Hotlas v Keefer et al. Q. Why did you continue to work? A. Well, because they promised me another mule or horse. A. The same one, the mule Nellie. Q. Did you have any trouble with her that day? A. Yes, sir. Q. What did you do that night when you finished work? A. Well, I went up to the boss driver, Mr. Henry Harvey, and I told him the same story what I had told Mr. Tudor, superintendent of Acme No. 1 mine. Q. Did you tell him what Mr. Tudor had told you? A. Yes, sir, I told him that Mr. Tudor, superintendent of Acme mine, had promised me another mule or horse. Q. Well, what did the boss driver say then? A. The boss driver told me, 'All right, if Mr. Tudor promised you, the superintendent, to get another mule, I am going to try to get you one, another mule or horse.' Q. Well, did you believe that they would get you another mule or horse? Did you think they would? Q. Well, I say, did you believe they would? Do you understand what the word 'believe' means? A. I can't understand. Q. Did you think they were going to give you another mule or horse? A. Well, I suppose when they promised me I was sure they would get me one." Plaintiff further testified that if he had not been promised another mule or a horse he would have quit work. Several witnesses testified to the bad habits of "Nellie" but, as stated above, there was no evidence that any complaint had been made to the superintendent or to the stable boss, other than as testified by plaintiff. The plaintiff was not a native American and did not always express himself grammatically, but his testimony is clear that when he complained about the mule he was told to go ahead with his work and was promised another mule or a horse. He was a servant and was bound to obey orders or lose his job, at least his refusal to obey carried with it the risk of dismissal. Plaintiff's testimony was met by unequivocal denial but the Court is not authorized to weigh conflicting evidence. We do not deem it necessary to quote from or discuss the numerous authorities cited by counsel as bearing upon the question involved, which is-Did the trial Judge err in that he refused to give binding instructions to find for the defendants? There is no testimony that defendant could not furnish a safe mule, or a horse, the day following the alleged complaint by plaintiff, nor does the evidence show that plaintiff was guilty of negligence in obeying instructions to "go ahead doing his work." ORDER. And now, to wit, April 22, 1920, new trial refused, motion for judgment non obstante veredicto overruled, and judgment directed to be entered on the verdict on payment of verdict fee. Penial Holiness Association's Appeal. Taxation Charities-Exemptions-Act of June 13, 1911. Under the Act of June 13, 1911, P. L. 898, exempting from taxation "all churches, meeting-houses or other regular places of stated worship and the grounds thereto annexed, necessary for the occupancy and enjoyment of the same." etc., the boarding-hall of an association incorporated for the purpose of holding annual evangelistical meetings, used by the association to furnish accommodations at cost for persons from a distance attending its religious meetings, and forming an integral part of its property, is exempt from taxation. Appeal From the Decision of County Commissioners as a Board of Revision. No. May Term, 1919. C. P. Crawford County. Isaac Mondreau and John D. McCoy, for petitioner. PRATHER, P. J., July 27, 1919.-The facts appearing by agreement of counsel and evidence produced at the hearing are: 1. That the Penial Holiness Association is a duly incorporated body, organized to acquire property for the purpose of holding annual evangelistic meetings, and said association is the owner in fee of the property assessed, and from which assessment this appeal is taken. 2. The annual meetings consist of a three days' convention, inclusive of the 4th of July, and ten days' continual meeting in August of each year. 3. The meetings held are evangelistic; the tabernacle has a seating capacity of about 1200; the Sabbath attendance reaches an audience of 2000 to 2500. 4. The property of appellant consists of 8 acres 106 rods, with twentyseven buildings, comprising a boarding-hall 132 by 30 feet, with dininghall downstairs, with seating capacity of 400, and thirty-two sleeping rooms for worshipers to occupy. 5. Of the above-described land and buildings, 61⁄2 acres are assessed as follows: Boarding-hall, $500; land, $180. The remaining land, to wit, 2 acres and 26 rods, with buildings thereon, were exempted from tax by the board of revision. 6. All the land owned by said association is used, is required and is necessary for the convenient occupying and enjoyment of the main house of worship during the occasions when said meetings are held. 7. Not only is all of said ground necessary, but the association has rented some four acres contiguous thereto for the parking of vehicles and automobiles that carry the worshipers to these meetings. Such automobiles and vehicles on the grounds number as high as 500 in a single day. 8. The boarding-hall is conducted solely for the accommodation of the attendants or worshipers at the meetings, furnishing thirty meals for $5. The purpose is to conduct it at cost. Some years the result is a loss; at others, a slight profit, which is applied toward the payment of the indebtedness of the institution. 9. Said property is all situate in Spring Township, in said county. DISCUSSION. The latest statute relating to exemption from taxation is the Act of June 13, 1911, P. L. 898, amendatory of the Act of May 14, 1874, P. L. 158. This act provides: "That all churches, meeting-houses or other regular places of stated worship, with the grounds thereto annexed, necessary for the occupancy and enjoyment....be and the same are hereby exempted from all and every county, borough, road, school and poor tax." The language quoted is identical with the Act of 1874. Penial Holiness Association's Appeal. The Constitution of the State, granting to the general assembly the right to exempt from taxation certain properties, including churches, employed the language "actual places of religious worship." It is argued, first, that that part of the property with the boardinghall is not necessary for the enjoyment of the activities of said association; and, second, that the organization generally does not come within the exemption of the statute. We cannot assent to this contention. The founders of this institution, under the charter, established a definite program of church meetings and evangelical services. These were confined to the months of July and August of each year. Many of the persons in attendar..e naturally come quite a distance and desire to remain during the entire session; hence, require food and lodging. These accommodations are furnished to such persons by the association at cost. The sole reason for providing this hospitality is to secure a larger co-operation and larger attendance at the church meetings. No admission fees are levied upon any person admitted to the grounds, either as a visitor or worshipers. The sole attraction is the religious services conducted by evangelists and speakers of national reputation. The expenses are all met by voluntary contributions. This enterprise has all the incidents and characteristics of an ordinary church, except its meetings are less frequent and less continuous, and its worshipers are more itinerant and interdenominational. In the language of the statute, it is a meeting-house, a regular place of stated worship, and within the Constitution it is an actual place of religious worship. In Pennsylvania Hospital v Delaware County, 169 Pa., 305, plaintiff owned several farms used in connection with its hospital. The Supreme Court, holding certain of them exempt from taxation, said: "Property used directly for the purpose and in the operation of the charity is exempt, though it may also be used in a manner to yield some return and thereby reduce the expenses." This case also recognizes the principle that the proposition does not turn upon a limited use of the property, in the following language: "It is true that such use is limited to the months of pleasant weather in the summer and autumn, but this does not make it temporary. So far as it appears, the farms are regularly and permanently devoted to that purpose, though from its nature its enjoyment is only p.acticable during part of the year. But a church does not cease to be exempt because it is closed and the pastor has a vacation in the summer. It is the character of the use, not the amount of it that determines the title to exemption." If it is urged that the furnishing of meals so commercializes the institution as to deprive that particular part of its exemption, the same argument might be offered against nearly all of our most active churches, who banquet their multitudinous memberships throughout the year with more or less profit, and on proper occasions feed assembled conventions from day to day. If churches in general can retain their exemption and continue their program of meal serving, either from a social or financial standpoint, then surely this particular church ought not to lose its statutory immunity when purely from a physical necessity it feeds its worshipers at cost. It should be observed that the commissioners exempted from tax the main church structure. But it is difficult to discriminate between or separate into items the properties or subjects of taxation comprising this church organization. The property is entire, compact, integral and inseparable in its nature. The acreage assessed is not sufficient to store or park the vehicles and automobiles belonging to the attendants upon Penial Holiness Association's Appeal. the meetings and used to transport them thither. The grounds are used for no purpose except the convenience of said attendants. See Pocono Pines Assembly v Monroe County, 9 Pa. Superior Ct., 36. We are of the opinion that all the property, inclusive of that assessed, is necessary for the enjoyment, occupancy and convenient use of the church or meeting-place, and, therefore, exempt from taxation. Now, July 27, 1919, the assessment upon the 61⁄2 acres of plaintiff's land, with boarding-hall thereon, is hereby set aside and a decree directed in appellant's favor exempting the same from taxation, at the cost of the County of Crawford.. In re Injured Convict. Prison Labor-Industrial Worker-Workmen's Compensation-Act of July 18, 1919, P. L. 1045. An inmate of a state penal institution, doing work under direction of the Prison Labor Commission, is an industrial worker within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act of July 18, 1919, P. L. 1045, and is entitled to the benefits of a physically handicapped person in consequence of an injury sustained while thus employed. There was duly received your communication to the Attorney General of the 9th inst. asking to be advised whether the following case comes within the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of July 18, 1919, P. L. 1045. The facts therein appear to be as follows: B., now a resident of Philadelphia, while an inmate of the Pennsylvania Industrial Reformatory, at Huntingdon, suffered amputation of two fingers and the thumb of his left hand in consequence of an injury received while operating a rimming machine making automobile tags. This work was being done under the direction of the Prison Labor Commission, pursuant to the Act of June 11, 1915, P. L. 656. He made claim for compensation for this injury under the Workmen's Compensation Law, which after a hearing de novo was disallowed by the Compensation Board in an opinion delivered by its Chairman, in which it was said: "Under any aspect of the Pennsylvania Compensation Act of 1915, before the relation of employer and employe can be established, there must be a meeting of minds in a contract of employment. We cannot find in the case at bar any element of contractual relationship between the Prison Labor Commission and the inmate who was forced, by correctional methods into an employment, notwithstanding the fact that a small daily stipend was set apart for his future use. "Compensation is accordingly disallowed." Department Reports, Vol. 6, page 1409. In re Injured Convict. He has now made application for the benefits of the Rehabilitation Act as a physically handicapped person within its definition. The principle governing in the rejection of his claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law does not rule the question here submitted. Its answer turns upon the point whether the accident which befell the claimant is to be deemed an "industrial accident" within the intent of the Rehabilitation Act of 1919. By virtue of subsection (c) of Section 1 thereof, its benefits extend to physically handicapped persons residing in Pennsylvania "whose capacity to earn a living is in any way destroyed or impaired through industrial accident occurring in the Commonwealth." It will be seen that of these requisites the only one in the claimant's case about which there could be a possible question is as to its being an “industrial accident," and I am of the opinion that it also fulfils that criterion. Although his status was not that of an employe within the intendment of the Workmen's Compensation Law, his work was industrial in nature. It was being performed under the provisions of the Prison Labor Commission Act of 1915, pursuant to which, under the supervision of the said Commission, industries may be carried on in certain penal institutions, using the labor of the inmates of these institutions, who are credited with some wages therefor in manner prescribed by that Act. In accordance with this authority there was being carried on the manufacture of automobile tags at the Huntingdon Reformatory. It was an industrial operation in which the claimant was an operative. That he was required to do this without his own option as part of the correctional discipline and instruction used by the Reformatory for his reformation did not alter the character of the work being done by him in which he received his injury, and its character fixes that of the accident. It would be a harsh rule to hold that while the Reformatory where he was confined could and rightly did for his own betterment set him at this work, yet the State should deny to him the assistance to render him again fit for a remunerative occupation from an injury suffered by him while so working, which it would afford to another likewise injured while engaged at precisely the same kind of work outside its walls. The purpose of the Rehabilitation Act was to train those incapacitated by industrial accident to a self-supporting condition, and both its spirit and letter are consonant with the conclusion that such a case as is here under consideration is not outside its benefits. You are, therefore, advised that the said party is entitled to receive the benefits of the said Act of 1919 as a physically handicapped person, in consequence of the injury sustained by him while an inmate of the Pennsylvania Industrial Reformatory. Very truly yours, EMERSON COLLINS, Deputy Attorney General. |