65. MASTER AND SERVANT-Negligence.- Though ordinary care as a legal standard for the measure of diligence is invariable, yet, as the conduct of a prudent man varies with the degree of danger attending the vocation in which he is engaged, and is more or less cautious according to circumstances, those who are bound to conform their conduct to his must graduate it in like manner. - Central R. R. of Georgia v. Ryalls, Ga., 11 S. E. Rep. 499.

66. MASTER AND SERVANT-Willful Neglect.-Failure of a coal company to repair the timbers supporting a trestle on which its employees work, and which has been in use for fifteen or twenty years, where the timbers appear sound, and can only be found defective on cutting into them, is not such willful neglect as will render it liable for the death of an employee caused by the breaking of such timbers; under Gen. St. Ky. ch. 57, § 3.- Reinder's Adm'r v. Blick & Philips Coal Co., Ky., 13 S. W. Rep. 719.

67. MECHANICS' LIENS-Notice. A notice of lien sufficiently gives the name of the owner of the land where the building or erection was placed, which says: "Said real estate reputed to be owned by one ER H, and said building reputed to be owned by one G MR." Allen v. Rowe, Oreg., 23 Pac. Rep. 901.

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68. MORTGAGES - Power of Sale. A mortgage contained a power in the mortgagee or her assigns, on default, to sell the premises at public or private sale, and convey the same to the purchaser in fee simple absolute. On default the mortgagee's assignee executed an absolute deed of the land, unambiguous in its terms, to defendant. The deed did not refer to the mortgage or the power of sale, and the note secured by the mortgage was not assigned to defendant: Held, that the conveyance was an execution of the power, and not an assignment of the mortgage.-Lanigan v. Sweany, Ark., 13 S. W. Rep. 740.

69. MORTGAGES-Redemption.- Under Act Ark. March 17, 1879, § 1, the mortgagor, in case of sale of real property, has the right to redeem in one year, whether the debt be for the purchase money or not. Wood v. Holland, Ark., 13 S. W. Rep. 739.

70. MORTGAGE-Tax title.-Const. La. art. 210, declaring that tax-titles are prima facie valid, and cannot be set aside without a previous tender to the purchaser of the price at 10 per cent. interest thereon, does not apply where suit is brought to enforce the lien of a mortgage as against a tax-ttile alleged to have been acquired after execution of the mortgage by the mortgagor's brother in collusion with the mortgagor.- Mendenhall v. Hall, U. S. S. C., 10 S. C. Rep. 616.

73. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-Parol Evidence.-In an action on a promissory note, it appeared that plaintiff wished defendant to manage a mine which he was about to purchase, and that defendant was unwilling to do so without an interest in it; that plaintiff paid for the mine, and had it conveyed to them jointly, and took defendant's note for half the purchase price: Held, that parol evidence of a contemporaneous agreement that defendant might examine the mine, and, if dissatisfied, convey his interest to plaintiff, and the note should be canceled, was inadmissible, as varying the terms of the note.-Dunaney v. Murke, Idaho, 23 Pac. Rep. 915.

74. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT.- A complaint, in an action on a note delivered to plaintiff by one of the makers without any indorsement of the payee named therein, alleging that the note was executed for discount, and that, on the refusal of the payee to discount it, plaintiff discounted it, is not demurrable for failure to make the nominal payee a party, under Civil Code Ky. § 18.-Rogge v. Cassidy, Ky., 13 S. W. Rep. 716.

75. PARTITION-Parties.-The right to partition lands is regulated by statute in this State. Prior to the enactment of section 423, Hill's Code, a partition suit could not be maintained by a reversioner or remainder-man, and the rule is unchanged by the Code.-Savage v. Sav. age, Oreg., 23 Pac. Rep. 890.

76. PAYMENT- Evidence. In an action against the maker of a promissory note found among the papers of a decedent, a plea of payment is not sustained by evi. dence that the decedent in his life-time had agreed to give up a note against defendant in consideration of a deed to some land, and that decedent had thereafter controlled the land, in the absence of evidence identify. ing the note referred to in the argeement.-Collins v. Spence, Ga., 11 S. E. Rep. 502.

77. PLEADING-Misjoinder.-A complaint for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff while in defendant's employ, which also prays for the cancellation of a release of defendant from all liability for the injuries, procured from plaintiff while incompetent to transact business, does not improperly unite two causes of action. Whetstone v. Beloit Straw Board Co., Wis., 45 N. W. Rep. 535.

78. PLEADING AND PRACTICE Warning Order. -A petition alleging defendant's non-residence, the affidavit to which only states that petitioner "believes" the statements contained therein to be true, does not warrant the issuing of a warning order under Mansf. Dig. Ark. § 4990.-Waggoner v. Foglemun, Ark., 13 S. W. Rep. 729.

79. PLEDGE-Negligence.-A party accepting a note and chattel mortgage, in his own name, to secure his own debt as well as the individual debt of another, as a matter of accommodation to the latter, and without compensation, is only bound to exercise ordinary dillgence, and is not liable for a failure to realize on the securities without proof of negligence Cross v. Kistler, Col., 23 Pac. Rep. 903.

80. POOR LAWS-Implied Promise. Where a town. ship, which is liable under How. St. Mich. § 1786, for the support of the poor having a settlement therein, neglected to support a person so settled, who was entirely without means, and unable to do anything towards her own support, although the proper officer had notice of her condition, a relative of the pauper with whom she was living, and who furnished her with necessary care, attention, and supplies, can maintain an action against the township on an implied promise to repay.-Eckman v. Township, Mich., 45 N. W. Rep. 502.

81. POWERS-Execution.-Testatrix bequeathed prop. erty to her daughter for life, and provided that "my daughter A is hereby authorized and empowered by her last will and testament, duly executed by her, to dispose of this bequest as she pleases." The daughter in her will recited: "Whereas, I am entitled to legacies under the last will of my deceased mother, and to a distributive share in the several estates of my deceased sister, and my brother, and, notwithstanding my coverture, have full testamentary power to dispose of the same," and devised "the entire property and estate to which I am now in anywise entitled, or which I may hereafter acquire, of whatever the same may consist, to my beloved husband:" Held, that this was a valid execution of the power given by the mother's will.Lee v. Simpson, U. S. S. C., 10 S. C. Rep. 631.

82. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.-Contract.-A written contract creating a commercial agency for one year, and fixing the agent's compensation for services, wharfage, storage, and paying for the goods sold at a gross sum per month, having been renewed expressly for the

next year, and the agency having in fact continued for several successive years afterwards, both parties in all their dealings conforming to the terms of the original contract, there was a tacit renewal of the same from year to year, and the principal could not, by notice given pending the last year's services, terminate the contract before the expiration of that year.-Standard Oil Co. v. Gilbert, Ga., 11 S. E. Rep. 491.

83. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Contracts. In an action against a railroad company for board furnished to its employees, under contract with its road-master, though It appears that the road-master "had made contracts to board section-men all along the line," and that "it was the custom of railroads in that section of country for road-masters to hire boarding bosses," the company is not liable, in the absence of proof of authority to the road-master to make such a contract, or of its ratification of similar contracts.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Bennet, Ark., 13 S. W. Rep. 742.

84. RAILROADS - Crossings and Connections. The report of commissioners appointed by the circuit court in a proceeding under Rev. St. Mo. 1879, § 765, will not be set aside on appeal because it fails to recite that the commissioners went upon the premises, and viewed the points of crossings and connections, as, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it will be presumed they preformed their statutory duty.-St. Louis, T. Ry. Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., Mo., 18 S. W. Rep. 710. 85. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Consolidation.-If railroad companies, which have consolidated] under Act Mo. March 24, 1870, providing for the consolidation of railroads which will, when connected, form a continuous line of road, have complied with all the other provisions of the act, the consolidation is valid, though they may have failed to comply with that provision requiring each company to file with the secretary of State a resolution accepting the provisions of the act. Such provision is merely directory.-Leavenworth County v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., U. S. S. C. 10 S. C. Rep. 708.

86. RAILROAD FIRES Negligence. When damage has been caused by sparks from a locomotive, in order to rebut the presumption of negligence on the part of the railroad company it must be shown not only that the locomotive was equipped with the most approved appliances in the way of a spark-arrester, but also that it was operated by a skillful engineer, in a careful Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., U. S. C. C. (La.), 41 Fed. Rep. 917.

manner.

87. RESCISSION OF CONTRACT-The right to rescind a contract for fraud may be lost by its confirmation, or by a failure to manifest the election to disaffirm it within a reasonable time, or, where the transaction is a sale of property by dealing with the property as owner after the discovery of the fraud.- Lockwood v. Fitts, Ala., 7 South. Rep. 467.

88. REMOVAL OF CAUSES.- Act W. Va. Feb. 23, 1883, provides that a person aggrieved by the assessment of his real estate may, after notice to the prosecuting attorney who shall protect the State's interest, apply to the county court for redress; and if on hearing the evidence, said court shall be of opinion that there is error in the assessment, it shall correct it: Held, that the power of the county courts under this act is ministerial, and the proceeding to correct assessments is not a suit, within the meaning of Rev. St. U. S. § 639, giving the right of removal to the federal courts of different States.-Upshur County v. Rich, U. S. S. C., 10 S. C. Rep. 651. 89. SALE Delivery. Held, that the facts that the loading of the lumber on the cars at P was a delivery to the H. L. Co. as a purchaser.-Hope Lumber Co. v. Foster & Logan Hardware Co., Ark., 13 S. W. Rep. 731.

90. SALE-Evidence. Where a harvester had been rejected after trial, and the question was whether there had been any sale, testimony that plaintiff had afterwards endeavored to sell it to other persons was properly excluded.— Gibbon v. Hughes, Wis., 45 N. W. Rep. 538.

91. SCHOOL FUNDS-County Treasurer. The act of Febuary 29, 1877, by which the county treasurers of the several counties were "constituted the treasurers of the school funds in their respective counties," did not create a new county office of treasurer of the school funds, to be filled by whomsoever might be county treasurer, but it transferred to the office of county treasurer the duties and responsibilities of the custody of the school funds of the county.- Perry, Governor, v. Woodberry, Fla., 7 South. Rep. 483.

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92. SHERIFF- Execution. In an action against a sheriff by those claiming under defendants in execution, for failure to pay over the proceeds of property sold under execution in excess of the debt, it is not error to exclude evidence that defendant actually received more cash than appears by his return, when the amount for which the property sold is admitted; that being the sum for which he was bound to account, whether he received the money or not. — State v. Finn, Mo., 13 S. W. Rep. 712.

Specific per

93. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE- Laches. formance of a contract to convey land will be denied, where the grantee has delayed for nearly six years in bringing his suit, during which time the grantor has died, the taxes have all been paid by him and his heirs, and the land has increased 20 to 50 fold in value.-Combs v. Scott, Wis., 45 N. W. Rep. 532.

94. STOCK.-In an action by a railroad company on a note given for a subscription to its capital stock, a good defense is set up by a plea that plaintiff's agents procured the subscriptions by representations that plaintiff would issue stock only to the amount of $3,000 per mile, and bonds only to the amount of $12,000 per mile, whereas, at the time the representations were made, stock had already been issued, or agreed to be issued to the amount of $12,000, and bonds to the amount of $15,000 per mile.- Weems v. Georgia, etc. R. Co., Ga., 11 S. E. Rep. 503.

95. TAXATION-Exemption. A lot belonging to a religious corporation which is situated at a distance from the lots on which the church buildings are situated, and is vacant and unoccupied, is not exempt from taxation under Rev. St. Wis. § 1038, subd. 3, exempting the real property owned by any religious association used exclusively for the purpose of such association, and necessary for the location and convenience of the buildings.-Green Bay, etc. Co. v. Outgamie County, Wis., 45 N. W. Rep. 536.

97. TAXATION-Voluntary Payment. After the suing out of a writ of error to a judgment declaring assessments against a railroad company valid, the assessments were, under an act of the legislature, readjusted and reduced, and thus paid by the company. No steps had been taken to collect the assessments, and proceedings to enforce them could not have been resorted to for several months after payment was in fact made: Held, that the payment was voluntary, and the writ of error should be dismissed on the ground that there was no actual controversy.-Little v. Bowers, U. S. S. C., 10 S. C. Rep. 620.

The Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, AUGUST 1, 1890.

We made an announcement last week of the meeting of the National Bar Association to be held in Indianapolis, and have since received the programme of the meeting of the American Bar Association which is to be held in Saratoga, August 20th, 21st and 22d. The opening address will be delivered by the President, Henry Hitchcock. Papers will be read by Henry C. Tomkins, of Alabama, on "The Necessity for Uniformity in the Law Governing Commercial Paper;" by Dwight H. Olmstead, of New York, on "Land Transfer Reform" with an explanation of New York Block Indexing; and by John F. Duncombe, of Iowa, on "Election Laws." A number of interesting reports of committees will be made and the meeting will undoubtedly be instructive and enjoyable to those who attend.

We cannot let the occasion pass without a mention of the very successful meeting of the Ohio State Bar Association at Put In Bay during the past week. In addition to a number of very enjoyable features, the very able address of Hon. John F. Dillon on "Bentham and his School of Jurisprudence" will be remembered by all who had the good fortune to be present, as a masterpiece of learning and originality of thought. The Ohio State Bar Association is second to none in vigor; and in the enthusiasm and interest of its members might well be emulated by other State Bar Associations.

The passage, by the house of representatives, of the Torrey National Bankruptcy Bill is a matter of great importance to the business interests of the country, and it is to be hoped that the senate will, before adjournment, adopt the measure and thus put into operation an effective method by which protection is given to the unfortunate debtor, and at the same time creditors in all the States are provided with just and expeditious remedies, securing prompt, equal and uniform operation of the law. The only criticisms VOL. 31-No. 5.

which seem to have been offered to the bill were that it was framed for the great commercial centers and not in the interest of the farmer class, and that the United States marshals, attorneys and court officers would profit most and be enriched by it. One member regarded the provision requiring the referees to be members of the legal profession, as a gratuitous insult to the members of other professions. There is no weight in either of these objections. The bill is an adroitly and wisely framed measure intended to operate with equal effect upon all classes of debtors and creditors. And, so far as we can see, the expenses attending its administration are reasonable and just.

The decision of the St. Louis court of appeals in the case of Conrad v. Fisher, that the owner of goods cannot give a receipt for them as warehouseman which will be an effectual pledge of the property, is only a reaffirmance of a well established doctrine, and the apparent conflict among the American courts upon this question is due to the peculiar statutes of certain States. In 'the absence of any statute or any well established custom of merchants to the contrary such attempts to pledge property have been almost uniformly held to be void, at least, where the rights of other have intervened. ceipt is at most only evidence of a pledge, and an oral pledge contract would have been just as valid. The real question in such cases is whether there was, in fact, a delivery, actual or symbolical, of the goods. If there was not the claims of others may become prior and superior to that of the holder of the receipt.

The re

But the courts of a few States have held, on the other hand, that a warehouseman having goods in his own store may, by giving a warehouse receipt, make a valid pledge of such property, good against attaching creditors. These decisions, however, were based upon statutes. The legislature of Nebraska provided that "any packer of pork or beef or any manufacturer of distilled spirits having a warehouse for the storage of his own products" may issue receipts for his own meats, spirits or grains which he actually has so stored, in the ordinary form of warehouse receipts, and they will be valid to the same extent as the receipts of a public warehouse

keeper. The statutes of Kentucky impliedly authorize the owner of goods to give receipts or vouchers for them when they are under his control or kept in his own warehouse, and the receipts will vest in the holder a right to the property, and no one without his written consent or the production of the receipt can gain any title thereto. The courts of these States have, of course, held that the owner of goods can give a valid receipt for them as warehouseman. The same doctrine was laid down in Michigan; but the rule is well settled to the contrary. Besides many of the States, Missouri included, have express laws which require a delivery of possession or a recording to create a valid pledge.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

FEDERAL COURTS HOW FAR BOUND BY STATE DECISIONS.-The recent case of City of Detroit v. Osborne, decided by the United States Supreme Court, is of interest as to the attitude of the United States courts towards State statutes and decisions. There were two questions in the case, the first being what was the Michigan law in cases of injuries to persons from defects in sidewalks. The an

swer to this, the court said, was clear. The second question was whether the settled law of Michigan in such cases was binding on the federal courts. The court says:

The second inquiry must be answered in the affirmative. If it is a matter of local law, that law is obligatory upon the federal courts. It must be conceded that this adjudication as to the liability of a city for injuries caused by a defect in the sidewalks, the repair of which it has both the power and duty to provide for, is not in harmony with the general rule in this country (2 Dillon on Mun. Corp., secs. 1017 and 1018), nor in accord with the views expressed by this court. In Barnes v. The District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540, this court, after referring to the case from 21 Michigan, supra, and the doctrine stated therein, observed that "the authorities establishing the contrary doctrine, that a city is responsible for its mere negligence, are so numerous and so well considered that the law must be deemed to be settled in accordance with them," citing in support a long list of authorities. The authorities which support a different view are collected in Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344. But even if it were a fact that the universal voice of the other authorities was against the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court of Michigan, the fact remains that the decision of that court, undisturbed by legislative action, is the law of that State. Whatever our views may be as to the reasoning or conclusion of that court, is immaterial. It does not change the fact that its de

cision is the law of the State of Michigan, binding all its courts, and all its citizens, and all others who may come within the limits of the State. The question presented by it is not one of general commercial law; it is purely local in its significance and extent. It involves simply a consideration of the powers and liabilities granted and imposed by legislative action upon cities within the State. While this court has been strenuous to uphold the supremacy of federal law, and the interpretation placed upon it by the federal courts, it has been equally strenuous to uphold the decisions by State courts of questions of purely local law. There should be, in all matters of a local nature, but one law within the State; and that law is not what this court might determine, but what the supreme court of the State has determined. A citizen of another State, going into Michigan, may be entitled under the federal constitution to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of that State; but under that constitution he can claim no more. He walks the streets and highways in that State, entitled to the same rights and protection as, but none others than, those accorded by its laws to its own citizens.

This question is not a new one in this court. In the case of Claiborne County v. Brooks, 111 U. S. 400, it was held that, "when the settled decisions of the highest court of a State have determined the extent and character of the powers which its political and municipal organizations may possess, the decisions are authoritative upon the courts of the United States;" and in the opinion it was observed: "It is undoubtedly a question of local policy with each State, what shall be the extent and character of the powers which its various political and municipal organizations shall possess; and the settled decisions of its highest courts on this subject will be regarded as authoritative by the courts of the United States; for it is a question that relates to the internal constitution of the body politic of the State."

What was there decided in reference to the powers is equally true as to the liability of a municipal corporation. The city of Detroit, in the discharge of its public duty in respect to keeping the streets and sidewalks in repair, is under no higher or different obligation to a citizen of Ohio than to one of the State of Michigan, and the measure of its liability under the statutes, as stated, is to be determined by the judgment of the supreme court of that State, and not by what our opinions might be as to the proper construction of those statutes. Reference may also be made to the recent case of Bucher v. Railroad Company, 125 ¡U. S. 555, in which this court followed, against its own judgment of the law, the rulings of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, and held that a party trav eling on Sunday, and not for necessity or charity, in the cars of a railroad company, could not recover for injuries sustained by the negligence of the company, because he was himself thus violating the law of the State. Concluding the opinion of the court in that case, it is observed: It may be said generally that whenever the decisions of the State courts relate to some law of a local character, which may have become established by those courts, or has always been a part of the law of the State, that the decisions upon the subject are usually conclusive, and always entitled to the highest respect of the federal courts. The whole of this subject has recently been very ably reviewed in the case of Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20. Where such local law or custon has been established by repeated decisions of the highest courts of a State, it becomes also the law governing the courts of the United States sitting in that State.

CARRIER OF GOODS--LIMITING LIABILITY. The Supreme Court of Illinois, in the case of Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Chapman, 24 N. E. Rep. 417, say that a common carrier cannot, by contract, limit its liability for injury to property during transportation, caused by its gross negligence. Shope, J., says:

The courts of this State have never held that the carrier may limit or restrict its liability for loss or damage resulting from its own gross negligence, or the gross negligence of its servants. On the contrary, it has been repeatedly and uniformly held that it cannot do so, even by express contract with the shipper. The question first arose in Railroad Co. v. Morrison, 19 Ill. 136, and it was there said: "We think the rule a good one, as established in England and in this country, that railroad companies have the right to restrict their liability as common carriers by such contracts as may be agreed upon specially, they still remaining liable for gross negligence or wilful misfeasance, against which good morals and public policy forbid that they should be permitted to stipulate." And substantially the same language is used in Railroad Co. v. Read, 37 Ill. 484, and in Railroad Co. v. Adams, 42 Ill. 474. In Railroad Co. v. Smyser, 38 Ill. 354, it was held that a railroad company may restrict its liabilities for loss or injury occurring during the transportation of property, the carrier being still held liable for gross negligence or willful misfeasance. So in Railroad Co. v. Adams, supra, it is said "that, although a railroad company might protect itself by contract against certain risks assumed by common carriers and belonging to their vocation, it was contrary to good morals and public policy that they should be allowed to stipulate against their own gross negligence, or that of their employees, or their wilful default." In Oppenheimer v. Express Co., 69 Ill. 62, the court holds that the contract exempting carriers from liabilities is not to be construed as providing against loss or injury occasioned by actual negligence on their part. In the subsequent case of Arnold v. Railroad Co., 83 Ill. 273, it was said: "The doctrine is settled in this court that railroad companies may by contract exempt themselves from liability on account of the negligence of their servants, other than that which is gross or willful." In the Read Case, supra, the question arose where the plaintiff was riding on a free ticket, on the back of which was an indorsement to the effect that the person accepting the same assumes all risks of accident and expressly agrees that the company shall be liable under circumstances for injury to the person or property of the passenger while using the ticket. It was held that the acceptance and use of the ticket made the indorsement thereon a special contract, but that the contract did not exempt the company from liability for injury caused by gross negli gence. In Railroad Co. v. Wilcox, supra, we said: "The law bas wisely, and for reasons that concern the public welfare, inhibited a common carrier of passengers or freight from contracting against its own negligence, or that of its servants and employees." See, also, Railway Co. v. Beggs, 85 Ill. 80. In Express Co. v. Stettaners, 61 Ill. 184, goods were shipped from Chicago to New York, worth in fact $400, for which the company gave the shipper a receipt, limiting its liability to $50 in case of loss, of which the shipper had notice. It was there said that "even if it should be conceded that the shipper in this case must be considered as having assented to the terms of the bill of

lading, we cannot hold the carrier excused from the exercise of reasonable and ordinary care. Courts have often had occasion to express their regret that common carriers have been permitted, even by contract, to discharge themselves from the obligations imposed by the salutary rules of the common law.

*It is very unreasonable in the carrier to say that it will in no event be liable beyond the sum of $50, in the absence of a special contract, though it may have received much more than that sum merely in the way of freight. * It would be very easy for them to require the shipper to specify the value of the merchandise, * making their charges in proportion to their liability. If the shipper should falsely state the value, he could not complain of being held to his own valuation. In order to prevent the carrier from releasing himself by contract from all liability, courts have laid down the rule above stated, that he cannot, even by contract, exempt himself from the exercise of reasonable care." And the same rule was laid down in Boscowitz v. Express Co., 93 Ill. 523, and it was there held that the defendant was liable for the full value of the goods, if the loss was owning to negligence on the part of the railroad company, who was the servant of the express company in the transportation of the goods.

We have thus given an epitome of cases decided by this court, to which others might be added, for the purpose of showing that we are committed to the doctrine that a common carrier cannot, even by express contract, exempt itself from liability resulting from gross negligence or willful misconduct, committed by itself, or by its servants or employees. Whatever may be the rule elsewhere, in this State the common carrier cannot contract for exemption from responsiblility for a failure on its part, or that of its servants, to exercise ordinary care in the transaction of its business. If the carrier may by con'ract limit its liability for gross negligence or willful misfeasance to any extent, it may contract for total exemption. A contract for exemption from liability for its torts being void as against public policy, it cannot shield itself, as to any portion of the damages to person or property, occasioned by its gross negligence or willful misconduct. As we have seen, it. may protect itself against fraud by requiring the consignee to state the value of the thing shipped; but when it receives property for transportation it must exercise reasonable care until it reaches its place of destination, and will not be permitted to absolve itself from that responsibility.

CRIMINAL LAW-ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO RAPE-COMPLICITY OF HUSBAND.-A case, as revolting in its facts as it is novel in the declaration of its law, is State v. Dowell, 11 S. E. Rep, 525, decided by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. There it is held that a husband, who by threats of death constrains another to attempt to ravish his wife, is guilty of an assault with intent to commit rape, and that on an indictment against a husband for assault with intent to ravish, it cannot be objected that there was no criminal intent where it appears that he, by threats, compelled another to attempt to