ant requested the court to charge the jury that a mere suggestion by the plaintiff that he thought the brace was not needed, would not excuse the defendant from putting it in, if it was necessary: Held, not applicable to the case, and properly refused.-Rlazinsky v. Perkins,| Wis., 45 N. W. Rep. 947.

Notes.

77. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-Accomodation -An accomodation note, before maturity, was deposited by the payee as collateral for his note to plaintiff, under an agreement that, if the principal note was not paid at maturity, the collateral note might be sold, and applied thereon. The principal note, after maturity, was reduced to a judgment providing for the sale of the collateral note on special execution. By mistake of the clerk a general instead of a special execution was issued. The note, then past due, was sold, and purchased by plaintiff: Held that, since the sale under a general instead of the special execution was by mistake of the clerk, there was not such voluntary waiver of plaintiff's claim to the note as a pledge as would divest his lien by virtue thereof, and make the note subject to equities existing in favor of the makers against the payee.-Valley Nat. Bank v. Jackaway, Iowa, 45 N. W. Rep. 881.

entitle a

78. NEW TRIAL-Loss of Deposition.-To party to either a continuance of a cause or a new trial on account of the loss before the trial of a deposition taken in the case, he must, under oath, set out the testi mony contained in the lost deposition. It is not sufficient to state that it fully supports the allegations of the answer.-Felton v. Moffett, Neb., 42 N. W. Rep. 930.

79. PARTNERSHIP-Dissolution.-A member of a partnership, who by the agreement could terminate the partnership at any time, made an assignment for the benefit of creditors. The partnership agreement provided that, on a dissolution by such members, the other partners who had charge and control of the partnership property, should "wind up their affairs, and sell the stock to the best advantage for all parties concerned:" Held, that after the dissolution the partner remaining in poseession held the partnership property, by the terms of the agreement, under a continuing trust for the other partner, and the statute of limitations would not begin to run against the latter's right to an account of the partnership dealings so long as the former did not repudiate the trust. Riddle v. Whitehill. U. S. S. C. 10 S. C. Rep. 924.

80. PARTNERSHIP-Dissolution. Where defendants, by their answer to a bill for dissolution of a partnership, consent to the dissolution, the court may proceed to a distribution of the assets without a formal decree of dissolution, and without proof of the special grounds set out in the bill.-Burns v. Rosenstein, U. S. S. C., 10 S. C. Rep. 817.

81. PLEADING-Abatement. - A complaint against the bondsmen of a county clerk alleged that he had received money for the redemption of tax certificates, held respectively by many different persons, and had converted the same to his own use. By way of abatement, the answer averred that the holders of the certificates were necessary parties, but did not name them: Held, that they were not necessary parties, and therefore a motion to make the answer more definite and certain was properly denied.-Door County v. Keogh, Wis., 45 N. W. Rep. 937.

States

82. PUBLIC LANDS-Grants in Aid of Colleges. -Under Act. Cong. July 2, 1862 (12 St. U. S. ch. 130), donating public lands to such of the States as might provide colleges for the benefit of agriculture and mechanic arts, which authorized the secretary of the interior to issue the land scrip to those within which there was no land subject to entry, but prohibited State any to which such scrip was issued from locating it in any other State, the State receiving the scrip had only the right to sell it, and could not locate the land, nor could any agent locate such scrip on behalf of the State which held it,

or obtain patents for the land represented by it.-Cornell University v. Fiske, U. S. S. C., 10 S. C. Rep. 777.

83. QUIETING TITLE.-Where plaintiff conveys land in trust to be reconveyed at the end of five years, an action to quiet title does not lie, on a failure to recon. vey, since the effect of such action is simply to declare the title as it is, while the purpose here is to have the title changed.—Harrigan v. Mowry, Cal., 24 Pac. Rep. 48. 84. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Contracts. A contract between two railroad companies in relation to the carriage of freights and division of earnings, which provides that this "contract, and any damages for the breach of the same, shall be a continuing lien upon the roads of the two contracting companies, their equip. ment and income, in whosoever hands they may come," does not constitute a lien or obligation running with the land, so as to render it liable in the hands of a purchaser of one of the roads for supposed earnings that would have accrued during the term provided in the lease.-Des Moines, etc. R. Co. v. Wabash, etc. R. Co., U. S. S. C., 10 S. C. Rep. 753.

85. RAILROAD MORTGAGES-Foreclosure.-Since a purchaser at a foreclosure sale thereby makes himself a party to the proceedings, and subject to the jurisdiction of the court for all orders necessary to compel the perfecting of his purchase, he has the right of appeal on all questions thereafter arising, affecting his bid, which are not foreclosed by the terms of the decree of sale, or are expressly reserved to him thereby. - Kneeland v. American Loan & Trust Co., U. S. S. C., 10 S. C. Rep.

950.

86. RAILROAD COMPANIES Railroad Crossings. Where the board of railroad crossings makes an order, in response to the application of a union depot company, authorizing the depot company to lay its tracks along specified streets, but imposes certain conditions as to the construction of a viaduct over a street, and the depot company proceeds to acquire a right of way along the route prescribed, without objecting to the order, it cannot afterwards object that the board of railroad crossings had no authority to impose the conditions. Fort Street Union Depot Co. v. State Railroad Crossing Board, Mich., 45 N. W. Rep. 973.

A pro

88. REMOVAL OF CAUSES-Federal Question. ceeding to exclude a bridge company from the use of a franchise to operate railroad tracks in a public street does not raise a federal question, though such tracks lead to its bridge, built under Acts Cong. July 14, 1862, and Feb. 17, 1865, authorizing the construction of a railroad bridge over the Ohio river, and declaring that it "shall be a lawful structure, and shall be recognized and known as a post-route," as those acts do not attempt to give the right to the use of the street as an approach. Commonwealth v. Louisville Bridge Co., U. S. C. C. (Ky.), 42 Fed. Rep. 241.

89. REMOVAL OF CAUSES Jurisdictional Amount.Where an action is brought in a State court which might have been removed to the circuit court of the United States had the amount of damages claimed been sufficient, the allowance of an amendment to make the complaint correspond with the evidence, which brings the damages claimed within the jurisdictional amount, cannot be objected to on proceedings in error, on the ground that it forced defendant to submit to a trial in the State court when he was entitled to a removal, where no application for removal was made when the amendment was allowed. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Austin, U. S. S. C., 10 S. C. Rep. 758. 90. SCHOOL DISTRICTS-Taxes. --ganized into a school district, under the control of the civil township of which they were at that time a part

Sections legally or

91. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE- Successors in Interest.A party entitled to specific performance against the original party to a contract may have judgment against the person claiming under him with notice.- Wilson v. Emig, Kan., 24 Pac. Rep. 80.

92. STATUS-Time of Taking Effect.-Chapter 159, Laws 1887, took effect and was in force after its publication in the statute book, and upon the expiration of the terms of all the officers named therein. Said chapter states a time when it shall take effect and be in force, and is therefore not in conflict with the first clause of § 19, art. 2, of the constitution.-Board of County Commissioners v. Chew, Kan., 24 Pac. Rep. 62.

93. TAXATION-Assessment.- When a township asses. sor receives a personal property statement from a person without making any objection thereto, and afterwards makes his return to the county clerk, and such statement is filed in his office, the assessor has no authority to change and alter the returns so made, without notice, by adding a greater sum than that returned by him. - Gibbons v. Adamson, Kan., 24 Pac. Rep.

51.

94. TAXATION-Certiorari.- Code Iowa, § 3224, providing that certiorari shall not be granted more than 12 months after the alleged illegal action was taken, does not require the return to be made within that time; and where the writ is addressed to the mayor, city council, and clerk of defendant city to review an illegal assessment by the board of equalization, and is served on the mayor and clerk only, the defect in the service is cured by an appearance and return made by the members of the council after the 12 months have expired.-Remey v. City Council of Burlington. Iowa, 45 N. W. Rep. 899.

95. TAX SALES.-Failure by a county treasurer to post a notice of a tax-sale "in a conspicuous place" in his office, as required by Rev. St. Wis. § 1130, will invalidate deed to a purchaser at such sale. - Morrow v. Lander, Wis., 45 N. W. Rep. 956.

96. TERRITORIAL COURTS- Jurisdiction. Act Cong. March 1, 1889, establishing a United States court in the Indian Territory, and giving it exclusive jurisdiction of offenses, "not punishable by death or by imprisonment at hard labor," does not give it jurisdiction of the of fense of retailing liquors without a license, made pun ishable, under Rev. St. U. S. §§ 2139, 3242, by imprisonment for "not less than six months nor more than two years."-In re Mills, U. S. S. C., 10 S. C. Rep. 762.

97. TERRITORIES-Oklahoma District-Rape. - In the act of congress of February 9, 1889, for the punishment of the carnal and unlawful knowledge of a female un der the age of sixteen years, the exception from the operation of the act of "the territories" applies only to those regions in which an organized system of civil government has been erected, and not to the district of Oklahoma.-In re Lane, U. S. S. C., 10 S. C. Rep. 760.

98. TOWNSHIP CERTIFICATES.- In an action against a township upon a certificate of indebtedness, it appeared that the township trustee contracted with plaintiff's assignor for lightning rods to be erected upon school-houses; that, in pursuance of a conspiracy between them, five certificates were issued, and a fictitious indebtedness created against the township, to an amount more than four times the value of the material furnished: Held, that the certificate was void, notwithstanding the fact that the township had never rescinded the original contract, nor relinquished any of the property or benefits received under it. — Boyd v. Mill Creek School Tp., Ind., 24 N. E. Rep. 661.

99. TRADE MARKS- Infringement.

-

Under Act Cong.

March 3, 1881, relating to registration of trade-marks used in foreign commerce, the circuit court has no jurisdiction of a bill for infringement where both parties reside in the State, and it does not appear that the trade-mark is used in foreign commerce.- Graveley v. Graveley, U. S. C. C. (Va.), 42 Fed. Rep. 265. 100. TRIAL-Sealed Verdict. The agreement of the attorneys of the parties to a civil action that the jury may return a sealed verdict does not operate as a discharge of the jury. In such a case, the jury should assemble again when their sealed verdict is to be delivered in court, to the end that they may be polled, should either party desire it.—Rigg v. Bias, Kan., 24 Pac. Rep. 56.

101. TRIAL-Witness.-Where counsel for both parties enter into a stipulation as to what a distant witness would testify if examined, and agree that the statement shall be received in evidence as the testimony of such person, and have the same force and effect as it were his deposition, the court has no right to discredit such evidence because uncorroborated, on the ground that the witness had been egaged for pay in looking up the evidence, and was not submitted to cross-examination.-Dickenson v. Bently, Iowa, 45 N. W. Rep. 903.

102. TRUST-School Funds in Bank.-Where the treasurer of a school-district without authority deposited its moneys in a bank in his own name, but with notice to the banker that they were school funds, the banker became a trustee of the school-district, and his insolvent estate in the hands of an assignee is subject to the repayment of such moneys to the prejudice of all other creditors.-Independent Dist. v. King, Iowa, 45 N. W. Rep.

908.

103. VENDOR'S LIEN-Subrogation.-A vendor of lands who has contracted to convey, but has made no conveyance, is entitled to a lien for a balance of the purchase money upon the lands in the hands of the vendee's grantee, who took with notice. Birdsall v. Cropsey, Neb., 45 N. W. Rep. 921. 104. WILL- Widow's Election. Where a will gave a widow all the personal property absolutely, and the real estate for life, and she, as one of the executors, signed and filed in the circuit court a report reciting such provisions of the will, and asking an extension of time for the purpose of converting the personal prop. erty into money, in order to discharge therewith a mortgage on the realty, and afterwards her receipt for the personal property was filed, together with a final report in which she consents to the closing of the estate, this was a sufficient entering of consent upon the records to satisfy the statute, and constituted an election to take under the will.-Craig v. Conover, Iowa, 45 N. W. Rep. 892.

105. WITNESS-Transactions with Decedent. Under How. St. Mich. § 7545, relating to evidence concerning transactions with decedents, the testimony of a plaintiff taken upon a trial when both parties were living cannot be read in evidence upon a second trial, after the death of defendant, nor can the stenographer testify as to what the plaintiff said upon such trial, although the plaintiff may offer to permit the steno. grapher to testify as to what the deceased said. Barker v. Hebbard, Mich., 45 N. W. Rep. 964.

106. WITNESS-Adultery.-Under Act Pa. March 23, 1887, authorizing the wife to testify to the marriage upon a charge of adultery against the husband, an indictment for adultery will not be quashed because the wife appeared before the grand jury, as it will be presumed, in the absence of proof, that she testified only to the marriage.-Commonwealth v. Mosier, Pa., 19 Atl. Rep. 943.

ST. LOUIS, SEPTEMBER 5, 1890.

One of the recent opinions of the appellate court of Illinois is of interest, partly because the transaction in question was a gambling scheme, on the Chicago board of trade, and, therefore, under the statute, void, but principally because the party who evoked the law for his protection was a minister of the gospel. We know no reason or law why even a clergyman is not at liberty to repudiate his gambling debts, if he so chooses, but in the future, to offset this case, we shall be on the lookout for a gentleman of that profession who, being on the winning side in such a transaction, insists upon repudiation and restoration of his ill-gotten gains. The learned judge of the Illinois court, in delivering the opinion, felicitously remarks: "The very fact that the conscience of this honest clergyman pricked him as he stood on the charmed circle of the 'corn pit' and watched the conflict between the 'bull and bears,' and looked with longing eyes upon the golden calf he was about to worship is a circumstance, not without signification, as showing what the intention of the appellant was."

We give place below to a very readable communication from Mr. Sam. Kimble, of Manhattan, Kansas, who, in taking exceptions to a recent editorial, on the subject of injunction of State officers, by federal courts, in the application of the "original package" law, gives us a clear idea of the points at issue in the Kansas cases referred to. We see now that the decision of the United States judges did not go to the length reported, and that our mistake in the matter was the result of a misconception of the pleadings by the reporter. We took occasion, however, to say distinctly that the decision might be in harmony with the principal case, and that it was calculated to cause much uncertainty and embarrassment in the enforcement of State laws. And we are still of that opinion. And, furthermore, we do not believe that the VOL. 31-No. 10.

As a constant and always interested reader of the JOURNAL, I was somewhat surprised at your editorial, page 101, of the issue of August 8th, 1890. From the manner of your discussion of the cases pending before Judges Foster and Phillips at Topeka, I am fully satisfied that you are laboring under a serious misunderstanding of the whole issue brought before the United States court. Quoting from your editorial you say: "It is there declared, in effect, that imported liquors cannot be reached by the State even for purposes of investigation, and that the man who has such liquors in his possession is thereby practically exempt from any sort of local interference. That is to say, the State is forbidden to institute proceedings against a dealer in original packages for any purpose whatever; the plea that the liquors have been introduced from another State is a bar, not only to punishment under prohibitory laws, but also to action designed to ascertain if any other local law is being violated. Thus a given article of commerce is invested with a sacredness, so to speak, and the dealer in original packages may laugh to scorn all statutes that dealers in other things are required to obey." I would beg leave to state, as the attorney for the complainants in one of these many actions instituted in the United States circuit court, that the above propositions, as made by you, are so erroneous as to cause me some surprise, knowing that the CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL usually wishes to discuss legal propositions in a fair manner. My informatian on these cases leads me to know that they are somewhat alike, and the facts in the case of Geo. Hemsley, agent for Glasner & Barzen, the Kansas City importers, the one in which I filed bill of complaint, do not furnish anything to support your proposition that the suit was instituted to prevent the investigation and punishment by the State courts under any and all circumstances. After the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Leisey v. Hordin, and in full compliance with the law laid down in that decision, Glasner & Barzen, importers of intoxicating liquors at Kansas City, established an agency at Manhattan, Kansas, employing Hemsley as their manager.

Shortly after the agency began business, an application was made to the district court of the State, under section 13 of the prohibitory law of Kansas, asking for an injunction to restrain Hemsley from keeping open such agency, on the grounds that such agency was a place where intoxicating liquors were sold and was a nuisance. Upon the filing of this application, the judge of the district court granted a temporary injunction and commanded that such agency be closed. Under the provision of section 13 of the prohibitory law, such injunction is granted without any bond being filed by the applicant, and so far as the recovery of any damages are concerned, the defendant, in such case, would be wholly without remedy, whether such injunction was properly granted or not.

After this temporary injunction was granted and served, I made application, on behalf of the defendant Hemsley, to the same judge of the State district court, asking that such temporary injunction be dissolved and set aside, and a hearing was had upon such motion, in which evidence was heard, on behalf of the plaintiff and defendant, and the judge of the district court made findings of fact, in which he found from the evidence before him that Hemsley was the agent of the importers only, that he received the intoxicating liquors and sold them in the original packages only, and that at the place of business no sales were made to minors or habitual drunkards; no disorderly conduct was permitted; no drinking was allowed about the premises, and that the peace and quiet of no one was disturbed; in short, that Hemsley, as agent, was conducting an original package house strictly and conscientiously, as had ever been done under the law of the United States, and doing nothing to make such place of business a nuisance at the common law, or a nuisance in fact. Upon such state of facts, it would seem the temporary injunction should at once have been dissolved and no further interference attempted with conducting the business in such

manner.

But the courts of the State of Kansas would not do this, but undertook, under color of authority and regardless of the Supreme Court of the United States, to say, "that while we recognize the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States as the law of the land, and that the importer has the clear right, under such decision, to import and sell intoxicating liquors in the original package into the State, notwithstanding the prohibitory law, yet the place, the twelve inches of soil, the room in which such legal sale is made, by the same prohibitory law is made a nuisance and must be abated." And in accord with such holding refused to dissolve the injunction, and by virtue of keeping the original injunction in force, must be presumed to threaten "to deprive, under color of the prohibitory law of the State of Kansas, the clear right and privilege secured by the constitution of the United States," as interpreted by the supreme court to Hemsley, the agent of Glasner & Barzen, to sell intoxicating liquors in the original packages.

It would seem to me that if the 16th subdivision of the section defining jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States means anything, or was ever intended to serve any purpose, it authorizes the presentment of just such facts as surrounded Hemsley, to the consideration of the circuit court of the United States for relief; and authorized him to ask that the officers of the State court be restrained from doing and attempting to do, under color of their offices, or under color of the prohibitory law, those things that they had no legal right to do. In presenting Hemsley's case I at no time attempted to claim, but that the State could legitimately and properly prosecute him in good faith for the keeping of a nuisance in fact.

That is, if an original package agent should so conduct his place of business in a disorderly manner, or should allow crowds to assemble about the same, and permit loafers indiscriminately, or should keep the same open on Sundays, or should in any other manner conduct the place so as to be grossly scandalous to the peace and quiet of the public, or should persistently sell to minors, then such agent could and should be prosecuted for keeping a nuisance in fact, and that such place could and should be abated. And if the State had in this case been in good faith attempting to do that, no application would ever have been made to the circuit court of the United States. And it is but fair to Judge Foster to say that in deciding the application for injunction against the officers of the State court to restrain the alleged illegal acts, under color of their offices and under color of the prohibitory law, that he took occasion to say that if the State was attempting, in good faith, to prosecute the complainant for the keeping of a nuisance in fact, and was not attempting to simply harrass and annoy the complainant by depriving him of a clear legal right, the United States court would not interfere.

Upon the hearing of this application the facts stood admitted by the officers of the State court then present before Judge Foster, and admitted that Hemsley had done that only which he had a right to do if the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States was right, and rendered nugatory the effects of section 13 of the prohibitory law. You say in your article "if this power may be used in one instance it may as well be used in others, and it will be difficult to tell where federal jurisdiction ends and State jurisdiction begins." This position it seems to me to be exceedingly frivolous, and such a one as a federal court might avail itself of, in case it wanted to avoid an examination of a case properly presented to it. Subdivision 16, of the law defining jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States, reads as follows: "Sixteenth: Of all suits authorized by law to be brought by any person to redress the deprivation, under color of the law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any statute, of any right, privilege, or immunity, secured by the constitution of the United States, or of any right secured by any law providing for equal rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States." Now, in the bill of complaints filed by these parties, it is alleged that the defendants, the officers of the State court, were doing certain alleged acts, and that under color of their offices they sought to deprive the complainants of a right and privilege granted to them under the constitution of the United States. Now, if this allegation be true there is no question whatever of the jurisdiction of the federal court, because the laws of the United States have expressly commanded that jurisdiction to the federal court. If the officers of the State court should be able to show, in answer to the bill of complaint, that the

allegations are not true, I warrant you that the federal court will not attempt to exercise jurisdiction; and if the officers of the State court in the Hemsley case, to which I have referred, had made showing to Judge Foster, to the satisfaction of the court, that they were not doing and attempting to do as was alleged in the bill of complaint, I am as well satisfied that the temporary injunction made against the officers of the State court would not have been issued. The officers present before Judge Foster, failed to deny and in substance admitted the truth of the matter laid in the bill of complaint.

Where you have any reason to apprehend any conflict between the State and federal jurisdiction under such circumstances passes my understanding. The fact of the matter is, newspaper comment has gone a little wild over the legal situation, and the progress of this hearing before the United States court has not always been correctly reported. You must remember that some of the State papers, particularly the "Topeka Capital," were attempting to cast as much odium as possible upon the federal courts, intending to create the impression that the judgments and orders made by Judges Foster and Phillips were arbitrary and with a total disregard of the law. Such was not the case, and I trust that a clear understanding of the facts presented in the pleadings will cause you to understand that no serious conflict has arisen between the federal and State jurisdictions, except as it is sought to be advanced for political purposes.

I feel the above explanation is due in view of the erroneous import given out by your editorial, first referred to.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT ACTION BY FOREIGN ADMINISTRATOR.-In Ash v. Baltimore & O. Ry. Co., 19 Atl. Rep. 643, the Court of Appeals of Maryland consider the effect of statutes providing actions for death by wrongful act upon the right of a foreign administrator to sue for same. Code Maryland, art. 67, § 1, provides that an action for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another shall be brought by the wife, husband, parent, or child of the deceased, to be prosecuted in the name of the State for the use of the persons entitled. Code W. Va. p. 709, § 6, provides that "every such action shall be brought in the name of the personal representative of such deceased person." It was held that an administrator appointed in Maryland could not sue in Maryland under the West Virginia statute,

for the death of his intestate caused by negligence in West Virginia. Alvey, C. J., says:

The plaintiff was bound to show, both by pleadings and proof, that she had a right, upon the law and the facts, to maintain the action; and, as this is a special action founded exclusively upon the statute of a neighboring State, the only principle upon which it can be sustained in the courts of this State is that of comity; and if it be not sustainable upon that ground, there was clearly no error committed by the court below in withdrawing the case from the jury. There is no pretense that this action is maintainable at the common law or upon common-law principles. It is a special action given by a statute which has no inherent authority or binding force beyond the limits of the State which enacted it. We suppose it to be quite clear if, instead of founding this action upon the statute of West Virginia, it had been instituted and attempted to be maintained upon and by virtue of the statute of this State, to the provisions of which we have referred-the statutes of the two States being essentially dissimilar in their provisions-the action could not have been sustained, unless we were to attempt to give extraterritorial force to our statute, and to make it apply to acts and transactions occurring in other States; and if our statute cannot be SO extended and applied, there can be no reason why statutes of other States, not similar in provisions to our own though belonging to the same general class of legislation, should be allowed extraterritorial force and operation by the courts of this State. By the statute of West Virginia the right of action accrues to the personal representative of the deceased, the executor or administrator, and the damages, limited in amount, and hence in the nature of a penalty, are directed "to be distributed to the parties and in the proportion provided by law in relation to the distribution of personal estate left by persons dying intestate," whether such parties be wife or children or collateral relations of the deceased, whereas, by our statute the right of action is given directly to the parties who suffer damage by the death of the deceased, namely, the wife, husband, parent, or child, and which action is to be prosecuted in the name of the State for the use of the persons entitled; and the jury are required to apportion the damages assessed.

An administrator or executor appointed in this State receives his power and authority to sue and maintain actions from the laws of this State, and from this State alone. It is according to the laws this State that he must conduct his administration and make distribution. There is no statute of State, nor any principle of law known to our courts, whereby an administrator or executor is given the right to sue and recover in an action like the present, nor is there any law of distribution in force in this State that entitles the next of kin or distributees of a decendent's estate to receive the money recovered in an action like the present; and, if the present administratrix were allowed to maintain the action, it would be exclusively by virtue of a foreign law, and it would only be by force of that law that she could be compelled to account for and to make distribution of the money recovered. There is certainly no comity that requires one State to apply and administer the statute law of another in a case such as the present.

In Rorer on Interestate Law, 144, 145, upon review of the authorities, the author states his conclusion to be that in all purely personal actions, of a