cover all its provisions, and it cannot be mis- [tiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed, withleading in what it says or omits. out awarding a new trial.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 136, 137; Dec. Dig. § 109.*] 4. STATUTES (§ 113*)-TITLE-SUFFICIENCY.

Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRISCOE, PEARCE, SCHMUCKER, BURKE, THOMAS, WORTHINGTON, and HENRY, JJ.

Joshua W. Miles and H. Fillmore Lank

Under Const. 1864, art. 3, § 28 (Const. art. 3, § 29), providing that every law shall embrace but one subject, which shall be described in the title, the title of Acts 1865, p. 18, c. 14, entitled "An act to incorporate the Pocomoke ford, for appellant. Melvin & Handy, for Bridge Company," is not sufficiently compre-appellee. hensive to include a provision requiring two counties to levy an annual tax, and pay the same to the company authorized to build a bridge across a river in such counties. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Dec. Dig. § 113.*] 5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 43*)-VALIDITY OF STATUTES-ACQUIESCENCE IN VALIDITY-EF

FECT.

Long acquiescence by a county in the validity of an act requiring the county to pay an annual tax does not estop the commissioners of the county from attacking the act as unconstitutional, the commissioners being public servants bound to protect the public, without right to pay out county money unless authorized to do so, and it never being too late to re-establish constitutional rights, the observance of which has been silently neglected.

BOYD, C. J. This is a suit by the Pocomoke Bridge Company, a corporation incorporated by chapter 14, p. 18, Acts 1865, against the county commissioners of Somerset county, to recover $600, claimed to be due under section 12 of that act. A demurrer to the declaration was overruled by the court below, and the defendant then filed six pleas, in the first of which is set out the charter of the company in full, and all of them allege, either that the whole act is unconstitutional and null and void, or that section 12 is. Some of them assign reasons for so alleging, while others do not; the principal ground relied on being that the title to the act is not sufficient, particularly in so far as the provisions contained in section 12 are 6. STATUTES (§ 61*)-VALIDITY-DETERMINATION-ACQUIESCENCE IN VALIDITY EFFECT. Concerned. A demurrer to the pleas was susIn doubtful cases involving the constitution-tained, and the general issue plea of not guil ality of an act because of its title, the court may consider long acquiescence in its constitutionality in support of the act. [Ed. Note:-For other cases, see Statutes, Dec. Dig. § 61.*]

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 41; Dec. Dig. § 43.*]

7. STATUTES (§ 64*)-INVALIDITY IN PART-EF

FECT.

It is not proper to declare an entire act unconstitutional because a provision thereof is void, unless the provisions are so connected in subject-matter, meaning, or purpose that it cannot be presumed that the Legislature would have enacted one provision without the other.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. 88 58-66, 195; Dec. Dig. § 64.*] 8. STATUTES (§ 64*)-INVALIDITY IN PARTEFFECT-BRIDGES.

--

ty was filed. The case was submitted to the court without the intervention of a jury, and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff. During the trial an exception was taken to the admission of section 12, on the ground that it is unconstitutional and void. This appeal was taken from the judgment on the abovementioned verdict. We do not deem it necessary to pass on the demurrers and the exception separately, but will proceed at once to what we regard the important question in the case.

It involves section 29, art. 3, of the Constitution, or more properly speaking section 28, art. 3, of the Constitution of 1864, which was Acts 1865, p. 18, c. 14, incorporates a bridge company to construct and maintain a in force when the act of 1865 was passed. toll bridge, authorizes the collection of toll, but The provision in question is, however, the provides that residents and nonresident taxpay- same in both-"every law enacted by the ers of two counties shall pass over the bridge free of toll, and requires such counties to levy General Assembly shall embrace but one suban annual tax and pay the same to the com- ject, and that shall be described in its tipany. Held, that the provisions for free pas- tle." The title of the act is: "An act to insage of residents and nonresident taxpayers of

the counties and for an annual tax are insep-corporate the Pocomoke Bridge Company." arably connected with each other, and, on the The act names seven persons as commissionlatter provision being void because not embracers to receive subscriptions to the capital ed in the title of the act, the former provision stock, "to construct a bridge across the Pocomust also be adjudged void, but the invalidity moke river, in Worcester and Somerset counof such provisions does not invalidate the remainder of the act, as to the incorporation of the company with right to maintain a toll bridge.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 58-66, 195; Dec. Dig. § 64.*]

Appeal from Circuit Court, Somerset County; Henry Lloyd, Judge.

ties, at or near the site of the present ferry,
known as 'Steven's Ferry'"; said stock be-
ing limited to $45,000, divided into shares of
As soon as 100 shares were sub-
$100 each.
scribed, the organization of the company was
authorized, and various provisions were
made in the charter. The two important sec-
tions are as follows:

Action by the Pocomoke Bridge Company against the County Commissioners of Somer- "Sec. 11. And be it enacted, that upon the set County. There was a judgment for plain-completion of said bridge, all citizens and

residents of Somerset and Worcester coun- | portion of the cost of each county, to adties, and all nonresident taxpayers of said vertise for proposals, award the work to the counties, shall pass over said bridge free of lowest bidder, supervise the work, etc. An toll or charges, but all other persons shall appeal was granted any citizen or citizens pay such tolls and charges as the president to the circuit court, if the county commisand directors may determine, provided said sioners determined to build or repair any tolls or charges shall not exceed the follow-bridge, or unite with an adjoining county in ing rates: For each foot passenger, five building or repairing one between the two cents; for each horse and rider, ten cents; for each carriage with one horse attached, twenty-five cents; for each carriage with two horses attached, fifty cents; for each wagon or cart with more than two horses or oxen attached, seventy-five cents.

counties, etc. Those provisions are still in force, being sections 19-38, art. 25, Code Pub. Gen. Laws 1904. Notwithstanding such precautions were to be taken when the county commissioners proposed to build or repair a bridge, this act required the county com"Sec. 12. And be it enacted, that the coun- missioners of those two counties to pay to a ty commissioners for Somerset county be and | private corporation $600 and $700, respectiveare hereby required to levy annually on the ly, every year, although there is nothing more assessable property of said county the sum in the title than shown above. Was that lawof six hundred dollars, and to pay the same fully done? Or, to put the question in a to the president and directors of said com- more apt form, Is this constitutional provipany at the end of each year, and that the sion of any value, if two counties can thus county commissioners of Worcester county be required to pay annually 6 per centum on be and they are hereby required to levy an- about one-half of the authorized capital of a nually on the assessable property of said private corporation, under an act, the title county, the sum of seven hundred dollars, to which does not make the remotest suggesand to pay over the same to the president and directors of the company aforesaid at the end of each year."

|tion of such a provision being in the body of the act? There have been so many decisions by this court relating to this clause of the Constitution that it would seem almost as if there was not room for further contention about it, but the difficulty is that the principles applicable to it must be applied to the particular facts and circumstances of each statute under consideration, and hence it is not easy to find a case exactly in point. What may be considered "one subject" in some classes of legislation may not be in others.

No one can read the title to this act without being impressed with the fact that it is exceedingly meager, in order to justify such | legislation as section 12. The charter was granted before the General Laws provided for the incorporation of bridge companies. Since 1868 the corporation laws of this state have required companies, incorporated under the General Laws for the erection of bridges, to first obtain, in writing, the consent of the county commissioners of the county in which The "subject" of the law now under conthe bridge is to be located, or if proposed to sideration, as indicated by the title, was the be erected over a stream dividing two coun: incorporation of the Pocomoke Bridge Comties to obtain the consent, in writing, of the pany, while the body of the act not only county commissioners of both counties, and contained provisions which were germane the commissioners are given large powers and appropriate to that subject, but also this over them, including that of requiring the provision which required the two counties adjustment and revision of tolls, so as to to pay the respective sums of money to the yield not more than 8 per centum net divi- company, after it was organized and the dend. Although those provisions were not in bridge was built. If it be conceded that in force when this company was chartered, a charter of a bridge company it would be there were other statutes which showed the germane and lawful to authorize a county to policy of this state to be to require great subscribe to its capital stock, or to authorize care, on the part of the county commission- the company to agree with the county that ers, before incurring obligations in connec- on payment of a reasonable sum its citizens tion with the building of bridges. They were could use the bridge free of tolls-although , required by the Code of 1860 to advertise not mentioned in the title-it does not folfor sealed proposals for building or repair-low that such a provision as that now attacking a bridge, if the cost exceeded $200, to- ed can be inserted in a charter of a private award a contract to the lowest competent corporation, and thus compel a county which bidder, to demand a bond of the contractor, and, upon petition praying for a bridge to be built or repaired over a stream dividing two adjoining counties, the commissioners of one county were directed to obtain the concurrence of those of the other. Three examiners were to be appointed by each, who were required to examine into the expediency of building or repairing the bridge, the place

is not a party to the charter to levy and pay annually a fixed sum for the use of the bridge, without at least giving some notice of such legislation in the title. That brings us more nearly to the real question in the case: Is the subject of this act so described in the title as to authorize the legislation embraced in section 12, within the spirit and meaning of the constitutional provision? As

title would, in the remotest degree, suggest | hardship, on the stockholders of the comto either the county commissioners, to any pany, to now strike it down; but, as we are representative of Somerset county in the called upon to determine the question, we Legislature, or to any taxpayer of the county must do so regardless of the consequences, that the act proposed to require the county however much we may regret that some into pay the corporation $600, or any other sum jury may ensue to innocent persons. The of money, every year. If we assume that long acquiescence by the county in paying they were informed by the name that it was the amount for so many years cannot estop proposed to form a corporation to build a the present county commissioners from raisbridge over the Pocomoke river, there is not ing the question, and thereby make an unconeven anything in the title to show that the stitutional law in effect constitutional. They bridge was to be between Somerset and Wor- are public servants, whose duty is to protect cester counties, for that river extended into the public, and they have no right to pay out Worcester county for a considerable dis- the money of the county unless authorized to tance beyond the Somerset boundary. In do so. It was said by Judge Pearce in Arnsmany of the cases in this court the object of perger v. Crawford, 101 Md. 258, 61 Atl. 417, this constitutional provision has been stated, 70 L. R. A. 497: "It was urged in argument and in Stiefel v. Maryland Institution, etc., that this statute has been silently acquiesced 61 Md. 148, it was said of it: "Publicity and in so long that it should not now be disturba knowledge of the true effect and operationed. This argument was urged in Sadler v. of every bill brought before the Legislature Langham, 34 Ala. 332, but the court replied. are the great safeguards against ill-consid-justly as we think, that it was never too late ered and improper legislation. The provi- to re-establish constitutional rights, the obsion in question is one, among many others servance of which has been silently neglectin the Constitution, designed to promote ed; and we may add that it is the infringethose objects." In Kafka v. Wilkinson, 99 ment of the constitutional rights of the few Md. 241, 57 Atl. 618, it was said, and has in minor matters which leads to the disrebeen several times since repeated, that its gard of the rights of the body of the people purpose and object "have been declared to in matters of graver import, and that no conbe twofold: The first is to prevent the com-stitutional right can be so unimportant as to bination in one act of several distinct and justify a court in failing to enforce it, when incongruous subjects; and the second is that its aid is invoked for that purpose." It is the Legislature and the people of the state said in 26 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 575, may be fairly advised of the real nature of that "long acquiescence in the constitutionalpending legislation." In one of the latest ity of an act in respect of its title is entitled cases (Fout v. Frederick Co., 105 Md. 563, 66 to much weight in determining the sufficiency Atl. 488) Judge Burke quoted from Cooley's of the title." In doubtful cases that may be Con. Lim. (3d Ed.) 158. that the purpose of properly considered, just as we may consider this provision is: "First, to prevent hodge the circumstances under which a provision podge 'log rolling legislation; second, to is adopted, the construction placed on it by prevent surprise or fraud upon the Legisla- the Legislature, the framers of the Constituture by means of provisions in bills of which tion, and the people, as we said in Bonsal v. the titles give no intimation, and which Yellott, 100 Md. 481, 60 Atl. 593, 69 L. R. A. might therefore be overlooked and carelessly 914, but in this case we can have no doubt and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to as to the unconstitutionality of this provifairly apprise the people, through such pub- sion, and hence must declare it void. lication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire." While courts should be very cautious in striking down acts of the Legislature, they must protect the public, and the members of the Legislature themselves, from being imposed on by the violation of constitutional provisions intended to furnish them protection. A title to an act should not only fairly indicate the general subject of the act, but should be sufficiently comprehensive in its scope to cover, to a reasonable extent, all its provisions, and must not be misleading by what it says or omits to say. Applying these and the above principles to section 12 of this act, we cannot hesitate to declare it invalid. If it was actually known by the authorities and people of the two counties before it was passed, this conclusion may possibly work a

There is, however, another branch of this case to be determined. It is well settled that it is not necessary, or proper, to strike down an entire act because one provision is void, "unless the provisions are so connected together in subject-matter, meaning, or purpose, that it cannot be presumed the Legislature would have passed the one without the other." 26 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 579. That principle has been announced by this court over and over again, and it has been applied to cases in which the valid and void provisions were in the same section of the act. Mayor, etc., of Hagerstown v. Dechert, 32 Md. 369; Steenken v. State, 88 Md. 708, 42 Atl. 212. There can therefore be no possible difficulty in the way of declaring section 12 unconstitutional and in upholding other sections, unless it is so inseparably connected with the others, or some of them, as to raise the presumption that the Legislature would not have passed the one without the

The rest of the act is applicable to the incorporation of the company-to what the title describes the act to be-and after a lapse of over 40 years, during which time much of the stock of the company has doubt-it less changed hands, it would be manifest inJustice to strike down the whole charter, but it would be equally unjust to strike down the section that was clearly intended to provide compensation for the privileges granted in the other section, and yet permit the latter to remain in force so as to continue those privileges. This conclusion will permit the appellee to charge such toll as the president and directors may determine-not to exceed the rates named in the charter. As the charter is subject to amendment, those rates can be reasonably regulated by the Legislature, if deemed excessive or unreasonable.

Inasmuch as we have reached the conclusions already announced, it is not necessary to discuss the question whether the Legislature could validly make such provisions as are contained in sections 11 and 12, although we do not understand it to be denied by the appellant that they were within the power of the Legislature. The question

market price, was not reversible error; it not | 10. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1068*)-HARMLESS appearing that the ruling was prejudicial. ERROR-ERRONEOUS CHARGE CURED BY VER