2 influencing ral. general corruption; nor will any persons be CHAP V. permitted to supply a want of proof as to authoExcept in rity by their own declarations that they were the case of agents. Moreover, it is open to the candidate corruption to rebut presumptions of agency by being ex- the return, or amined on oath in his own case. Perhaps, the being generule that bribery by a stranger will not necessarily affect a seat, may seem, at first sight, to militate against the principle that the avoidance of an election on account of corruption, is a purely civil consequence, introduced with the object of securing an unbiassed election, irrespectively of the merits, or demerits, of the candidate. But very slight consideration will show, that this object has really more to do with the rule in question than any apprehension of hardship to the candidate himself; for, were strangers permitted to invalidate elections by corrupting two or three voters, it is evident that hostile and unprincipled persons would constantly use so easy a means of nullifying the returns, and of preventing constituencies from exercising the franchise effectually. Again, even as regards strangers, it has already been observed that corruption of so wholesale a character as to influence the return, will avoid an election, without any proof of agency, or of complicity on the part of the candidate so returned.4 2. Having thus considered who may be The person deemed to bribe under this section, the next dealt with: question is-Who may be the person dealt with, so as to bring the briber within the statute ? This may be very shortly answered. The bribe, Ilchester, Lud. 463; Sim. 169; ante, pp. 5, 108. Petrie's Cricklade case, 372; Dunfermline, 1 Peck. 15; Great Grimsby, ib. 76; Shrewsbury, Feb. 16, 1807. 14 & 15 Vic. c. 99, s. 2 repealing so much of 11 & 12 Vic. c. 98, s. 83, as excludes interested witnesses. 4 Rogers, 188; ante, p. 108. CHAP. V. in the words of the Act, may be given “to, or for, any voter, or to, or for, any person on behalf of any voter, or to, or for, any other person." That is to say, the person dealt with may be anybody, be he an elector or not. The premium or bribe: Gift or loan: An agreement for ditto: 3. What premium may be held out in bribery? Here, too, the Act is both comprehensive and explicit. The corrupting inducement may be— Any gift, or loan,1 of money; or of any "valuable consideration." And by valuable consideration is meant anything-and probably any act or service-capable of being estimated in money. "I am of opinion," said Alderson, B., after delivering judgment in Cooper v. Slade, and I know several of my learned brothers agree with me, that the words 'valuable consideration' mean valuable consideration estimated in money." Again, the premium may be "any agreement to make such a gift or loan -any offer, or promise to procure, or endeavour to procure any money, or valuable consideraA promise to tion"- -no matter whether the offer be accepted endeavour to or declined: 3-the giving, or procuring, of any procure, office, place, or employment," which will include every species of post or appointment, private or public; paid or unpaid; and whether Agreements it is in the gift of the corrupter, or is to be obtained through his means: any agreement to give or procure, or any offer or promise of, such office, &c., be the offer accepted or not:-any endeavour to promise so to procure, or to endeavour so to procure. procure, or ditto: Appointments: for ditto: Offer, or promise of ditto: Promise to procure ditto. 66 4. What may be the consideration for the premium? The words of the statute vary in 1 Lyme Regis, B. & Aust. 454; Herefordshire, 1 Peck. 186; 2nd Montgomery, P. & K. 462. 2 Cooper v. Slade, 27 L. T. R.137. And see Chitty on Contr. 28. 3 Ante, p. 104. Nottingham, B. & Arn. 165; Derby, 2 P. R. & D. 106. their description of the consideration when the CHAP. V. premium (or bribe) is given before a vote, and after it. Before a vote, bribery is committed when any premium, capable of being classed among those which have been described, is held out "in order to induce any voter to vote, or refrain from voting." After a vote, the offence is committed when such a premium is held out corruptly, on account of any voter having voted, or refrained from voting." It is, how- Proviso as to ever, provided, as to the second section of the tion: Act generally, that it is not to extend to any money paid, or agreed to be paid, "on account of any legal expenses bona fide incurred at or concerning any election." 66 66 second sec in definition Several questions have been raised as to the Ambiguity meaning of the phrases quoted in the preceding of bribery paragraph. And, first, as to bribery before the before vote: vote. Must the briber intend to violate the law; or will the offence be complete if he intends "to induce, &c.," though ignorant that he is thereby violating the law? Secondly, must he intend to induce, &c.," or will the offence be complete, if he intends to make a gift, or do an act, which in fact tends to "induce, &c.," though he does not contemplate such a tendency? Thirdly, does the phrase "induce a voter to vote," include every inducement to vote at all, without reference to the side on which the vote is to be given; or must the inducement be of a partisan character? دو of bribery Fourthly as regards bribery after the vote In definition -is the word " corruptly to be taken as after vote: part of the definition, and requiring therefore distinct proof; or is it only meant to stigmatise every gift on account of a previous vote as a corrupt bribe? If part of the definition, what additional proof is needed to make a gift to a voter, on account of a previous vote, corrupt? 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102, s. 2 (APPENDIX, p. xxvii). CHAP. V. Does the statute mean, by this word, to require a stronger amount of proof than in bribery before a vote:-for instance, must an understanding previous to the vote be proved, in the case of bribery "on account of a voter having voted,” though this is not necessary to complete the offence where a gift is "made to induce a voter to vote"? proviso. Ambiguity of Lastly, what is the effect of the proviso; and does it mean that a candidate might lawfully agree for the necessary and usual expenses of an election, and though he were to couple such agreement with conditions as to voting? Cooper v. These questions have had thrown upon them several cross lights, of a somewhat perplexing kind, by a recent case in the House of Lords.1 The main point in issue there was, whether a circular in the following form, was any evidence to go to the jury of an offence within the penal clauses of the Corrupt Practices Act: Cambridge Borough Election Committee Room, Mr. R. Carter. Lion Hotel, Aug. 12, 1854. Sir, The mayor having appointed Wednesday next for the nomination, and Thursday for the polling, you are earnestly requested to return to Cambridge and record your vote in favour of Lord Maidstone and F. W. Slade, Esq., Q. C. Yours truly, CHARLES BALL, Chairman. Your railway expenses will be paid. The postscript as to the railway expenses was in writing. After the vote had been given, Carter's reasonable travelling expenses were paid, from Huntingdon to Cambridge and back; but nothing more was given.2 1 Cooper v. Slade, 27 Law J., Q. B. 449. 2 See Cambridge, 1857, Minutes, where a similar letter was circulated, and similar payments made, without vitiating the return; 30 Law Times R. 106. The House of Lords held, affirming the verdict, that the defendant had authorised this circular, and the subsequent payments; that the circular was in effect a promise to pay the voter's travelling expenses on the condition of his voting for the promisers; that it was not within the proviso at the end of the second section; and that there was therefore evidence to go to the jury of bribery both before and after the vote; but that only one penalty should be awarded. It is evident that this decision leaves open the question whether a promise not so conditioned would have been within the Act: but incidentally the learned Judges who acted as assessors on the occasion, touched on this point, as well as on many others of those already adverted to, as being involved in the interpretation of the second section.1 CHAP. V. violating Thus, in the first place, the question whether Intention of the offence of bribery may be complete without law immaany intention of violating the law was clearly terial: affirmed. On this subject Mr. Baron Channell said:"The defendant acted, I have no doubt, in the honest belief that the payment of mere travelling expenses was legal; but the question isnot what the defendant may have thought to be legal, but what he did; and whether what he did was an offence against the statute."2 Soo, too, Mr. Justice Coleridge:-"The word "corruptly certainly was not inserted in the statute without a purpose; twice in the [second] section, in branches 1 and 2, it is omitted in the first parts, which relate to promises and agreements to procure future votes; twice it is inserted in the latter parts, where the reference is to votes having been given or withheld at the election past. For the omission in the former, and the |