make out of the expression is that the some special service in construction of work of grading and excavating the road bed were contracted to S. R. Adams or to Spring & Adams. If this is the meaning of this sentence it is intirely immaterial and can be stricken out of the notice without impairing its sufficiency. It would make no difference in whose name the contract for grading the roadbed might have been made, if the property was Adams' and used in and about the work of grading and the labor was done for him, as the notice positively avers.

works for the opening of mines preparatory to their being operated, and concluded by finding that the property sold in that case was not connected with or used in carrying on any branch of business described in the Act of 1872. In the latter case the same judge holds that the "words, 'works, mines, manufactory,'" thus employed in the Act have a definite signification well understood in their general and popular acceptation. Ex vi termini the branches of business intended to The question raised by the first, second be described are, in a certain sense comand fourth exceptions goes to the merits plete and independent and of a fixed and of the claims set up by the different la- permanet character as opposed to a temborers. The learned counsel for the porary employment that is merely inciplaintiff in the execution claims that the dental to any particular branch of busigrading of a railroad under contract is ness. If the Act of 1872 had not been not a business contemplated by the Act amended by the supplementary Acts of of 1972 and its sudplements of 1883 and 1883 and 1891, we would be obliged to 1891; that these acts contemplate a busi- hold that these labor claims could not ness complete and independent, of a fixed share in the distribution of the fund in and permanent character, as opposed to court. The construction of the Act of a temporary employment that is merely 1872 is attended with considerable diffiincidental to any particular branch of culty because of the want of clearness in business, and in his contention relies the use of terms. The first clause of the mainly upon the Appeal of the Gibbs & Sterrett Manufacturing Co., 100 Pa. 528, wherein Justice Sterrett held that one who by special contract undertakes the drilling of oil wells and in such works employs laborers, is not an employer or contractor within the purview of the Act of April 9, 1872, giving a preferred lien to the wages of certain classes of employers; and Pardee's Appeal, supra, in which it was decided by the same judge that cutting saw logs for the owners and driving them to the place of manufacture, After the passage of this act, a number is not a business which comes within the of conflicting decisions were rendered in Act. It is to be noticed that both these the lower courts and finally the Act was cases were decided in 1882, before either reviewed in the Supreme Court, and a of the supplements to the Act of 1872 large number of claims for labor were exwere passed. In the first of the above cluded from the operation of the Act cited cases Judge Sterrett held that Lewis which the legal profession generally bewho had the contract for drilling the oil lieved the legislature intended to embrace well was clearly neither owner, under within its terms. These decisions led owner, nor lessee of the oil wells. He finally in 1883 to an amendment which had no interest whatever therein, nor was added to the class of employes, "servant he a contractor withing the meaning of girls at hotels, boarding houses, restauthe Act, the word "contractors" as used rants, or in private families, and other therein is applicable only to persons em- servants and laborers in said houses of ployed by the owner or lessee of the mine entertainment and private houses, porters, to operate the same, produce the mineral, hostlers, employees in and about livery coal, iron or whatever it may be, for an stables, laundrymen, washerwomen, seamagreed compensation, and does not em- sters, seamstresses, dressmakers, hands, brace those who undertake to perform laborers, printers, &c.," thus adding

first section of that Act which has given rise to a variety of conflicting decisions may be briefly analyzed as follows: it seeks, (1) to specify the classes of employees as "clerks, miners, mechanics or laborers;" (2) the employer as "person or persons or chartered companies;" (3) the relation of the employer to the business, as "owners, lessees, contractors, and under owners;" and (4) the nature of business to be carried on, as "works, mines, manufactory, etc."

read hand laborers, and the term "clerks" is made to embrace clerks employed in stores and elsewhere.

chanics are employed," which appears in the earlier act immediately after the words "from any person or persons or chartered company employing clerks, miners, mechanics or laborers either as owners, lessees, contractors or underowners," thus extending the protection of the law to the classes of employes designated without respect to the character of the employer; but this does not affect the present claimant. The business of the defendant was that of manufacturing, and if the claimant is such an employe as is contemplated by either the Act of 1883 or that of 1891, he is entitled to a preference."

largely to the employe class. By this amendment of 1883, no changes were made in the class of employers, nor in the business of the employer. But this The most important change in the act amendment did not accomplish all that is effected by omitting the words "of any the friends of that kind of legislation works, mines or manufactory, or other sought. The numerous decisions of the business where clerks, miners or medifferent courts by this time had taught the legislature a principle they ought to have remembered in the first place, that "exceptions strengthen the force of the general law, while enumeration weakens as to things enumerated," and the familiar maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. As the Act of 1883 was intended to extend the class of employes, so the Act of 1891, amending the Act of 1883, sought to widen the classification of the business about which those different classes of persons were employed, and as the legislature had now learned the danger of enumerating or specifying the different branches of business, as "works, mines, manufactory," they omitted entirely that portion of the Act of 1883 and 1872 which limited the employment to common pleas of Philadelphia, Judge works, mines, manufactories, and this Mitchell, speaking of the Act of 1883, omission of the classification from the Act says: "From the preamble of the act, of 1891 is significant. It was clearly in- from its avowed purpose to enlarge the tended to cure the defects in the prior restricted construction that had been acts disclosed by the decisions of Justice given to the Act of 1872, and from the Sterrett in Pardee's Appeal and the ap- language used, such as the specification peal of the Gibbs and Sterrett Manufac- of 'servant girls at hotels turing Company. The Act of 1891 also or in private families, increases the class of employers by adding to any person or persons or chartered company, as fouud in the Acts of 1872 and 1883, the words "joint stock companies, limited partnerships or other partnership."

In re Assigned Estate of the Clymer Distilling Company, 17 W. N. C. 374,

hostlers,

porters, washerwomen,' etc., we are of the opinion that the Act of 1883 includes all kinds of business in which any of the classes of employes named in the act are engaged.”

In the case of Purefoy v. Brown, 13 C. That we are correct in our view as to C. R. 281, is a case in which the facts are the effect of the amendment of the Act of the same as the case under consideration. 1891 upon previous decisions, we refer to There a confessed judgment was entered Witmer v. Miller, 12 C. C. R. 363, where- against T. K. Brown, a railroad contracin Judge McMullen says "The Act of tor, in favor of G. R. Purefoy, on which Assembly of May 12, 1891, amending the execution was issued. Brown's property Act of June 13, 1883, enlarges the class was sold by the sheriff and an auditor apof persons only by including in the term pointed to distribute the proceeds of the "hand laborer," farm laborers or any sale, who apportioned the proceeds other kind of laborer, and by the addition amongst the labor claimants. The plainto printers and apprentices of "all other tiff in the judgment excepted. Judge tradesmen" hired for wages or salary, Bittenger, July 5, 1893, says, in dismissbeyond this it does not enlarge, but rather ing the exceptions to the auditor's report: restricts the classes of employes. The "The Act approved May 12, 1891, P. L. general class "hands," is omitted altogether, and in order that the word laborer may not be permitted too wide a scope, it prefixes the word "hand" to it, so as to

54, amending the Act of June 13, 1883, clearly extended the provisions of the Act of 1872 and subsequent acts to all hired laborers, including farm laborers or any

other kind of laborers entitled to wages defendant fraudulently contracted the debt or salaries, preferred in cases of distribu- for which the claim is made? This is a tion of estates and effects of individuals, matter for the court to determine; under partnerships and corporations indebted to the sixth section of the act of March 17, them for labor and services." In this 1869, P. L. 10. Such was held to be the case it was conceded by the parties that law in The Mechanics' Nat. Bank of the Act of 1891 was broad enough to Phila. v. The Miners' Bank of Summit cover the claimants in the distribution, Hill, Com. Pleas of Carbon Co., No. 10, provided the act of assembly was consti- June T., 1883, wherein Judge Dreher tutional, valid and applicable, and the says: "As this is a special writ for the only question raised was the constitution commencement of a suit under the act of ality of the Act of 1891. The court held assembly which provides a mode of prothat the act was constitutional. As that ceeding to dissolve the attachment, that question is not raised by the exceptions proceeding must be adopted, and as the in this case, we say nothing on the sub- court, or a judge in vacation, must deterject. mine the truth of the allegations contained in the affidavit, it would seem that there are no facts, as respects such allegations, to be determined by a jury.” See also, Walls, v. Campbell, 23 W. N. C. 506; Herman v. Saller, 25 W. N. C. 408; Brewster's Practice, Vol. I. 59.

We therefore hold that the learned auditor committed no error in distributing this fund to the labor claimants set forth in the schedule of distribution, and the exceptions are therefore dismissed and the report confirmed.

C. P. of

Hooven Mercantile Co. v. Backley. Attachment-Affidavit of fraud-Infancy.

The evidence shows that the fraudulent Luzerne Co contraction of the debt complained of was through a credit statement given by Andrew J. Backley, a boy of eighteen years of age, and a son of the defendant, who An attachment under act of 1869, based on affidavit alleging that the debt was fraudulently was then running the business for her. contracted, will be dissolved where only proof There is no proof to connect the defendof fraud is that a minor son of defendant, without defendant's knowledge, and without having been authorized to do so, made a false statement to gain credit for the defendant.

ant with this credit slip. She was in a house adjoining the store at the time it was being taken, and the young man

Rule on plaintiff to show cause why the went in and talked to her whilst it was

attachment should not be dissolved.

George H. Troutman for plaintiff. G. L. Halsey for defendant. March 26, 1895, CRAIG, P. J., 43rd District, specially presiding. -At the argument the first ground for maintaining the attachment, viz: that the defendant "has assigned and disposed of her property with intent to defraud her creditors,' was abandoned. The plaintiff conceded that the evidence did not sustain the charge.

This brings us to the consideration of the second ground, which avers that the defendant fraudulently contracted the debt for which the claim is made. This charge is specifically denied in the affidavit of the defendant. Hence the burden of proof is on the plaintiff; Butcher v. Fernau, Kulp 401; Easterline v. Jones, 2 Kulp 121; Miller v. Paine, 2 Kulp 304; Adams v. Baily, 17 W. N. C. 399; Hall v. Kintz, 13 C. C. 24. Has, then, the plaintiff, by its proofs, shown that the

Un

going on. The plaintiff called Andrew
J. Backley, and made him a witness. It,
therefore, avouched his credibility, and
is estopped from averring to the contrary.
It cannot contradict his testimony.
angst v. Goodyear, 2 North Repts. 90;
Stockton et al. v. Demuth, 7 Watts 39.
Young Backley swears that he furnished
the items of the credit statement "out of
my head"; that he did not talk to his
mother about it at the time plaintiff's
agent was in the store getting the state-
ment; that his mother knew nothing
about the matter; that he had no author-
ity from her to sign it as attorney; and
that his mother did not know there was
a statement made until after the sheriff's
sale of the store.

We must confess that this evidence is not free from suspicious circumstances. But we must bear in mind that Backley was plaintiff's witness. The plaintiff cannot be allowed to assert that so much as tells against the defendant is true, and that what witness tells in her favor is false.

of money ($1000.00) if she would cease making resistance to his application for a The wife of the defendant presented her divorce and sign a deed to convey his real petition, showing separation between herself estate, which proposition she rejected. and husband, and alleging that the judgment That he then made threats that unless she was part of a collusive and fraudulent scheme complied with his demands he would disto deprive her of her dower interest in her husband's lands, in case she should survive him. pose of his property so as to deprive her The answers filed by the plaintiff and defend- of her dower interests in his lands. That ant denied these allegations, averring that the her said husband is the owner of real esnote was given for money actually paid to Neff tate in this county of the value of about by Taylor. The testimony showed that Neff had repeatedly tried to sell his real estate, but that his wife always refused to join in the conveyance, and that this judgment was given for

against her husband of about $1100.00 opened and he let into a defence, that he for interest due her on money that she loaned to him.

That in pursuance of the threats made, as aforesaid, her husband, on the 25th day of March, 1895, executed to his sonin-law, Wm. H. Taylor, a judgment exemption note for the sum of $2000.00, which was entered of record in the court on the 27th day of March, 1895, to No. 848, January Term, 1895 and on which, on the same day, a Fi. Fa. was issued to No. 146, April Term, 1895, and upon which the sheriff levied upon said real estate, and is about to condemn it so as to enable a writ of venditioni exponas to be issued and said real estate sold by the sheriff. That her husband has personal estate of the value of about $400.00, which was not levied upon by virtue of said writ.

has no defence whatever to make to the said judgment confessed by him to William H. Taylor; that he received full consideration and value, to wit, the sum two thousand dollars ($2000.00) from the said Willian H. Taylor for said judgment so confessed by him; that said money was paid to him in cash by the said William H. Taylor, in the presence of Frank Geise, Esq.; that said $2000.00 was paid by said William H. Taylor in part consideration of the sale made to him, the said Taylor, of real estate sold to him in the latter part of September, 1894, for which a deed was to be given him on the 1st day of April, 1895; that it was given with a view of carrying out the contract, which in good faith, was made by the said William H. Taylor and your deponent, and without any view, as alleged That your petitioner avers, and is ready in the petition filed by Matilda Neff, of to prove it, that the said judgment of depriving her of any right of dower, but Wm. H. Taylor v. her husband, of with the view simply and solely of carry$2000.00, is without a valid, legal and ing into effect the contract made by your bona-fide consideration, and is collusive deponent. and fraudulent, and was given and confessed by her husband as a part of a fraudulent scheme to deprive your petitioner from the collection of her claim of $1100.00 against her husband, and for the purpose of depriving her of her dower, or inchoate interest, in the real estate aforesaid of her husband.

Your deponent further emphatically denies the representations made in the said petition as set forth by the said Matilda Neff, petitioner, in relation to the divorce proceedings as set forth, but admits that negotiations were pending between your deponent and his said wife for a settlement of the difficulties existing between them, but not as set forth in the said petition.

Your deponent further denies that he owes to his said wife, Matilda Neff, or that she has any valid claim against him for $1100.00 for interest due on money that she loaned to him, and that he has paid her every dollar that is due and legally owing to her, and he therefore prays that the rule to show cause why the judgment should not be opened, may be dismissed by your honorable court at the cost of the petitioner.

CHARLES NEFF.
And the plaintiff answered:

In the Court of Common Pleas of York
County.

I, William H. Taylor, plaintiff in judgment No. 848, January Term, 1895, and Fi. Fa. No. 146, April Term, 1895, make answer to the petition of Matilda Neff to show cause why judgment should not be opened and defendant let into a defence, that he has a valid claim against Charles