the effect of defendant's act in disabling the plaintiff to respond to the crown, and that the chancery was a court of superior and more general jurisdiction. See Joanes v. Whitney (1578) Cary, 161; 21 E. R. 60 (but this was an injunction out of chancery to restrain an action at law brought in the exchequer after the commencement of the chancery suit); Vendall v. Harvey (1632) Nels. 19; 21 E. R. 427; 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 80, G. 2, and 134, D. 3; 21 E. R. 893 and 939; where the Lord Keeper (North) overruled a plea that set up the pendency of a prior equitable action in the exchequer as a bar to a suit in chancery, on the ground that "the chancery was the highest court of equity, and though the exchequer was an ancient court of equity, yet the same was but a private court, and its jurisdiction properly was only for getting in the King's revenue, and for the King's officers, and they ought to keep within their proper bounds." And see 6 Vin. Abr. "Court of Exchequer," Q. 2 (page 569).

(2) Interpleader suits are a recognized exception; and where a plaintiff is entitled to interplead defendants, and pays the money into court, other actions against them may be enjoined, whether these be legal or equitable. Warington v. Wheatstone (1821) Jac. 202; 4 Eng. Ch. 203; 37 E. R. 826. (Here one of the suits enjoined was legal, the other equltable; see 10 Sim. 480.) So in Crawford v. Fisher (1840) 10 Sim. 479; 59 E. R. 701; Richards v. Salter, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 445; Sieveking v. Beherns (1837) 2 Myl. & Cr. 581, 592, 593; 40 E. R. 761, 765; Prudential Assurance Co. v. Thomas (1867) L. R. 3 Ch. App. 74; 2 Story, Eq. § 808.

(3) Creditors' suits against executors or administrators for the administration of the estate may be treated as an exception; where, after (but not before) decree, an injunction has frequently been issued to restrain other proceedings by creditors at law or in equity, the decree in the administration suit being considered to be in the nature of a judgment in favor of each and every creditor. 1 Story, Eq. § 549; 2 Id. § 890; Jackson v. Leaf (1820) 1 Jac. & Walk. 229, 231; 37 E. R. 362; Beachamp v. Marquis of Huntley, and Clarke v. Earl of Ormonde (1822) reported together in Jacob, 546; 37 E. R. 956; Carron Iron Co. v. Maclaren (1855) 5 H. L. Cas. 416; 10 E. R. 415, cited more fully hereafter.

(4) Prevention of multiplicity of suits. On this ground suits in equity may no doubt be enjoined, if necessary to do so, as well as suits at law. Probably Beckford v. Kemble (1822) 1 Sim. & Stu. 7, 57 E. R. 3, belongs in this category; there Leach, V. C., stayed a foreclosure suit pending in the colonial court of chancery in Jamaica until an account could be taken in a suit for redemption in England, all the parties being in England, so that the accounts could be more conveniently taken there than in Jamaica.

produce an unjust result in a pending suit and consequent irreparable injury to his adversary, he may of course be enjoined. In this class lies the injunction 'granted by Justice Barnard in Erie R. R. Co. v. Ramsey, 45 N. Y. 637; the criticism being that he should have left the company to apply for a stay by motion in the suit already pending.

(6) Oppression amounting to fraud may be attempted by suing a debtor outside of his home jurisdiction in order to gain an unconscionable advantage over him, in which case equity may restrain the creditor upon proper terms. Standard Roller Bearing Co. v. Crucible Steel Co. (N. J. Ch.) 63 Atl. 546, decided by my predecessor, Chancellor Magie, was a case where both parties were corporations of the state of New Jersey. The defendant had a claim against the complainant of less than $4,000, and notwithstanding it might sue the complainant in the courts of this state, or prosecute its claim by attachment upon a valuable property of the complainant in Pennsylvania (in either case the claim could be prosecuted and defended by proofs and witnesses at hand), the defendant brought three attachment suits simultaneously in Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin, wherein credits due to the complainant to an amount exceeding $20,000 were garnisheed. The learned Chancellor held that these attachment suits in distant states were oppressive, and that their prosecution should be enjoined, upon terms, however, that complainant would submit to a speedy trial of the claim in this state, and would give bond, with security, in a penal sum double the amount of the claim conditioned for paying the amount ascertained to be due; ascertainment either to I be made by this court or by any court of competent jurisdiction in this state, at the election of the defendant.

(7) Cases where a party oppresses his adversary by suing him in a foreign jurisdiction for the purpose of evading some established policy of the jurisdiction where the parties are domiciled.

Since complainant here relies upon certain decisions that, so far as they have any pertinency, belong in this category, they may well be examined at some length. In reading the opinions, care should be exercised in distinguishing that part of the reasoning which merely establishes the power, from that which vindicates its exercise in given cases.

Bushby v. Munday, Cloves & Cracroft (1821) 5 Mad. 297, 56 E. R. 908. Bushby had given to Munday, as trustee for Cracroft, a bond to secure a gambling debt, and Munday had assigned it to Cloves. The bond was given in England and was in English form, and was claimed to be void as a gambling debt under an act of Parliament. Bushby was a Scotchman and proprietor of real estate in Scotland, but resident abroad. Cloves brought an action in the Scotch court upon the bond, and thereby secured a lien (equiv

on Bushby's estates. The latter thereupon filed a bill in the English Chancery for the purpose of having the bond delivered up to be canceled, and incidentally to restrain the prosecution of the action in Scotland. The grounds of the application for the injunction were that a bond was an English security, and a discharge from it abroad could not be pleaded in England; that the English Chancery might require the bond to be delivered up, while in Scotland no such relief was given; in England discovery could be had by sworn answer of Munday and Cracroft, whereas in Scotland such an answer would not be evidence; besides which it was urged that the invalidity of the bond arose out of an English act of Parliament, not in force in Scotland. Leach, V. C., allowed an injunction upon terms, saying (5 Madd. 308, 56 E. R. 913): "Mr. Bushby may succeed in his defense in Scotland, and still be exposed to future proceedings upon the bond; but if he establish his case here, the bond itself will be delivered up to be canceled, and he will be absolutely relieved from all future proceedings. This court is a more convenient jurisdiction for determining the question whether Cloves has by the law of England a right to recover upon the bond, than the Court of Session in Scotland. The proceeding there is less likely to elicit the truth of the case than the proceeding here, because there Bushby cannot have the benefit of Munday's admissions upon his oath, and because, Munday and Cracroft being both resident out of Scotland, he cannot compel their testimony as witnesses." The terms imposed were that Bushby should consent to judgment in Scotland so as to secure to Cloves a priority of lien upon the real estate, subject to the event of the suit in Chancery. I deem it plain that the remark of Sir John Leach about the English Chancery being "a more convenient jurisdiction" than the Scotch court for determining a question of English law was not intended to indicate that the injunction was to be allowed on this ground, but as showing that an injunction, allowed on the other grounds mentioned, would not work a hardship upon Cloves.

Talleyrand v. Boulanger (1797) 3 Ves. 447, 30 E. R. 1099. A personal bond was given when obligors and obligee were citizens and residents of France. By the law of France there was no liability to arrest on civil process for such an obligation. Afterwards the parties to the cause emigrated to England, and their property was confiscated. One of the plaintiffs was an obligor in this bond, as surety, and, being about to sail on an expedition which went from England to the coast of Brittany, was arrested at suit of the defendant, and in order to procure his release made a cash payment and gave two bills of exchange payable in a short time, and executed a new bond payable six months after peace should be concluded between France

first became a surety by joining in these securities. One of the bills of exchange having been paid, the plaintiffs, under advice of counsel, refused to make any more payments, and were thereupon arrested and held to bail by the defendant in four actions, whereupon a bill was filed for an injunction, and the Lord Chancellor (Lord Loughborough) granted it on the ground "that the proceeding on the part of the defendant has been extremely oppressive and immoral. I am not prepared to say how far this court will finally give redress; but I will not allow the defendant to avail himself of an advantage got by duress, which is the sole cause of the new engagement." This case was manifestly decided upon the ground of apparent hardship, and in disregard of the rule that the lex fori governs actions for the enforcement of a contract although made in another jurisdiction. Like the case of Melan v. Fitzjames, 1 Bos. & Pul. 138, decided by the Court of Common Pleas in the same year, it is a plainly erroneous decision, outcome of the troublous times. Although Lord Brougham cited both these cases with apparent approval in the House of Lords 40 years later, yet the decision then made was to the effect that the law of the country where a contract is to be enforced must govern its enforcement. Don. v. Lippmann (1837) 5 Cl. & Fin. 1, 18; 7 E. R. 303, 309. And in Liverpool Marine Credit Co. v. Hunter (1868) L. R. 3 Ch. App. 479, 486, Talleyrand v. Boulanger was severely criticised. Melan v. Fitzjames was distinctly overruled and the doctrine of the dissenting opinion affirmed in De La Vega v. Vianna (1830) 1 Barn. & Ad. 284. And so, little (if anything) remains of authority in Talleyrand v. Boulanger.

Lord Portarlington v. Soulby (1834) 3 Myl. & K. 104, 40 E. R. 40. An injunction was allowed to restrain defendants from suing in Ireland upon a bill of exchange given by plaintiff for a gambling debt. The ground of the injunction, however, was that the court in which the action was brought was a court of common law, and had no jurisdiction to stop the proceeding on the ground that it was founded upon a gaming transaction.

Carron Iron Co. v. Maclaren (1855) 5 H. L Cas. 416, 10 E. R. 415, rather bears against the complainant. The company was a Scotch corporation, having its manufacturing works in Scotland and an important sales agency in London. A suit for administration of the estate of one Stainton, deceased, had been instituted in the English Court of Chancery, and a decree made for an accounting. Afterwards the company, a large creditor of the decedent, instituted an action in the Scotch Court of Session, in which process was issued (equivalent to our writ of attachment) securing a lien upon real and personal estate of the decedent in Scotland. An injunction was allowed to restrain this proceeding, but on appeal to the House of Lords it was dissoly

foreign creditor resident abroad, suing for his debt in the courts of his own country.

The following cases are typical of the group, and appear to be the principal authorities upon the question of enjoining foreign actions brought to evade the home policy:

In Margarum v. Moon, 63 N. J. Eq. 586, 53 Atl. 179, creditor and debtor were both citizens and residents of New Jersey, and the debtor under the laws of this state was entitled to $200 exemption from process, and had not personal property of that value. He had a claim for wages against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and his creditor assigned his claim against the debtor to a nonresident, who, in attachment proceedings in the courts of West Virginia, garnished the wages due to the debtor from the railroad company. This court allowed an injunction on the ground that the resident creditor was endeavoring to deprive his debtor of the benefit of the exemption provided by the law of their common domicile.

Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen (Mass.) 545; Id., 7 Allen (Mass.) 57. A resident of Massachusetts being insolvent under the laws of the commonwealth, and proceedings in insolvency having been commenced there, an injunction was allowed to restrain one of the creditors, who likewise was a citizen of Massachusetts, from proceeding by attachment in another state to divert property from the assignees in insolvency and thereby secure a preference for himself, contrary to the policy of the insolvent law of Massachusetts.

To the same effect is Cunningham v. Butler, 142 Mass. 47, 6 N. E. 782, 56 Am. Rep. 657. This case was carried to the Supreme Court of the United States, upon the ground that such an injunction was a violation of the "full faith and credit" clause of the federal Constitution. The decree was affirmed, Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269, 33 L. R. A. 538.

Wilson v. Joseph, 107 Ind. 490, 8 N. E. 616. Injunction granted to restrain a resident of Indiana from prosecuting an attachment proceeding against another resident in the courts of another state in violation of an Indiana statute which made it an offense to send a claim against a debtor out of the state for collection in order to evade the local exemption laws.

Sandage v. Studebaker Bros. Co. (1895) 142 Ind. 148, 41 N. E. 380, 34 L. R. A. 363, 51 Am. St. Rep. 165, held that a citizen of one state may be enjoined from prosecuting an action against another citizen of the same state in a foreign jurisdiction for the purpose of evading the laws of his own state.

land should restrain the creditor from proceeding against the debtor in another state to which the creditor had resorted to evade the Maryland laws prohibiting imprisonment for debt, where the foreign court must through imperfect methods of proof ascertain the statute on which the debtor relied to avoid the transactions, and where there must be difficulty and expense in obtaining evidence.

It will be observed that in all of these cases (with the single exception of Bushby v. Munday, where other special circumstances appeared), the party against whom the injunction was issued had either gone himself to a foreign jurisdiction, or had sent his claim there for prosecution by his assignee,' in order to evade some distinct prohibition of the local law of the common domicile. (In most of them, the suit whose prosecution was restrained was an action at law; but I assume that in such a case it would make no difference whether the foreign action was an action at law or an action in equity.) But it is important to observe that the public policy, whose attempted evasion was deemed sufficient ground for injunction, was in each instance somewhat akin to a police regulation, being designed to maintain a certain standard in the social, moral, or commercial life of the state adopting it; such as a prohibition against gambling, against preferences in insolvency, against imprisoning the honest debtor or depriving him by civil process of the last comforts of life. There is, is seems to me, a noticeable difference between that sort of local policy and the alleged grounds of public policy that are asserted in the present case.

Besides, this case lacks two of the elements that were treated as essential in the cases just referred to; there was no common domicile of the parties in this state, and the defendant company did not choose the Massachusetts jurisdiction for the purpose of evading any law, policy, or doctrine peculiarly cognizable by the courts of New Jersey, but for the very simple reason that Massachusetts had jurisdiction over the person of Mr. Bigelow, while this state had not. Mr. Bigelow is sued in personam in his home jurisdiction, in equitable actions, and in a court of full equity jurisdiction. He tests the sense of that court upon the law by a demurrer, and being overruled he answers upon the merits, submits to a hearing upon the merits, a finding of facts is made, and upon it final decrees are made against him. The litigation in that court continues for more than

five years. After all this, and pending appeals taken by him and by his adversary to the court of last resort, he comes into the state of New Jersey to have his adversary restrained from further prosecuting the ac tions in Massachusetts. He proposes no waiver of his appeals there taken. He offers no security that he will abide by any decree

here or there. He avers, it is true, that in the Massachusetts actions he "gave a surety bond or bonds, in the sum of $500,000, to indemnify the company"; but there is nothing to show that such bonds could be enforced by this court, nor do the specific conditions thereof appear; besides which, the amount of them is manifestly inadequate to cover the company's claims. He alleges no fraud, mistake, surprise, or adventitious circumstances beyond his control that prevent the Massachusetts court from doing full justice. He alleges no suppression of evidence, no obstruction by the present defendant of any effort of his to get justice in Massachusetts. And he alleges no excuse for failing to set up in the Massachusetts litigation the special matters that he here relies upon, nor for waiting until five years have gone by, and a decision has been rendered against him there, before setting up his special matters here. Ostensibly his appeal is to the public policy of New Jersey, in certain respects presently to be mentioned. But a large part of the efforts of his counsel have been addressed to convincing me that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, and Justice Sheldon, the trial judge, have improperly determined the questions of law and of fact presented to them. The arguments to this effect are not in the least convincing; but if they were, I take it that I have no legitimate concern with the merits of the controversy as joined in Massachusetts. The notion is intolerable that this court should, directly or by indirection, assume any supervisory jurisdiction over the courts of Massachusetts.

Upon the questions of alleged state policy the query at once arises whether Mr. Bigelow, a citizen and resident of the commonwealth of Massachusetts, is entitled to invoke in his protection any rule of public pol icy that is local to New Jersey. See Bentley v. Whittemore, 19 N. J. Eq. 462, 469, 470, 97 Am. Dec. 671; Flagg v. Baldwin, 38 N. J. Eq. 219, 225, 48 Am. Rep. 308; Recvr. of State Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 34 N. J. Eq. 450, 454; Moore v. Bonnell, 31 N. J. Law, 90; Barnett v. Kinney, 147 U. S. 476, 483, 13 Sup. Ct. 403, 37 L. Ed. 247. I have not considered the point, preferring to rest my decision upon a broader ground.

The first grounds of supposed public policy that are appealed to are, that the conduct of the suits in Massachusetts and in New York by the Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Company is a speculation in a lawsuit, and that those suits are being conducted by what is called a "voting trust." The argument to this effect is rested upon certain averments in the bill not as yet adverted to. The bill alleges that, since the Massachusetts actions were begun, the owners of about 100,000 out of the total 150,000 shares of stock of the New Jersey company caused a Maine corporation to be formed known as

ed at first about 100,000 shares, and afterwards about 40,000 additional shares, of the New Jersey company to be transferred to the Maine company, whereupon an agreement was entered into (as is alleged in the body of the present bill) between the New Jersey company and the Maine company and two men named Smith and Hoar, providing that the Maine company, as the majority shareholder of the New Jersey company, should cause the latter company to realize upon the suits against Bigelow and the Lewisohn estate, and distribute the proceeds thereof as in the agreement provided; that Smith and Hoar declared themselves to be trustees of any fund obtained by virtue of this agreement, and issued certificates of interest known as trust receipts, which are sold upon the public markets, the holders thereof not being in any substantial part the holders of shares of the Maine company or holders of shares of the New Jersey company. Complainant alleges that the holders of these trust receipts are the persons ultimately entitled to the moneys to be paid by the Maine company to Smith and Hoar as trustees, and that the prosecution of the suits in question is not being had for the purpose of benefiting the New Jersey Company, but for the purpose of realizing the largest sum possible on the trust certificates; that the buying and selling of such certificates constitutes the trading in a lawsuit, and that the proceeds of any recovery in the actions will not go to any persons who were originally interested in the New Jersey company, nor, so far as 14/15ths are concerned will they go to the New Jersey company, but will go to strangers to the transaction who have purchased the trust receipts." Annexed to the bill, and by reference made a part of it, are a copy of the agreement referred to, and a copy of one of the trust receipts. Where these differ from the construction placed upon them in the bill, the documents themselves must of course control. It thus appears that the New Jersey company is not at all a party to these transactions. The agreement is dated. January 15, 1904, and is made between the Maine company, as a stockholder in the New Jersey company, and Smith and Hoar, as trustees. It pledges the Maine company to cause the New Jersey company to actively prosecute the claims against Bigelow and Lewisohn in such manner as the trustees may request, and upon like request to make settlement and adjustment of the claims; to cause the New Jersey company, if and so far as any moneys are realized from the claims, to pay the expenses of the litigation, including advances made by the trustees, and, after providing for certain other disbursements, to distribute the surplus as a dividend among its stockholders (that is, the stockholders of the New Jersey Company), if it may lawfully do so, and, if it cannot then lawfully make such dividend, to make the same as

moved. The Maine company agrees in other respects to use its reasonable efforts as a stockholder of the New Jersey company to carry out the agreement according to its true intent and purpose, and that if it ceases to be a majority stockholder in the New Jersey company it will make arrangements to bind the holders of a majority of the stock of the New Jersey company to carry out what the Maine company has by this agree ment undertaken to do. The trust certificate simply certifies that the holder thereof is entitled to certain shares in the trust and to all the rights and benefits of a shareholder therein.

Plainly, therefore, what has happened is that, after the present defendant company began its actions against Mr. Bigelow in Massachusetts, another company, a corporation of Maine, being the holder of a large majority of the stock of the present company, made an agreement with trustees by which they undertook to sell, or to place in form to be sold, any dividend that may hereafter be declared by the defendant to its stockholders out of the proceeds of the suits against Bigelow and the Lewisohn estate. It is alleged in the bill that Mr. Bigelow is informed and believes that the voting power on the stock of the New Jersey company held by the Maine company has been (as to the matters referred to in the agreement between the Maine company, and Smith and Hoar) transferred to Smith and Hoar; but this does not amount to an averment that such is the fact (even if the fact were material), and nothing of that kind appears from the agreement.

To the argument of complainant's counsel, based upon the situation thus disclosed, there are several replies:

First. The trust agreement was made January 15, 1904, more than four years before the filing of the bill of complaint herein, and nearly four years before the filing by Mr. Bigelow of his final answers in the Massachusetts suits; it is not suggested that his knowledge of this agreement and of the situation resulting therefrom is newly acquired; nor is any reason given why, if it is of any concern in the controversy between Bigelow and the New Jersey company, it should not have been set up and relied upon in the Massachusetts suits.

Second. The New Jersey company is not a party to the agreement, either in a legal or in an equitable sense.

Third. The agreement was made not only after the New Jersey company's cause of action against Bigelow and Lewisohn arose, but after suits thereon were commenced, and 50 cannot amount to a bar of the causes of action.

Fourth. Neither the law nor the policy of New Jersey prohibits what complainant is pleased to call a speculation in a lawsuit. In this state we have not adopted the Eng

Schomp v. Schenck, 40 N. J. Law, 195, 29 Am. Rep. 219; Bouvier v. Baltimore, etc., Ry. Co., 67 N. J. Law, 281, 291, 51 Atl. 781, 60 L. R. A. 750. And with us the assignment of choses in action has from an early day been encouraged. Sullivan v. Visconti, 68 N. J. Law, 543, 549, 53 Atl. 598; Id., 69 N. J. Law, 452, 55 Atl. 1133. An exception beIng the right of action for personal injuries. Weller v. Jersey City, etc., St. Ry. Co., 68 N. J. Eq. 659, 662, 61 Atl. 459. Our law, therefore, would not 'prohibit the present defendant from thus assigning its right to recover from Bigelow and Lewisohn the moneys claimed to be due from them for breach of trust. And supposing this does not carry with it the right of individual stockholders to thus sell their anticipated participation in the moneys to be recovered, because such participation is contingent upon the declaration of a dividend out of the proceeds, yet in this state we recognize, in equity, assignments of contingent and expectant interests, provided they be made bona fide and for a valuable consideration (Bacon v. Bonham, 33 N. J. Eq. 614; Terney v. Wilson, 45 N. J. Law, 282, 285); an attempted assignment of an allowance of alimony to be paid in futuro being an exception, based on special grounds (Lynde v. Lynde, 64 N. J. Eq. 736, 750, 757, 52 Atl. 694, 58 L. R. A. 471, 97 Am. St. Rep. 692).

Fifth. In view of the nonadoption in this state of the laws against champerty and maintenance, and of the absence from our corporation act of any prohibition, I am unaware of anything in the policy of this state to prevent stockholders from agreeing among themselves to aid the company in proper ways in its litigations against third parties, and to use their influence as stockholders to see that out of the proceeds of the litigation, if successful, the reasonable disbursements made by the stockholders in the company's behalf shall be refunded, and a special dividend made of the net proceeds, if and when that can lawfully be done.

Sixth. But if the New Jersey company (the present defendant) were a party to the Smith and Hoar agreement, and if that agreement were contrary to public policy. I do not see how that benefits the present complainant. The proper result is that it ought to be nullified, not that the company should go without remedy against a third party who defrauded it before the void agreement was made.

Seventh. If Mr. Bigelow desires to uphold the supposed public policy of New Jersey, in the respect that this agreement violates it, he can easily do so by paying to the New Jersey Company what he owes to it, disre garding the claims of the holders of the trust certificates.

Eighth. There is nothing in the nature of a voting trust. Our corporation act recognizes that corporate stock may be placed in