appointment and qualifications, said receiver, | the assessments had been paid the assets of through remittances sent to the corporation the corporation would have been increased in response to the notices, received premi- to the extent of the payments made, and if ums and assessments amounting in the whole to several thousand dollars. Said premiums and assessments were paid by the policy holders in ignorance that a receiver had been appointed and that the corporation had been dissolved, and were made for the purpose of continuing said policies. There existed valid death claims against the corporation at the time of its dissolution. the assessments had not been paid the policies would have been forfeited and no claim thereon could have been made for unearned premiums; and they say that, the corporation having failed to lay the assessments, the court should have ordered the receiver to lay them. It is unnecessary to inquire why the corporation failed to do this. It may be that its relations to the insurance department of the state rendered it impolitic. An attempt by the court to do it would have been futile. The policy holders were under The court did not order, and, so far as appears, was not requested to order, the receiver to make any assessment for death claims, and he made none. The court allow-no legal obligation to pay the assessments ed to living policy holders dividends upon claims for unearned premiums from the date of the order of dissolution. The appellants, who are death claimants, assign error on the part of the court (1) in dissolving the corporation, (2) in not ordering the receiver to make an assessment for death claims and send out notices of such assessment, (3) in ordering the return of the premiums and assessments received after the company had been dissolved, (4) in ordering a dividend to be paid on claims for unearned premiums to living policy holders who at the time of the commencement of the action were liable to assessments for death claims to a larger amount than the unearned premium and assessment, (5) in ordering a dividend to be paid on claims for unearned premiums to living policy holders when such claims were not presented by the policy holders in accordance with the order of the court, (6) in ordering dividends to be paid on claims for unearned premiums when the amount of dividend would be less than the cost of ascertaining and paying it, and (7) in ordering a dividend to be paid on unearned premiums when the unpaid assessments laid prior to the dissolution of the corporation exceeded such unearned premiums. The proceeding for the dissolution of the corporation was a statutory one brought by certain of its stockholders against it, asking that it be dissolved and its affairs wound up. The court gave notice of the proceeding and of the time of hearing to its creditors and policy holders before proceeding to act upon the complaint. The present death claimants then had an opportunity, had they seen fit, to intervene and object to the dissolution. They failed to do this, and the court proceeded to a hearing and rendered its judgment. That judgment was final between the parties, and the time within which they or these creditors could take an appeal from that judgment has long since expired. The claimants are therefore precluded from now raising the question attempted to be raised by the first-mentioned assignment. The claimants say that the corporation should have laid and collected an assessment for all death claims before a receiver was on their policies to the corporation if laid. They were not situated like policy holders in mutual companies, who are legally bound to pay death-claim assessments. Their only purpose in paying assessments on policies in this corporation would be to continue their policies in force; that is, to continue the company's obligation to insure them. When the corporation was dissolved, its ability to insure the policy holder ceased. The receiver was not appointed to continue its business, but to receive its assets, pay its creditors, and wind up its affairs. An assessment paid to him, therefore, would be without consideration, and without legal obligation on the part of the policy holder to pay it. The court, therefore, could not properly order the receiver to make the assessments, and the claimants have no ground for complaint in its failure to do so. For the same reason, the premiums and assessments which were sent to the corporation after its dissolution by policy holders ignorant of the fact that it had been dissolved and was no longer able to insure them were properly ordered to be returned as having been paid by mistake and without consideration. The remaining reasons of appeal relate to the allowance of dividends upon claims for unearned premiums. These were proper claims against the corporation. By its dissolution it became unable to earn the full premium which it had received, and thereby forfeited the policy. The policy holders who had paid the premiums were therefore entitled to recover the amount of premium un. earned by the corporation. There is nothing in the finding showing that any assessment against any of these policy holders had been legally laid prior to its dissolution. It appears in the receiver's application for instructions already alluded to that in June prior to its dissolution the insurance department of the state had forbidden the corporation from sending out any more assessments. But, as already stated, if there had been such assessments, the policy holders were not bound to pay them. And, if they neglected to pay them because the corporation was defunct and could not earn them, the ques their right to the unearned premium, and not the one which is raised by the fourth and seventh reasons of appeal, which assumes that a claim for the assessment could be set off against the claim for the unearned premium. The court correctly held upon the facts that there was no liability for assessments which prevented the allowance in full of the claims for unearned premiums. The fifth reason of appeal assumes that some of the claims were not presented in time. There is nothing in the finding which shows that these claims were not presented within the time limited by the court for the presentation of claims. But if they were not presented within that time, the court had power to extend the time for their presenta tion. As it has allowed the claims, it will be presumed, in the absence of any finding to the contrary, that the claims were seasonably presented. The sixth reason, without any finding as to the cost of ascertaining and paying the claims for unearned premiums, or that such cost will exceed the amount of the premium, assumes that such will be the fact. No question of law is properly presented for our consideration by this reason of appeal. There is no error. The other Judges con curred. (81 Conn. 534) Appeal of ALLYN. (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. Jan. 22, 1909.) 1. INTOXICATING LIQUORS (§ 6*)-REGULATION -LICENSE SYSTEM-LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY. The preamble of the Constitution, reciting that the people acknowledge the good providence of God in having permitted them to enjoy a free government, does not, in view of the history of the legislation on the subject, deprive the General Assembly of the power to license the sale of intoxicating liquors, even on the theory that God is recognized by the Constitution as the author of the government, that the Bible is the Word of God, and prohibits the use of intoxicants as a beverage, wherefore the state cannot permit their sale. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Dec. Dig. § 6.*] 2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 50*)-LEGISLATIVE POWER. CESS OF LAW." The "due process of law," in the fourteenth amendment of the federal Constitution, refers to that law of the land in each state which derives its authority from the inherent and reserved powers of the state, exerted within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil the enactment by the General Assembly of a and political institutions, but does not forbid general liquor license law; the liquor business being a subject of prohibition or regulation. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 831; Dec. Dig. § 287.* vol. 3, pp. 2227-2256; vol. 8, p. 7644.] For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, 5. INTOXICATING LIQUORS (§ 1*) TIONS-VALIDITY. REGULA At common law the liquor business was a lawful business open to any one, and the stat utes regulating the licensing of the business merely restrict the common-law right. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Dec. Dig. § 1.*] 6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 81*) POWER.' "POLICE The term "police power" means the general power of governing its people and dominions belonging to every sovereignty. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 148; Dec. Dig. § 81.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 6, pp. 5424, 5438; vol. 8, p. 7756.] 7. INTOXICATING LIQUORS (§ 15*) — REGULATION OF TRAFFIC. Under the power of the state to properly restrict a business dangerous, if unregulated, to public morals or security, by the requirement of license fees, a state statute imposing a license fee is valid, whether the fee is required by way of regulation or for purposes of revenue, and hence Gen. St. 1902, cc. 157, 158, regulating and licensing the sale of intoxicating liquors, is valid whether the statute is a revenue measure, or whether the license fee is required by way of regulation only. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. §§ 17, 18; Dec. Dig. § 15.*] Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Silas A. Robinson, Judge. Charles B. Allyn, a taxpayer, appealed to the superior court of Fairfield county from a decision of the county commissioners thereof granting a license to an individual for the sale of intoxicating liquors. There was a judgment pro forma affirming the decision of the commissioners, and the said Allyn appeals. Affirmed. Thomas C. Coughlin and Frank L. Wilder. for appellant. Homer S. Cummings, for appellee. Const. U. S. art. 4. § 3, providing that the United States shall guaranty to every state in the Union a republican form of government, imBALDWIN, C. J. The sole ground of the pliedly binds Connecticut to maintain a republi- appeal to this court is that the license law can form of government, and the legislative pow- (Gen. St. 1902, cc. 157, 158) is void. The er of the General Assembly of the state is such claim is that the sale of intoxicating liquors as is consistent with a republican form of government, and, while there are fundamental prin- to be drunk as a beverage at the place of ciples of morality and justice which no Legisla sale is so destructive to the public health and so inherently immoral that no law upholding it can be valid either under the Constitution of this state or of the United States. The appellant first contends: That, as the people of Connecticut, in the preamble of their Constitution, gratefully acknowledge "the good providence of God, in having permitted them to enjoy a free government," this is a recognition of God as the source of that government; that the Bible contains the "Word of God;" that it condemns the use and sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage; and therefore that the state cannot permit it on any terms. put her legislative power in the hands of the General Assembly. She put only, because she could put only, such power of that nature as was consistent with a republican form of government. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 3 L. Ed. 162; Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149, 155, 79 Am. Dec. 239. In constitutional republics, as was observed by Chief Justice Chase in a case where arguments somewhat resembling those now made at our bar were advanced, "there are, undoubtedly, fundamental principles of morality and justice which no Legislature is at liberty to disregard; but it is equally undoubted that no court, except in the clearest case, can properly impute the disregard of those principles to the Legislature." License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 469, 18 L. Ed. 497; Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 22 L. Ed. 455. There was a time in the early history of this commonwealth when the Bible was, "in the defect of a law in any particular case," a rule of political government. Col. Rec. of Conn. I, 509. But even then it was never considered to contain any absolute prohibition of such a business as that for which the The General Assembly of Connecticut, unlicense now in question was granted. As ear- der the fourteenth amendment to the Constily as 1643 it was provided by the colonial tution of the United States, can deprive no laws that no person or persons should sell one of life, liberty, or property without due wine or "strong water in any place within process of law. Any precise and exhaustive these libertyes, without license from the par- definition of the phrase "due process of law" ticular court or any two magistrates." Col. has been sedulously avoided by the Supreme Rec. of Conn. I, 100. Cf. Id., 154. Our Code Court of the United States. Davidson v. of 1650 (Col. Rec. I, 533), under the title of New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104, 24 L. Ed. 616. "Inkeepers," recited that: "Forasmuch as It has, however, been repeatedly declared to there is a necessary use of howses of com- refer not merely to forms of legal proceedmon intertainement in every commonwealth, ings, but to "that law of the land in each and of such as retaile wine, beare and victu- state, which derives its authority from the alls, yet because there are so many abuses inherent and reserved powers of the state, of that lawfull libberty, both by persons in- exerted within the limits of those fundaterteining and persons interteined, there is mental principles of liberty and justice which allso need of strict lawes and rules to regu- lie at the base of all our civil and political late such an imployment." Legislation of a institutions, and the greatest security for similar character appears in subsequent revi- which resides in the right of the people to sions of the statutes, down to the date of the make their own laws, and alter them at their adoption of our Constitution. St. 1715, p. 123; pleasure." Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. Rev. St. 1808, p. 640, tit. 158, c. 1; Sess. 516, 527, 535, 4 Sup. Ct. 111, 120, 28 L. Ed. Laws 1810, p. 33, c. 7. It had been one of 232. It therefore embraces such a matter as the permanent features of that free govern- taxation by a state of personal property havment, for the enjoyment of which the people ing a situs in territory beyond its borders. expressed in that instrument, in the language Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. quoted, their gratitude to the good provi- 194, 202, 211, 26 Sup. Ct. 36, 50 L. Ed. 150. dence of God. In the face of this long his- It forbids arbitrary interference with any tory of dealing with the use and sale of in- man's liberty of contract. Adair v. United toxicating liquors as a beverage, to be drunk States, 208 U. S. 161, 174, 175, 28 Sup. Ct. at the place where they are purchased, it is 277, 52 L. Ed. 436. But however broad the idle to claim that the framers of the Consti- scope that has been given to the guaranty of tution understood or intended that anything due process of law by such decisions as those contained in it should be regarded as pro- to which reference has been made, that there hibiting altogether the licensing of such a is nothing unrepublican, nor beyond the lebusiness. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, gitimate sphere of legislative power, in the 175, 22 L. Ed. 627. Our Constitution (article maintenance of such a system as that long 3, § 1) vests "the legislative power of this established here for governmental licenses state" in the General Assembly. That power to sell intoxicating liquors, is plain from the covers the whole field of legitimate legislation, fact, of which judicial notice must be taken, except so far as limitations are to be found that most free governments have, at all pein other provisions of this Constitution or in riods of time, made that business a subject, that of the United States. The latter pro- not of prohibition, but of regulation. Either vides (article 4, § 4) that the "United States mode of treatment is equally legitimate. shall guarantee to every state in this Union State v. Brennan's Liquors, 25 Conn. 278, a republican form of government." Connecti- 288; Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, cut is therefore impliedly bound forever to 91, 11 Sup. Ct. 13, 34 L. Ed. 620. At com Sweetland, Presiding Justice. Action by Alphonse Perrier against the Dunn Worsted Mills. A demurrer to plaintiff's declaration was sustained, and plaintiff brings exceptions, Sustained. to any man. Our statutes do not enlarge, but | Exceptions from Superior Court, Provirestrict, this right. Sopher v. State, 169 dence and Bristol Counties; William H. Ind. 177, 81 N. E. 912, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 172. Finally, it is argued that the statute is essentially a revenue measure, though ostensibly in the interest of public policy. The term "police power" has, at bottom, no other meaning than the general power of governing its people and dominions belonging to every sovereignty. McKeon v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. Co., 75 Conn. 343, 347, 53 Atl. 656, 61 L. R. A. 730. The state may properly restrict a business dangerous, if unregulated, to public morals or security, by the requirement of, large license fees. State v. Conlon, 65 Conn. 478, 484, 33 Atl. 519, 31 L. R. A. 55, 48 Am. St. Rep. 227. It is only important to distinguish between licenses issued by way of regulation and licenses issued for purposes of revenue in the case of municipal corporations, acting under legislative authority. The question then is: For what object was the authority given by the Legislature? Such an inquiry is irrele vant in testing the validity of a statute of the state. There is no error. The other Judges concurred. (29 R. I. 396) PERRIER v. DUNN WORSTED MILLS. (Supreme Court of Rhode Island. Feb. 1, 1909.) 1. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 286*)-INJURY TO SERVANT-EMERGENCY-NEGLIGENCE. Where by reason of a breakdown in a worsted mill there was an accumulation of rolls of cloth on the floor in a space usually free for passage to and from a machine, and plaintiff, being directed by his overseer to make haste, while walking along the passage in some manner caught his foot in a leader, causing an injury, the master was not free from negligence as a matter of law. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 1010; Dec. Dig. § 286.*] 2. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 288*)-INJURIES TO SERVANT-ASSUMED RISK. Where plaintiff, a pressing machine tender in a worsted mill, was ordered to make haste with the work on a machine, and while carrying a roll of cloth through a passageway, which had been obstructed by other cloth because of a breakdown of one of the machines, his foot became entangled in a leader and was injured. plaintiff did not assume the risk as a matter of law. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 1069; Dec. Dig. § 288.*] 3. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 289*)-INJURIES TO SERVANT-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. Where plaintiff, a cloth pressing machine operator, was ordered by the foreman to hurry the work on the machine, and in endeavoring to comply his foot became caught in a cloth leader and was injured, because a passageway between the machines had become clogged with rolls of cloth, plaintiff was not negligent as a matter of law. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 1089; Dec. Dig. § 289.*] Plaintiff was employed in defendant's mills as a pressing machine tender. It was necessary to pile in a passageway adjacent to the machine a larger roll or rolls of cloth than usual, owing to one of the machines being out of order. Plaintiff was injured by his foot catching or becoming entangled in a "leader," so called, while engaged in carrying a roll of cloth through the passageway in the performance of his duty as tender in obedience to an order to hurry made by his superior. The declaration alleged that plaintiff and his co-employés were fully absorbed in the work, and in consequence of haste had to sew the roll which they were carrying to the roll which already had been run through the machine, and had barely sufficient time in which to do the work; that before they could sew the rolls together they had to hastily carry the second roll between the machine and a pile of rolls, a distance of about eight feet. Thomas P. Corcoran and James M. Gillrain, for plaintiff. Gardner, Pirce & Thornley and Fred A. Otis (William W. Moss, of counsel), for defendant. PARKHURST, J. This case is before this court upon exception to the decision of the superior court sustaining a demurrer to the amended declaration; the said decision holding in substance that the plaintiff knew of the condition of the passageway and of the loose piece of cloth upon the floor, and must have known of the danger incident to this condition of the passageway, and that the averments of the amended declaration do not show such a case of emergency as would excuse forgetfulness on the part of the plaintiff or the neglect of due care for his own safety. We are of the opinion that the averments of the declaration, if sustained by adequate proof, would make out such a case of emergency as would entitle the plaintiff to go to the jury on the questions of assumed risk and contributory negligence. There are averments of the breaking down of one of two pressing machines and of the consequent accumulation of an unusual number of rolls of cloth on the floor, in a space usually free for passage to and from the machines; of the piling of these rolls of cloth in this space upon a loose piece of cloth, called a "leader," by the plaintiff. and another employé under the express orders of the overseer, so that the passage between the pile of rolls and the dewing machine was so narrow that a roll of cloth carried through the space grazed The plaintiff's exception to the decision of the superior court sustaining the defendant's demurrer is sustained, and the case is remitted to the superior court, with direction to overrule said demurrer and for further proceedings. ANDERTON v. BOARD OF ASSESSORS (Supreme Court of Rhode Island. Feb. 5, 1909.) INCREASE IN VALUATION. The increase in valuation of farm land for taxation by the board of assessors is not rendered illegal by the fact that no improvements were made on the land and that its condition was unaltered. the pile of rolls on one side and the dewing | 884; Magone v. Portland Mfg. Co. (Or.) 93 machine on the other; that the plaintiff and Pac. 450; San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. his assistant were expressly ordered by the Stevens, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 80, 83 S. W. 235; overseer "to hurry along the work on said Illinois Central R Co. v. Keebler (Ky.) 84 machine, as the output from the room had S. W. 1167. fallen behind because of the breaking down of one of the pressing machines;" and such further and particular allegations as to show on the face of the declaration an emergency resulting from the breaking down of a machine, and bringing about abnormal conditions under which the plaintiff was required to work hurriedly, under the express orders of his superior, and by reason of which hurry the injuries occurred. In view of all the allegations of the declaration, we cannot determine as a matter of law either that there was no negligence on the part of the defendant or that the plaintiff as a matter of law either assumed the risk or was guilty of contributory negligence. We are not satisfied as a matter of law that, under all the circumstances alleged, it was obvious to the plaintiff that he was incurring any danger to himself in obeying the orders given him to hurry the work along and in doing as he was obliged to do in order to get the roll of cloth to the machine. This court has heretofore recognized as compatible with the statement of an emergency averments in a declaration showing that the plaintiff was obliged to do certain work hurriedly under the orders of his foreman, and that by reason of such hurried work so ordered the plaintiff was injured, and overruled a demurrer to the declaration, thereby requiring the case to be submitted to a jury on the facts. See Mayott v. Norcross Bros., Dem. No. 427, rescript filed May 11, 1901. See, also, Mayott v. Norcross Bros., 24 R. I. 187, 192, 193, 52 Atl. 894, where it appears that the evidence placed before the jury was held not to prove any emergency, such as the declaration set forth. The questions whether an employé has assumed the risk, or has been guilty of contributory negligence, in a case where he is required to do his work in haste, either under orders of his superior or by reason of the exigency of his position or because of an emergency, and where his whole energy and attention are absorbed in his work, or whether he may be excused from the degree of care ordinarily required, or for temporary forgetfulness of a risk previously known to him, or of a risk which he might under other circumstances have remembered or appreciated, have been generally held to be questions for the jury upon all the facts of the particular case. See Kane v. Northern Central R. Co., 128 U. S. 91, 9 Sup. Ct. 16, 32 L. Ed. 339; Stackman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 80 Wis. 428, 50 N. W. 404; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Higgins, 53 Ark. 458, 14 S. W. 653; Lee v. Woolsey, 109 Pa. 124; Pullman Co. v. Geller, 107 S. W. 271, 32 Ky. Law Rep. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. 8 838; Dec. Dig. § 469.*] 2. TAXATION (§. 469*)-INCREASE IN VALUA TION-STATEMENTS-NOTICES-VALIDITY. An increase in the valuation of property for taxation is not rendered illegal by the fact that a notice under Gen. Laws 1896, c. 46. § 6, to persons to bring in sworn statements of their taxable property, made the time for bringing in statements include, contrary to law, days prior to the assessment, where the objecting property owner made no statement at any time and was not prejudiced by the notice. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. § 838; Dec. Dig. § 469.*] Board of Assessors of Taxes of the City of PER CURIAM. The eight causes of error assigned by the petitioner in support of her petition for certiorari are without foundation. The first and second causes are based upon the erroneous ideas that the land had been platted into house lots and that the assessors regarded said land for taxation purposes as so many house lots. The third cause is based upon the claim that the assessors assumed that farm land platted on paper is more valuable than if the same had not been platted. The claim is not supported by the evidence. The fourth and fifth causes set out that the board of assessors kept no records of their acts and proceedings in making the assessment of taxes in the city of Pawtucket for the year 1908. The evidence discloses the fact that some records were kept. The sixth assignment of error is without merit. The fact that the petitioner has not improved or altered the condition of the |