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have done had their design not been frus-, the one killed :-(I.) The general rule; trated, the officer was encountered and (II.) when murder in the first degree; killed.

Id. (III.) when murder in the second or a 4. Evidence that accused and others lower degree; (IV.) when manslaughter; armed themselves and started out to com- (V.) when justifiable or excusable; (VI.) mit a burglary, and that they encountered summary

660 and killed a police officer near the scene of In the commission of, or attempt to comthe intended crime, is sufficient to sustain mit, an abortion :-(I.) Scope; (II.) gena finding of deliberation and premeditation eral and common-law rules as to; (III.) necessary to constitute the crime of murder theories as to ground of criminal liability: in the first degree, although there is also (a) that it is killing in commission of unevidence that the officer was the first to fire. lawful act; (b) that it is killing in an act People v. Sullivan (N. Y.)

353 involving serious bodily harm; (IV.) grade 5. To sustain a conviction upon a charge or degree of the crime? (a) at common law; of murder in the first degree, where the (6) under general statutes as to degree of facts show the killing of a police officer dur- homicide: (1) when act is ngerous to ing an expedition undertaken for the pur- lire; (2) when not likely to cause death; pose of committing burglary, it is not nec- (c) under special statutes as to abortion; essary that all the jurors should agree that (V.) application of rules to the killing of there was a deliberate and premeditated de- the unborn child; (VI.) justification or exsign to take life, or that accused was, at cuse: (a) consent of woman; (b) the aborthe time of the killing, engaged in an at- tionist as an accessory before the act; (c) tempt to commit a felony; it is sufficient that act was necessary to life or health; that each juror is convinced beyond a rea- (VII.) the indictment: (a) at common law sonable doubt that accused committed the and under general statutes; (b) under specrime which the statute designates as murcial statutes; (VIII.) evidence: (a) adder in the first degree, when a killing is missibility generally; (b) dying declaraperpetrated under either condition. Id. tions; (c) sufficiency; (IX.) the trial and Manslaughter.

determination; (X.) conclusion.

902 6. A killing is not reduced to man

Homicide in the commission of an unslaughter, where a person, after having lawful act:-(I.) Scope; (II.) general been knocked down and having started to rules; (III.) homicide in the commission of leave the room, turned and fired back to felonies: (a) general and common-law rules; wards the spot where his assailant stood, but (b) statutory provisions as to: (1) their which had been vacated by him and was terms generally; (2) their construction and occupied by another, if at the time the shot effect on common-law rules generally; (c) was fired the accused recognized that the the effect of the felony: (1) general stateperson at whom he aimed was not his as- ment as to; (2) the prevailing rule; (3) sailant. White v. State i Tex. Crim. App.) exceptions; (d) the act of killing: (1)

660 with reference to criminality; (2) with ref7. That at the time one kills another he erence to methods of effecting; (e) the felis laboring under such a passion as deprives ony; nature of: (1) at common law and him of the power of forming the intent with under general statutes; (2) under statutes deliberate mind does not reduce the crime naming particular felonies; (3) doctrine to manslaughter, if the passion is caused that rule is confined to independent fel. by another person, and the killing of de-onies; (f) necessary relationship between ceased is intentional, and not by mistake, felony and killing: (1) what sufficient genunder a statute defining manslaughter as erally; (2) distinction between preparation homicide committed under the immediate in- and attempt; (g) killing in the perpetrafluence of sudden passion arising from ade- tion of acts naturally tending to destroy quate cause, and providing that the act life: (1) scope; general rules; (2) grossly must be directly caused by passion arising improper use of fire-arms; (3) assaults; out of a provocation, and that a provocation (4) dueling; (5) derailing railway train; given by some other person than the one (IV.) homicide in the commission of unkilled is not sufficient.

Id. lawful acts not felonies: (a) general and

common-law rules; (b) statutory provisions NOTES AND BRIEFS.

as to; (c) the preliminary unlawful act: Homicide; in commission of felony; what (1) its nature; what is unlawful generally; necessary to show premeditation and delib- | (2) rule that it must not be an ingredient eration; committed in repelling assault; in of the killing; (3) in particular cases: (a) resisting arrest without warrant by officer games, sports, and athletic performances ; not announcing his official character. 355 (6) mutual combat; (c) other miscellane

By unlawful act aimed at another than'ous matters; (d) what constitutes killing

1036 HUSBAND AND WIFE-INDICTMENT, INFORMATION, AND COMPLAINT. in commission of unlawful act: (1) gener-, the deceased, under the statute of descents ally; (2) improper use of dangerous weap- and distributions, by virtue of the former ons: (a) drawing contrary to law; (6) neg. relationship.

Id. ligently and carelessly handling; (3) as- 4. A husband who, pursuant to a decree saults; (V.) abandonment of unlawful de- of divorce adjusting property rights, pays sign; (VI.) homicide in resisting arrest; money to his former wife within six months (VII.) homicide in carrying out unlawful from the date of the judgment, cannot reconspiracy; (VIII.) homicide by act aimed claim it from the administrator of her esat another; (IX.) negligent homicide; (X.) tate should she die within six months from homicide in attempting or committing abor- the date of the decree with the money in tion; (XI.) homicide by excessive or im- her possession, since the title to the money proper chastisement; (XII.) the indictment: passes absolutely to her, although, by statia) application of general rules; (b) in ute, the decree does not become absolute un. case of killing in the commission of a fel- til the end of six months.

Id. ony; (c) in case of killing in the commission of an unlawful act not a felony;

NOTES AND BRIEFS. (XIII.) evidence: (a) application of gen- Husband and wife; effect, on relation of, eral rules; (b) admissibility generally; (c) of divorce not to become absolute until end effect of rule against proof of other crimes; of six months; where wife dies during such (d) sufficiency; (XIV.) instructions: (a) period; husband's right to recover alimony application of general rules; (b) as to kill. paid; when judgment of divorce goes into ing in the commission of a felony; (c) as effect; constitutionality of statute providto involuntary manslaughter; (XV.) the ing judgment shall not become absolute for conviction or acquittal: (a) power to con- six months; power of court to grant divorce vict of a lower degree; (b) effect of, as a independent of statute.

959 bar; (XVI.) conclusion.


Fraud as ground for annulment of mar

riage; where marriage is induced by de HUSBAND AND WIFE.

fendant's production of spurious child and See also FRAUD AND FRAUDULENT CON- false representations that plaintiff was the VEYANCES, l.

father thereof; effect of illicit intercourse 1. A marriage contract may be annulled prior to marriage on plaintiff's right of by the court, where it was procured by action; marriage considered as civil confraudulent representations by the woman


92 that during the man's absence from the

IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATION OF state she had given birth to a child of

CONTRACTS. which he was the father, and which she

See CONTRACTS, 8. purports to exhibit to him, no such child ever having been born, where the law re

IMPLIED WARRANTY. gards marriage as a civil contract, and the

See SALE. statute provides that it may be annulled when the consent of one of the parties is IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE. procured by fraud. Di Lorenzo y. Di Lo

See NEGLIGENCE, 3. renzo (N. Y.)

92 2. Under the provisions of Kan. Const. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR art. 2, § 18, vesting the power to grant di- Liability for Negligence of, see Masvorces in the district courts, subject to reg

TER AND SERVANT, 23. ulation by law, the legislature may forbid divorced persons

to marry within six INDICTMENT, INFORMATION, AND months of the date of the decree, and may

COMPLAINT. require the decree to recite the day and date 1. An indictment for murder in the comof its rendition, and that it do not become mon-law form is sufficient to admit proof absolute and take effect until the expiration of facts to bring a homicide within statuof six months from such date. Durland v. tory definitions of murder in the first deDurland (Kan.)

959 gree. People v. Sullivan (N. Y.) 353 3. Upon the rendition of a decree of di- 2. An indictment for failure to furnish vorce the relation of husband and wife no medical attendance to a minor as required longer exists between the parties to the by statute is not insufficient because of suit, notwithstanding a statute providing failure to allege that the case was one where that the decree shall not become absolute a physician ought to have been called, if it until six months after its rendition; and, alleges that accused unlawfully omitted to if one of them should die within six months perform the statutory duty of furnishing following the date of the decree, the sur medical attendance. People v. Pierson (N. vivor can take no share of the property of 'Y.)




secret, will be enjoined from disclosing the.

Stone v. Goss (N. J. Err. & App.) Indictment; necessity of averring exist

344 ence of facts and circumstances necessary to make act charged criminal.


2. One to whom the formula and right

to manufacture an unpatented, though seINFANTS.

cret, medical preparation have been sold by Requiring Furnishing of Medical At the discoverer cannot maintain an action

tendance to, as Constituting a De- for damages against another to whom the nial of Religious Freedom, see Con- discoverer has subsequently sold the same STITUTIONAL LAW, 13.

formula and right, without showing that Indictment for Failure to Furnish Med- the defendant, in the acquisition of the

ical Attendance to Minors, see In- formula, has been guilty of a breach of con-
DICTMENT, INFORMATION, AND Com. fidence or of contract with the plaintiff, or
hus acted in fraud of the plaintiff's rights.

255 1. Notice of rescission of a contract for

Stewart v. Hook (Ga.) life insurance, and demand for return of

3. The disclosure of a trade secret, necpremiums paid by an agent appointed by the essarily made to the court by complainants infant, is sufficient until avoided by the one in an action to enjoin its publication or use making the appointment. Simpson v. Pru- by others, does not deprive the complaindential Ins. Co. (Mass.) 741 ants of their right to the injunction. Stone

344 2. An infant is not bound by a contract V. Goss (N. J. Err. & App.) of insurance upon his life.

Id. 4. Persons who induce another to dis3. A statute requiring medical attend close a trade secret, knowing of his conance to be furnished to minors refers to the tract not to disclose it, or knowing that authorized medical attendance prescribed his disclosure is in violation of the confiby the statute relating to the qualification dence reposed in him, will be enjoined from and licensing of medical practitioners. Peo- making any use of the information so obple v. Pierson (N. Y.)


tained, although they might have reached

the same result independently by their own 4. A statute making a person liable for experiments or efforts.

Id. wilfully omitting to perform the duty im

5. Representatives of allied labor unions posed upon him by law to furnish medical attendance to a minor places the duty of ises where certain firms which have been

cannot be restrained from going upon premfurnishing such attendance upon the one upon whom the law imposes the obligation

placed upon the “unfair” list are employed, of caring for the minor.


for the purpose of ordering men belonging

to the various allied unions to cease work 5. The time when a physician must be

on the premises because such firms are emcalled, under a statute requiring the furnishing of medical attendance to minors, is of the premises does not object to their

ployed thereon,—at least where the owner when an ordinarily prudent person, solicit

doing so. Gray v. ous for the welfare of his child and anxious

Building Trades Council (Minn.)

753 to promote its recovery, would deem it nec. essary to do so.


6. Labor unions cannot be restrained

from merely notifying customers or proNOTES AND BRIEFS.

spective customers of certain firms that such Infants; common-law duty to furnish firms have been placed on the “unfair" list medical attendance to; constitutionality of by the unions because of their employment statute requiring medical attendance to be of nonunion men.

Id. furnished to.


7. Acts of a council of allied labor Negligence of; degree of care required unions which seek by intimidation to coerce from; competency as witness.

271 | laborers to join a particular organization Insurance on life of; binding effect of; and cause workmen to suffer damage are recovery of premiums; duty on rescission to unlawful, and will be enjoined. Erdman v. place insurer in statu quo. 741 Mitchell (Pa.)


See ANIMALS, 1, 2.

Injunction; to restrain prosecution for

violation of ordinance claimed to be inINJUNCTION.

valid; to prevent multiplicity of suits or Against Boycott, see BOYCOTT, 3.

irreparable injury. 1. One who is under an express con- To restrain, at suit of taxpayer, wrongtract, or a contract implied from a confi. ful appropriations of public money; to redential relation, not to disclose a trade strain collection of illegal tax.




To restrain construction of public im- | tentional act of a sane person. Shipman 7. provement at suit of abutting property Protected Home Circle (N. Y.) 347

267 Validity of policy. To restrain boycott by labor unions; to 6. An agent having general authority restrain strikers from leaving service of to solicit applications for certificates in a employer; injunction pendente lite as mat- mutual benefit association connected with a ter within discretion of trial court. 753 particular secret society has authority to

take applications for certificates from perINSANE PERSONS.

sons not members of the society, to become Duty of Carrier to Transport, see CAR- binding when the applicants shall become RIERS, 14-16.

members. Delaney v. Modern Accident Club Presumption as to Sanity of One Com- (Iowa)

603 mitting Suicide, see EVIDENCE, 7. 7. A benefit certificate to which by its

terms only a member of a particular assoINSTRUCTIONS.

ciation is entitled is not void because at the See TRIAL, 8, 9.

time the application is made the applicant

is not a member of the association, if the INSURANCE.

agent soliciting the application agreed that Application to Foreign Policies of Stat- the certificate should become binding when

ute Requiring that Copy of Appli- applicant was admitted into the association,
cation be Attached to Policy, see and he was in fact admitted before any lia-
bility arose under the certificate.

Id. Statute Forbidding Admissibility, in 8. A misstatement in an application for

Evidence, of Application, unless a benefit certificate that applicant is a memAttached to Policy, see EVIDENCE, ber of the fraternal association with which 16.

the benefit association is connected will not Rescission of Contract of Insurance by avoid the certificate if the facts are known Infant, see INFANTS, 1.

to the agent soliciting the application, and 1. Delay of twelve days after death re applicant becomes a member of the associasulting from accident before notifying the tion before any obligation accrues upon the insurer is not unreasonable, so as to defeat


Id. recovery upon the policy, although it re- Cause of death loss or injury. quires immediate notice to be given of the 9. An attempt to board a train of cars accident, and the accident occurred several running at 8 or 10 miles an hour, by a weeks before death ensued. Horsfall v. young, strong, and active man, with experiPacific Mut. L. Ins. Co. (Wash.) 425 ence as a “traveling man” in boarding and 2. A beneficiary in a mutual benefit cer

alighting from moving cars, is an exposure tificate acquires no vested interest in either to “obvious risk of injury," within the the certificate or the money to be paid un- meaning of an accident insurance policy der it, since he takes subject to whatever which excepts the insurer from liability for change may be made in the contract under injuries received as result of "voluntary the constitution and by-laws of the associa- or unnecessary exposure to danger, or to tion. Shipman v. Protected Home Circle obvious risk of injury;" and, when made (N. Y.)

347 merely for the purpose of avoiding the delay 3. The adoption of a by-law by a mu

incident to missing the train, will prevent tual benefit society relieving itself from lia

a recovery against the insurer for injuries bility for death benefits in cases of suicide received in consequence of such attempt. applies to existing members who have agreed Small v. Travelers' Protective Asso. (Ga.) to be bound by all rules that may be enact

510 ed, since there is no vested right to insur

10. The suicide of the assured will termiance covering such a risk, and the agree- nate the rights of the beneficiary in a mument that the insured shall not intentional. tual benefit certificate, the same as it would ly cause his own death is a fundamental, the rights of his legal representative. Shipthough unexpressed, part of the original man v. Protected Home Circle (N. Y.) 347 contract.

11. Where, by reason of the fact that a 4. The insurer is not entitled to deduct provision against suicide is found in the the cost of carrying the policy from the constitution of a mutual benefit association, premiums to be returned, in case of a repu- and a separate agreement with regard to it diation by an infant of a contract of insur- is inserted in the application, which conance upon his life. Simpson v. Prudential tains a general agreement as to keeping the Ins. Co. (Mass.)

741 rules and regulations of the association, it 5. A finding of suicide implies the in- lis doubtful whether a clause making the cer


tificate incontestable after a certain time, | other of his interest in partnership real except for breach of the rules and regula- estate is not a conveyance within the meantions, was intended to cover suicide,—the ing of a fire insurance policy making the doubt will be resolved in favor of the bene- policy void in case of a conveyance of the ficiary, and after the lapse of the stipulated property. German Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Fox period the association will be required to (Neb.)

334 pay the amount of the certificate, notwith

19. Recovery under a fire insurance polstanding its holder came to his death by icy is not prevented by a conveyance of the suicide. Royal Circle v. Achterrath (II.) | property in violation of its conditions, if,


prior to the loss, the property is recon12. Unless made so by statute, suicide is veyed to the insurer.

Id. not a crime, within the meaning of a mutual Waiver; estoppel. benefit certificate exempting the association 20. A mutual benefit society is estopped from liability in case the holder dies on ac

to take advantage of a clause in its certificount of violation of the criminal laws. Id. cate relieving it from liability for death by

13. A member of a mutual benefit asso-suicide, by a clause that, after the lapse of ciation does not cease to be in good standing a certain period, the only conditions binding by the fact that he commits suicide contrary on the member are the agreements as to full to the laws of the order, within the meaning compliance with the laws and rules of the of a clause in the policy making the certifi- association and full payment of the dues. cate incontestable after a certain period in Royal Circle v. Achterrath (Ill.) 452 case the member continues in good standing,

NOTES AND BRIEFS. except for nonpayment of dues and failure to comply with the rules of the association. Insurance; on life of infant; not con

Id. tract for necessaries; binding effect of; duty 14. Deathly paleness, cold extremities, of infant on rescinding to place insurer in and cold perspiration on hands and face, statu quo; right to recover back premiums

741 and the permanent change of color on the on rescission. following day from a ruddy hue to a bluish Conflict of laws as to contracts of; power gray, as the result of a dilation of the of state to regulate business of; prescribheart due to a heavy lift, constitute a visi. ing conditions on which foreign companies ble external mark, within the meaning of a may do business within state; company obpolicy insuring against irrjuries, but which taining authority to do business in state provides that it does not cover injuries deemed to have voluntarily submitted to where there are no visible, external marks laws.

833 upon the body produced at the time of and by the accident. Horsfall v. Pacific Mut. title, interest, or possession; reasonableness

Provision avoiding policy for change in L. Ins. Co. (Wash.)


of; forfeiture for violation of; conveyance 15. A dilation of the heart accompanied by one partner to the other as violation of; by deathly paleness, coldness of extremities, lease of property as violation of; effect of and cold perspiration on face and hands, change of title or possession to premises which results in death in a few weeks, and restored to original condition before loss is caused by a heavy lift, is within the terms

occurred; effect of giving mortgage where of a policy insuring against the effect of

same is released before loss occurs. 334 bodily injury "caused solely by external, violent, and accidental means.”


Effect of incontestable clauses; validity 16. Death caused by blood poisoning re

of; presumption that member of benefit soceived through a slight wound on the hand ciety continued in good standing; what conis the result of an accidental injury, within stitutes “good standing;” how loss of,


455 the meaning of an accident insurance policy, whether the poison was introduced into the

Waiver by insurer of conditions renderwound by the instrument which inflicted it ing policy void; estoppel to plead defense of or from other sources. Delaney v. Modern ultra vires; death by blood poisoning reAccident Club (Iowa) 603 ceived through slight wound as result of

603 17. A stipulation by an insrred that his

"accident.” interest shall revert to the insurer in case Amendment of by-laws of benefit society his death shall be caused by any illegal act as to suicide; binding effect of, on prior of his own applies to suicide, which is a members; effect of suicide on rights of bencrime at common law. Shipman v. Protect- eficiary; suicide as defense where policy ed Home Circle (N. Y.) 347 contains no reference thereto.

347 Forfeitures.

What constitutes an "accident;" recovery 18. A conveyance by one partner to the 'on policy where death results from disease

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