Page images

-γλυφος, ον

χρυσό, Hesych. s.v. χρυσοτόρευτα. ayaλuaro, Vett. Val. 4. 12 Kroll, +

KEрато-, PS.-Didym. ad II. 4. 110,

E.M. 505. 11. δούρατο, Lyc.

ȧvopiavтo-, Tzetz. Lyc.
ὀδοντογλύφον, Th., without ref.
avró-, PS.-Plut. Fluv. 12. 2.
ὠτογλύφον, CCL. 3. 368. 8.
(wo-, Mel. in Anth. P.

ev, Ambros. ad Psalm. 118 Serm.

16. 42,+

(w-, pap. Lond. 1. 46. 15.

ἀ κέλυφος, ον, Theophr.

κοσώλυφος, Hesych.

Κίνυφος, Ρ.

A-úpos, pap. Tebt. 1. 5. 249, Cod.

Theod. 10. 20. 8,+

†* Γελνυφος, [p. 203.

Boúpos, Anton. Mon. Lex. [p. 200. oplo-pos, pap. Grenf. 2. 79. 1, 3

(see Wilcken Ostr. 1. 173 f.n.). κούφος, η, ον, Hom.,+ †Koupos, Act. SS. Sept. 8. 45 C. †kovov, Wilcken Ostr. Gr. 43,

etc., pap. Goodsp. 30. 14. 22,+, Apophth. 257 C Migne [p. 211. tκauvoдoupov, pap. Wilcken Ostr. Gr. 1. 766 f.n. 2.

ὑπόκουφος, ον, Plut., CGL. 2. 466. 41. Kaρvóκovos, ov, Antioch. Pandect.

1573 D Migne.

-πάρυφος, ον

ȧ-, Ps.-Plut. Pro Nobil. (Th.). powiкo, Dion. H.

λevко-, Antip. ap. Plut. 2. 180 E. Xρvσo-, Plut.

eu-, Nicostr. 3. 282 Mein.,+ typvpós, Mela 2. 1. 1, 3. 7. 2 [p. 200. δρύφος, Hesych.

ἀμφίδρυφος, ον, Hom., + Kρúpos, Pind.,+ [p. 213. - κρυφος, ον

máy, Justin Mart.

y-, Nonn.

éπí-, Pind.,+

áró-, Hdt., Eur.,+

évaró-, Acta Thomae 123 Bonnet,+ vó-, Schol. Ar. Ach. 96 Dind. Kópνpos, IG. 4. 929. 17, 18, 19, etc., Herodian 1.225. 18 L.,+ [p. 204. Κόρυφον, Ρ. [p. 204.

[blocks in formation]
[blocks in formation]
[blocks in formation]



Stobaeus Florilegium 7. 21: χρυσίππου· Ἔλεγεν δὲ ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀλγεῖν μὲν τὸν σοφόν, μὴ βασανίζεσθαι δέ· μὴ γὰρ ἐνδιδόναι τῇ ψυχῇ. Καὶ δεῖσθαι μέν, μὴ προσδέχεσθαι δέ. In the last sentence it is hardly possible to find a satisfactory meaning for poodéɣeola. To say that the wise man needs (things) but does not expect them is not very pointed, and, moreover, it is not true of the Stoic sage. An alternative would be to take poσdéɣeolai in the technical sense of προσλαμβάνειν, λαμβάνειν, sumere. But there is,

I believe, no authority for that use of the word, and, again, it is the reverse of the truth to say that the Stoic sage needs things but does not take or accept them. On the contrary, his way is to take things while denying that they are good or necessary to his happiness (Cic. de Fin. iv. 30). There is no authorized meaning of poσdéxeσbai which yields a suitable sense here under analysis. The word is corrupt, and it is easy to find the word which it has displaced. It is poodeîola. The chief obstacle to the acceptance of this reading is the fact that we think in English, not in Greek. To say that the sage needs but does not need in addition seems pointless. But decola here does not mean precisely "need," but rather "have use for," both in the serious and the slang sense of the phrase illustrated in my note on ovde Séopai (Classical Journal II, 171-72). The meaning then becomes "the sage has use for things, but does not need or lack anything more than he has"-a distinction quite in the Stoic manner. This yields a good sense, is true of the Stoic sage, and, in the Greek, is epigrammatic. It is further confirmed by the fact that the converse is true of the ordinary man, the idiwrns, paλos, or appwv. He "has no use" for things because he cannot use them rightly, but feels the need of something more because he is not, like the sage, sufficient unto himself, or complete and content with what he has. Cf. Plutarch de Stoic. repug. 1038: “roîs paúλois ovdèv elvai χρήσιμον” ὁ Χρύσιππός φησιν “οὐδ ̓ ἔχειν χρείαν τὸν φαῦλον οὐδενὸς οὐδὲ δεῖσθαι.”

de comm. not. 1068α: τουτὶ γὰρ λέγει Χρύσιππος, ὡς “οὐ δέονται μέν, ἐνδέονται δὲ οἱ φαῦλοι.”


Seneca Ep. 9.14: Volo tibi Chrysippi quoque distinctionem indicare. ait: "sapientem nulla re egere et tamen multis illi rebus opus esse. stulto nulla re opus est, nulla enim re uti scit, sed omnibus eget."

The idea that underlies these sentences is also found in the distinction between xpýμara and Krýμara. Hense, Teletis relliquiae, p. 27; cf. also [Plato] Eryxias 402C: ὡς τά γε ἄχρεια ἡμῖν ὄντα οὐδὲ χρήματά ἐστι, and

the conclusion (406B) that the rich are the most wretched elrep åváyên tŵv χρησίμων πάντων προσδεῖσθαι. The ultimate source is Plato (Euthydemus and elsewhere) or Socrates (Xen. Econ. 1.14). The use of πpoσdeîσbaı which I postulate may be illustrated by Plato Tim. 34B: kai ovdevòs éтéρоν πроσdεóμevov, said of the universe, which, like the sage, is sufficient unto itself, and Aristotle Ethics 1099a 15: ovdèv dǹ πpoodeîtai tŷs ýdovŷs & βίος αὐτῶν ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.

Lastly, for the rhetorical antithesis of δεῖσθαι and προσδεῖσθαι, cf. δέονται and ἐνδεόνται above and Demosthenes Olynth. 1.19: εἰ δὲ μὴ, προσδεῖ, μᾶλλον δ' ἅπαντος ἐνδεῖ τοῦ πόρου.



Quintilian's chapter de Risu (Inst. Orat. vi. 3) and Macrobius' imitation of it (Sat., Book ii) are of unique value to us in determining finesses of Latin idiom. In a joke, you must either see nothing, or see the point-which is everything: and the point of the joke is usually contained in an idiom of the language.

Quintilian tells us (vi. 3. 90), as an instance of ironical Tαρà πроσdокíaν (opinionem decipere), this story: C. Cassius, seeing a soldier parading at the decursio with no sword, said to him "Heus, commilito, pugno bene uteris!”

Exactly to appreciate this witticism, you must have an exact sense of what bene uti means. Besides the various meanings which are distinguished in the great Berlin thesaurus (s.v. "bonus") there is one which is not recognized there: it is the one which this story requires. Bene uti does not here mean "to make a good use of," but "to have the full use of, the unimpeded control of."

This sense is established by the following collection of passages:

Cic. Tusc. i. 106: "metuit ne laceratis membris minus bene utatur; ne combustis, non extimescit."

ibid., iii. 15: "Munus animi est ratione bene uti; et sapientis animus ita semper adfectus est ut ratione optime utatur."

Pro rege Deiotaro 28 (the only place in Cicero's speeches where the phrase is found): "bene ut armis, optime ut equis uteretur."

de Off. i. 133: "optime uti lingua Latina putabantur" (not, to make the best use of, but to have the best command of, the Latin language).

Corn. Nepos Hann. 4. 3: "hoc itinere adeo gravi morbo adficitur oculorum ut postea nunquam dextro aeque bene usus sit."

Livy xliv. 35: "ipsi natura et operibus insuperabilis ripa videbatur et praeterquam quod tormenta ubique disposita essent missilibus etiam melius et certiore ictu hostis uti audiebat." This does not mean that the enemy were better shots, but that they could bring their artillery more freely into action and so make better practice.

Seneca de Ira I. xvii. 1: "Aristoteles ait affectus quosdam, si quis illis bene utatur, pro armis esse." Not: "if you can turn them to a good use," but "if they be instruments well in control, of which you can freely avail yourself."

Finally there are two passages in poetry, which only take their full significance if this idiom of bene uti be recognized in them.

Horace Epist. I. ii. 50:

valeat possessor oportet

si comportatis rebus bene cogitat uti.

Not: "if he means to put to a good use" but "if he means to take full advantage of, to avail himself of."

And Catullus x. 31, 32:

verum utrum illius an mei, quid ad me?

utor tam bene quam mihi pararim.

"I have absolutely free use, take full advantage of, the litter and bearers tamquam mihi pararim."

So Cassius' jest, a humorous irony in the style of wrapà pоodоkíav, was "You keep your fist free, mate-you know better than to encumber yourself with a sword! You know how to avail yourself of your fist."




In a review of Tucker's Life in Ancient Athens (Classical Philology IV, 342), Professor O. M. Washburn announces this thesis, which he attributes to Professor Loeschke: "It seems to have been a custom [in ancient Greece] for married women to appear with their hair hanging loose, . . . . while a girl would use the net." For a contradictory doctrine see Furtwängler Meisterwerke 39, n. 4, and Conze Die attischen Grabreliefs, text to No. 873: "eine weibliche Gestalt, . . . . deren Haar nach Art der Jungfrauentracht lang in den Nacken fällt."

Although Mr. Washburn has stated his doctrine without qualification, I do not suppose that he would maintain it for the earlier historical period, or say for the period of the François Vase. In the idea that even later there may possibly have been local and temporal differences of fashion in the matter in question, I have tried to ascertain the facts for Athens during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. My search has been far from thorough, but it appears to warrant certain conclusions.

That in the place and during the time indicated married women did not always wear their hair hanging loose is clear; witness Deianeira on two vases in Boston (Furtwängler-Reichhold Griechische Vasenmalerei, Pls. 128-29) and Eurydice in the relief, presumably Attic, representing Orpheus, Eurydice, and Hermes. Indeed the grave-reliefs appear to prove that the

« PreviousContinue »