Page images
PDF
EPUB

evidence in Markham v. Brown that the proprietor of the hotel had any contract with another stage line, or would suffer pecuniary loss or injury, if the agent who was expelled was successful in his solicitations; and it seems that Angell and others, who cite as authority that case, as well as Jencks v. Coleman and Barney v. Steamboat Co., reconcile them by drawing the distinction that in the latter cases, and in the hypothetical case of an innkeeper, put by Justice Story, the person whose expulsion was justified was doing an injury to the proprietor, who had him removed, by diminishing his profits derived legitimately from a business used as an adjunct to that of common carrier or innkeeper. In using the language quoted above, Justice Parker seems to have had in his mind, without referring to it, the opinion of Justice Story, delivered in the circuit court but two years before (Jencks v. Coleman, supra).

IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE-PARENT AND CHILD. -The question as to the effect of negligence of a parent upon the rights of a child injured by reason of it, is one not yet settled, and upon which there is considerable conflict of authority. The Supreme Court of Illinois, in Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Wilcox, 24 N. E. Rep. 419, consider the question, and come to the conclusion that in an action by a child for personal injuries caused by defendant's negligence, the negligence of the child's parents in permitting it to stray beyond their immediate control into a place of danger cannot be imputed to the child, and further that it is error to instruct the jury that negligence cannot be attributed to a child seven years old. Wilkin, J., says:

Thus two legal questions are presented for decision, upon either of which there is to be found a conflict of authorities. On the first, two well-defined lines of decisions appear, each in direct conflict with the other. In Shearman & Redfield on Negligence the rule established by one line of these decisions is denominated the "New York rule," the other the "Vermont rule." Sections 74, 78. The first is based upon Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615, in which it is said: "An infant is not sui juris. He belongs to another, to whom discretion in the care of his person is exclusively confided. That person is keeper and agent for this purpose; and, in respect to third persons, his act must be deemed that of the infant. His neglect is the infant's neglect." The other or Vermont rule "holds that the contributory negligence of a parent, guardian, or other person having control of the child is not to be imputed to the child itself," so as to defeat an action by it for an injury caused by the negligence of another. Robinson v. Cone, 22 Vt. 213. It is insisted by counsel for the appellant that we are committed to the first-named rule. Messrs. Shearman and Redfield seem to have so understood some of our former decisions, and so cite them in their valuable work on the Law of Negligence. 4th Ed. vol. 1, § 74, note 6. It will be found upon examination that the cases cited do not bear that construction. Hund v. Geier, 72 Ill. 393, was a suit by a father for an injury to his infant

[blocks in formation]

Hesing, 83 Ill. 204; Chicago v. Starr, 42 Ill. 174; Railroad Co. v. Becker, 76 Ill. 25, and the same case in 84 Ill. 483-in each of which cases the action was by an administrator for the benefit of the parents as next of kin. These cases are so clearly distinguishable from those in which the child himself sues that they must have been cited by mistake. See Id. § 71. The two remaining cases cited in note 6 were suits by the child in its own name, but neither of them holds that negligence on the part of the parents would have defeated the action. In Gavin v. Chicago, 97 Ill. 66, Gavin recovered a judgment in the circuit court of Cook county against the city of Chicago for an injury to his person alleged to have been occasioned by the city in negligently maintaining a swing bridge. That judgment was reversed by the appellate court of the first district, and Gavin prosecuted a writ of error to this court. The judgment of the appellate court was affirmed on the broad ground that the evidence showed no negligence on the part of the city. It appeared, however, that on the trial the care bestowed upon the plaintiff by his parents, he being a child but four years of age, was submitted to the jury; and Justice Scott, rendering the opinion of the court, said: "Under the circumstances proven, the jury found there was no negligence on the part of the mother touching the care she bestowed upon her child." In Railroad Co. v. Gregory, 58 Ill. 226, the defendants offered proof of the negligence of the plaintiff's mother in permitting him to go unattended in a place of danger. The competency of such evidence was not raised either on the trial below or in this court. In affirming the judgment of the circuit court, it was said the evidence failed to establish such negligence; but that fact in no way controlled in the decision of the case. All that can be fairly said in regard to these cases is that the question now under discussion might have been raised in them, but counsel did not see fit to do so; and, as its decision did not become necessary to a proper determination of the cases, the court was not called upon to express any opinion upon it, and did not. In Wharton on Negligence, Ross v. Innis, 26 Ill. 260; Chicago v. Starr, 42 Ill. 174; and Railroad v. Bumstead, 48 Ill. 221,-are cited, in a note to section 311, as holding "that, when a child is negligently permitted by its parents or guardians to stray on a thoroughfare or (railroad track, this negligence may be regarded, even when the child brings suit through a guardian or prochien ami, as the contributory negligence of the child." The citation of Ross v. Innis is evidently a mistake, as the case has no relation whatever to this question. Chicago v. Starr, as already stated, was an action by an administrator for the benefit of the next of kin. Railroad v. Bumstead, 48 Ill. 221, like Hund v. Geier, 72 Ill. supra, was an action by the father to recover for an injury to his minor son. It is also to be borne in mind that there is a distinction between cases in which a parent having the immediate custody and control of a child negligently contributes to its injury, as in Railway Co. v. Stratton, 78 Ill. 88, and those in which the negli gence consists in merely permitting it to stray beyond such immediate custody and control into a place of danger. If these distinctions are observed, it will be found that the question now raised has never been decided by this court. So treating it, we are clearly of opinion that the weight of authority and better reasoning is in support of the doctrine that in a case like this the child is not chargeable with a negligent omission of duty by its parent. There was therefore no reversible error in giving the first part of the third

nstruction. Bish. Non-Cont. Law, §§ 581-583; Whart. Neg. §§ 310, 314; 1 Shear. & R. Neg. § 78.

The question as to whether, as a matter of law, personal negligence can be attributable to a child seven years of age, as before stated, is also one upon which the authorities are not harmonious. In 1 Shear. & R. Negligence, § 73, it is said: "In analogy to the rule which holds a child under seven years of age incapable of crime, some courts have considered them also incapable of negligence; but we think that this is not to be conclusively presumed. Juries may be depended upon not to overrule this presumption except in perfectly clear cases." Railroad Co. v. Becker, 76 Ill. is in conformity with the well-recognized rule that a child can only be chargeable with want of care for his personal safety in proportion to his age and intelligence. 1 Shear. & R. Neg. sec. 73; Bish. Non-Cont. Law, sec. 586; Whart. Neg. sec. 309; Kerr v. Forgue, 54 Ill. 482; Railway Company v. Eininger, 114 Ill. 79. When the case of Railroad Company v. Becker came up on a second appeal (84 Ill. 483), a reversal was insisted upon on the sole ground that the evidence (did not sustains the verdict; and it was then said, in commenting upon the evidence: "While the deceased was no doubt possessed of ordinary intelligence, and was as capable of using as much caution for his safety as other boys of his age, yet it is not to be expected of a boy between six or seven years of age that the same caution and care will be used for personal safety as will be exercised by a person of mature age; and the law will not impute negligence to an infant of such tender years." The appellate court seems to have understood this case to hold that negligence cannot, as a matter of law, be imputed to a child of the age of six or seven years. Such is not the purport of the decision. In the very same case, it has been expressly held that the question of the child's negligence was one of fact to be determined by the jury. In Railroad Co. v. Murry, 62 Ill. 326, it was held that a little girl about seven and a half years of age was guilty of contributory negligence, and a judgment in her favor reversed because instructions given on her behalf did not tell the jury to consider whether she had not been guilty of a high degree of negligence even for a person of her age. We think the true rule is that a child is to be held to the exercise of care for its personal safety according to its age, experience, and intelligence, and the circumstances by which it was surrounded at the time of the alleged injury; that it cannot be arbitrarily said that negligence may be imputed to a child seven and a half years of age, but not to one of six or seven.

CONTRACT-PURCHASE OF LOTTERY TICKETS-ILLEGAL CONSIDERATION. In view of the present struggle for continued existence on the part of the Louisiana State Lottery, the case of Goodrich v. Houghton, 9 N. Y. Supp. 214, decided by the Supreme Court of New York, will be of special interest. In that case it was held that, under Pen. Code N. Y. §§ 324, 334, declaring lotteries to be unlawful and a public nuisance, though drawn in another State, and authorized by the laws of such State, an agreement to make a joint purchase of tickets in the Louisiana State Lottery, and to share equally in the re

sults, is illegal, and cannot be enforced in the New York courts, though the tickets were actually purchased in New Orleans. It seems that after the drawing, defendant informed plaintiff that their tickets had drawn a prize, and it was arranged that the money should be sent by express to defendant, who promised to divide it with plaintiff. It was held that the promise had reference to the original bargain, and afforded no basis for a recovery by plaintiff of her share of the money when received by defendant.

MASTER AND SERVANT-FELLOW-SERVANT. -The modern doctrine of fellow-servants is well stated by the Supreme Court of Washington in Sayward v. Carlson, 23 Pac. Rep. 830. Stiles, J., says:

Up to a certain point, undoubtedly, the commonlaw rule was and is that the master is not liable if one of his servants negligently injure another. It was indirectly stated so to be in Priestley v. Fowler, 3 Mees. & W. 1, in 1837, but was first distinctly announced in Murray v. Railroad Co., 1 McMul. 385, in 1841, and was reannounced in Massachusetts, in 1842, in Farwell v. Railroad Co., 4 Metc. 49. The first positive announcement of the rule in England was in Hutchinson v. Railway Co., 5 Exch. 343. The theory of the South Carolina case was that each of the servants, in his separate department, represented the principal, and that they were engaged in a joint undertaking. In Massachusetts the ground of the decision was that by refusing a resort to the common employer the safety of each employee would be more effectually secured, by reason of the greater skill and care with which they would conduct their several operations. Hutchinson v. Railway Co. seems to have rested upon the conclusion of the court that the principle of holding the master liable would "carry us to an alarming extent." The English cases down to this time, except as they have been restricted by statute, have been kept well up to the general rule, in which they have rather followed, than been followed by, many American cases, notably those decided in Massachusetts. See Holden Railroad Co., 129 Mass. 268. But, almost contemporaneously with the assertion of the general rule of the exemption of the master, other American courts refuse adherence to it as a universal rule. The rise and progress of great railroad corporations, operating over long lines of road, with hundreds of employees, from 'president down, caused a closer inspection of the real relations of the men, who, although they were employed and paid by the same master, were often so widely separated in their spheres of duty that reason seemed to call for some substantial modification of the decisions as to what the rule really was when applied to cases where there was so large a delegation of the anthority of the master to the negligent servant that the master could be said to be present and acting only in the person of the servant. The courts of last resort of many of the States, and the Supreme Court of the United States, have given their adherence to this view; and according to their decision the common law of such cases is that the rule of exemption to the master only applies when the negligent servant and

the serva

injured are in a common employment. The leading authority on this subject-for this case, at least is the Supreme Court of the United States, which, in Railroad Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 184, said: "There is in our judgment, a clear distinction to be made, in their relations to their common principal, between servants of a corporation exercising no supervision over others engaged with them in the same employment, and agents of the corporation clothed with the control and management of a distinct department, in which their duty is entirely that of direction and superintendence," -and held a railroad conductor who neglected to inform his engineer of an order to wait at a station ahead for a train going in the opposite direction, whereby a collision occurred, not to be the fellow-servant of the engineer. Other courts have applied the principle to far more complicated cases, and have not hesitated to give the employees of natural persons the benefit of the new common law, the announcement of which was at first based upon that peculiarity of corporations which compels them to act by agents only. Doubtless the United States Supreme Court would do the same, in a proper case.

Yielding our adherence to the doctrine that, to exempt the master and make the two servants fellowservants, they must be engaged in the same common employment, in the same department of service, and act under the same immediate direction, we look vainly for any agreement among the courts as to what "common employments" are. The diversity of employments and myriad circumstances under which men act and are injured make it impossible to define them. Some general definitions there are, and with them each case must be compared as it arises, and the rules extended so as to make a reasonable application. We find in Crispin v. Babbitt, 81 N. Y. 516, what seems to us the most correct, brief, statement of some of the points to be regarded in cases of this kind which has come to our notice. The court said (page 520): "The liability of the master does not depend upon the grade or rank of the employee whose negligence causes the injury. A superintendent of a factory, although having power to employ men or represent the master in other respects, is, in the management of the machinery, a fellow-servant of the other operatives. On the same principle, however low the grade or rank of the employee, the master is liable for injuries caused by him to another servant if they result from the omission of some duty of the master which he has confided to such inferior employee.

mere

Flike v. Railroad Co., 53 N. Y. 549. * The liability of the master is thus made to depend upon the character of the act in the performance of which the injury arises, without regard to the rank of the employee performing it. If it is one pertaining to the duty the master owes to his servants, he is responsible to them for the manner of its performance. The converse of the proposition necessarily follows. If the act is one which pertains only to the duty of an operative, the employee performing it is a servant; and the master, although liable to strangers, is not liable to fellow-servant for its improper performance. Wood, Mast. & Serv. § 438. " These are flexible rules, in which the doctrine that the delegated powers and duties of the master make a servant, at times, the very master himself as to other servants, is the central feature; and they seem to us eminently just to both master and servant. They would fully sustain the decision in Brodeur v. Valley Falls Co., (R. I.) 17 Atl. Rep. 54, cited by plaintiff in error.

LEGAL STATUS OF ADOPTED CHILDREN.

Sources of the Law of Adoption. The adoption of a stranger into one's family, or accepting the child of another as one's own child and heir,' created a domestic relation well known, with its legal consequences, tothe ancients, of whom the Athenians and Spartans, the Romans and ancient Germans are mentioned by historians and law writers. In the Roman law it suffered considerable change, and the doctrine, as modified by Justinian, was transmitted to the modern nations of Europe. The Code Civil of France contained stringent provisions in connection therewith, whence it passed into the laws of Louisiana. From the Spanish law it was transmitted to Mexico, and thus became the law of Texas when it formed part of that country.1

[ocr errors]

2

Statutory Requisites to Adoption.—Adoption is entirely ignored by the common law. Within forty years past nearly all the States. of the Union have enacted statutes authorizing the adoption of children, following, it seems, the lead of Massachusetts in this respect. These statutes vary greatly in their details; but their common purpose is to enable persons so disposed to vest in the children of others the rights and privileges which they would possess if they were children of their own blood, including the right of inheritance. The persons adopting must, of course, in all the States having legislated on the subject, be adults. In Louisiana the statute originally required the adopter to be

1 Anderson Dict. L., "Adoption."

2 The adopter must be fifty years of age, fifteen years older than the person adopted, and have no children of his own; the adoption of minors takes effect only after the minor has been supported by the adopter for six years, etc. Code Nap. Art. 343, et seq. promulgated April 2, 1803, tit. "De Adoption."

8 But was omitted from the Code of 1808: Per Merrick, J., in Vidal v. Commagere, 13 La. Ann. 516. Under the constitution of 1865 it was again introduced in a modified form, and incorporated in the Rev. Civil Code of 1870, § 214.

4 Teal v. Sevier, 26 Tex. 516, 520; Eckford v. Knox, 67 Tex. 200, 204. According to these cases no one could, under the Mexican law, adopt a stranger into his family as co-heir if he had children of his own living. The statute of Texas (Sayles Civ. St. § 1,) now allows adopted childred to inherit the adopter's estate to the extent of one-fourth thereof.

5 See a review of Whitman's "Law of Adoption in. the United States," 3 Cent. L. J. 397; also the editor's note to Barnhizel v. Ferrel, 14 Am. L. Reg. 682.

[blocks in formation]

It is still provided in California,8 Dakota,9mitted without their own free consent, or

and Montana, 10 that the adopter be ten, in Idaho" that he be fifteen years older than the one adopted. In Massachusetts the person adopted, according to one interpretation of the statute, must be younger than the one adopting, unless it be the wife, husband, brother, sister, uncle or aunt, either of the whole or half blood, of the adopter; according to another, perhaps equally reasonable interpretation, the right to adopt any of the persons in the relationship mentioned is excluded.12 Nearly all the statutes provide that if the person adopting be married both of the spouses must join in the act of adopt ing, or at least consent thereto;13 but where the adoption by one spouse is valid, the other not joining or consenting is not bound thereby.14 In most States, also, the consent of the child is required, if it be of the age of fourteen; in California,15 Dakota, 16 Idaho,17 Montana, 18 Nevada, 19 and New York 20 if twelve years of age. It seems that where the effect of the adoption is limited to make the adopted person an heir no consent is necessary; but to make a minor the member of a new family by the adoption, giving

6 Succession of Vollmer, 40 La. Ann. 593.

7 Succession of Vollmer, supra.

8 Deer. Ann. Civ. C., 1883, § 221, et seq.

9 Comp. L. 1887, § 2622 et seq.

10 Comp. St. 1888.

11 Rev. St. 1887, § 2545.

12 Publ. St. 1882, p. 824, § 1.

13 The statutes of Colorado, Gen. St. 1683, p. 119, and of Missouri Rev. St. 1889, § 969, provide that a married woman may join her husband in a deed of adoption. The Indiana statute is construed as authorizing a married man to adopt a child without his wife joining in the petition, and that an adopted child may have an adopted father, without an adopted mother: Barnhizel v. Ferrel, 47 Ind. 335, 339; Krug v. Davis, 87 Ind. 590, 595.

14 Reinder v. Koppelmann, 68 Mo. 482, 485; Stanley v. Chandler, 53 Vt. 619, 625, (in this case the adoption was by act of the legislature); Sharkey v. McDermott, 16 Mo. App. 80.

15 C. C. § 221 et seq.

16 Comp. L. 1887 § 2622 et seq.

17 Rev. St. 1887 § 2545 et seq.

is Comp. St. 1888.

19 Gen. St. 1885 § 601 et seq.

20 Banks & Bro. Rev. St. 1889 § 2608.

21 The statue of Vermont, however, provides that an adult, to be adopted, must join in the deed of adoption: Rev. L. 1880 § 2537.

proof that the rights of the latter are inconsistent with the child's interest. Hence, most States require either the consent of the parents, surviving parent, guardian or other person, corporation or institution having lawful custody of the child to be shown affirmatively, or that notice be given to them so that they may appear and be heard upon the question of adoption before the court.22 Where the act of adoption is by deed between the parties, not requiring the sanction or judgment of a court or judicial tribunal,28 the terms of the statute must be complied with, or the act will be held void. 24 But if the act of adoption is sanctioned or decreed by a court having jurisdiction, on notice to all persons entitled thereto, as is required in most of the States, the judgment or decree will not be questioned collaterally," 25 but parties having an interest in the adoption or its consequences (such as parents, blood relatives, friends or any of the parties entitled to notice under the statute), if they have not given their consent, may appeal from the decree or judgment, or seek a remedy in equity.26 In many of the States the appeal is provided for by statute. The right of appeal does not, however, extend to the heirs in their own right, because, as such, they have no vested right,27 nor to the legal representative of a deceased adopter, because the adoption was his own act. Statutes of

22 Burger v. Frakes, 67 Iowa 460, 465; Chambers in re, 22 Pac. Rep. (Cal.) 138; Furgeson v. Jones, 20 Pac. (Oreg.) 842; Luppie v. Winans, 37 N. J. Eq. 245, 249; Humphrey Appellant, 137 Mass. 84.

23 Adoption has been declared a ministerial act, not judicial, in Alabama: Abner v. DeLoach, 84 Ala. 393. And in Louisiana: Succession of Vollmer, 40 La. Ann. 593. See also In re Stevens' Estate, 23 Pac. Rep. (Cal.) 379.

24 The failure to file for record during the life time of the adopter the deed of adoption otherwise in strict accordance with the statute is fatal: Tyler v. Reynolds, 53 Iowa 578; Shearer v. Weaver, 56 Iowa 578. The consent of parties need not, however, appear in the body of the instrument; it may be evidenced by the signatures: Bancroft v. Bancroft, 53 Vt. 9 12.

25 Edds, Appellant, 137 Mass. 346, 347; Brown v. Brown, 101 Ind. 349; Newman In re, 75 Cal. 213, 219. 26 Murray v. Barber, 17 Atl. Rep. (R. I.) 553. Brown v. Brown, supra.

27 Gray v. Gardner, 18 Atl. Rep. 286.

adoption, though in derogation of the common law are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the legislative intent; 28 but no presumption arising out of collateral facts can be indulged in to supply proof of the facts required by the statute.29 Parol agreements to adopt have been held valid and, at least to the extent of securing inheritance to the adopted children, enforced in equity, though the statute of adoption has not been followed.30

32

Rights of Adopting and of Adopted Persons. -The person having adopted an infant is entitled to its custody and services, even against its natural parents and statutory guardian31 to the full extent as if the adopting were the natural father. By the statutes of Colorado,3 Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,36 Kentucky, Louisiana,38 Maine, Massachusetts, 40 Michigan, Minnesota, 12 Mississippi,43 Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 46 New Jersey, New York,48 Ohio,49 Oregon,50

33

37

47

41

34

42

28 Abney v. DeLoach, 84 Ala. 393, deciding a number of points touching the formalities of adoption.

29 Romero, In re, 75 Cal. 379, 381. To similar effect: Sharpy v. McDermott, 16 Mo. App. 80, 85. This case was reversed by the supreme court which held that a parol contract of adoption, executed in good faith by the party to be adopted, and performed in part by the other party, is not avoided by the statute of frauds: Sharkey v. McDermott, 91 Mo. 647, 652; and that the wife was bound by such contract, the adopted child having continued to live with her and to render her services after the husband's death: Ib. p. 648, syllabus.

30 Sharkey v. McDermott 91, Mo. 647; Van Tine v. Van Tine, 15 Atl. (N. J.) 249; Van Dyne v. Vreeland, 11 N. J. Eq. 370, 379; s. c. 12 N. J. Eq. 142.

31 Rives v. Sneed, 25 Ga. 612, 622; Brown v. Welsh, 27 N. J. Eq. 429, 433; Matter of Clements, 78 Mo. 352. 32 Gen. St. 1883 p. 119.

33 Code 1882 § 1788, 1789.

34 St. & Cur. Ann. St. 1885 ch. 14.

35 Rev. St. 1888, § 823; Barnhizel v. Ferrel, 47 Ind. 335.

36 Dass. Comp. L. 1885, § 3482.

37 By consent of both parties the court may decree the control of the adopted child to the adopter: Gen. St. 1887 ch. 31 §§ 17, 18.

38 Rev. C. C. § 214; Succession of Hosser, 37 La. Ann. 839.

39 Rev. St. 1884, p. 566.
40 Publ. St. 1882, p. 824.
How. St. 1882, § 6379.
42 Gen. St. 1881, p. 1014.
43 Rev. Code 1880 § 1496.
44 Rev. St. 1889 § 970.
45 Comp. L. 1887, p. 831.

46 Gen. St. 1878, ch. 188.

47 Rev. 1877, p. 1342.

48 Banks & Bro. Rev. St. p. 2608.

49 Rev. St. 1880 § 3137.

50 Hill's Ann. L. 1887.

Pennsylvania,51 Rhode Island, 52 West Vir ginia, and Wisconsin, the same rights for support, education and protection are secured to adopted children against the persons adopting them, as if they were the natural, legitimate children of these persons, with the exception, noticed below, of some modification of their right of inheritance. The right of adopted children has been held to extend to the homestead descending from a deceased adopter.55 The right of the children conditions, of necessity, the corresponding right of the adopting parents to the custody, control and services of the children, which will be awarded according to the best interest of the child, with the like discretional powers in the courts as in cases contested by a natural father or mother.57

Change of Name of Adopted Persons.-It is, under the statutes of most of the States, within the power of a court sanctioning the adoption to change the name of the adopted person from that of the natural to that of the adopting father. In Missouri the power to change the name of an adopted child is conferred upon the probate courts;58 in Colorado upon the district or county court.5 In Pennsylvania the child takes the name of the adopter by statute.60

59

Right of Inheritance Conferred by Adoption. -The most important consequence of adoption, in many instances the controlling or sole motive thereto, is that the right is thereby conferred upon the person adopted to inherit the estate of the deceased adopter. As a general rule it may be said that the person adopted inherits from the person adopting, real and personal essate, to the same extent as the right to inherit exists in legitimate natural children. But this is a mere statutory right, extending only to what a child would be entitled to under the statutes regulating descent and distributions, unless augmented or diminished by the terms of the statute au

51 Bright. Purd. Dig. 1885.

52 Publ. St. 1882.

53 Code 1887, ch. 122 § 2.

54 Rev. St. 1878 § 4121 et seq.

55 Per Belcher, C. C., in Matter of Romero, 75 Cal. 379, 381.

56 Matter of Clements, 78 Mo. 352; and see cases supra.

57 Fouts v. Pierce, 64 Iowa 71.

38 Rev. St. 1889 § 971.

59 Gen. St. 1883, p. 119.

60 Appeal of Rowan, 19 Atl. Rep. 82.

« PreviousContinue »