they had done the military power and talent of Russia. But the delay of the Prince before Sheesha had not only given time for the retreat of the advanced corps, the organisation of a field force at Tiflis, and the arrival of reinforcements, as well as of several officers of distinction, who hurried from St Petersburgh to take a part in the war; but it had also permitted the inhabitants of the country to recover from the consternation into which they had been thrown, to balance the advantages of resistance against those of submission, which in their first panic they had considered inevitable; and, finally, when re-assured by the presence of a considerable force, to come forward in support of the government, and contribute everything in their power to the defence of the country.

Encouraged by this injudicious delay on the part of the Prince, and by the reviving spirits of their Georgian subjects, the Russians prepared to assume the offensive, and a corps, consisting of four thousand infantry, with a proportion of cavalry and artillery, was pushed on to the vicinity of Shamkoor, a village not far from Ganja, on the road to Tiflis, while another corps of three thousand men followed up to support the preceding.

Mahommed Meerza, who commanded in Ganja, having heard of the advance of the first of these forces, moved out to attack it; and an action was fought early in September at Shamkoor, in which the Persians were totally defeated, with the loss of their artillery and baggage, and the greater part of their infantry. Almeer Khan, Sirdar, was killed, and the young Prince narrowly escaped being taken prisoner. The fugitives from the field of battle, flying to Ganja, created a panic in the garrison; and the Persian officer who had been left to defend the place evacuated it the same evening, without even attempting to carry off or destroy his stores or ammunition, of which last there was a considerable quantity.

The Shah had, in the meantime, moved from Ardebil to Aher, in Karabaugh, and on receiving intelligence of the advance of the Russians, detached a considerable body of men under the command of the Ausef ud Dowleh, (prime minister,) to rein force his Royal Highness, Abbas Meer VOL. XXIII.

za, who was still before Sheesha. The Persian army, thus reinforced, amounted to about twenty thousand infantry, and ten thousand cavalry, with twenty pieces of artillery; but the Prince was nevertheless desirous not to hazard a general action. The Russians had occupied Ganja, from whence he could not hope to drive them; and the garrison of Sheesha, now closely pressed, might probably be reduced before the Russians could force him to raise the siege. Were he to advance and bring the enemy to an action near Ganja, they could at all times retire upon the fort, even if defeated. The country afforded no provisions, as all it could supply had been consumed by the Persian army; and if the Russians should advance, they would, in consequence of this deficiency, soon be forced to retire, when they might be advantageously attacked in their retreat. These considerations were, however, over-ruled by the minister, whose confidence was greater than his judgment. The siege of Sheesha was hastily raised-sufficient time was not even allowed to collect and call in the foraging parties which had gone out the day before. A mine, which had been carried under one of the towers of the fort, and had now been completed, was not sprung, and the advance was effected with all the tumultuous confusion of a retreat.

The two Russian corps had, in the meantime, formed a junction, and some reinforcements had come up from the

rear.

After leaving a sufficient gar rison in Ganja, and throwing into it their heavy baggage and stores, the army, under the command of General Paskevitch, advanced to the distance. of five miles from Ganja, and having there taken up a position, waited the approach of Abbas Meerza. The force here collected might amount to about seven thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry, and twenty guns.

On the evening of the September, the Persians came in sight of the enemy, and it was determined to attack him next morning; but fearing lest the Russians should make a night attack, the Persian commanders kept their men in motion almost the whole night, and in the morning drew them up in order of battle, fatigued with the continued exertion, and exhausted by want of sleep and of food; for the confusion had been so great during

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the night march, that the men were separated from their baggage, and had not been able to procure provisions. It was intended that the Prince with his own troops should attack the Russians in front, while the Ausef ud Dowleh should make a detour to the left, and follow their right flank; at the same time a body of cavalry was to get into their rear, and cut off their communication with the fort of Ganja. The Persian army was, however, by some misunderstanding, drawn up in one line, extending several miles, by which arrangement, nearly one-half of the troops never came into action. The battle commenced with a cannonade on both sides. The Persian line of infantry marched steadily up to within musket range, and kept up a smart fire for a considerable time. The Russian artillery was rapidly but badly served, and did little execution, while the fire from the Persian guns was much more destructive. The Russian troops were becoming unsteady, and had even abandoned some of their guns, when a disorderly and unauthorized charge made by some of the Persian infantry was repelled, and the whole of the Prince's troops gave way. The division commanded by the Ausef ud Dowleh, seeing the right of the line in confusion, and the men dispersing, fled in disorder. Five hundred of them, whose retreat was cut off, after making a gallant resistance, surrendered to the enemy. The main body of the Persian army retreated to a fortified camp, some miles in the rear, in which its baggage was deposited, and the troops which first reach ed it, plundered everything they could find, even to the Prince's baggage, and again fled with their booty. The Russian cavalry followed the fugitives for some miles, but was kept in check by two guns of the Prince's artillery, and some men of his regiment of guards, who covered the flight of the army. The panic was, however, so great, that all attempts to arrest the retreat of the troops before they crossed the Arras, were ineffectual, and it was not until the Prince arrived at Oslandooz, that he was able to collect together any considerable number of the fugitives. In this action the Persians lost about 1200 men, most of whom were made prisoners; and the Russians 700, all of whom were either killed or wounded. Of the Persians,

however, a great number dispersed on the retreat, and returned to their houses, and by the loss of its baggage, ammunition, and stores, and by the feeling which had been excited, the army was completely disorganized.

A few days after this defeat, the. Prince Royal joined the Shah's camp at Aher, and arrangements were made to form a corps of observation on the banks of the Arras, which should also serve to protect the Mahommedan tribes of Karabaugh, who had taken a part against Russia in the war, and now sought refuge in the Persian territory.

The Russians showed no disposi tion to follow up this victory by any decided movement, and as the season was too far advanced to admit of the formation of a fresh army, the Shah moved before the end of September to Tabreez, preparatory to his return to Tehran for the winter, and Abbas Meerza proceeded, in command of the corps of observation, to the banks of the Arras. About the middle of October a body of Russians crossed the river, and succeeded in carrying off some. families of the Karabaugh tribes, who had expressed a desire to return to their own country. The troops under Abbas Meerza made an unsuccessful attempt to recover the families which were thus carried off, and some ineffective skirmishing took place. This may be considered the close of the first campaign. In the beginning of November, the Prince, finding the season too far advanced for active operations, and having learnt that the Russian army was preparing to go into winter cantonments at Akoglan, near the banks of the Arras, made arrangements for the defence of the frontier during the winter, and then returned to Tabreez.

The army, which had till now occupied Sheerwan, retired for the winter, and while recrossing the Koor, was attacked by a small party of Rus◄ sians, which had followed its move ments; the Erivan force fell back from Loree, within the Persian frontier; and thus, at the close of the campaign, Russia had recovered all her provinces except Talish and Moghan.

The approach of winter having produced a suspension of active operations, it was hoped that before the return of spring should enable either party to open another campaign, some

arrangement towards an accommodation of the differences between Persia and Russia might be effected, and the British Envoy, who had remained during the autumn at Tabreez, with a view to avail himself of any oppor tunity which might present itself to lead the Persian frontier authorities to open a negotiation, repaired to Tehran, for the purpose of inducing the Shah to consult his true interests, rather than yield to the dictates of his pride, and to send a mission to St Petersburgh, with proposals for peace. The Shah could not reconcile his feel ings to the propriety of adopting any measure which might, as he thought, have the appearance of humbling himself before Russia, but determined to send Meerza Mahommed Allee, a nephew of his Excellency Meerza Abul Hassan Khan, to Tiflis, to ascertain the views of the Russian government, and to announce the Shah's intention to send his Excellency as ambassador to the court of the Emperor, should he find the Russian authorities disposed to treat. Letters, expressing a desire to restore the pacific and friendly relations which had so long subsisted between the countries, were at the same time addressed to Count Nesserode by the Persian ministers, and in testimony of the sincerity of -the Shah's desire to terminate the war, two or three hundred Russian prison ers, (all who were then at the capital,) were directed to accompany Meerza Mahommed Allee, and to be delivered to the Russian commander on the frontier of Erivan, as a gift from the Shah to the Emperor-a gift, too, which it was not doubted but his Imperial Majesty's love for his people would induce him to appreciate more -highly than costly presents.

The Meerza left Tehran in December, and on his arrival in the vicinity of Tabreez, was detained for some time, in consequence of the invasion of the Persian territories by a Russian army.

The advance of a body of six thousand infantry, with a proportion of cavalry and artillery, and a long train of waggons, in the depth of winter, seemed to imply, that some enterprise of importance was in contemplation. The point at which it had crossed the Arras, afforded very practicable routes both to Tabreez and to Ardebil; and sits first movements seemed to indicate

Tabreez as the object of its destination. No attempt of this nature had been anticipated by the Prince Royal; and as the inclemency of the season appeared to preclude all idea of pursuing active military operations, the greater part of the Persian infantry and all the cavalry had been dismissed to their homes. A force sufficient to oppose the enemy could not therefore be collected before several days. Tabreez was imperfectly supplied with provisions; and the inhabitants, unaided by a military garrison, were scarcely prepared to undertake the defence of the town. The sudden and unexpected approach of danger produced the alarm and confusion which usually occur in such cases, and these were augmented by a belief, that unless invited by a disaffected party, the Russian general would scarcely have ventured with so small a force to attack Tabreez, because it was obvious that, if he failed in taking it, his whole army must be destroyed. The powerful tribe of Shaksevuud occupied the province of Miskkeen, which the Russians had entered; and their chief, Atta Khan, who had been blinded by order of the Prince, and who could influence his tribe to take part with the enemy, were he disposed so to do, had waited on the Russian general, and was said to have collected troops to co-operate with him. A considerable magazine of wheat and rice had been captured by the Russians on first entering the province; and the peasants, having received assurances of protection, were neither inclined to incur the resentment of the invaders, by opposing them, nor to abandon their homes in the severity of winter, and destroy or relinquish a great proportion of their property, which they had not the means of transporting. If, therefore, the Russian commander had pushed on rapidly to Tabreez, and taken advantage of the confusion produced by the first alarm, it is very possible, that, by risking much, he might have effected something brilliant. But, in a few days, troops be gan to arrive from every part of the province. The delay of the Russians gave the inhabitants time to recover their confidence, and they now became desirous that the enemy should make an attempt to carry the city, which they felt could not fail to be disastrous to him.

driven from their possessions to seek shelter in Persia.

Still the peasantry had perhaps lost nothing by the change, and under a more judicious government, the absence of the chiefs might have been productive of benefit to the lower classes, and even the differences of religious prejudice and observance might have been overlooked in the enjoy ment of superior worldly advantages under a good government. But we fear that Russia, with all her boasted toleration in religious matters, is, after all, a bigoted superior, and with all her pretensions to moderation, a harsh master. Her civil servants, of the lower grades at least, are miserably corrupt, and drawn from classes of society in which they are not likely to acquire enlightened views or elevated principles. The service is considered degrading, and respect is reserved for the military. On the other hand, the officers of the army in Georgia, excepting those in the higher ranks, are for the most part, persons of mean birth and no education, and they are generally insolent, overbearing, and tyrannical to those under them. With subordinate officers of such a character, what government can be popular with strangers, or effective over a proud people? The revenue levied from the country was not exorbitant, but the mode of exacting it was oppressive; and while the government affected to respect the feelings and even the prejudices of its subjects, they were continually violated and disregarded by its agents. The chiefs had been removed, but the nobles were still unprovided for. Their power and influence necessarily fell on the accession of a new authority with which theirs was incompatible. Their revenues were dissipated by their extravagance, and

they had no means of recruiting them -their pride was wounded by the arrogance and assumed superiority of the Russian officers, and they saw themselves sinking without a hope of redemption into the mass of the common people. It is true, that the Russian service was open to them, and some of them availed themselves of this gracious provision-but the consequence of these men was confined to their native soil, and lived only in the feudal attachment of their dependents. To enter the Russian army was to abandon these, and to do so, they were forced to lay aside their national habits, sometimes even their religious feelings, and to mix with the other officers, on terms inconsistent with the preservation of their peculiar tenets. Even the Georgian and Armenian Christians complained of the rigour with which the Russian authorities exacted a strict compliance with Russian habits, and were mortified to find, that in adhering to their national customs, even in regard to the dress and conduct of their wives and daughters, they gave umbrage to their superiors.

At the same time, the chiefs who had found an asylum in Persia, took advantage of the discontents which the measures of the government or the conduct of its officers had excited, and carried on incessant intrigues with their former adherents, which doubtless tended to foment feelings hostile to the existing state of affairs, and warmed their own hopes while it gratified their revenge.

The defects in the civil administration might possibly, however, have been tolerated, and the rising genera tion, knowing no better times, and goaded by no recollections of past splendour or exhausted influence, might have grown up in habitual submission

to an authority which was obnoxious to their fathers. But there was another evil of greater magnitude. In most of the provinces, the Mahommedans had been the rulers and the Christians their subjects. When the power of Russia was consolidated, the Christians became the favoured people, and domineered over their former rulers with all the senseless insolence of eman cipated slaves. In some places, they scoffed at the religious rites of the Mahommedans, and in others, attempted to interrupt their most sacred cere monies. The Moollahs had lost much of their importance, and with it their revenues had declined. The form of government was opposed to their interests, and they became opposed to the government. No effective measures were adopted to soothe or to restrain them, and as the only means they possessed of recovering their power or preserving what remained to them, they endeavoured to rekindle religious feelings in their flocks. In doing so, it was impossible to avoid casting some degree of odium on the government, which they considered infidel, and consequently infamous. The shame of submitting to the yoke of unbelieving foreigners, became a favourite theme for declamation. Every outrage, and even every incidental disregard of Mahommedan feeling or prejudice, was represented to be a part of a systematic attack on their faith, and there is reason to believe that the conduct of the Russian officers, and of the troops under their command, nay, even of the government itself, was not always well calculated to controvert such an interpretation of their designs. The pilgrims from those countries who resorted to the tombs at Kerbelace and Nujjif carried thither exaggerated accounts of the evils and dangers to which the disciples of Islam were exposed under the Russian yoke, and roused the fears of the spiritual chief of the Sheeahs. The almost total extirpation of Mahommedanism from the Crimea became a familiar illustration of their fears, and an evidence that they were well founded. The disputes of Russia with Persia regarding their frontier, the haughty and offensive bearing of the Governor-General of Georgia towards the highest

Persian authorities, and the uncourtly and uncompromising manner in which he appeared determined to force a compliance with all his demands in every negotiation for a settlement of his differences with the courts of Tehran and Tabreez, seemed to indicate a desire to drive the Shah to some act of hostility; while the discussions then pending between Russia and the Porte, arising, as they had done, out of the demands of the former, made it easy to impress a belief that the Emperor contemplated the total subversion of Islamism.

Such was the state of men's minds in the Russian provinces, when the discussions between the Shah and his Imperial Majesty began to assume a threatening aspect. The death of the Emperor Alexander and the confusion which followed it, tended to foster hopes, which, till then, few had dared to entertain. Persia, the seat of the Sheeah greatness and power, was able to call to her aid the whole influence of the acknowledged head of the sect, and through him could at all times divide the allegiance of the Georgian Mahommedans with Russia. The refugee chiefs were available instruments in her hands to stir men up to rebellion; and holding these powers, more especially the former, at her disposal, while the government of Georgia was exulting in its strength, and taunting her with reproaches for her weakness, it would have required more than human forbearance not to use them in the negotiations and discussions in which she was engaged. But as the power was great, it was proportionally difficult to control or direct its oper ation, and we have already shown* how great a share it had in causing the war.

In the month of July 1826, Abbas Meerza, the heir apparent to the throne of Persia, moved from the royal camp at Sooltaneeah, to put himself at the head of his own army, reinforced by a large body of the Shah's troops, which, under the command of Ismael Meerza, a younger son of his Majesty, had been sent in advance a few days before. It was his Royal Highness's intention to cross the Araxes by the bridge called Pool i khoda afereen, and push into Karabaugh before General Madatoff, who