The Mechanisms of Governance
This book brings together in one place the work of one of our most respected economic theorists, on a field in which he has played a large part in originating: the New Institutional Economics. Transaction cost economics, which studies the governance of contractual relations, is the branch of the New Institutional Economics with which Oliver Williamson is especially associated. Transaction cost economics takes issue with one of the fundamental building blocks in microeconomics: the theory of the firm. Whereas orthodox economics describes the firm in technological terms, as a production function, transaction cost economics describes the firm in organizational terms, as a governance structure. Alternative feasible forms of organization--firms, markets, hybrids, bureaus--are examined comparatively. The analytical action resides in the details of transactions and the mechanisms of governance. Transaction cost economics has had a pervasive influence on current economic thought about how and why institutions function as they do, and it has become a practical framework for research in organizations by representatives of a variety of disciplines. Through a transaction cost analysis, The Mechanisms of Governance shows how and why simple contracts give way to complex contracts and internal organization as the hazards of contracting build up. That complicates the study of economic organization, but a richer and more relevant theory of organization is the result. Many testable implications and lessons for public policy accrue to this framework. Applications of both kinds are numerous and growing. Written by one of the leading economic theorists of our time, The Mechanisms of Governance is sure to be an important work for years to come. It will be of interest to scholars and students of economics, organization, management, and law.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Calculativeness Trust and Economic Organization
Strategizing Economizing and Economic Organization
The Institutions and Governance of Economic Development
Controversy and Perspectives
The Politics and Economics of Redistribution and Inefficiency
Other editions - View all
adaptation alternative antitrust applies approach argument assessment asset specificity assumes attributes Barnard bilateral dependency bounded rationality bureaucratic buyer calculativeness Chapter Coase comparative competition condition contract law corporate court credible commitments deadweight losses debt described developed discrete structural Easterbrook economic organization economists efficacy efficiency equity ex ante ex post examined exchange feasible finance firm governance structures hazards hostage hybrid important incentive incomplete contracting inefficiency institutional economics institutional environment internal organization investment issues Jensen KitchenAid Kreps managers market failure markets and hierarchies mechanisms merger microanalytic Milgrom mode monopoly neoclassical organization theory organizational parties pertinent political predatory pricing private ordering problem property rights purpose purpose technology realized redistribution reference reform relation relevant reputation effects rivals Ronald Coase safeguards science of organization Simon social strategic behavior tion trading transaction cost economics transaction-cost trust unit of analysis vertical integration Williamson