217 U.S. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 66; People v. Warden, 157 N. Y. 116; 51 N. E. Rep. 1006; 2 Hare's Am. Law, 777; Cooley's Const. Lim., 6th ed., 738. The claim that this act merely prevents appellant from soliciting custom for his boarding house, and does not interfere with his right to conduct it, begs the question. The right to advertise a business and to solicit custom is essentially an incident to the right to do business. See Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, which has been approved in Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S. 129; Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 143; Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289; McCall v. California, 136 J. S. 104; Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U. S. 622; Gunn v. White Sewing Machine Co., 57 Arkansas, 24; Hurjord v. State, 91 Tennessee, 673; 20 S. W. Rep. 201; Coit v. Scott, 98 Tennessee, 258; 39 S. W. Rep. 1; Clements v. Casper, 9 Wyoming, 497; 35 Pac. Rep. 473; Overton v. State, 70 Mississippi, 559; 13 So. Rep. 227; Pegues v. Ray, 50 La. Ann. 579; 23 So. Rep. 904; McLaughlin v. South Bend, 126 Indiana, 472; 26 N. E. Rep. 185; Bloomington v. Bourland, 137 Illinois, 536; 27 N. E. Rep. 692; Toledo Com. Co. v. Glenn Mfg. Co., 55 Ohio St. 222; 45 N. E. Rep. 197; Mershon v. Pottsville Lumber Co., 187 Pa. St. 16; 40 Atl. Rep. 1018; Simons Hdw. Co. v. McGuire, 39 La. Ann. 850; 2 So. Rep. 592; State v. Agee, 83 Alabama, 112; 3 So. Rep. 856; Stratford v. Montgomery, 110 Alabama, 626; 20 So. Rep. 129; State v. Bracco, 103 N. C. 350; 9 S. E. Rep. 404; Wrought Iron Range Co. v. Johnson, 84 Georgia, 758; 11 S. E. Rep. 233; Emmons v. Lewiston, 132 Illinois, 382; 24 N. E. Rep. 58; State v. Rankin, 11 S. Dak. 148; 76 N. W. Rep. 299; Ames v. People, 25 Colorado, 511; 56 Pac. Rep. 725; Ex parte Rosenblatt, 19 Nevada, 441; 14 Pac. Rep. 298; Fort Scott v. Pelton, 39 Kansas, 766; 18 Pac. Rep. 954; State v. Hickox, 64 Kansas, 654; 68 Pac. Rep. 35; Talbutt v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. 65; 44 S. W. Rep. 1091; French v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. 224; 58 S. W. Rep. 1015; State v. Hanaphy, 117 Iowa, 18; 90 N. W. Rep. 601; Adkins v. Richmond, 98 Virginia, 101; 34 S. E. Rep. 967; Stone v. State, 117 Georgia, 296; 43 S. E. Rep. 740; Commonwealth v. VOL. CCXVII-6 Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 217 U.S. Pearl Laundry Co., 49 S. W. Rep. 28; Wagner v. Meakin, 92 Fed. Rep. 76; In re Tinsman, 95 Fed. Rep. 648; In re Kimmel, 41 Fed. Rep. 775; In re Houston, 47 Fed. Rep. 539; In re Mitchell, 62 Fed. Rep. 576; In re Hough, 69 Fed. Rep. 330; Ex parte Loeb, 72 Fed. Rep. 657; Louisiana v. Lagarde, 60 Fed. Rep. 186; Ex parte Green, 114 Fed. 959; Delamater v. South Dakota, 205 U. S. 100; People v. Armstrong, 73 Michigan, 288. The statute cannot be justified on the principle that it applies only to persons traveling upon railroads. Passengers who avail themselves of their services do not surrender their liberty as citizens; nor can the act be justified on the ground that it tends to secure the comfort of other passengers. Cooley's Const. Lim., 6th ed., 510-518. Under the common law, to solicit a person's patronage for a hotel or boarding house was not a crime, and therefore it is not within the power of the legislature to make such use of the right of free speech an offense. The act also deprives the citizen of the equal protection of the law. It applies only to the keepers of hotels, lodging, eating and bath houses, among pursuits open to all the world. It applies also to medical practitioners; but as their vocation is one which concerns the public health and which is not pursued as of right, but only by leave of the State, they are legitimately subject to police regulation, and for the purposes of this case, they may be dismissed from our consideration. Acts which single out one class of citizens and impose upon them burdens or restraints not imposed upon others, can only be justified by inherent differences. If they are merely arbitrary, they deny to the citizen the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 368. The requirement of equal laws does not exclude classification, but the classification must not be arbitrary. It must be based on reason. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 217 U.S. Argument for Defendant in Error. 150; Atchison, Topeka & Kansas R. R. v. Mathews, 174 U. S. 96; Railroad Tax Cases, 13 Fed. Rep. 733; Walley's Heirs v. Kennedy, 2 Yerger, 554; 24 Amer. Dec. 512; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U. S. 79; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 555. See also State v. Conlon, 65 Connecticut, 478; 33 Atl. Rep. 521; Millett v. People, 117 Illinois, 284; 7 N. E. Rep. 635; Ritchie v. People, 155 Illinois, 88; 40 N. E. Rep. 456; Frorer v. People, 141 Illinois, 171; 31 N. E. Rep. 397; Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Illinois, 66; 35 N. E. Rep. 63; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 236. This court has of late refused to set aside a number of state laws on the ground that they were in conflict with the equality clause; but it seems that the case now presepted shows an oppressive and inexcusable violation of the equality clause, and that the act should be held unconstitutional in so far as it applies to keepers of boarding houses. Mr. Hal. L. Norwood, Attorney General of the State of Arkansas, Mr. C. A. Cunnir ham and Mr. William F. Kirby. for defendant in error: The statute is a police regulation and clearly within the power of the State. The State has the inherent power to make all laws necessary for the protection of the health, safety, morals and comfort of its citizens and to promote the public convenience and general welfare. The rights of property and liberty even, guaranteed by the Constitution against deprivation without due process of law, are subject to such reasonable restraints under the police power as the common good or general welfare may require. It is within the province of the legislature to declare the public policy and it has broad discretion to determine what the public interests require and what measures are necessary for their protection. The purpose of the act is apparent. It was to promote the comfort of the public traveling upon railroad trains in the State, and especially of passengers journeying to Hot Springs. Argument for Defendant in Error. 217 U.S. where the halt, the lame, the sick and diseased of the earth, pain-laden, come to seek relief from their burden of suffering, in the justly world-famed healing waters, and protect them from annoyance from the insistent, harassing, persistent and continuous solicitations and importunities of the pestiferous drummer who made himself an insufferable nuisance. The act was necessary, was within the power of the lawmaking body and is a wholesome regulation. McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 546; Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11; Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 172; Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 53, 56; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436; Crowley v. Christenson, 137 U. S. 86; In re Converse, 137 U. S. 624; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Drainage Commissioners, 200 U. S. 584; Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311. See also Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190; Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361; Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527; Offield v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 203 U. S. 372; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537. Railroads are vast enterprises, great highways of commerce, public highways, that are permitted to be organized and exist for the public cor venience and benefit and are subject to such regulation as the public good may require. Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U. S. 279, 293, 296; Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co., 135 U. S 641, 651. The hotel drummer and hackman have long been regarded as belonging to that class of person whose occupation or business may be regulated for the pure good and the railroad companies themselves have the ming or soliciting for hotels bore upon their trains and depot platiorme ht to prohibit drumhe uses and hack lines St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Osborn, 67 Arkansas. 312 Indrigan v. State, 31 Arkansas, 51; Lindsay v. Annisto, 101 van v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U. S. pal Ordinances, §§ 28 Alabama, 261; Dono Quilla. on Munici74 Arkansas, 552. The act does not deny plaintiff the equal protection of the law. The State has the power of classification in legislation, and as this court has said, "may distinguish, select and classify objects of legislation, and necessarily the power must have a wide range of discretion." Magoun v. Ill. Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283; Farmers' & Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Debney, 189 U. S. 301; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557; Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311; McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 546; Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County Bank, 207 U. S. 256; New York, N. H. & H. Ry. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 268; Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U. S. 114; American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89; Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339; Mo., Kan. & Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 276. This law operates alike upon all whom it affects and equal protection is not denied where the law operates alike upon all persons similarly situated. McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 546; New York v. Van De Carr, 199 U..S. 552; Western Turf Association v. Greenburg, 204 U. S. 359; Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311; Watson v. Nervin, 128 U. S. 578; State v. Schlemmer, 42 La. Ann. 8; State v. Moore, 104 N. C. 714; Ex parte Swann, 96 Missouri, 44; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 32; Soon Hing v. Crawley, 113 U. S. 709; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68; Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26; Ky. Ry. Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321; Magoun v. Ill. Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 282. Statutes are presumed to be constitutional and it is the duty of the courts in testing their validity to resolve all doubts in favor of legislative action. Mo., Ka... & Tex. Ry. Co. v. May. 194 U. S. 267; McLean v. Arkansas, supra. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the court. Plaintiff in error was convicted for violating a statute of the State of Arkansas, entitled "An act for the protection of passengers, and for the suppression of drumming and soliciting upon railroad trains and upon the premises of common |