record that the patents, on their face, disclosed any invalidity in the title conveyed. While an examination of the records would, if the facts stated in the petition are true, show that they were improperly issued yet this could be ascertained only by looking beyond the face of the patent. Now, whether the patents were wrongfully issued or could be set aside was a matter to be settled between the State and the patentee. The State undoubtedly received something, for the acceptance of every McEnery certificate released the State pro tanto from its obligation under the contract to McEnery. Whether it should remain satisfied with that payment or not was for the State to determine. If it were not satisfied it could take proper proceedings to set aside the patent, but no individual was authorized to act for the State.

The rule in respect to the administration of the public domain of the United States is well settled. In Doolan v. Corr, 125 U. S. 618, 624, Mr. Justice Miller said:

"There is no question as to the principle that where the officers of the Government have issued a patent in due form of law, which on its face is sufficient to convey the title to the land described in it, such patent is to be treated as valid in actions at law, as distinguished from suits in equity, subject, however, at all times to the inquiry whether such officers had the lawful authority to make a conveyance of the title. But if those officers acted without authority; if the land which they purported to convey had never been within their control, or had been withdrawn from that control at the time they undertook to exercise such authority, then their act was void-void for want of power in them to act on the subjectmatter of the patent, not merely voidable; in which latter case, if the circumstances justified such a decree, a direct proceeding with proper averments and evidence, would be required to establish that it was voidable, and should therefore be avoided."

In Hastings &c. Railroad Company v. Whitney, 132 U. S. 357, 363, Mr. Justice Lamar, who had been Secretary of the

Interior, discussed the question of a homestead entry, and, after referring to Kansas Pacific Railway Co. v. Dunmeyer, 113 U. S. 629, added:

"Counsel for plaintiff in error contends that the case just cited has no application to the one we are now considering, the difference being that in that case the entry existing at the time of the location of the road was an entry valid in all respects, while the entry in this case was invalid on its face, and in its inception; and that this entry having been made by an agent of the applicant, and based upon an affidavit, which failed to show the settlement and improvement required by law, was, on its face, not such a proceeding in the proper land office, as could attach even an inchoate right to the land.

"We do not think this contention can be maintained. Under the homestead law three things are needed to be done in order to constitute an entry on public lands. . If either one of these integral parts of an entry is defective, that is, if the affidavit be insufficient in its showing, or if the application itself is informal, or if the payment is not made in actual cash, the register and receiver are justified in rejecting the application. But if, notwithstanding these defects, the application is allowed by the land officers, and a certificate of entry is delivered to the applicant, and the entry is made of record, such entry may be afterwards canceled on account of these defects by the Commissioner, or on appeal by the Secretary of the Interior; or, as is often the practice, the entry may be suspended, a hearing ordered, and the party notified to show by supplemental proof a full compliance with the requirements of the department; and on failure to do so the entry may then be canceled. But these defects, whether they be of form or substance, by no means render the entry absolutely a nullity. So long as it remains a subsisting entry of record, whose legality has been passed upon by the land authorities, and their action remains unreversed, it is such an appropriation of the tract as segregates it from the public domain, and therefore precludes it from subsequent grants."

In In re Emblen, 161 U. S. 52, 56, Mr. Justice Gray thus stated the law:

"After the patent has once been issued, the original contest is no longer within the jurisdiction of the land department. The patent conveys the legal title to the patentee; and cannot be revoked or set aside, except upon judicial proceedings instituted in behalf of the United States. The only remedy of Emblen is by bill in equity to charge Weed with a trust in his favor. All this is clearly settled by previous decisions of this court, including some of those on which the petitioner most relies. Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72; Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530; Marquez v. Frisbie, 101 U. S. 473; Smelting Company v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636; Steel v. Smelting Company, 106 U. S. 447; Monroe Cattle Company v. Becker, 147 U. S. 47; Turner v. Sawyer, 150 U. S. 578, 586."

See also McMichael v. Murphy, 197 U. S. 304, 311.

Obviously, in this case the Supreme Court of Louisiana followed the practice obtaining in respect to the public lands of the United States. But if it had not and had declared simply the law of the State of Louisiana its decision would, doubtless, be controlling on this court, for, in the matter of the sale and conveyance of lands belonging to the public no one State is obliged to follow the legislation or decisions of another State, or even those of the United States, but may administer its public lands in any way that it sees fit, so long as it does not conflict with rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.

Counsel criticize the opinion of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in that it speaks of all the lands as having gone to patent while it is said in the petition that some of the assignees "stood upon the certificates." Whether the language of the petition technically justifies the construction placed upon it by the Supreme Court of the State, is immaterial. Certainly, there is no naming of any single tract as covered by certificate alone and not patented, and if any tract was held under a certificate of location it was, within the scope of the rul

ing of the Supreme Court, not subject to other entry or purchase.

We see no error in the ruling of the Supreme Court, and its judgment is

WILLIAMS v. STATE OF ARKANSAS.

Affirmed.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS.

No. 138. Submitted March 11, 1910.-Decided April 4, 1910.

State legislation which in carrying out a public purpose is limited in its application, is not a denial of equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27.

When a state legislature has declared that, in its opinion, the policy of the State requires a certain measure, its action should not be disturbed by the courts under the Fourteenth Amendment, unless they can clearly see that there is no reason why the law should not be extended to classes left untouched. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267.

A classification in a state statute prohibiting drumming or soliciting on trains for business for any "hotels, lodging houses, eating houses, bath houses, physicians, masseurs, surgeon or other medical practitioner" will not be held by this court to be unreasonable and amounting to denial of equal protection of the laws, after it has been sustained by the state court as meeting an existing condition which was required to be met; and so held that the anti-drumming or soliciting law of Arkansas of 1907 is not unconstitutional because it relates to the above classes alone and does not prohibit drumming and soliciting for other purposes.

85 Arkansas, 470, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the constitutionality of the antidrumming law of Arkansas of 1907, are stated in the opinion.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

217 U.S.

Mr. George B. Rose, with whom Mr. U. M. Rose, Mr. W. E. Hemingway, Mr. D. H. Cantrell and Mr. J. P. Loughborough were on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

The act is unconstitutional as it deprives appellant of the liberty and the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

It is an unlawful restriction upon the liberty of the citizen. The guaranty of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, secures to the citizen the right to pursue any calling not injurious to the public and to protect him against all interference with his business not in the lawful exercise of the police power. The police power is limited to those things essential to the safety, health, comfort and morals of the community, and any enactment seeking to restrict the liberty of a citizen in matters not falling within the scope of the police power as thus defined, is unconstitutional and void.

The occupation of drumming or soliciting for legitimate forms of business is not merely a lawful, but a most important, calling. In this particular instance, the appellant is earning his livelihood by drumming and soliciting for his own boarding house.

This is not a case of an occupation tax. The drummers are not taxed; they are forbidden altogether to exercise their callings. As to the right to pursue any lawful business, see Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 757; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 137; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 589; Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 57. The principles announced by this court have frequently been applied by the state courts. See Bassett v. People, 193 Illinois, 334; 62 N. E. Rep. 219, 220; Bailey v. People, 190 Illinois, 28; People v. Gillison, 98 N. Y. 108; 17 N. E. Rep. 343; Ritchie v. People, 155 Illinois, 88; 40 N. E. Rep. 454; Ex parte Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 105; Ex parte Whitewell, 98 California, 73; 32 Pac. Rep. 872; People v. Beattie, 89 N. Y. Supp. 193; State v. Peel Splint Coal Co., 30 W. Va. 856; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179; Bracewell v. People, 147 Illinois,