, 14, 15. plea in abatement only, and after oyer. ld. Plaintiff's pleadings.

PARTIES.

See ACTION OR SUIT, 2-4.

PARTNERSHIP.

An agreement between one having a contract to grade a portion of a railroad and another party, by the terms of which the latter was to "put in" 16 mules and harness against the former's 6 mules and his services, and to receive one half of the net profits of the business for the use of his mules and harness, constitutes a partnership between them as to third persons, although they agreed that the second party was to have nothing to do with the work, and was not to be responsible for any debts. Brandon & Dreyer v. Connor (Ga.) 260

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8. A shipper who is made a party to a suit to compel a railroad company to furnish equal facilities to a rival upon a train which has been established at the shipper's solicitation, but against whom no relief is asked, cannot, by cross bill, compel complainant to share the expense which the establishment of the service has cost him. Memphis News Pub. Co. v. Southern R. Co. (Tenn.) 150

9. A contestee of an election, who holds a certificate to the office, regularly issued to him by the canvassing board, and who asks no affirmative relief, his answer going only to defeat the allegations made by the contestor, is not required by Kan. Gen. Stat. 1901, § 2659, to plead that he is an elector of the county. Cory v. Spencer (Kan.)

Demurrer.

275

10. A general demurrer will not raise the

objection that the declaration is bad for | as a credit on the passbook of his creditor. duplicity. Bowden v. Derby (Me.) 223 Hier v. Miller (Kan.)

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952

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650

as.

728

PROXIMATE CAUSE.

761

255

In quo warranto; covered by principles of common law.

POLICE.

Police Officers; Exemption from Pro-
visions of Statute as Constituting
Class Legislation, see CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, 3.

POLICE POWER.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 14. PREJUDICIAL ERROR.

See APPEAL AND ERROR, 20-29.

PRESUMPTION.

See EVIDENCE, 7-9.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

1. General authority of an agent to sell a horse is not destroyed because of the unlawfulness of the act by an attempt to exercise it on Sunday, so as to entitle the principal to repudiate the sale if consummated, and recover possession of the animal. Rickards v. Rickards (Md.) 724

Burden of Proof as to, see EVIDENCE, 13.
As Constituting Question for Jury, see

TRIAL, 6.

1. The act of a strange boy in pushing open the door of an elevator well and stepping back, apparently to allow another to enter the elevator, which was not there but at another floor, could not reasonably be foreseen as the probable result of the negligence of the owner of the building in permitting the hall to be so dark that it was difficult to see whether or not the elevator was there, in allowing boys to ride upon, and sometimes to operate, the elevator, in permitting the door of the shaft to stand open from 1 to 10 inches, and in failing to provide a lock that would prevent the opening of the door from the outside. Cole v. German Sav. & L. Soc. (C. C. A. 8th C.) 416

2. The negligence of the owner of a building in permitting a hallway leading to an elevator well to be so dark that it was difficult to see whether or not the ele2. The fact that the cashier is person- vator was there, in allowing boys to ride ally interested in the transaction is suf- upon, and sometimes to operate, the eieficient to put his creditor upon inquiry as vator, in failing to provide a lock that would to the actual extent of his power, where the prevent the door of the shaft from being cashier of a bank attempts to pay his indi- opened from the outside, and in permitvidual debt by entering the amount thereof 'ting it to stand open from 1 to 10 inches as

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