have been the consequence of the system of measures recommended by the archbishop,) would be a much greater. And in this opinion, I truft, I am not fingular, but have the concurrence of thoufands and tens of thousands of my fellow-fubjects. 66 Probibe lamenta fonare; Flere veta populos; lacrymas, luctus que remitte: Lucani Pharfalia, Lib. 7, vers. 707, 708, 709. F. M. OF THE STATE OF NORTH AMERICA, AFTER THE For the MORNING CHRONICLE. MR. PRINTEr, London, August 7, 1782. INCLOSED you have a letter wrote by a gentleman in South-Carolina to his friend in London, without the alteration of a word or fyllable. The writer I know to be a native of South-Britain, and that he is a gentleman of large property in America, where he has refided near twenty years. The knowledge and ability of the writer, and the fitness and propriety of the plans and reafons fuggefted, are fubmitted to the opinion of the nation; but whatever the politics of the day may determine, I am confident that Great-Britain will ere long be convinced, that it was her interest and her wisdom to have adopted and pursued them with an ardour, which is due to that patriotifm, integrity, and good fenfe, with which they are recommended by the writer, for the benefit of his King and country, A. B. South-Carolina, March 28, 1782. In the prefent fituation of affairs, to be filent is to be criminal; and I fhould ill deferve the confidence and friendship I have fo repeatedly experienced from you, if I did not give you my fentiments candidly on the times. The fall of Lord Cornwallis is, beyond a doubt, a misfortune of the firft magnitude, but by no means places America in so independent a fituation as the first com plexion of this unfortunate event seemed to give it in the eyes of the enemies to Great-Britain; but I am confining myself to the fouth country altogether, and, before I write another fentence, I will be free enough to own the impoffibility now of reducing the northern country to obedience, for there I confefs it is taking a bull by the horns. But the cafe is very different to the fouthward. The fall of Lord Cornwallis was not effected by the abilities, members, or refources of America: it was the power of France, it was their fuperior navy, and the infamous conduct of our own, that did the bufinefs: till the French gained this decifive advantage, our troops, though inferior in numbers, marched from one end of Virginia to the other, backwards and forwards, with little or no lofs. You will fay this is not conquering the country; I grant it; but it is exhausting it in fuch a manner, that another campaign, with fuccefs, muft fo cripple it, as to render it incapable of fupporting itself against your operations. Whilft this was doing, about fixteen hundred troops, under a fenfible and an active officer, kept North-Carolina not only at bay, but in actual fufpenfe; whilst the Tories were ranging at Jarge, and with fupport and judicious officers, would have very foon poffeffed themselves of all the principal leaders. in that country againft Britain. Why nothing was attempted to be done in South-Carolina, with fo fine an army, is a paradox only to be folved by comparing it with what was not done to the northward. Had my humble ideas prevailed either in England or New-York, Green would not have infulted a fuperior army fo long and fo fatally. I propofed (in my mind) that the laft reinforcement from England would have been. made 1500 ftrong, and that fuch a number would have been fent into North-Carolina, and either landed at Cape Fear or Edenton; and forced their march to the weftward, and and back of Green, whilft the fouthern army pushed him in front; a few weeks muft have decided his fate, and he would have been fortunate if he could capitulate-this was what be dreaded; and therefore a moft fubftantial reason why it was not done: at that time near 6 or 7000 men were under parole, their internal government diftra&ted, their governor a prifoner, and Wilmington open as an asylum and protection for the loyalifts; the greatest difficulty attended fupplies getting to Green, either men or ftores. The subject, was I to continue it, would fwell too large for a letter; I fhall, therefore, briefly give you my opinion upon what ought to be done, and what can be done, if Great-Britain has only virtue enough left to hang, and substitute honesty, activity, and plan-instead of fupinenefs, confufion, &c. &c. The force that Great-Britain has now in America is fully fufficient for the plan I propose, which is to bring all their force to the fouthward, and reduce the whole as far to the northward as James River: this is not vifionary, like all the fchemes our country has been purfuing thefe feven years, but is real and fubftantial. How, evacuate New-York, and leave the loyalists to the mercy of the rebels? My aufwer fhall be fhort: If you don't do this, you must evacuate all America. What is then to become of the loyalifts? Can any man in his fenfes think, that holding New-York with 14 or 15,000 troops in its garrifon, will prevent the independence of America? The way to prevent it, is to conquer that country that is acceffible to our arms; to keep their internal government in confufion by the operations of war; to prevent the cultivation of their lands; to increase their diftrefs by the continual drafts of men for their army; and the extreme burthen their taxes must be. Now their paper currency is annihilated, if Washington comes to the fouthward, so much the better; he greater muft the ex penfe be to the Americans, the better opportunity to bring him to a decifive action, and the fooner will the country be exhaufted of its refources; which I am fure you need not be told is every day growing lefs and lefs, notwithftanding all the pompous harangues of the patriots and republicans. What I purpofe can be compleated in twelve months, if a man of courage and wifdom is placed to conduct it. It would be wifer in the nation to vote a few thousand pounds as a compenfation for loffes to fuch loyalifts as may incline to follow the British standard from New-York, than idly to wafte millions on what I will be bold to pronounce fhe will never effect, if the prefent measures are re-adopted and purfued. If a poft is wanted to the northward, why not take Rhode Island, a much lefs garrifon is neceffary? But why will not Tybee and Beaufort answer for our fhipping? and, if fortune should ever give us a fuperior advantage over the French by fea (and, if you had honeft and wife men to direct your naval officers, you would have done it long ago), what is to prevent our taking poffeflion of the Chesapeak again? If Great Britain gains the provinces of Georgia, South and North-Carolina, and Virginia, fhe will have the only places worth her contending-for: and " that she can gain them" is indifputable. Let her whole force be brought to this point: determine to extirpate rebellion by inftantly punishing thofe who fhall oppofe them either by arins or any other way. Court and reward thofe who join you, and let your addrefs and money be applied for this purpose; prevent plundering either foes or friends ; exact the stricteft difcipline; establish a civil and moderate code of government, till the country is prepared for the reception of its former civil government; endeavour and invite the principal perfons in each province into a fhare of its government; avoid the leaft shadow of difrefpect |