transitory nature, for torts at common law, a citizen of a State may sue a citzen of another State in the courts of such other State, or of any State wherein he may reside, or may be found and served with process, without regard to the place or State in which the injury may have been inflicted, but that where certain acts are made wrongs by statute which were not such theretofore, or where remedies additional to those which existed at common law are provided by statute, advantage can be taken of these new and additional remedies only within the territory or locality in which the statute has force. These constitute new rights, so to speak, and depend for their enforcement, always, upon the statutes by which they are created; and such statutes will be enforced only by the courts of the State wherein they are exacted. In support of these propositions many well considered cases may be cited, as those of Woodard v. Railroad Co., 10 Ohio St. 121; Richardson v. Railroad Co., 98 Mass. 85; Taylor's Admr. v. Pennsylvania Co., 78 Ky. 348; McCarthy v. Railroad Co., 18 Kan. 46; Wills v. Railroad Co., 61 Tex. 432; Buckles v. Eller, 72 Ind. 220. In the case of Taylor's Admr. v. Pennsylvania Co., just refered to, where it was held that an administrator appointed and suing in Kentucky could not maintain an action for the death of his intestate by negligence in Indiana, such action being maintainable by an administrator under the Indiana statute, but not under that of Kentucky, the court of appeals of the latter State said: "A personal representative, as such, has no rights or powers beyond the jurisdiction of the government under whose laws he receives his appointment, and a prior he cannot have any rights, nor be subject to any obligations or duties, not imposed by the law of his official domicile. He cannot carry his official character abroad, nor can his official powers and duties at home be affected by foreign laws. A Kentucky administrator suing in a Kentucky court must be able to show that the laws of Kentucky entitle him to the thing sued for. He cannot receive his office from one jurisdiction, and appeal to the laws of another jurisdiction for rights or powers not given by the law which created him." And the same principle is fully sustained in a well-reasoned opinion by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Woodard v. Railroad Co., supra.

We are aware that there is some diversity of opinion upon this subject; but we are not aware that there is any well-considered case that holds that the action may be maintained, in a State other than that in which the accident occurred, on the same state of facts, as here presented, and where there existed in the statutes of the two States upon this subject such dissimilarity of provisions as we find to exist in the statutes of West Virginia and Maryland. In Leonard v. Navigation Co., 84 N. Y. 48, it was held that an administrator appointed in the State of New York might maintain an action for the death of his intestate occasioned by a negligent injury inflicted by the defendant in another State, having a statute substantially like the New York statute, allowing an action of damages for death by negligence to be prosecuted by the personal representative of the deceased; and in case of Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U. S. 11, brought up from a circuit court sitting in New York, the same rule of decisions is maintained as that laid down in Leonard v. Navigation Co., supra. This case in 103 U. S. 11, is much relied on by the plaintiff, but the facts of that case are not similar to the facts of the present case. In that case the death occurred in New Jersey, and the action was brought by an adminis

tratrix appointed in New York; and in delivering the opinion the supreme court said "that a statute of New York, just like the New Jersey law, provides for bringing the action by the personal representative, and for distribution to the same parties, and [that] an administrator appointed under the law of that State would be held to have recovered to the same uses, and subject to the remedies, in her fiduciary character which both statute require." The court also said that "the questions growing out of these statutes are new, and many of them unsettled. Each State court will construe its own statute on the subject, and differences are to be expected." It is clear, therefore, that the decision in the case reported in 103 U. S. does not apply to this case. But even the qualified decis ions of the court of appeals of New York and of the Supreme Court of the United States upon this subject have not met with general approval, and have not been generally followed by subsequent State court decisions. In the recent case of Davis v. Railroad Co., 143 Mass. 301, 9 N. E. Rep. 815, it was held by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts that an action by an administrator could not be maintained in that State for the death of a person caused by the negligence of the defendant in another State, the remedies provided in the two States not being alike, and the court expressly declined to depart from its own previous decision in Richardson v. Railroad Co., 98 Mass. 85, and follow the general doctrine laid down in Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U. S. 11. And so in case of Vawter v. Railroad Co., 84 Mo. 679, where it was held by the Supreme Court of Missouri that an administrator appointed in that State could not maintain an action there for the death of his intestate by negligence of the defendant in Kansas; such action being allowed by the statute of Kansas, but not by that of Missouri. There, also, the case of Dennick y. Railroad Co., and Leonard v. Navigation Co., supra, were pressed upon the court for the general doctrine there laid down; but the Supreme Court of Missouri declined to adopt or follow those cases, and decided in accordance with what was taken to be the well-established general principle of interstate law in such cases. And even in New York, in the recent case of Debvoise v. Railroad Co., 98 N. Y. 377, it was held that an action by an administrator for damages for the death of his intestate, caused by the negligence of the defendant in another State, could not be maintained in the courts of New York without proof of the existence of a like statute to that of New York in the State where the accident occurred; thus showing that the right of action given by statute for the death of an individual is not transitory, like the common-law right of action for personal injuries, but the operation and force of such statute must be confined to the State enacting it, except where it can be extended by comity. And whether an action would be sustained by the courts of this State for the death of a person occurring in another State, having a statute of the same or like provisions as our own, is a question not presented in this case, and in regard to which we express no opinion.

The plaintiff having entirely failed to show any such state of case or cause of action as would entitle her to recover in a Maryland court, there was no error in taking the case from the jury, and therefore the judg ment must be aflirmed.

interest arose in the case of Town of Summerville v. Pressley, 11 S. E. Rep. 545, decided by the Supreme Court of South Carolina. There it was held that an ordinance limiting the maximum quantity of land which it should be lawful for any person or family to cultivate within the corporate limits of the town is valid under a charter which gives the town authorities power to pass any ordinance they may deem necessary for the preservation of the health, good order, etc., of the town. Such an ordinance, imposing a proper and reasonable restriction upon the enjoyment of property in order to prevent it from becoming injurious to public health, is a legal exercise of the police power of the State, which it is competent for the legislature to delegate by charter to the municipal authorities. Nor is it in conflict with Const. S. C. art. 1, § 12, providing that no person shall be subjected in law to any other restraint in regard to personal rights than such as are laid on others in like circumstances. The limit imposed being the same for all, it is not unequal in its operation, though some have more land than others. McGowan, J., says:

The second exception makes the objection that the legislature has not conferred, and could not confer, on the town council, any authority to prevent the usual, proper use of cleared lands by the owner without full compensation paid to him. The State, through the law-making body, certainly possesses the police power, which from its very nature has no well defined limits, but must be as extensive as the necessities which call for its exercise. Judge Dillon describes it thus: "Every citizen holds his property subject to the proper exercise of this [police] power, either by the legislature directly, or by public corporations to which the legislature may delegate it. Laws and ordinances relating to the comfort, health, convenience, good order, and general welfare of the inhabitants are comprehensively styled, 'police laws or regulations;' and it is well settled that laws and regulations of this character, though they may disturb the enjoyment of individual rights, are not unconstitutional, though no provision is made for compensation for such disturb. ances. They do not appropriate private property for public use, but simply regulate its use and enjoyment by the owner. If he suffers injury, it is either damnum absque injuria, or,in the theory of the law, he is compensated for it by sharing in the general benefits which the regulations are intended and calculated to secure. The citizen own his property absolutely, it cannot be taken from him for any private use whatever without his consent, not for any public use without compensation. Still he owns it subject to this restriction, namely, that it must be so used as not to injure others, and that the sovereign authority may, by police regulations, so direct the use of it that shall not prove pernicious to his neighbors, or the citizens generally. These regulations rest upon the maxim, salus populi suprema est lex. This power to restrain a private in

jurious use of property is very different from the right of eminent domain. It is not a taking of private property for public use," etc. 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. (3d ed.) § 141. In the great leading case upon the subject of Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. 85, Chief Justice Shaw said; "Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law as the legisature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient. This is very different from the right of eminent domain-the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to public use whenever the public exigency requires it--which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor. The power we allude to is rather the police powerthe power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same. It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this power than to mark its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its exercise," etc. It would seem that these authorities are conclusive of the right of the State, in the exercise of the police power, to make the restriction complained of. If the legislature itself had passed the ordiance just as it stands, it could not, as we think, be doubted that it was a constitutional exercise of the police power. It is said, however, that it was a mistake to suppose that the cultivation of the soil in certain crops was dangerous to health, and therefore the restriction was not a "proper" one. We suppose that the cultivation inhibited must have been considered dangerous to health in the locality of Summerville. But, be that as it may, it was a question for the law-making body. "The judiciary can only arrest the execution of a statute when it conflicts with the constitution. It cannot run a race of opinions upon points of right, reason, and expediency with the law-making power." Cooley, Const. Lim. 201.

Assuming that the legislature had the power to pass the Summerville ordinance, there can be no doubt that it had the right to delegate that power to the municipal authorities of Summerville as the governmental agent of the State within the corporate limits of the town. "The preservation of the public health and safety is often made a matter of municipal duty; and it is competent for the legislature to delegate to municipalities the power to regulate, restrain, and even suppress particular branches of business, if deemed necessary for the public good." See 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. (3d ed.) § 144; and Harrison v. Baltimore, 1 Gill. 264. The charter of the town of Summerville has the following: "Sec. 5. And the said intendant and wardens shall have full power, under their corporate seal, to make such rules, by-laws, and ordinances respecting the roads, streets, markets, public spring, and police of said village as shall appear to them necessary and requisite for the security, welfare, and convenience of said village, or for preserving health, peace, order, and good government within the same," etc. This provision was adopted from the charter of the town of Newberry, and seems to be as full and comprehensive as municipal charters generally are. We think that the legislature intended to give to the city council of Summerville all the police powers it

possessed, to be exercised within the corporate limits of the town. As was said by the court in the case of Harrison v. Baltimore, supra: By its charter the city Baltimore was vested with full power and authority to make all ordiances "necessary to preserve the health of the city.' *The transfer of this salutary and essential power is given in terms as explicit and comprehensive as could have been used for such a purpose. To accomplish within the specified territorial limits the objects enumerated, the corporate authorities were clothed with all the legislative powers which the general assembly could have exerted. the degree of necessity for such municipal legislation the mayor and city council of Baltimore were the exclusive judges. To their sound discretion was committed the selection of the means and manner contributory to the end of exercising the powers which they might deem requisite to the accomplishment of the objects of which they were made the guardians," etc. 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 144; City Council v. Baptist Church, 4 Strob. 310; Copes v. City of Charleston, 10 Rich. Law, 502.

Of

The third exception complains that the ordinance is "unequal and unjust in that it permits the owner of one-fourth or one-half of one acre of land to cultivate one-fourth or one-half of his possessions, and denies the owner of six acres the right to cultivate more than one forty-ninth of his lands." The second clause of the ordinance declares what shall be the maximum quantity of land it shall be lawful for any family to cultivate in ordinary agricultural crops. Section 12, art. 1, of our constitution declares that "no persons

shall be subjected in law to any other restraints or disqualifications in regard to any personal rights than such as are laid upon others under like circumstances." And the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States provides, among other things, that "no State shall

deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," etc. Under these provisions, one or both, it is contended that the section of the ordinance which fixes a maximum of soil to be cultivated is unconstitutional-being, as alleged, "unequal and unjust”—in that the maximum allowed is the same for all citizens. without regard to their "possessions," respectively. The intent of the ordinance was to limit to a certain point the cultivation of certain crops; and, as it seems to us, the question of "equality" should be determined, not by the number of acres a citizen may happen to own, but by the limit imposed, which, it is admitted, is precisely the same upon all. It is manifest that the object was, not to impose a burden on the citizens in the nature of a tax, which, of course, would have to be levied in proportion to property, but to limit the culti vation of the soil with a view to the preservation of the health of the town. A restriction only according to the quantity of land owned, as suggested would, certainly have failed in accomplishing the purpose in view, and possibly might have been obnoxious to the very objection made here, as creating a distinction among citizens dependent upon the amount of lands owned by them, respectively. Although the citizens may own lands within the corporate limits in different amounts, some more and some less, yet in that regard we are obliged to consider that they are all "under like circumstances;" and the amount of soil allowed to be cultivated in particular crops being the same to all, we cannot hold that this section of the ordinance is unconstitutional on the ground of "inequality" in ts provisions.

-

EJECTION

CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS TICKETS-CONDITIONS.-In Edwards v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 45 N. W. Rep. 827. decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan, plaintiff purchased a return ticket from Lansing to Chicago, sold at a reduced rate on condition-printed on the face of the ticket and signed by plaintiff-that it should not be good for return passage unless stamped by the company's ticket agent in Chicago and there signed again by plaintiff as the original purchaser. Plaintiff failed to have the ticket stamped or to sign it in Chicago, and refusing to pay his fare on the return trip was ejected from the train. It was held that having

failed to comply with the reasonable conditions of the contract, he could not ride on it nor recover for his ejectment. Champlin, J., says:

It is claimed by counsel for plaintiff that the condition requiring the ticket to be stamped at Chicago was an immaterial condition, so long as the plaintiff had, to the certain knowledge of the conductor, taken passage at Chicago; that plaintiff was in a situation to, and offered to, identify himself as the proper person-as the purchaser of the ticket; that the question of identity was, by the ticket itself, to be finally decided by the conductor; that the peculiar circumstances, including the terms of the ticket contract, distinguished this case from all those cases in which the reasonableness of conditions in tickets, limiting the use of them, have been passed upon by the courts. These distinctions are pointed out by counsel for plaintiff as follows: "First. But one question arose, or could possibly have arisen, concerning his right to ride upon the ticket. That question, addressed to the conductor was: 'Is this man who presents this ticket to me the person who bought it and owns it, and is entitled to ride upon it? Second. That, taking the condition, or all the conditions, of the ticket together, they give to the conductor the right and power to pass finally upon this question; to answer it for the company; to determine the fact. Third. This power or right, being one provided in the contract itself, and for the benefit of the company, and it imposing a duty and obligations upon the passenger which he must discharge upon request to the company, also imposes a duty upon the company, its officers and agents.

Unquestionably, parties capable of contracting may enter into such agreements as they choose; and, if they rest upon a sufficient consideration, and are not void for illegality, nor as being against public policy, they are binding upon them. The contract of carriage in this case, including the conditions, was a valid and binding agreement. The conditions were reasonable, and rested upon a sufficient consideration, namely, the reduced rate of fare. Ordinarily a person going by rail from Lansing to Chicago would be required to purchase a ticket at the point of starting, and upon returning he would be required to purchase a ticket, from the agent in Chicago, from that place to Lansing. Under the conditions of this ticket, he is required to do no more than to call upon the agent there to secure his passage from Chicago to Lansing in accordance with the conditions. There is nothing unreasonable or

annoying in this requirement. The trouble to the passenger is no more than would ordinarily occur, except the signing of his name, and if required, to identify himself, which he has received the consideration for in the reduced rate of fare. His contract with the company was that they would transport him from Chicago to Lansing upon condition that he would present his ticket to the agent at Chicago, sign his name in compliance with the contract upon the back of the ticket, and have it dated and stamped upon the back by the ticket agent. This part of his contract he did not comply with. It was a condition precedent to his right to be carried from Chicago to Lansing upon that ticket. The unstamped ticket gave him no right to a return passage; and, he absolutely refusing to pay his fare, there was no contract in force between the plaintiff and defendant company to carry him upon its cars. Under such circumstances, they had a right to eject him from its cars. The company had broken no contract, and were not in fault, but were ready to fulfill their contract according to its terms and conditions. This being so, it is difficult to see how their ejecting him from the cars, where he had no right to be, can be treated as a tort; they having used no more force then was necessary to accomplish the purpose. To hold them liable would be to hold them responsible to plaintiff for the consequences of his own neglect and failure to comply with the contract upon his part. This would be neither reasonable nor just. The distinctions which the plaintiff's counsel seeks to make, above stated, are not warranted by the contract. The plaintiff's right to ride on that ticket from Chicago to Lansing did not depend upon his being the identical person who purchased the ticket, but upon his compliance with the condition precedent of having it stamped and dated, signing his name. He is not entitled to ride upon it on its return unless this condition is complied with; and no power or authority is given to the conductor to finally determine whether he has a right to a passage upon that ticket unless it is stamped, etc., in accordance with the contract. Neither could the conductor be called upon to enter upon an investigation of the identity of the plaintiff. This position is well answered by Mr. Justice Gray in the similar case of Mosher v. Railroad Co., 127 U. S. at page 396, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1324. He says: "The conductor of the defendant's train, upon the plaintiff's presenting a ticket bearing no stamp of the agent at Hot Springs, had no authority to waive any condition of the contract, to dispense with the want of such stamp, to inquire into the previous circumstances, or to permit him to travel on the train. It would be inconsistent alike with the express terms of the contract of the parties, and with the proper performance of the duties of the conductor in examining tickets of other passengers, and in conducting his train with due regard to speed and safety, that he should undertake to determine, from oral statements of the passenger or other evidence, facts alleged to have taken place before the beginning of the return trip, and as to which the contract on the face of the ticket made the stamp of the agent of Hot Springs Railroad Company at Hot Springs the only and conclusive proof." See also the late case of Boylan v. R. Co., 10 S. C. Rep. 50. The authorities are uniform that, under a contract like the one in question here, there is no liability, either in tort or upon contract, where the plaintiff has failed to comply with the condition precedent stated above.

SUCCESSION AND DISTRIBUTION.

1. Introduction. 2. Succession.

a. Movable Property.

b. Immovable Property.

c. Capacity to Take.

(1.) Devises to Corporations.

(2.) Devises for Charitable Purposes. (3.) Capacity of Aliens to Inherit.

3. Distributions.

1. Introduction. It is the purpose of this article merely to give an outline of those principles of law which relate to the succession and distribution of property as between the different States of the Union and foreign nations. Those who are curious as to the early history of the question of the succession to property and testamentary disposition thereof, will be inserted in Bentham's chapter on "Succession." Prof. Maine's chapters on "The Early History of Testamentary Succession," and "Ancient and Modern Ideas Respecting Wills and Succession," and Morgan's chapter on "The Three Rules of Inheritance."'3 Those who are interested in the modern theories of the right of property and hereditary patrimony, to say nothing of the wild speculations and unpracticable theories of Henry George, Dennis Kerney, and others of that ilk, can consult with profit Herbert Spencer, M. Huet,5 M. C. Baron de Calins, M. Agathon de Potter," Gerr Fritche, Prof. Zachariae' Herr Krause,10 and Prof. A. H. Ahrens.

8

4

11

2. Succession-a. Movable Property.—It is now the universal rule recognized by the common law that the succession of personal property is governed exclusively by the law of the place where the testator was domiciled at the time of his death. 12 The lex domicilei

11 Bentham's Works, 334.

2 Maine's Ancient Law, chs. VI., VII., pp. 166–237. 3 Morgan's Ancient Society, pp. 523-554.

4 Social Statistics, ch. IX.

5 C. Regne Social du Christianisme, B. III., ch. V.

6 L'Economie Politique Sources des Revolutions, passims.

7 Economic Sociale (1874), ad passim; and Revue de la Philosopic de C'areuir (1876), passim.

8 Der geshlorrene Handelstaat, B. I., K. I., §§ 399, 402; Id. K. 7, § 446.

9 Buchern Vom Staat, passim.

10 System der Rechtphilosophie, Kearusgg von Karl Roder (1874), passim.

11 Naturrecht, passim.

12 See Lawrence v. Kittredge, 21 Conn. 577, 56 Am. Dec. 385; Stolcomb v. Phelps, 16 Conn. 127; Thomas' Succession, 35 La. Ann. 19; Suarez v. Mayor, etc. of New York, 2 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 173; Stolmes v. Rem

fixes the right of decent of personalty.18 But But it is said that the validity of a gift causa mostis is to be determined by the law of the place where it is made, without reference to the donor's domicile.14 And where while a husband and wife were domiciled in Minnesota, the wife inherited property from her father in Norway, which, in the form of money, was transmitted to this country, it was held, that the rights of the husband and wife in respect to such property were determined by the laws of Minnesota, and not by those of Norway.15 The right of succession to a decedent's personal property is governed by the law of the domicile, and therefore, where a testator domiciled in Louisiana left two children, a daughter residing in New York, and a son who had been absent and unheard from for twelve years, and the daughter's husband obtained administration in New York, and

sen, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 460, 8 Am. Dec. 581; 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 229, 9 Am. Dec. 269; Parsons v. Lyman, 20 N. Y. 103, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 564, reversing 4 Bradf. (N. Y.) 268; Graham v. Public Admr., 4 Bradf. (N. Y.) 127, Law Rep. 386; Public Admr. v. Hughes, 1 Bradf. (N. Y.) 125; Burr v. Sherwood, 3 Bradf (N. Y.) 85; Mercure's Estate, 1 Tuck (N. Y.) 288; Guier v. O'Daniel, 11 Binn. (Pa.) 349, n.; DeSobrey v. DeLaistre, 2 Harr. & J. (Md.) 191, 3 Am. Dec. 533; Goodwin v. Jones, 3 Mass. 514, 517, 3 Am. Dec. 173; Blake v. Williams, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 286, 314, 17 Am. Dec. 372; French v. Hall, 9 N. H. 137, 32 Am. Dec. 341; Oliver v. Towner, 14 Martin (La.), 99; Shultz v. Pulver, 3 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 182; DeCouche v. Savaties, Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 190, 8 Am. Dec. 478; Harvey v. Richards, 1 Mason C. C. 418; Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. (U. S.) 400; Pisson v. Pisson, Ambl. 25; Thorne v. Watkins, 2 Ves. 35; Sill v. Worswick, 1 H. Black, 690, 691; Bruce v. Bruce, 2 Bos. & Pull, 229, n.; Hunter v. Potk, 4 T. & R. 182; Potter v. Brown, 5 East, 130; Birtwhistle v. Vardill, 5 Barn. & Cres. 438, 445, 450, 9 Bligh. 32-88, 2 Clark & Finn. 571; Enohin v. Wylie, 10 H. L. Cas. 1; Crispin v. Doglioni, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 653; affirmed L. R. 1 H. L. 304; Partington v. AttorneyGeneral, L. R. 4 H. L. 104; Yates v. Thomson, 3 Clark & Fin. 554; Thornton v. Curling, 8 Sim. 310; Price v. Dewhurst, 8 Sim. 279, 599; Moore v. Budd, 4 Hagg. Ecc. 346, 352; Preston v. Melville, 8 Clark & Finn. 1, 12; In re Ewing, 1 Tyrw. 91, 1 Rose, Bank. Carr. 478; 5 Barn. & Cres. 451, 452; Philips v. Hunter, 2 H. Black. 402, 405. But this rule, it would seem, does not prevail in France. At least Sterne says that under droits 'd aubaine (the right of escheat) all the effects of strangers (Swiss and Scots excepted) lying in France are seized and confiscated to the government, although the heir be on the spot. See Sterne's "Sentimental Journey," 11, and note.

13 Grote v. Pace, 71 Ga. 231. By the law of domicile, as applied to succession, is meant, not the general law, but the law which the country of the domicile applies to the particular case. Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 556.

14 Emery v. Clough, 63 N. H. 552.

15 Muus v. Muus, 29 Minn. 115.

procured a decree of the probate court of Louisiana declaring his wife the sole heir, such decree was held to be a bar to the rights of the son, who subsequently appeared and claimed his share of the estate.1 16 H, born in Connecticut, went to Europe in 1869, to acquire the German language and complete his professional studies. In 1872 he went to Paris, where he remained; and in Feb. 1877, there married a French woman, without any contract as to property. Immediately after he rented a house at Suresnes, near Paris, for two years, and took up his residence there with his wife. In May, 1878, he was brought to this country and sent to a hospital for the insane at Philadelphia, where he died in 1881. The court held that his personal property became subject to the community law of France, and that his widow was entitled to one-half thereof, notwithstanding that by his will, made before the marriage, he had bequeathed the whole of it to others.17 The succession to personal property is governed by the law of the actual domicile of the intestate at the time of his death, 18 no matter what was the country of his birth or his former domicile, or the actual situs of the property at the time of his death. 19 Accordingly, one dying in the State of Sonora, Mexico, leaving neither issue nor a father, his mother would succeed to the whole estate, to the exclusion of his brothers and sisters.20 The courts of one State have no jurisdiction over the assets of a decedent, within the latter's domicile in another State.21 And it has been held in Pennsylvania that the courts. of a State have no jurisdiction to grant administration, for the purpose of recovering from the resident agent of a foreign executor a fund not collected within the jurisdiction.22 Where a person dies abroad, being domiciled there, and the courts thereof, under the local law, have adjudicated upon the rights of his

16 Sherwood v. Wooster, 11 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 441. 17 Harral y. Harral, 39 N. J. Eq. 279, 51 Am. Rep. 17. 18 It has been said that this qualification "at the time of his death" is important, because any change made after the death of the testator will not effect the succession. Lynch v. The Government of Paraguay, 25 L. T. (N. S.) 164.

19 Russell v. Madden, 95 Ill. 485. 20 Russell v. Madden, supra.

21 Watt's Appeal, 31 Leg. Int. 182, 8 Phila. (Pa.) 217; Vandyke's Estate, 32 Leg. Int. 29, 1 Weekly Notes of Cases, 171.

22 Schley's Estate, 33 Leg. Int. 202, 2 Weekly Notes of Cases, 684.