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39.9 that Charinus actually had the kind of plate known as argentum purum (unembossed) weakens the point of the epigram. The phrase used in the first line, argenti genus omne is simply an echo of Charinus' boast and is not to be taken seriously. While the statement at v. 22. 6. that many of the aqueducts entered Rome by way of the Esquiline is of course true, it is extremely doubtful whether this fact accounts for the mud in the region where the clivus Suburanus was. At viii. 51. 7 the important word is opus, not materiae; the lines that follow (9-16) refer to the workmanship. The number of this epigram is incorrectly given as 50.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
G. J. LAING
Die orientalischen Religionen im römischen Heidentum. Vorlesungen am Collège de France gehalten von FRANCE CUMONT. Autorisierte deutsche Ausgabe von GEORG GEHRICH. Leipzig und Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1910.
The original French edition of this collection of lectures was reviewed by Professor Showerman in an earlier number of this Journal (III , 465-67). This translation is based on the second French edition. The translator has made numerous additions to the notes, bringing the bibliography up to date, and has made the material of the lectures more accessible by providing an index. The work is done well.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
G. J. LAING
Le Procès de Phidias dans les Chroniques d'Apollodore d'après un papyrus inédit de la collection de Genève. Déchiffré et commenté par JULES NICOLE avec un fac-simile. Genève: Librairie Kündig, 1910.
The document consisting of two badly mutilated fragments belongs to the third century A.D. Only the central portions of the two columns are preserved. No considerable restorations were possible. For, though the text is in iambic trimeters, it is written continuously with spaces to indicate the separate verses. With great skill and learning Nicole has reconstructed the narrative in outline. As in Plutarch's account (Pericles 31) Menon is the accuser. The charge is embezzlement of ivory intended for the statue of Athena. The prosecution failed to secure a verdict in the assembly; a fuller investigation was ordered. In the meantime Phidias was kept in prison. Taking advantage of a revulsion of popular feeling in favor of the distinguished sculptor the Eleans secured his liberation by giving bail in the amount of 40 talents; and Phidias went to Elis to make the statue of Zeus.
This was in the year 438-437. Four or five years later the case against Phidias came to trial. As the Eleans refused to surrender him he was condemned and his bail was forfeited. On the completion of the statue of Zeus in the year 432-431 the Eleans showed their gratitude to Phidias by conferring isotelia on him.
The strength of Nicole's reconstruction lies in the fact that it accounts for practically all of the statements of the ancient authorities. It explains how Aristophanes (Pax 605 ff.) connected the trial of Phidias and the Megarian decree. Even the elder Seneca's incredible statement that the Eleans secured the services of Phidias by agreeing to pay 100 talents if they did not return him to Athens appears to be wrong only in the amount. But we may well hesitate to believe that the Eleans were willing to forfeit the enormous sum of 40 talents even to secure and retain the services of so distinguished an artist as Phidias. Is it not possible that the reference is to the amount of gold on the Zeus statue? The gold used for the Athena statue weighed 44 talents (Schol. Aristoph. Pax 605).
Limitations of space and the laudable desire to publish the document as speedily as possible precluded a full treatment of the subject on the basis of the extensive modern literature. Until this is done Nicole's views will be accepted with more or less reservation.
ROBERT J. BONNER
Roman Stoicism. By E. VERNON ARNOLD, Litt.D. Cambridge: University Press, 1911. Pp. ix+468. $3.50.
This excellent book may be recommended to the English student as the best guide to the subject. It does not, of course, attempt to supersede Zeller, or to take the place of the abundant special French and German literature on Stoicism referred to in the appended bibliography. But it is a much more solid performance than Davidson's The Stoic Creed or Capes's little handbook, and its 467 pages give opportunity for a more extended treatment of the theme than is possible in Hicks's Stoics and Epicureans. Writing avowedly for students of Latin literature, Professor Arnold has constructed the history of Stoicism as far as possible from the writings of Cicero and Seneca, copiously quoted in the footnotes. But with the aid of Von Arnim's fragments, Zeller, Stein, Pearson, and Schmekel, whom he sometimes follows. quite closely, he has made the work a sufficient compendium of Stoic doctrine as a whole.
The first three chapters, broadly introductory, are entitled "The World Religions," "Heraclitus and Socrates," "The Academy and the Porch." The fourth and fifth chapters, on the preaching of Stoicism, and the Stoic sect in Rome, complete the historic introduction. The doctrine follows in ten chapters, "Of Reason and Speech," "The Foundations of Physics,"
"The Universe," "The Supreme Problems," "Religion," "The Kingdom of the Soul," "The Law for Humanity," "Daily Duties," "Sin and Weakness," "Counsels of Perfection," and the whole concludes with two admirable chapters on "Stoicism in Roman History and Literature," and "The Stoic Strain in Christianity."
The book, originally composed in the form of lectures, is pleasant reading, and if one admits the standpoint of perhaps excessive sympathy with Stoicism it is essentially sound in scholarship. "To understand Stoicism," says the author, "a man must himself become for the time being a Stoic whilst constantly referring to the original authorities, he will allow much to be forgotten and in other cases he will draw out more meaning than the writers themselves set in their words" (p. 28). This gives the reader fair warning. And if the reviewer were to apply these critical principles to Mr. Arnold's own book he would have nothing but praise for the way in which the author has accomplished the task which he set himself. But in a technical journal it may be permissible to indicate some reserves and to call attention to a few inadvertences or errors.
1. In the introductory chapters, and indeed, throughout the book, there is, I think, some exaggeration of the debt of Greek philosophy to oriental thought. The proemium of Diogenes Laertius is quoted with approval (p. 3); Xenophon, we are told, derived from Cyrus his belief in the immortality of the soul (p. 10); the doctrine of the λóyos is traced to Persism (pp. 12, 19, etc.); we are told that the emissaries of Buddhism "must" often have appeared in the Hellenistic world (p. 15), and that the system of Zeno "deals with all the great themes touched upon by Chaldaism, Persism, and Buddhism" (p. 17). And lastly Lightfoot is quoted with approval to the effect that "Stoicism was the earliest offspring of the union between the religious consciousness of the East and the intellectual culture of the West" (p. 29). This is of course partly a matter of opinion. The Greek mind doubtless received impressions from the Orient, and it is impossible to determine a priori the precise measure of its debt. But, as Zeller has shown, the evolution of Greek philosophy is quite intelligible and complete in itself, and it seems unnecessary therefore to multiply hypotheses. Moreover, the vague appeal to oriental influence sometimes leads to neglect or misinterpretation of the Greek sources. It may or may not be true that Persian monotheism influenced the Greek religious thought of the fifth century. But it is quite fanciful to say (p. 38) that "the same Aeschylus who (in his Persae) celebrates the defeat of the national enemy, a few years later (in his Agamemnon) questions whether the Supreme Ruler be really pleased with the Greek title of Zeus and the Greek method of worshiping him." This is simply to mislead the student with regard to a commonplace of Greek idiom and Greek religious language. It is wholly fantastic to see a concession to the religion of Persia in the words of the chorus, Zevs oorIS ποτ' ἐστὶν εἰ τόδ' αὐτῷ φιλον κεκλημένῳ, as it is to say (p. 46) that it might
be fairly argued that Socrates was introducing the most essential parts of the religion of the national enemy, Persia.
2. The overestimate of Stoicism leads to some neglect of the priority of Plato and Aristotle. Professor Arnold repudiates the view of Antiochus that Stoicism is merely a new terminology for ideas borrowed from the Academy and the Lyceum (p. 152). He argues that the entire spirit and tendency of the Stoic philosophy is opposed to Platonism and therefore original. That is a tenable thesis. But it does not justify the repeated introduction of specific ideas, clearly formulated by Plato, as if they were new and characteristic Stoic discoveries. For example, on p. 87, Professor Arnold speaks of a passage of Cleanthes in which we are "introduced to an ethical paradox of the highest importance to Stoicism: that good and evil are set in the will and the intention, and are not dependent upon the action." This elementary moral principle may or may not be a paradox. But it is explicitly stated in Plato's Laws. Again, while there is a general acknowledgment that the later Stoics Platonized, nothing is said of the repeated quotations of Plato by Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. There is only the barest allusion to the anticipation of the entire Stoic theodicy in Plato's Laws. And in the final chapter the beginning of the Fourth Gospel is referred to Stoicism, not Platonism. Again it is a complete misunderstanding of the work of Plato and Aristotle in science to write (on p. 74) that "they [the Stoics and Epicureans] agreed in removing the barrier which Socrates had set up against the pursuit of natural science" (cf. also p. 175). The tyro could only infer from this that the Stoics and Epicureans cultivated science more than the Platonists and Aristotelians did, than which nothing could be farther from the truth.
3. The weakest point in the exposition of Stoic doctrine is the account of the psychology, which Professor Arnold possibly despaired of making intelligible in a lecture. He perhaps reads too much modern meaning into his texts when he asks us to distinguish carefully between the simple sensation, the mind picture, and the notion, or idea. For this is what the ancients rarely did. They usually distinguished two things only: sense, and inference from sense, the action of mind, but rarely isolated the percept from the sensation on the one hand and the concept on the other. There is also, I think, some inadequacy in the treatment of dowμara. It is somewhat misleading to say (p. 146) "thought is immaterial." The λEKTOV, which is immaterial, is not the phrase, or word, nor yet the idea, but, if I understand it, the "meaning" of the word, or perhaps rather the meaning of the predication or the sentence. For it is not quite clear that in the case of general nouns the Stoics always assumed an immaterial AeKTóv between the word and the idea, both of which were material.
4. Lastly, among minor inadvertences, I note the following: The word Vπóbeσis is used as a synonym for the idea in Plato (p. 57). This is common doctrine in England, and its occurrence here is sufficiently explained by the
dedication of this volume to Professor Henry Jackson. It is nevertheless a demonstrable misinterpretation of a passage of the Phaedo, and will some time be recognized as such. On p. 142 åπepiowaσtos does not quite mean "such as no reasoning process can shake." On p. 145 pîμa and κatnyópnμa are identified. Strictly, perhaps too strictly, speaking, I think pua is the infinitive. On p. 167 κοινῶς ποιόν and ἰδίως ποιόν are not quite correctly exemplified by "heat in the universe and heat in particular objects." The idíws Totóv is more nearly the haecceitas of the schoolmen, the apoioμa of Plato's Theaetetus, an individual thing regarded as a complex of qualities or predicates rather than as an Aristotelian first substance. On p. 193, the statement that in the conflagration the Deity "may at last claim for himself a period of rest during which he will contemplate with calmness the history of the universe that has passed away and plan for himself a better one to follow" is a rhetorical amplification of Senecan rhetoric hardly to be reconciled with the recognition on the same page of the doctrine that all things will recur in a cycle. On p. 391, we are told that "in a happy phrase Vergil sums up the whole ethics of Stoicism . . . . the Stoic sage can hesitate or be hasty, can love or weep, but the sovereignty of his mind is never upset. "Calm in his soul he abides, and the tears roll down but in vain." But surely in mens immota manet, lacrimae volvuntur inanes, it is not the tears of Aeneas but those of Dido that "rolled down in vain."
Eurythmia, vel compositio rythmica prosae antiquae. Exposuit CAROLUS ZANDER. I, Eurythmia Demosthenis. Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1910.
In the preface to The Crown of Wild Olive, Ruskin writes, "No proud one! no jewelled | circlet flaming through heaven above the height of the unmerited throne, | only some few leaves of wild olive, cool to the tired brow, through a few years of peace. It should have been of gold, they thought; but Jupiter was poor; this was the best the god could give them. | Seeking a greater than this, they had known it a mockery. | Not in war, not in wealth, not in tyranny, I was there any happiness to be found for
them only in kindly peace, | fruitful and free." These words easily fall into the following eurhythmic scheme: