17. Raising Federal question; timeliness of.
An attempt to raise a Federal question in this court for the first time
is too late. Rogers v. Clark Iron Co., 589.
18. Scope of review in determining constitutionality of state statute.
Where the penalty provisions of a statute are clearly separable, as in
this case, and are not invoked, this court is not called upon to de-
termine whether the penalties are so excessive as to amount to
deprivation of property without due process of law and thus
render the statute unconstitutional in that respect. Grenada
Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 433.
19. Considerations in determining constitutionality of state statute.
In determining the constitutionality of a state statute this court con-
siders only so much thereof as is assailed, construed and applied
in the particular case. Ib.
20. Considerations in determining validity of state statute.
In determining the validity of a state statute, this court is concerned
only with its constitutionality; it does not comiler any question
of its expediency. Ib.
21. Scope of review in determining constitutionality of state statute.
This court will not consider whether a state statute is unconstitutional
under provisions of the Constitution other than those set up in
the state court even if those provisions be referred to in the assign-
ment of error. Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 114.
22. Scope of review on writ of error. Effect of decision of state court as to
constitutional validity of state statute.
On writ of error this court is not concerned with the question of
whether the statute attacked as unconstitutional under the Four-
teenth Amendment violates the state constitution if the state
courts have held that it does not do so. Ib.
23. Scope of review where state statute attacked on ground of excessive
penalties which are not asked for by the State.
Whether the severity of penalties for non-compliance with a state
statute renders it unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment will not be considered in an action in which the State does
not ask for any penalties. Ib.
24. Scope of review; assumption of good faith of State in enacting taxing
laws.
This court will not speculate as to the motive of a State in adopting
taxing laws, but assumes-the statute neither upon its face nor
by necessary operation suggesting a contrary assumption-that
it was adopted in good faith. Ib.
25. Scope of review; discredited contentions not overlooked.
A court does not overlook contentions advanced which arc necessarily
untrue if the proposition upon which its decision rests is true.
The statement of such proposition answers opposing contentions.
Chicago, St. P., Minn. & O. Ry. Co. v. United States, 180.
26. Scope of review; reasonableness of award in condemnation proceedings
not determinable.
Where the evidence in a condemnation proceeding is not before this
court and there is no agreed statement of facts this court cannot
determine that the trial court erred in holding the award of the
jury made on viewing the premises and expert evidence not so
unreasonable or unjust as to require a new trial before another
jury. Columbia Heights Realty Co. v. Rudolph, 547.
27. Mandate; direction of, where certiorari to Circuit Court of Appeals
granted on ground of failure of that court to consider case.
Although ordinarily the mandate of this court in cases coming to it
on certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals goes directly to the
Circuit Court, where certiorari is granted, solely on the ground
that the Circuit Court of Appeals has failed to consider the case,
the judgment will be reversed and the case remanded to that court
with instructions to hear and decide it. Lutcher & Moore Lumber
Co. v. Knight, 257.
See APPEAL AND ERROR, 1;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 21;
PLEADING.
PREFERENCES.
See LOCAL LAW (PORTO RICO, 4).
PRESCRIPTION.
See STATES, 8, 9.
See CONDEMNATION OF LAND, 5;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 24;
STATES, 8.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.
See JUDGMENTS AND DECREES, 1, 2, 3.
PROCESS.
See JURISDICTION, H;
MANDAMUS;
WRIT AND PROCESS.
PROPERTY RIGHTS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 36;
FORGED INSTRUMENTS, 1.
1. State patents; setting aside.
Whether a patent is wrongfully issued or can be set aside is a matter to
be settled between the State and the patentee, but no individual is
authorized to act for the State. Frellsen & Co. v. Crandell, 71.
2. State patents; effect of tender of statutory price to create contract under
Federal Constitution.
Even if the State could set aside a patent for having been issued on
illegal or inadequate consideration the matter is between it and
the patentee; and, until set aside, one tendering the statutory
price does not thereby become entitled to receive such land from
the State, nor does the tender create a contract with the State
within the protection of the contract clause of the Federal Con-
stitution. Ib.
3. State patents; when land subject to reentry or purchase.
Where the state court so holds, public land of a State, as is the case
of public land of the United States, held under patent or certifi-
cate of location, is not, until such patent or certificate be set
aside at the instance of the State, subject to other entry or pur-
chase. Ib.
4. State lands; power of State in administering.
In the matter of sale and conveyance each State may administer its
public lands as it sees fit so long as it does not conflict with rights
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution; nor is any State obliged
to follow the legislation or decisions of the Federal Government
or of any other State. Ib.
1. Accountability as agent.
A public official may not retain any profit or advantage realized
through an interest in conflict with his fidelity as an agent.
United States v. Carter, 286.
2. Right of United States to recover profits wrongfully received by officer.
Where an officer of the United States secretly receives a part of the
profits gained by others in the execution of contracts with the
Government over which he has control, the United States is en-
titled to a decree in equity for the amount so received; and this,
even if the Government cannot prove fraud or abuse of discre-
tion on the part of such officer or that it has suffered actual loss.
Ib.
3. Fraud; evidence to establish.
In determining whether an officer of the Government has been guilty
of fraud in connection with contracts under his control, abnormal
profits arouse suspicion and demand clear explanation. Ib.
4. Liability to account for unlawful profits; effect of intervention of third
party.
The receipt in any manner as a gratuity or otherwise by an officer of
the United States of a share of profits on government contracts
under his control through a third party is the same, as to his lia-
bility to account therefor, as though he received such share direct
from the contractor. Ib..
5. Recovery of unlawful profits received by-Extent of right of recovery by
United States-What property subject to.
When an officer of the United States has received a share of profits
from contracts under his control the Government is not limited,
in a suit to recover the same and in which it has impounded
securities, to the traced securities; the officer must account for all
his gains and, under a prayer for other and general relief, the
Government is entitled to a judgment for money had and received
to its use, and may enforce it against any property of the defend-
ant including property in the hands of third parties with notice
of how it was obtained.
PUBLIC SAFETY.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 2.
PUBLIC WRONGS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7.
PUNISHMENTS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 10-13;
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISH-
MENTS;
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS;
PENALTIES AND FORFEIT-
URES.
Ouster; judgment of affirmed.
A judgment of ouster rendered in quo warranto proceeding, 241 Illinois,
155, affirmed without opinion. Shedd v. Illinois ex rel. Healy, 597.
Terminal facilities; construction of decree granting to one company use
and benefit of right of way of another company.
Where a decree gives to another company the equal use and benefit
of the right of way of a railroad company in a terminal city on a
basis of compensation and apportionment of expenses, with pro-
vision for modification in case of unexpected changes, it will be
construed as applying to the terminal facilities and the connec-
tions with industrial establishments as the same naturally in-
crease in a growing city, and not to the mere right of way as it
existed when the decree was entered, and the court has power to
provide for the use of such increased facilities on a proportionately
increased rental based on the increased valuation. St. Louis,
K. C. & C. R. R. Co. v. Wabash R. R. Co., 247.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, INTERSTATE COMMERCE;
|