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to correct the finding only serve to show that, deceased. The averments of the second dethere was a conflict of evidence upon the ma- feuse, that the Railroad Commissioners had terial facts of the case, the decision of the made no order requiring such safeguards to trial court upon which was final.
be provided at said crossing as were in the There is no error. The other Judges con- complaint alleged to be necessary, and that
the defendant had violated no order or requirement of the Railroad Commissioners
regarding safeguards at said crossing, were POPKE V. NEW YORK, N. H. & H. R. CO.
admitted by plaintiff's reply. (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
The evidence presented by the plaintiff
showed these facts: Maple avenue, running March 4, 1909.)
north and south in the city of Danbury, is 1. RAILROADS (8 346*) — ACCIDENT AT Cross-crossed at grade by the tracks of the deING-EVIDENCE.
In an action for the negligent death of a fendant's railroad, running easterly and traveler struck by a train at a crossing, plaintiff westerly. At the time of the accident there must show prima facie that decedent exercised
were no gates, flagman, or automatic bell at due care. [Ed. Note: -For other cases, see Railroads, the Railroad Commissioners. The Danbury
this crossing, and none had been ordered by Cent. Dig. $$ 1121, 1122; Dec. Dig. § 346.*] 2. RAILROADS ($ 329*)—INJURIES TO TRAVEL- | railroad station is a few hundred feet east AT CROSSING – CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI. of said crossing. At between 5 and 6 o'clock
of the evening of December 29, 1906, the A traveler was killed by a train at a cross: plaintiff's intestate, G. William Walter, while ing. Witnesses testified that they saw decedent approach the crossing; that they called to him going southerly on Maple avenue, was struck to look out; that he drove straight along; that and killed, at said grade crossing, by a westthe train was in plain sight; that decedent did erly bound train of the defendant. Walter not see the train until it was almost on him. was 69 years old. He was very deaf. He The crossing was an exceptionally dangerous one, and no warnings had been furnished for it. De had lived in Danbury 30 years, and was facedent was familiar with the surroundings. He miliar with the Maple avenue crossiug. Just was very deaf. Held, that decedent was, as a
before the accident he was seated in his matter of law, guilty of negligence, precluding a recovery.
wagon, driving slowly, in a southerly direc[Ed. Note.- For other cases, see Railroads, tion, a gentle horse, which he had used for Cent. Dig. § 1026; Dec. Dig. & 329.*]
many years. The evening was dark. The Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield only two eyewitnesses of the accident called County; William S. Case, Judge.
by the plaintiff testified, in substance, that Action by William D. Popke, administra- they had themselves just hurried across the tor of G. William Walter, deceased, against tracks going north in front of the train, the New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail which they saw approaching from the east; road Company. From a judgment refusing that after they had crossed they saw Walto set aside a nonsuit, plaintiff appeals. . Af. ter quite near the tracks, seated in his wag. firmed,
on, driving pretty slowly toward the cross
ing; that they called to him to look out, say. J. Moss Ives and John R. Booth, for ap- ing that there was a train coming; that he pellant. Joseph F. Berry, for appellee. did not appear to heed the warning, but
drove straight along; that the train was in HALL, J. The plaintiff's intestate, G. Wil plain sight, and one could see the headlight liam Walter, was, on the 29th of December, of the engine; that Walters "didn't see the 1907, between 5 and 6 o'clock in the after-train until it was almost onto him"; that the noon, struck and fatally injured by the de- horse saw the train before Walters did, and fendant's train, on its Highland Division, at was frightened and reared up, and Walters the aple avenue grade ossing in the city jumped out with the reins in his hands, and of Danbury.
the train struck him. The complaint alleges that without fault The testimony of these two witnesses, or negligence upon the part of the deceased with evidence showing that the Maple are the injury was caused by the neglect of the nue crossing was an exceptionally dangerous defendant to maintain gates or other safe-one, and the admitted facts that no safeguards at said crossing, which, it is alleged, guards or warning signals had, at the time was extremely dangerous for public travel. of the accident, been either furnished or orThe defendant demurred to the complaint dered for this crossing, constitute practicalupon the ground, in substance, that it did ly the entire proof presented by the plaintiff not appear that the Railroad Commission of the alleged negligence of the defendant, ers had ordered the defendant to provide any and the reasonable care exercised by the such gates or safeguards at said crossing, plaintiff's intestate. as were alleged to have been necessary. The When the plaintiff rested his case, the court overruled this demurrer. The first de court granted the defendant's motion for a fense of the answer denied the alleged negli- nonsuit. The plaintiff contends that the only gence of the defendant, and due care of the question raised by the appeal from the judg. ment of nonsuit is whether there was suffi- 1 3. EVIDENCE (8 462*)-PAROL EVIDENCE-ADcient evidence of due care upon the part of
MISSIBLE-PURPOSE IN EXECUTING INSTRU
MENT. the deceased to be submitted to the jury.
One's purpose in executing an instrument The record does not show that that was may be shown by parol evidence. the question upon which the motion for a [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Evidence, nonsuit was decided. Notwithstanding the Cent. Dig. § 2134; Dec. Dig. $ 462.*] ruling of the trial court upon the demurrer 4. CHATTEL MORTGAGES (8 255*) — REMEDIES to the complaint, and the fact that the plain
or MORTGAGEE. tiff produced considerable evidence of the by an action at law as well as by foreclosing
A chattel mortgage debt may be collected exceptionally dangerous character of this the mortgage. crossing, it does not appear from the record [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Chattel Mortthat the trial court held that the plaintiff gages, Cent. Dig. 8 517; Dec. Dig. § 255.*] had presented prima facie proof of the de- 3. SALES (8 479*)–CONDITIONAL SALES-REMfendant's alleged negligence. But we do EDY OF SELLER. not find it necessary to discuss the question sale the seller can sue on the debt or reclaim
On breach by the buyer under a conditional of whether there was sufficient evidence up- the property. on the question of the defendant's negligence [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Sales, Cent. to go to the jury. It is sufficient to say that Dig. $8 1418, 1420, 1436; Dec. Dig. $ 479.*] the record shows that the plaintiff clearly 6. CHATTEL MORTGAGES _(8_255*) — TAKING failed to present evidence from which the
POSSESSION OF GOODS-EFFECT ON RIGHT TO
SUE ON MORTGAGE DEBT. jury could have been justified in deciding
Defendant, being in debt to plaintiff for that the plaintiff had sustained the burden rent and costs of an action of summary process, of proving that Walters was in the exercise executed a chattel mortgage reciting that on of due care as alleged. Walters placed him- default in paying the debt certain goods might self in a position of danger, and by so doing the goods after suing on the debt plaintiff was
be taken by plaintiff. Held, that by receiving he was injured. Does the evidence recited not estopped from making further claim on acfairly indicate, as it should to sustain a pri- count of the debt. ma facie case in favor of the plaintiff, that
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Chattel MortWalters used the care of a person of ordi- gages, Cent. Dig. $ 517; Dec. Dig. § 255.*] nary prudence in placing himself in that po- Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, sition? It not only fails to do so, but clear. Hartford County; John Coats, Judge. ly shows the contrary. The only fair con- Action by Edwina E. Stalker against Euclusion from the evidence is that Walters, nice Hayes. From a judgment for plaintiff, had he made reasonable use of his eyes, defendant appeals. Affirmed. would have seen the headlight of the ap
Joseph P. Tuttle, for appellant. J. Gilbert proaching engine in ample time to have es- Calhoun and James B. Henry, for appellee. caped injury. For his failure to look, the facts furnish no excuse. He was negligent in failing to make any reasonable use of
RORABACK, J. This action is brought to
recover rent and costs of an action of sumhis senses to avoid injury, and for that reason the trial court properly granted the momary process. The substance of the matetion for a nonsuit. Fay v. Hartford & rial facts appearing in the finding is as fol
lows: Springfield Street Ry. Co., 81 Conn. 330, 336,
On June 3, 1907, the defendant owed 71 Atl. 364.
the plaintiff for rent and costs of an action There is no error. The other Judges con
of summary process amounting to the sum
of $53.96. The defendant owned and had in curred.
her possession the articles named in the fol
lowing writing: “Hartford, Conn., June 3, (81 Conn. 711)
1907. This is to certify that I have received STALKER V. HAYES.
of Edwina E. Stalker at Hartford, Conn., the (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
following goods and chattels, to wit: Five March 4, 1909.)
iron double beds complete with mattresses
and springs, one Richmond range, one parlor 1. PAYMENT ($ 59*)-DEFENSE-PLEADING.
Under the express terms of Practice Bookstove, which goods and chattels are to be 1908, p. 250, $ 160, payment must be pleaded and remain the property of said Edwina E. to be available as a defense.
Stalker until I shall have fully performed [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Payment, my part of the agreement as hereinafter set Cent. Dig. $ 14312; Dec. Dig. 8 59.*]
forth. I hereby agree to keep said prop2. CHATTEL MORTGAGES ( 106*)–CONSTRUC-erty at my own risk and charge and pay TION-INTENTION OF PARTIES.
said Edwina E. Stalker for the use thereof In construing an instrument claimed to be the sum of $58.16 on or before the 1st day a chattel mortgage, it was proper to consider of July, 1907, as evidenced by her indorsethe intent of the parties as disclosed by the writing in the light of the surrounding circum- ments on the back of this agreement, when stances in which it was executed.
said goods and chattels shall become my [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Chattel Mort- property, when all claim to the same by her gages, Cent. Dig. $$ 102, 109; Dec. Dig. § 106.*] J shall cease and be determined. It is further hereby agreed that said goods and chattels, import into this document a condition or are to be kept by me at my residence, No. contingency of which it furnishes no inti115 Ann street, Hartford, or in some place mation. There is nothing in the complaint of storage in said Hartford, the name of from which payment can be found or inwhich I am to inform said Mrs. Stalker, or ferred. If the defendant wished to avail before I remove said articles from 115 Ann herself of the defense of payment resulting street, and that I will not remove the same from the transaction, she should have spefrom said places without the consent of said cially pleaded it. Practice Book 1908, p. 250, Edwina E. Stalker indorsed on this agree- 8 160. ment, nor dispose of the same in any man- The plaintiff alleged in her complaint, and ner; and it is further agreed by me that if the trial court has found, that this writing I shall make default of any of said pay- was given as security for the debt therein ments, or shall fail in any manner to per described. The court in construing this inform this agreement, the said Edwina E. strument properly took into consideration Stalker shall be entitled to the immediate the intent of the parties as disclosed by the possession of said property, which I hereby writing in the light of the surrounding cirpromise to deliver to her on demand. In cumstances under which it was executed. case I shall violate any part of the foregoing The purpose of the party in executing an inagreement, the said lessor, her agent, or as- strument may be shown by parol evidence. signs may enter upon my premises and take Lovell v. Hammond Co., 66 Conn. 500, 510, possession of said property, and they and 34 Atl. 511; Williams v. Chadwick, 74 Conn. every of them are hereby exonerated from 252, 255, 50 Atl. 720; Post v. Gilbert, 44 any claim on my part, or on the part of Conn. 9, 18; Susman v. Whyard, 149 N. Y. any person in my name or stead for any 127, 130, 43 N. E. 413. damages which I might have against them For the purposes of this case it is unnecfor so doing had this agreement not been essary to determine whether the writing in made and entered into by me. Eunice M. question is a mortgage or a conditional sale. Hayes. [L. S.] This is to certify that the If it is a mortgage the plaintiff had an opabove-described property has been delivered tion either to collect her debt by an action to the lessee named in the foregoing agree- at law, or by a proceeding to foreclose the ment by the undersigned on the terms and mortgage. 27 Cyc. 1515. Assuming that the conditions therein specified. Dated at Hart- contract is a conditional sale, the plaintiff ford this 3d day of June, A. D. 1907. Ed-could bring an action for the debt or reclaim wina E. Stalker, By Terry J. Chapin, Her the property. The finding shows that an Attorney." In response to a demand for se- action for the collection of the debt was curity for her indebtedness the defendant commenced long before possession was taksigned and delivered to the plaintiff this en of the goods. Receiving the goods after writing. This written instrument by a mis- the commencement of this action did not take stated the amount which the defend- estop the plaintiff from making further ant was to pay the plaintiff at $58.16, instead claim on account of the indebtedness in of $53.96. On July 1, 1907, upon demand the question. Robinson's Appeal from Commisdefendant refused payment. This action sioners, 63 Conn. 290, 297, 28 Atl. 40; Crompwas then commenced. A long time after ton v. Beach, 62 Conn. 25, 35, 25 Atl. 446, 18 commencing her action the plaintiff took pos- L. R. A. 187, 36 Am. St. Rep. 323; Bailey session of the articles in question.
v. Hervey, 135 Mass. 172, 174; Herryford v. The trial court, from the surrounding cir- Davis, 102 U. S. 235, 26 L. Ed. 160. cumstances and the intention of the parties There is no error. The other Judges conexpressed in the writing, found that the contract in effect is a mortgage and intended as security for the debt named therein. The
(81 Conn. 702) defendant contends that this action of the
THOMAS et al. v. YOUNG. court was erroneous for reasons which may be briefly stated as follows: The court erred
(Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. ind mistook the law in holding that the
March 3, 1909.) writing did not constitute payment of the 1. PLEADING ($ 248*)—AMENDMENT_CHANGE
OF CAUSE OF ACTION. charges and claims for which the plaintiff
Where, in an action to recover possession brought this action; that the plaintiff was of land and damages, the original plaintiffs not estopped, by the writing and the receipt were the heirs at law, the widow, and the adof the articles therein mentioned, from mak-ministrator of the deceased owner of the land, ing further claim against the defendant on
the court properly permitted the administrator
to withdraw, and the remaining plaintiffs to account of said rent or costs in said sum- file a substitute complaint alleging that the mary process; that this writing contituted ownership of the premises and the right of in effect a mortgage upon the articles men- possession was in them, and that they had been tioned therein. The defense of payment introducing a new cause of action.
dispossessed by defendant; such amendment not claimed to be shown is not indicated by the [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Pleading, Dec. written instrument. The defendant seeks to | Dig. § 248.*]
2. LANDLORD AND TENANT (8 62*)-ESTOPPEL | newal was fraudulently obtained from him was OF TENANT TO DENY LANDLORD'S TITLE. immaterial,
In an action by the widow and heirs at [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Landlord and law of a decedent to recover possession of land, Tenant, Cent. Dig. 153 ; Déc. Dig. $ 62.*] a lease executed by plaintiffs to defendant was admissible as an estoppel, though plaintiffs al- | 9. EVIDENCE (8 155*)- PART OF CONVERSATION
-SHOWING ENTIRE CONVERSATION. leged that on a date subsequent to the termination of the lease they possessed the premises, I view on whatever subject is not rendered admis
All that two parties say at a single interand were on such date dispossessed by defendant, since the operation of the estoppel did not sible for the simple reason that what is said on cease with the termination of the lease.
some one or more subjects is testified to.
(Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Evidence, [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Landlord and Cent. Dig. $ 455; Dec. Dig. & 155.*] Tenant, Cent. Dig. § 163; Dec. Dig. 8 62.*]
Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, New 3. LANDLORD AND TENANT (8 63*) - LANDLORD'S TITLE-ESTOPPEL.
Haven County ; Isaac Wolfe, Judge, In ejectment, a notice served on plaintiffs Action by William P. Thomas, adminisby defendant, purporting to notify them that trator, and others, against John H. Young, to defendant surrendered to them all right, title, recover possession of land and damages. or possession that he ever received, if any, to the premises, and also that he disclaimed having Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant apentered into possession under certain leases peals. No error. executed by plaintiffs, and renounced any tenancy under them, was ineffective to relieve de
This case was formerly before this court. fendant from the operation of the estoppel crea- 79 Conn. 493, 65 Atl. 955. The facts out of ted by the leases, and put him in a position to which it arises are sufficiently stated there. question plaintiffs' title; it being incumbent on
After it had, as the result of the decision defendant to surrender possession before he could question the title.
then rendered, been returned to the trial (Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Landlord and court, leave was asked, and, against the obTenant, Cent. Dig. $ 161; Dec. Dig. § 63.*] jection of the defendant, granted for the 4. LANDLORD AND TENANT (8 62*)-LAND- plaintiff Thomas, administrator, to withdraw, LORD'S TITLE_ESTOPPEL.
and for the remaining plaintiffs to file a subThe rule that in ejectment by a landlord stitute complaint alleging that the ownership against a tenant the latter must surrender pos- of the premises and the right of possession session before he can question plaintiff's title is thereof was in them, and that they had been as applicable when the lease is given to one already in possession as where the lessee is one dispossessed by the defendant. Upon the who is admitted to possession.
trial the plaintiffs supported their allegation (Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Landlord and of title by the introduction of the lease of Tenant, Cent. Dig. § 154; Dec. Dig. 8 62.*] March 1, 1901, and presented no other tes5. LANDLORD_AND TENANT (8 66*)-ESTOPPEL timony upon that point. TO DENY LANDLORD'S TITLE-EFFECT OF
William B. Stoddard and George E. Hall, DISCLAIMER-ADVERSE POSSESSION.
A disclaimer by a lessee does not afford him for appellant. Edward A. Harriman, for apthe right of thereafter asserting a title adverse pellees. to the lessor until the statutory period for the perfection of title by adverse possession expires. PRENTICE, J. (after stating the facts as
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Landlord and above). The defendant complains of the acTenant, Cent. Dig. 204; Dec. Dig. $ 66.*]
tion of the court in permitting the substitute 6. LANDLORD AND TENANT (8 62*)–EJECTMENT complaint to be filed. The contention is that -ESTOPPEL TO QUESTION LANDLORD'S TI- the plaintiffs were thus allowed to substitute In ejectment by a landlord, defendant can
for the original cause of action another and not assert that the one from whom plaintiff different one, and one which could not have received his title never had title to the prem- been joined with the original. The original ises, never occupied the same, and never claim- plaintiffs were the heirs at law, widow, and ed ownership, since such assertion is in deroga- administrator, of George T. Smith, deceased, tion of the estoppel created by the lease.
his personal representatives, and all of them. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. $ 156; Dec. Dig. § 62.*]
They were seeking to obtain possession of 7. LANDLORD AND Tenant ($ 62*) —ESTOPPEL Smith owned at his death, and then passed
certain real estate, which, as they claim, TO DENY LANDLORD'S TITLE-VALIDITY OF LEASE.
to them as his personal representatives. Where the acceptance of a lease is induced They asserted no right which did not thus by the fraud or false representations of the come to them. In their attempt to enforce lessor, the lessee is not estopped to question the that right they alleged ownership in the lessor's title.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Landlord and widow and heirs, and, the estate being still Tenant, Cent. Dig. $ 153; Dec. Dig. § 62.*]
in settlement, as was averred, the right of 8. LANDLORD AND TENANT (8 62*)-ESTOPPEL
possession in the administrator. The present To DENY LANDLORD'S TITLE-VALIDITY OF plaintiffs are the same persons save that the LEASE.
administrator has disappeared. They are Where, in ejectment by a landlord against seeking to enforce, as to the same land, the a tenant, defendant failed to show that a lease under which an estoppel to question plaintiff's same right of possession derived in the same title arose was not voluntarily executed, that way by virtue of the title cast upon them by a prior lease giving defendant an option for re- the death of Smith. The substituted com
plaint differs from the original only in that, disclaimed any tenancy under them. The it proceeds upon the theory that the right purpose of this notice was to relieve the deof possession was, at the time of the claimed fendant from the operation of the estoppel dispossession, and is, in the widow and heirs created by the leases, and put him in a posiat law, the present plaintiffs, and not in the tion to question the plaintiffs' title. It was administrator, and so alleges. The opinion ineffective to that end. Counsel have called in Dunnett v. Thornton, 73 Conn. 1, 46 Ati. it a surrender, but it surrendered nothing. * 158, contains an exhaustive review of the It was incumbent upon the defendant to history of our law upon the subject of the surrender possession before he could call in amendment of declarations and complaints, question the plaintiffs' title. Camp v. Camp, both before and after statutory regulation 5 Conn. 291, 301, 13 Am. Dec. 60; Bigelow on was attempted, and calls attention to the Estoppel, 371; Tiedemann on Real Property, generous policy which has always marked $ 157; Taylor on Landlord & Tenant, 8 705,
It also recites at length the course of note. This principle is as applicable where statutory regulation, and calls attention to the lease is given to one already in possesthe liberal and untechnical spirit in which sion as where the lessee is one who is admitthey have been construed and applied. The ted to possession. Washburne on Real Proppresent statute (Gen. St. 1902, § 639) is con- erty, 600, 601 ; Camp v. Camp, 13 Amer. Dec. sidered, both of itself and in its relation to 71, note. At the very time that the defendthe spirit and provisions of the practice act, ant was engaged in making the pretended and the principles which should govern its surrender he was clinging fast to the possesapplication stated. It is unnecessary to re- sion, and has done so ever since. Nothing peat what was there said. It is sufficient to was further from his thoughts than letting observe that the court, in exercising its dis- the plaintiffs into possession. On the concretion in permitting the present amendment, trary, he was devising means to retain it him. was well within its rights as there defined. self, and the giving of the notice was one
There was no error in admitting in evi- of those means. If the notice be regarded as dence the lease of March 1, 1901. It was not a disclaimer, the defendant is placed in no offered or received as establishing title in the better position. The cases which give the plaintiffs, but as creating an estoppel, which greatest efficacy to disclaimers hold that they would be equally as effective as against the do not afford the lessee the right of theredefendant. Camp v. Camp, 5 Conn. 291, 300, after asserting a title adverse to the lessor 13 Am. Dec, 60; Magill v. Hinsdale, 6 Conn. until the statutory period for the perfection 464, 469, 16 Am. Dec. 70; Thomas v. Young, of title by adverse possession shall have ex79 Conn. 493, 497, 65 Atl. 955. The operation pired. Willison v. Watkins, 3 Pet. 43, 7 L. of this estoppel did not cease with the ter- Ed. 596; Peyton v. Stith, 5 Pet. 485, 491, 8 mination of the lease. Camp v. Camp, 5 L. Ed. 200; Bigelow on Estoppel, Š 373. See Conn. 291, 301, 13 Am. Dec. 60; Bigelow on Hanford v. Fitch, 41 Conn. 486, 501. The noEstoppel, 348. One reason assigned by the tice was rightly excluded. defendant's counsel for the exclusion of the The defendant offered evidence to show lease was that the complaint alleged that on that Smith, from whom the plaintiffs receiv. - April 1, 1904, a 'date subsequent to that of ed their title, never had any, never occupied the termination of the lease, the plaintiffs the premises, and never claimed to own them. possessed the premises, and were on that day This evidence was rightly excluded as being dispossessed by the defendant. This claim in derogation of the estoppel. Other evidence attaches too much importance to the allega- was presented for the purpose of showing tion of time, which is an immaterial one. that a prior three-year lease, terminating Bulkley v. Norwich & Westerly Ry. Co., 81 March 1, 1898, was procured from the defendConn. 284, 286, 70 Atl. 1021.
ant by these plaintiffs by means of false repThe defendant offered in evidence a writ- resentations and deceit. It is an establishten notice signed by him, and addressed to ed principle that where the acceptance of a the plaintiffs, bearing date April 20, 1907, lease is induced by the fraud or false repand claimed to have been served upon each resentations of the lessor, there is no estopof the plaintiffs by copy on April 26, 1907. pel. Washburne on Real Property, 599; This paper purported to notify the plaintiffs Bigelow on Estoppel, 364. The defendant ofthat the defendant surrendered to them "all fered no evidence that the lease of March, right, title, or possession that he ever re- 1901, was not freely and voluntarily taken. ceived, if any, to the premises” in question. That is the lease under which the present It also notified the plaintiffs that the defend- estoppel arises, and the facts which may ant disclaimed ever having entered into the have surrounded a prior transaction of a possession of the premises under the lease similar character are immaterial. They are of March, 1904, or a prior one; that he none the less so, and the giving and acceptdisclaimed and denied that he ever by virtue ance of the last lease no less an independent of said pretended leases, or either of them, transaction, for the reason that the former occupied the premises; that he now disclaim-lease gave the lessee an option for a renewal. ed any and all right to the possession or oc-Platt v. Cutler, 75 Conn. 183, 186, 52 Atl. cupancy of them by virtue of said instru- $19; Nutmeg Park Driving Corporation 5.