right to be heard in the courts of the state, and the utmost that can be demanded on the part of nonresident defendants is that they shall be fairly notified of the action so as to have an ample opportunity to appear and be heard therein. When these conditions exist, the rights of all parties interested in the res are determined by due process of law. Colorado court. The Colorado action out of | ty in question enforced or protected, have a which arose the case of Pennoyer v. Neff was not specifically directed toward the res, nor was any effort made to notify the defendant, the nonresident owner of the res, that any such res existed, or that the action had any relation to it. The course of procedure prescribed by the Colorado statute and pursued in the case above mentioned, in respect of the matters now under consideration, is analogous to a foreclosure suit brought in New Jersey against an owner of the equity of redemption residing in New York, in which the notice of the suit served or published mere ly states that an action in the Court of Chancery of New Jersey has been brought against the nonresident defendant, without further informing him that the object of the action, as described in the bill of complaint, is to foreclose a mortgage on land belonging to the defendant and situate in New Jersey. An heir of the mortgagor residing in a foreign state may not have the slightest knowledge of the existence of the res of which he is the owner or part owner. The notice to nonresident defendants prescribed by our chancery act (Laws 1902, p. 514, § 12, 13) is plainly intended to be a notice which shall apprise the defendant, not only that he is sued, but also of the nature of the suit, and such notice necessarily involves a disclosure of the res toward which the suit is directed. The statute (section 13) makes it the duty of the Chancellor to prescribe the exact form and scope of the notice by rule of court, and in the discharge of this duty the Chancellor has ordained that such notice shall state "the object of the suit and why the persons to whom it [1. e., the notice] is addressed are made defendants." Rule 58. If the Colorado statute above referred to had, consistently with the Constitution of the state, prescribed an action in which the plaintiff not only set forth his money claim against the defendant, but also described property of the defendant situate in the state of Colorado and within the jurisdiction of the court, and prayed, not only for the establishment of the money claim against the defendant, but the application of the property described to the payment of such claim, it seems to me that a plain instance would be presented of an action quasi in rem. It is plain that no notice to the defendant of such an action quasi in rem would be reasonable which did not distinctly disclose the res, and its relation to the defendant and to the demand of the plaintiff. The origin of the jurisdiction of our courts in actions quasi in rem is to be found in the power of the sovereign state to exercise, control over all objects to which that power can be directly applied. The state must control all property within its territorial limits. Parties interested in that property, and residing within the state, or voluntarily coming into the state, in order Formerly, when a decree in equity for the specific performance of a contract to convey real estate was enforceable solely by the compulsive power of the court, brought to bear upon the defendant so as to constrain him to make a conveyance in accordance with his contract and the decree of the court, the action in which such a decree was obtained was strictly an action in personam. Spurr v. Scoville, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 578. As stated by Mr. Justice Gray, in Hart v. Sansom, 110 U. S. 151, 3 Sup. Ct. 586, 28 L. Ed. 101: "Upon a bill for the removal of a cloud upon the title as upon a bill for the specific performance of an agreement to convey the decree, unless otherwise expressly provided by statute, is clearly not a judgment in rem establishing a title in land, but operates in personam only by restraining the defendant from asserting his claim, and directing him to deliver up his deed to be canceled, or to execute a release to the plaintiff." When, however, the state through its Legislature imparts a quality to the decree in equity in the classes of cases above mentioned, so as to make such decree operate directly upon the res so as to make the decree establish the rights of the parties litigant in respect of the res, irrespective of any compulsory action by the parties themselves, or any of them, the whole character of the action at once is changed, and what was under the former course of procedure an action strictly in personam, becomes an action quasi in rem. Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 10 Sup. Ct. 557, 33 L. Ed. 918. In the present case the res is personal property. It does not follow that, because anciently an equity decree affecting real estate operated only in personam, and did not proprio vigore transfer or establish title. such decrees affecting personal property within the jurisdiction of the court were in the same way limited in their practical operation. Assuming that formerly in neither case did the decree establish title, but only the right of the complainant to receive a title, the important distinction still remains that in the case of real estate title did not pass upon delivery of possession, whereas in the case of chattel property it did. Anciently the Court of Chancery would not give to a successful complainant, in a suit for the specific performance of a contract to convey real estate, a writ of assistance to put him in possession, because no legal title would be thereby established. The same dif The argument to sustain the plea in this case seems to assume that a party complainant, who has obtained a final decree in this court establishing his equitable title to chattels in possession of a defendant holding legal title thereto, and who in pursuance of such decree has actually obtained possession, has no legal title, and will have none until the defendant has voluntarily, or under the compulsion of the court, executed a conveyance. The general principle I think is now recognized that a bare legal title to chattels ceases to exist when the holder of a complete equitable title takes possession, for the reason that such possession creates a legal title. Kronson v. Lipschitz, 68 N. J. Eq. 367, 60 Atl. 819 (1904). Such certainly must be the effect of the union of a complete equitable title and possession, when the only right or duty in respect of the chattels remaining in the original holder of the legal title is to convey the same to the holder of the equitable title. Possession of a chattel under a complete equitable title in such a case must make a complete legal title. Chancery Act of 1874, possibly deeming that they were only expressing what had there tofore been implied, consolidated, to a certain extent, the two laws above mentioned, and left their unified and revised section applicable to real property only. Revision 1877, p. 115, § 63. The section as drafted in 1874 is now found in section 45, Revised Chancery Act of 1902 (Laws 1902, p. 525). Conceding that the argument on behalf of the complainant cannot be strengthened by any reference to the existing law defining the effect of a chancery decree directing a "conveyance, release or acquittance," nevertheless there are other provisions in the act of 1799, and an early supplement thereto, which remain to day unrepealed, which I think greatly strengthen the force and effect of a chancery decree relating to personal property, and undertaking to establish title thereto when the situs of the property is within the jurisdiction of the court. Section 46 provides that the "decree of the Court of Chancery shall * have the force, operation and effect of a judgment at law in the Supreme Court of this state." We are not, however, at the present day, This mandate is now found unchanged in in a case like this, confined to the considera- section 44, Revised Chancery Act 1902 (Laws tion of those principles of equity jurispru- 1902, p. 524). The dictum of Chief Justice dence and equity procedure and practice Hornblower in deciding the case of Van Buswhich were recognized a hundred years ago. kirk v. Mulock, 18 N. J. Law, 184 (1841), Mr. Paterson's famous Chancery Act of 1799 which would greatly limit the meaning and (Paterson's Laws, p. 428) contained a num- effect of this statutory provision, may cerber of provisions which I think bear very tainly at the present day be disregarded; the directly upon the subject under discussion. decision itself having been overruled. BulSection 47 provided that a decree of the lock v. Bullock, 57 N. J. Law, 508, 31 Atl. Court of Chancery "for a conveyance, release, 1024 (Ct. of E. & A. 1895); Mutual Life Ins. or acquittance," after the allotted time for Co. v. Newton, 50 N. J. Law, 571, 575, 14 Atl. compliance had passed, should be considered 756 (1888). In the supplement to Mr. Pater"in all courts of law and equity to have the son's Chancery Act, passed Feb. 29, 1820 (P. same operation and effect, and be as avail- L. p. 99), it was provided that, when the comable as if the conveyance, release or acquit- plainant obtained a decree, the Court of tance had been executed conformably to such | Chancery should have power, among other decree." Paterson's Laws, p. 433. There things, "to cause by injunction the possession seems to be nothing in this language, especially when considered in the light of the section of the statute next to be cited, which limits the conveyance, etc., to instruments affecting real estate only. This original statute, apparently extending to all classes of property, came down through the Revision of 1846 unaffected. Rev. St. 1847, p. 914, tit. 33, c. 1, § 56. In 1852, in a supplement to the Chancery Act of 1799, a provision was inserted making a decree of the Court of Chancery for a conveyance, release, or acquittance "of lands or any interest therein" directly and immediately effective to pass title, notwithstanding the disability of any party to the suit whose estate was so transferred, "arising from infancy, lunacy, cover ture or otherwise." Laws 1852, p. 257, § 6. Section 47, Paterson's Law, however, remained entirely unaffected by this new law, which merely provided for a wider effect of a decree in the case of real estate than the effect of a decree relating to personal property. The revisers who drafted the of the effects and estate demanded by the bill, and whereof the possession or a sale is decreed, to be delivered to the complainant, or otherwise, according to such decree, and as the nature of the case may require. Laws 1820, p. 705, § 7. This language is repeated in our present chancery act. Laws 1902, p. 526, § 46. Whatever may have been the exact doctrine prior to these statutes, it seems to me that ever since these acts were passed a decree of the Court of Chancery of New Jersey establishing a complete equitable title to personal property, coupled with actual posses. sion by the equitable owner, constitutes a le gal title which must be recognized as such in courts of law as well as in courts of equity. It may be admitted that the complete equitable title referred to does not include cases where the holder of the legal title has any interest, or has any duty as trustee, or otherwise, to perform with respect to the property in question other than the duty to convey the same to the equitable owner. The question now arises whether a decree of the Court of Chancery of New Jersey, establishing a complete equitable title to personal property, can be enforced by the court in any other way than by compelling action, on the part of the defendant, in the way of delivering up possession, I shall not discuss this question at length because it is no longer an open one in New Jersey while the two recent decisions of this court above cited remain in full force. A careful examination of the ancient rules of equity applicable to the case, with the aid of the statutory provisions above set forth, in my opinion leaves no ground for the proposition that the Court of Chancery of this state, having pronounced a decree establishing title to personal property within its jurisdiction, and in the custody of a party to the suit, can only give possession of the property to the party who is entitled to it under the decree, by compulsive force exerted upon the custodian, constraining him to deliver up possession. The court may appoint a receiver, and such receiver will have a right to possession, and may take possession, and the custodian, after being enjoined from preventing the receiver from taking possession, may be removed as an obstructive force and be placed in jail. But, without pursuing this subject further, it may be pointed out that prior to the chancery act of 1799, the fundamental weakness of a decree of the Court of Chancery, in suits to obtain title to real estate, such as suits for specific performance of a contract to convey real estate, did not arise out of any essential incapacity of the court to obtain possession of the res, or to give possession of the res to the party entitled thereto under the decree. The fundamental weakness of the decree consisted in the fact that possession of the res gave no legal title under the technical rules of law governing the transfer of freehold estates in land. Possession, which was so potent for the transfer of title to personal property, has had no effect to transfer a freehold title to real estate since the days of livery of seisin. It is undoubtedly true that an action strictly in personam may be brought in the Court of Chancery of New Jersey, for the recovery of corporate stock, the situs of which is in New Jersey. In the Guayaquil, etc., Ry. Co. Case, if the complainant in the cross-bill had commenced an original suit against the resident of the state of New York who claimed to own the stock of the Guayaquill, etc., Ry. Co. in dispute, without making the last-mentioned company a party to the suit, it seems to me that the action would have been strictly in personam. The decree in such case, even if the defendant had appeared in the suit, would have had no direct effect upon the possession of the res, nor do I see that proceedings upon the decree could have been conducted which would have had the effect to give the successful complainant possession of the res. The decree could only have been en of imprisonment, to execute a transfer, or otherwise deliver the shares in dispute to the complainant in conformity with the decree. The New Jersey corporation would have been left free to act in relation to the disputed shares of its stock as it might see fit. It is unnecessary to discuss the effect of the decree in a new suit brought by the complainant against the custodian, the Guayaquil, etc., Ry. Co. The point to be observed is that a decree, in an action against the nonresident stockholder as sole defendant, could not operate directly upon the res, and be made to control and dispose of the res, without regard to any action on the part of the sole defendant which the decree might direct to be taken. In supporting the proposition that the present suit is strictly a suit in personam the brief for the defendant alleges "that the object of the suit is to obtain relief which could only be decreed in personam," and points out that "the prayer is specifically limited to a decree directing the defendant to transfer the shares of stock in question," and that "the operation of the decree would be purely against the person of the defendant." In support of these views it is alleged that "the case differs from those in which decrees are sought to compel the conveyance of lands," in which cases by statute the "decree if not complied with by the defendant can operate itself as a conveyance," and it is insisted that "no similar provision is made for the transfer of property purely personal," such as the shares of stock in question. This argument seems to rest upon a mistaken view of the nature of the case set forth in the complainant's bill, and of the relief therein prayed for, as well as an inadequate view of the power of the Court of Chancery to enforce its decrees affecting personal property which it can seize and control. The allegations of the bill show that the stock in litigation is charged with a trust for the complainant's benefit, that the complainant is the equitable owner of this stock, and that the defendant, as executor, etc., has no estate or interest therein, excepting so far as the same stands as security for the sum of $40,000. The prayer of the bill is that the rights under the trust above mentioned may be estab lished by the decree of the court, as well as that the defendant may be decreed to assign and transfer the said shares of stock to the complainant upon payment of the said sum of $40,000, with the interest thereon. Of course it must be conceded that in any action to recover stock, if the relief prayed for includes the surrender of a certificate, or the execution of an assignment or power of attorney, such relief can only be obtained by compelling the defendant to act, and if such relief is the whole relief prayed for, the action, as we have seen, may be strictly in personam. In the present case, while the bill prays that the defendant may be decreed to pute, the main relief prayed for is the estab- | with. The mere fact that the failure of some lishment of the complainant's equitable title. The jurisdiction of the court is sustained by the existence of a trust, a trust in respect of a res, situate within the jurisdiction of the court and in the custody of a party to the suit. If the complainant shall obtain a decree in this case establishing its rights in respect of the res, and then shall desire to secure the surrender of the outstanding certificates representing the res, it may be obliged to bring a suit in the state of Pennsylvania in order to secure such surrender. A similar situation would exist if the defendant were a natural person resident in New Jersey who had been duly served with process in New Jersey, but who had gone out of the state, carrying with him the certificates representing the stock which was the subject-matter of the litigation. In such a case, however, the decree would be enforceable in personam, whenever the defendant could be seized within the state of New Jersey. The last matter to be considered is whether it is necessary, where the res is personal property, to have the res actually placed within the custody of the court, through the instrumentality of a receiver, in order to give to the action the quality of an action quasi in rem. I can find no warrant in reason, and none in the authorities, disregarding a few dicta, which make the actual seizure of the res by an officer of the court essential to the status of the action as one quasi in rem. The fundamental essential, of course, must be that the personal property which is the res is so situated within the state that it may be seized. In other words, the res must be within the control of the state. If the state provides for an action affecting the res, but the court in which the action is brought has no power to directly control the res, and can only control the res by compulsory action on the part of the defendant, then we have an instance where the state has full power to provide for an action quasi in rem, but has seen fit not to do so has seen fit to provide only an action strictly in personam. It is not the actual seizure of the res which is the essential element of an action quasi in rem, but the power to seize the res, and to seize it in the action. If the res is within the jurisdiction of the court, it may be entirely unnecessary to take possession of it through a receiver in order to secure its presence when the decree of the court is to be enforced. An injunction restraining the custodian of the res, who is a party defendant, may be amply sufficient to secure the desired result. Neither a receiver nor an injunction may be necessary to preserve the res within the control of the court. So long as the res is situate within the jurisdiction of the court, and the custodian of the res is made a party to the suit, the requirement of an action quasi in rem under party to the action to move for an injunction, or for the appointment of a receiver, may in fact result in the disappearance of the res pending the suit, and its absence from the state when the final decree passes, cannot in my judgment affect the essential character of the action at the time when it was commenced, if at that time the res was within the state and within the control of the court. The actual seizure of chattels which constitute the res, and the custody thereof in a receiver appointed by the court, cannot exclude the possibility that the res may be removed from the jurisdiction of the court while the action is pending. It is, however, unnecessary to consider several questions which are suggested in regard to the effect of the removal of the res prior to the final decree, in an action which was plainly, at the time of its institution, an action quasi in rem. In considering the essential nature of an action quasi in rem, both at the time of its institution and at the time of the final decree, there is a plain distinction between the mere possibility that, pending the action, the res may be removed from the jurisdiction of the court and the actual removal of the res. I think it follows from the principles enunciated in a number of recent federal cases, and in the New Jersey cases above cited, that an action like the present one, brought by the complainant to establish a trust in shares of stock in a New Jersey corporation, is an action quasi in rem, provided the corporation, the stock of which is in litigation, is made a party to the suit, and is lawfully subjected to the jurisdiction of the court in which the suit is brought by service of process within the state, or by voluntary appearance. Arndt v. Griggs, supra; Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U. S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 559, 44 L. Ed. 647; Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398, 20 Sup. Ct. 410, 44 L. Ed. 520; Citizens' Savings & Trust Co. v. Illinois Central Railway Co., 205 U. S. 46, 27 Sup. Ct. 425, 51 L. Ed 703. All parties, whether resident in New Jersey or residing in other states, may be lawfully brought into the suit by serving process upon the New Jersey residents, and giving the reasonable notice provided by law to the defendants residing in other states. I discover no basis for the proposition that the whole fabric of the action quasi in rem falls to the ground unless the Court of Chancery through a receiver attempts in some way to take possession of the res, and actually obtains such possession. The question remains whether, when the custodian of the res, the New Jersey corporation whose stock constitutes the res, comes into court as a party complainant, the case is essentially different from that which is presented where the custodian is made a party defendant. In each case the res is subjected to the power of the court; in the one An order will be advised overruling the court acquires when the custodian of the res | decree had been passed, the court would have is brought into court by service of process, no power, by process of contempt or otherand in the other by the voluntary action of wise, to enforce the decree so far as such the complainant in coming into court and decree might undertake to constrain the depresenting to the court for adjudication his fendant to deliver certificates of stock, exclaims in respect of the res. No doubt the ecute assignments or powers of attorney, or court at the instance of the defendant may pursue any other course of conduct relating preserve the res to meet the decree of the to the res which the decree might undertake court by an injunction or by a receiver. If, to prescribe. however, in cases like the Guayaquil, etc., Railway Company Case and the Singer Mfg. plea. Company Case, a prayer for a receiver, or the appointment of a receiver, or the actual placing of the res in the custody of a receiver, is necessary to give the action the status of an action quasi in rem, I do not think that (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. it would necessarily follow that such receivership proceedings would be necessary to constitute the present action one quasi in rem. If the decree in this case is in favor of the complainant, no action on the part of any receiver is necessary. The situation of the res is not disturbed. The complainant stands with its equitable rights to the res established by the decree, and it remains in possession of such res. If, on the other hand, the decree is in favor of the defendant, no action on the part of any receiver can do the defendant any good. Presumably the defendant holds some certificates which have al (74 N. J. E. 812) PARKER v. TRAVERS et al. Nov. 16, 1908.) 1. WILLS (8 616*) - CONSTRUCTION-ESTATES CREATED-LIFE ESTATE-POWER OF DISPOSI TION. When to a life estate, with remainder over of what may be undisposed of, the will adds a est of the life tenant is not thereby enlarged, power of disposition, the property right of interbut the devisee takes the life estate only with a power of disposal, to be exercised by her during the continuance of the life estate, and for her benefit. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 1418-1430; Dec. Dig. § 616.*] 2. WILLS (§ 740*)-RIGHTS OF DEVISEES-CONVEYANCES BETWEEN DEVISEES-EFFECT. Testator devised and bequeathed all his property not disposed of to his widow, with power of disposition, the remainder as to all property not disposed of by the widow to testator's daughter in case she survived the widow, and in the event of the widow marrying again she should have only one-third of the property remaining, the balance to be invested for, and to be paid to, the daughter on her attaining majority. The widow conveyed all the real estate devised by the will to B., to whom she was afterwards married, and he, immediately after the conveyance, conveyed to his son, who reconveyed to the widow. Held that, on the widow's remarriage, the daughter acquired an absolute eswidow's subsequent deed to the daughter was tate in two-thirds of the land, and that the only effective to transfer an undivided onethird thereof. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Wills, Dec. Dig. § 740.*] 3. BANKRUPTCY_(§ 186*)-FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES BY BANKRUPT-ACTION BY BANKRUPT'S TRUSTEE-ESTOPPEL. ready been issued representing the stock in Where a suit by a bankrupt's trustee to set aside a conveyance by the bankrupt to her daughter was based entirely on the charge that the conveyance was to hinder and delay E., who was the only real creditor in the bankrupt cy proceedings, E., having accepted from defendant the balance due on a loan for which she held the title to the land, and having thereupon conveyed the land to defendant, was estopped to claim that a conveyance of the bankrupt's alleged interest in the land to defendant was fraudulent as to her. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Dec. Dig. § 186.*] BANKRUPTCY (§ 177*)-FRAUDULENT CON VEYANCES-VALIDITY. Where a bankrupt owned the equitable title to certain land, subject to an indebtedness, which she paid, and then induced the creditor to convey the property to defendant, her daughter, within four months prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, such conveyance was, |